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Note from the FHQ Editors
by Connie L. Lester and Daniel Murphree
he publication of the 2012 Symposium celebrating the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United States District Court
of the Middle District of Florida has been a two-year
project. Attorneys Richard S. Dellinger and T. Michael Woods
first approached the University of Central Florida Department of
History for assistance in organizing the symposium in 2011. In the
course of discussions on the format of the symposium, the idea
of publishing the papers as a special issue of the Florida Historical
Quarterly emerged.
The publication of the papers represents a new chapter in the
history of the Quarterly. It has been an intellectual and editorial
challenge, but one that we believe is enormously rewarding for the
readers of the FHQ Publishing legal comments is unlike historical
publication and readers will notice an immediate difference in the
presentation and footnote styles. The second difference can be seen
in the format. Typical issues of the Quarterly contain three or four
articles which, on occasion, are thematically organized. This issue
includes the work of twenty-six authors, not counting the "Note" by
the FHQ editors. The text is organized around the significant cases
heard before the Middle District Court: Segregation/ Integration
Cases, Civil Cases, and Criminal Cases. Each section begins with an
introduction by a judge or judges who reminisce about the cases
and outline their significance. Attorneys and law students provide
case comments on individual cases that came before the court.
As we worked through the papers, Dr. Murphree and I came to
appreciate the intellectual depth of the Federal Court system. The
comments guided us through the issues that come before the court

T

[177]
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and demonstrated the organic nature of the federal government.
Textbooks emphasize the separation of powers, but the case
.comments demonstrate the ways in which the legislative and
judicial branches inform one another: conflicts that are decided
in the courts can become the subjects of new or clarifying law and
vice versa. We believe that this issue of the Florida Historical Quarterly
will contribute to new scholarship on Civil Rights, social history,
political history and the history of law in Florida. It has been a
pleasure to work with the Historical Society of the U .S. District
Court of the Middle District of Florida on this important project
in Florida history.
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Fifty Years of Central Florida History Through
the Lens of the Federal Courts
by Richard S. Dellinger and Jon M. Philipson
ifty years ago, Central Florida schools were segregated by
race; population was beginning to swell; development was
beginning; airports were not used for significant travel;
Disney, Universal and Sea World had not yet arrived; and the Space
Race had just started. Central Florida has seen much change over
the past fifty years. And, all throughout those fifty years, our courts
have been a witness to the changes in Central Florida.
Due to great population growth, on October 30, 1962, the
Middle District of Florida was born after being carved out of part of
the Northern District of Florida and part of the Southern District
of Florida. Three Judges were selected from the Southern District
and three Judges were selected from the Northern District to sit
in Courthouses across Central Florida. Those judges heard and
decided federal cases. And those legal disputes provide an in
depth perspective into the past fifty years in Central Florida.
This special addition of the Florida Historial Quarterly reviews
the cases and issues that the Courts in the Middle District of Florida
have grappled with over the past 50 years. As you read about the

F

Richard S. Dellinger is the Vice President for the 11 lh Circuit, Chair of the Vice
Presidents, and an ex officio member of the national Board of Directors with the
Federal Bar Association. Mr. Dellinger is a partner with Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster,
Kantor and Reed, P.A. in Orlando, Florida.
Jon M. Philipson is the former Editor and Chief of the Florida Law Review and former
law clerk to ChiefJudge Anne C. Conwa
y. Mr. Philipson is an associate attorney with
Carlton Fields, P.A. in Tampa, Florida.

[179]
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cases, think about the people involved, think about the stories
involved and think about how those cases make up the story of
.Central Florida's history. The stories contained in this edition are
stories that were known by a few judges, lawyers, and litigants, but
not preserved for the general public-until now. We hope that by
bringing you an analysis of these cases, we do our part to preserve
the last five decades of Central Florida history.
This edition is divided into sections for civil cases and criminal
cases. Within the civil cases, you will read about segregation and
integration, prison overcrowding, admiralty cases, employment
cases, and intellectual property cases. And, within the criminal
cases, you will read about terrorism, espionage, organized crime,
fraud, drug policies and federalism.
Today, many take for granted the integration of our public
schools. Fifty years ago, Florida's public schools were not integrated
as the school districts felt that "separate but equal" schools were
legally and morally permissible. The case Brown v. Board ofEducation
changed that, when the United States Supreme Court required
that all schools be integrated "with all deliberate speed."
In Central Florida, the Federal Courts oversaw the school
boards' plans for integration. In this edition you will read the
remarks from Senior United States District Judge William Terrell
Hodges, a Federal Judge who oversaw segregation and integration
of school districts all throughout his lengthy career. You will read
about a case where Governor Claude Kirk attempted to take over
the school board in Bradenton in order to halt the integration
efforts. Governor Kirk's coup of the school board and his attempt
to stop the busing related to integration resulted in U.S. Marshalls
being dispatched from the Federal Court to ensure compliance
with the desegregation plan.
And, although the desegregation of schools in Florida was
largely non-violent, you will read about an African-American
student, Donal Godfrey, whose house was bombed after he joined
an integrated school inJacksonville, Florida.
In this edition, you will read about the problems with prison
overcrowding in Central Florida and how the federal courts
addressed those problems. You will hear from Senior Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Susan Black who oversaw some of
those cases as a District Judge. And you will hear from a litigant,
Bill Shepard, who worked as an attorney on those cases. You will
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hear how Central Florida's overcrowded prisons were addressed
through the oversight of the federal courts.
And in this edition you will read about cases associated with
Florida's waterways. You will read about the Skyway Bridge collapse
in Tampa and the litigation that ensued. And you will read about
the Jacksonville shipyards. You will read about the case of Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards where women fought to remove pervasive
pornography from the shipyards when they joined the workforce
on the docks.
And you will read about intellectual property disputes that
have been decided by the Federal Courts. You will read about Tyne
v Time Warner where a former crew member of the Andrea Gail sued
to obtain royalties from the movie The Perfect Storm. And you will
read about Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, an early case dealing with
online subscription services being used to distribute copyrighted
materials without the consent of the copyright holder. And, you will
read about commerce clause challenges to textbook regulations in
American Yearbook Company v. Askew.
And you will read about significant criminal cases decided by
the Courts in the Middle District. You will read about the case of
Santo Trafficante,Jr., a mob boss who was prosecuted as part of the
Donnie Brasco investigation. You will hear about the prosecution
of Carlos Enrique Lehnder Rivas, a well-known cocaine trafficker
believed to be the highest ranking member of the Medellin Cartel
prosecuted before Manuel Noriega. You will read about a $450
million ponzi scheme perpetrated by Sholam Weiss through the
National Heritage Life Insurance Company. And, you will read
about the case of Colonel George Trofimoff, a high ranking military
figure prosecuted in the Middle District for spying for the KGB.
And, you will read about the case of Sammy Al-Arian, a professor
who was prosecuted after September 11, 2011 and charged with
providing funds for Islamic Jihad.
And, in the criminal section, you will read about challenges
facing the courts. You will read about the decline of federalism
and the expanding role of the Federal Courts in the criminal arena
from Professor Robert Batey of Stetson University. And, you will
read about the prosecution of defendants by prosecutors who
were withholding evidence. And, you will read about a recent
case overturning laws that eliminated the criminal mind (mens rea)
element for drug crimes.
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As you read these stories, you will see that the story of this Court
is really a story of the people of Central Florida. The creation of
_the Court is a direct result of population growth and expansion.
And the cases heard by this Court reflect the major political
events of the times, whether that be segregation and integration,
prison overcrowding, natural disasters such as the collapse of the
Skyway Bridge, criminal drug trafficking and the war on drugs,
terrorism, spying or the evolving technology disputes associated
with intellectual property. The cases heard by the Courts tell the
story of Central Florida over the past fifty years. The true stories
discussed in this edition tell the real story of Florida. And in
Florida, reality is much more interesting than fiction .
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Creating the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida
by J ames M. Denham
he creation of the Middle District was tied up in fundamental
changes that, in the mid- l 950s, were working social,
cultural, political, and all manner of other revolutions in
the Sunshine State. The Middle District was carved out of the
Southern District of Florida, a huge district that spanned the entire
peninsula from the Georgia border to the Florida Keys. The new
district resembled a cross ways slash of territory running from the
Georgia border as far south as Brevard County before it swung west
and south all the way down the peninsula to the southern boundary
of Lee County. After 1962 the Southern District included Florida's
high density population centers of the Gold Coast to the Keys. The
new Middle District contained thirty-three counties and the new
Southern District contained twelve. 1
The Middle District of Florida was the first federal district
created by Congress since 1928, and Florida's burgeoning
population growth caused the move. As early as 1953 a federal

T

James M. Denham is a Professor of History and Director of the Lawton M. Chiles
Jr. , Center for Florida History at Florida Southern College in Lakeland. He is the
author of A Rogue's Paradise: Crime and Punishment in A n tebellum Florida, 1821-1861
(University of Alabama Press, 2005). His narrative history of the U.S. District Court
of the Middle District of Florida is forthcoming from the University Press of Florida.
Kermit L. Hall and Eric Rise, From Local Courts to National Tribunals, (Brooklyn,
1
NY: Carlson, 1991) , 111-12; 28 U.S.C., United
States
2008
Code,
Edition , Title
28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, PART I - ORGANIZATION
OF COURTS, CHAPTER 5 - DISTRICT COURTS, Sec. 89 - Florida http: / I
www.gpo.govI fdsys/ pkg/ USCO D E-2008-title28 / h tml/USCO D E-2008-ti tle28partl-chap5-sec89 .htm (accessedJune 20, 2013).
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grand jury for the Southern District of Florida had called for a new
district to ease the overwhelming caseload. 2 By 1960 the Southern
l)istrict's case load had reached crisis levels. As one source noted
the previous year, the district had the largest number of criminal
cases filed per judge of all the federal districts in the nation. Only
the Southern District of New York exceeded the Southern District
of Florida in the number of civil cases filed per judge. The district
contained only five judges who heard an average of 526 cases each.
The national average was 219. 3
Population in the Southern District grew faster than any area
in the country. With slightly less than three million inhabitants
in 1950 to nearly five million in 1960, Florida could claim the
highest population growth rate of any state. Most of the growth
was centered in Dade, Broward, Hillsborough, Pinellas, Orange,
and Duval counties. Miami jumped to capture the honor as the
state's largest city by 1950, with a quarter million inhabitants. By
mid-decade that figure had tripled. Formerly tiny communities
emerged as thriving cities, among them Fort Lauderdale, Miami
Beach, Orlando, West Palm Beach, St. Petersburg, and Daytona
Beach.
Florida's rapid growth during the Eisenhower Years ( 19521960) stemmed from many causes. World War II veterans who
had received training in the Sunshine State returned to pursue the
"Florida" lifestyle they had experienced. The GI Bill opened up
educational opportunities at the rapidly expanding University of
Florida and newly transformed Florida State University. FHA loans
spurred housing developments and infused millions of dollars into
the Florida economy. Mosquito control and air-conditioning made
Florida's torrid heat livable for newcomers and retirees seeking
respite from snow and icy winters in the North. Tourism boosted
Florida's economy. Low taxes and other inducements also drew
military contractors such as Martin Marietta to the Sunshine State.
In 1959 Cuba's Revolution sent thousands of refugees to Florida,
mostly Miami. The influx of Cubans into Florida was closely related
to the Cold War and the Eisenhower years saw a continuation and
expansion of army and air bases in Florida, such as those in Tampa,
Orlando, and Jacksonville. Military expenditures and the good
2
3

Hall and Rise, 111-12.
John Crews, "The Hands are Busy But So is the Mind," Daytona Beach Morning
Journal, December 27, 1960.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

16

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

CREATING THE MIDDLE DISTRICT COURT

185

salaries that came with them boosted Florida's economy. Criminal
or civil disputes occurring on these federal military bases would be
adjudicated in the federal courts.
Florida's growth also benefitted from the Space Race. In 1958
at Cape Canaveral, one year after the successful launching of the
Soviet rocket Sputnik, America's first earth satellite, Explorer I
was launched. Within three years, answering President John F.
Kennedy's call for sending a man to the moon, Congress authorized
the massive expansion of the Cape Canaveral site. Nearly 140,000
acres were eventually acquired for the site. The federal acquisition
of land from private property owners for the new space center
proved a windfall for some. Yet there were numerous disputes
regarding the value of the land. And these disputes would be
settled in federal court.
Most trials in the Southern District of Florida took place in
Jacksonville, Tampa and Miami. Some cases were also heard in
Fort Myers and Orlando. Most of the actions in the latter two
locations involved processing work done by U. S. commissioners
(the precursor of modern day U. S. magistrate judges) who
essentially performed a 'justice of the peace" type federal function.
According to Paul Game, who was appointed commissioner in
Tampa in 1962, U.S. Commissioners could issue warrants, set bail,
hold probable cause hearings, and perform other mundane tasks.
They were usually part-time positions, had no salary, and were paid
on a fee basis for what they did. 4 George T. Swartz performed
similar duties in Fort Myers in the 1960s.
Tampa first heard federal cases in 1879. After 1905, trials were
held in Tampa's large four-story federal building whose primary
function was a post office. When the building opened in 1904 it was
celebrated as the "finest public building south of Washington D.
C." The court shared the third floor with the district attorney and
the U.S. Weather Service. Ocala (1900), Fernandina (beginning
in 1905), and Miami (beginning in 1906) held district courts. By
1931 Miami had a huge federal building which housed the court
and other federal agencies. In 1933 the first federal court was
held in Orlando. By 1941 the town had a new federal building
to accommodate trials. A session of federal court was added in

4

Paul Game, interview transcript, June 27, 2007, 13, Samuel Proctor Oral
History Program, University of Florida (hereinafter SPOHP).
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Fort Pierce in 1935. 5 In 1949 Congress created a "roving judge"
position and that official held court in selected locations in both
the Northern and the Southern districts. In 1952 sessions of the
federal court in the Southern District were established in West Palm
Beach and Fort Myers. Built of coquina rock in 1933, the federal
building in Fort Myers had one courtroom. As George T. Swartz
recalled it was "beautiful ... all mahogany and inlayed wood-it
was gorgeous. "6
In the years immediately preceding the Middle District's
creation Judges William Barker, George Whitehurst, Bryan
Simpson and Joseph P. Lieb held appointments to the Southern
District of Florida. William]. Barker was born on June 25, 1886
in Marietta, Georgia, but his family relocated to Tallahassee where
Barker attended high school at West Florida Seminary, a precursor
to Florida State University. After a brief career in business in
Jacksonville, Barker pursued legal studies at the University of
Florida and one of his classmates was future governor and senator,
Spessard Holland. Returning to Jacksonville, Barker practiced in a
large firm and served as assistant city attorney and city councilman
from 1916-1925. He served as a circuitjudge from 1925 to 1939
when President Franklin Roosevelt appointed him district judge of
the U.S. Southern District of Florida.
George W. Whitehurst was appointed district judge in 1950 by
President Harry Truman. Whitehurst was born in Zolfo Springs,
Florida, on May 18, 1891. He attended Stetson University and after
one year of legal studies at the University of Florida, passed the
bar exam. Practicing law in Wauchula, Florida, from 1915-1916,
Whitehurst became a DeSoto County Judge and in 1919 he became
judge in the Twelfth Circuit, serving until 1947. Whitehurst retired
from the federal bench in 1962, but like Barker, he continued
to fill in as needs arose, especially in Fort Myers and Tampa. An
avid outdoorsman, Whitehurst had a famous hunting camp in Lee
County where he entertained friends, including Judge Barker. He
maintained a close relationship with communities in southwest
Florida and Fort Myers. George T. Swartz recalled "every once in
the while he would come down just to keep the place active and
hold a series of cases down there, and that was as a senior judge."
One lawyer who practiced before Judge Whitehurst recalled that
5
6

Hall and Rise, 64, 79, 91, 149-50.
George T. Swartz, interview transcript, January 17, 2007 16, (SPOHP).
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he was "stem" and "was a very keen observer... [HJ e used to talk to
you with his eyes. He would penetrate his eyes into a lawyer trying
to figure out, 'Is this lawyer telling me the truth, is he telling me
half-truths, how much of what he's telling me can I believe, can I
rely on?' We always had a high opinion of the old man who was
tough." Another impressive trait that the lawyer remembered was
Judge Whitehurst's ability to make instructions to the jury from
memory and completely without notes. We did not have what we
now call standard jury instructions . . . . These old-timers did not
have that and they had memorized, committed to memory, the law
that they were going to give the juries. And we were always in awe
how these Old Men were able to quickly recite and tell the jury what
is reasonable doubt and how to define circumstantial evidence ...
and the law of accomplice and the law of a co-conspirator and it
would just flow naturally, and that is not found today." 7
Another lawyer who practiced before Judge Whitehurst
remembered him as a "wonderful gentleman" and a "big man
physically, very fit, huge hands, an avid outdoorsman .... He did
have one idiosyncrasy I remember," the lawyer noted. "He would
listen to your argument and with his huge hand he would point
his index finger toward the ceiling at the end of the argument
and begin to sum up the pros and cons of what he had heard ....
Thinking out loud with his finger up like this, pointing toward the
ceiling about shoulder height. Then his finger would start arching
down toward the top of the table. Whatever he was saying at the
moment would be it because once that finger reached the top of
the table. Lord help the lawyer that wanted to interrupt him or
begin to argue with him at that point, because he had decided.
But in the instant before that finger touched the table," the lawyer
continued, "if you didn't like what he was saying, if you interrupted
him, got his attention somehow and suggested to him that you
weren't sure that you had made the argument the best way you
could and stated it again, you might get that finger to come back,

7

Hall and Rise, 173-74; Swartz, 16; John T. Carlton, "Pepper Stalling Judicial
Appointment," Miami News, August 5, 1950; Morison Buck, "George
W. Whitehurst: Panoramic Jurist Extraordinaire, 1891-1974." (1998).
Digi,tal CoUection - FWrida Studies Center Publications, Paper 2501.
http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/ flstud_pub/ 2501 (accessed June 20, 2013); E. J.
Salcines, interview transcript, July 26, 2010, Lawton Chiles Center for Florida
History Oral History Program, Florida Southern College, 8-9 (Hereinafter
LCCFH).

Published by STARS, 2013

19

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

188

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

which I saw happen once or twice. But once that finger hit the
table it was done, it was over." 8
Two other Southern District judges who would eventually join
the Middle District of Florida were Bryan Simpson and Joseph P.
Lieb. John Milton Bryan Simpson was born in Kissimmee, Florida,
on May 30, 1903. He was the son of Arthur Allen Simpson and Mary
Elizabeth Bryan. Simpson's father was the principal of Osceola
County High School. Simpson had two distinguished uncles on
his mother's side: Nathan P. and William Bryan. Nathan P. served
as a U.S. Senator and a federal judge. William also served in the
U.S. Senate.
Bryan Simpson graduated from the University of Florida in 1926.
One person described him as a "rangy young man" of twenty-three
"who came to the big city [of Jacksonville] fresh from Florida's
cow country to practice law." He was a man "equipped not only
to bulldoze a legal opponent," the man continued, "but it is
reported he ... could play a credible game of poker." He worked
in the Jacksonville law firm of Cooper, Knight, Adair, Cooper, and
Osborne. From 1933 to 1937, he served as assistant state attorney
for the Fourth Judicial Circuit which at that time was composed of
Duval, Clay, and Nassau Counties. After returning briefly to private
practice, he served as judge of the Duval County Criminal Court
beginning in 1939. In 1943 Bryan Simpson entered the United
States Army, serving in Europe during World War II. After the war
he served briefly as a Duval Circuit Judge until his appointment to
the federal bench by President Harry Truman in 1950. 9 Upon his
appointment in 1950, a newspaper asserted that Judge Simpson's
"conduct, demeanor, ability and competence on the bench ... have
won him the highest esteem within the ranks of his profession. "10
Nicknamed "Cowboy" because of his roots in Osceola County,
Judge Simpson was an impressive figure in the courtroom. In
1960, he was fifty-seven years old and stood nearly six foot two and
his bronze complexion was set off by a thatch of white hair. John

8
9

10
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Judge Bryan Simpson on the occasion of his swearing in, October 6, 1950. (1. tor.):
William Barker, George Whitehurst, Louis Strum, Bryan Simpson, Dozier DeVane.
(Hodges Collection, U.S. Middle District Court of Florida Archives, Orlando,
Florida).

Crews, a frequent observer of Simpson's courtroom demeanor,
noted that when he "stands to his full height on the raised bench,
any attorney who draws his wrath is bound to feel mighty small
below him. "11
Another Southern District judge who eventually served on
the Middle District Court of Florida was Joseph Patrick Lieb, born
on September 4, 1901, in Faribault, Minnesota. Lieb received
scholarships to play football at St. Thomas College in St. Paul,
and later, Georgetown University. Receiving his law degree from
Georgetown in 1924, Lieb worked as a junior attorney in the War
Fraud Section of the Department of Justice. He later worked for
the FBI as a special agent and eventually became Director of the
Fingerprint or Identification Section of the FBI. Lieb eventually
settled in Florida, practicing first in Tampa before his appointment

11
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as assistant U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida.
Handling cases in Miami until 1934, Lieb resigned and entered
private practice in Tampa until 1955, when President Dwight
Eisenhower appointed him to the Federal District Court in Miami.
Lieb became known to Eisenhower in a number of ways. For one, he
was a well-respected Republican in a state dominated by Democrats.
Lieb's brother John had been a classmate of Eisenhower's at West
Point. Also, Lieb's wife, Helen Bowman Lieb, was active in state
and national Republican politics for years. In 1961, after sitting on
the bench in Miami for five years, Lieb was transferred to Tampa to
fill the vacancy left by retiringJudge George Whitehurst. 12
Judge Lieb was known for his calm, easy going demeanor in
the courtroom. According to one lawyer who practiced before him
in the early 1960s, he was a "perfect gentleman in the courtroom,
always welcoming you. When two lawyers would get a bit loud," the
lawyer continued, "he would try to calm them down, and if not,
he would say, 'Look, Mr. Marshal, the court is going to take a brief
recess.' And then he would look at the lawyers and say, 'Gentleman,
why don't you join me in my chambers for a cup of coffee?' Well,
when he got us in the chambers, he would quickly tell us, 'Look, I
know that you're fighting for your case and so forth, but you need
to settle down, you need to calm down, you're beginning to get out
of hand.' And that's how he controlled his courtroom in a very
nice manner. The public never knew it because he had that civility,
natural civility." 13
U. S. Magistrate Judge Thomas Wilson who clerked for Lieb
from 1964-1965 after finishing Duke Law School, and then practiced
before the judge as assistant U. S. attorney, agreed with the previous
assessment. Wilson also observed that the judge still bore scars
from the football field as he looked like he had his nose broken
a few times. But his courtroom temperament was superb. "He
had extraordinary patience," Wilson remembered. "He used the
golden rule with lawyers. He had a great sense of humor. He was an

12

13
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Joseph P. Lieb joined the court in 1955 and served until his death in 1971. Image
courtesy of the University of South Florida Library, Tampa, Florida.

outstanding trial judge-not a legal scholar-[but he] applied the
law with great common sense. "14 A lawyer who practiced before him
in the early 1960s remembered Lieb as a "gentleman's gentleman.
I never knew him to be discourteous to anybody. He was not an
14
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active participant from the bench, he didn't ask a lot of questions
or interrogate witnesses but he would listen and make his ruling
or take it under submission and that was that." 15 Lieb was also a
devout Catholic. Nearly every day he attended Mass at Sacred Heart
Catholic Church next to the Tampa courthouse.
One of Judge Lieb's clerks in Miami was Alexander Paskey,
a Hungarian war refugee. Born in Mohacs, Hungary in 1922,
the son of a prominent attorney, Paskay attended "humanistic"
gymnasium and eventually graduated from the University of
Budapest Law School in June 1944. Paskay was working for an
anti-Nazi newspaper when the Germans occupied the country in
October 1944. Along with other Hungarian men in Budapest, he
found himself conscripted into work gangs. He was transported
to Vienna, Linz, Prague, and eventually wound up on the Dutch
border building defenses. He escaped from the Germans and
after the D-Day invasion he was eventually picked up by a squad of
British soldiers. He served briefly as an aide to a British officer who
interrogated German soldiers. As a "displaced person" he worked
in Baden Baden in the French occupation zone of Germany until
immigrating to the United States. After arriving at New Orleans
in September 1949 he went to Miami and lived with an aunt and
uncle. He worked at various odd jobs until he was able to enter
the University of Miami Law School, graduating in 1958. He
clerked for Judge Lieb in Miami for five-and-a-half years. During
that time, Paskay began reviewing bankruptcy cases for Lieb and
Judge Emmett Choate. As Paskay himself later explained, "All
bankruptcy at that time was called, not an appeal, but a review of
the decisions of the referees and it had to be reviewed by a district
judge. The review material presented for the judge was so terrible
that the judge told me that you straighten this business out because
we have no idea what was the reasoning, because we can't rule on
this thing. So I handled all the appeals at that time called the
reviews." Paskay told Judge Lieb that if there was an opening, he
wanted the job. The judges eventually selected Paskay to replace
an older bankruptcy referee and he was officially sworn in at Tampa
on July 1, 1963. 16

15
16
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The rulings of the "Warren Court" transformed jurisprudence
in America from 1954 through 1968 in the areas of the rights of the
accused, school desegregation, legislative redistricting, and civil
and voting rights. According to legal scholar Paul Finkelman, the
Warren Court is "remembered for modernizing and rationalizing
criminal procedure, striking down almost all forms of racial
discrimination, strengthening the wall of separation between
church and state, and expanding individual liberty in such areas
as privacy, speech, and political expression. "17 The rulings of the
Warren court were controversial, and nowhere more so than in the
South. In Florida the winds of change blew forcefully and rapidly,
conflicting with and undermining traditional legal precepts and
customs.
In 1954, Floridians, like other southerners, greeted the Warren
Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas, that
segregated schools were unconstitutional, with a mixture of shock,
disbelief, and outrage. Another ruling the next year ordering that
schools be desegregated with "all deliberate speed" found a similar
response. In 1956 a "Declaration of 96 Southern Congressmen"
denounced the decision as a clear violation of the Constitution and
a dangerous intrusion upon the rights of the states by the federal
government. The next year the Little Rock crisis galvanized public
attention when President Eisenhower called out the National
Guard to enforce court-ordered integration of Central High
School. Florida and other southern states adopted the stance of
"Massive Resistance." It is certainly within reason to state that
the vast majority of Florida's white citizens, lawyers, and judges
deplored the Brown decision. Glenn Terrell, associate justice of the
Florida Supreme Court, denounced the decision in no uncertain
terms. Former governor Millard F. Caldwell (and an eventual
member of Florida's highest court) labeled members of the United
States Supreme Court "Communists." Leroy Collins was elected
governor the same year that the Brown decision came down. The
Tallahassean, a moderate, pledged to maintain segregation by all
lawful means. Even so, Collins and his attorney general, Richard
W. Ervin, attempted to calm the public reaction to the Brown
decision but there were any number of local and state politicians

17
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who were eager to fan the flames, and the heat grew hotter as years
progressed. 18
Florida's federal judges took these dire omens into account,
while understanding that these matters would eventually find their
way in their courts. In 1958, while addressing a bar function at
Stetson University in its new location in Gulfport, Judge Bryan
Simpson warned his audience that there were "deeply held and
widely divergent views in regard to integration in public schools,
and the problem's solution will ' tax to the utmost the wisdom of
both races. "' The issue could not be swept under the rug. "'It's
going to stay with us and not go away because we wish it to," he
declared. 19
The pressure on Judge Simpson mounted as Florida reached
the end of the decade. One commentator noted in December
1960 that Judge Simpson "like all federal judges in the South
today ... is occupying the hot seat." At that moment Simpson was
hearing two desegregation suits-one for Duval and another for
Volusia County. A week earlier he had ruled against the City of
Jacksonville in its attempt to restrict the use of recreational facilities
along racial lines. Simpson understood it was his responsibility to
interpret the law in line with rulings of the Supreme Court, but
his decision made him unpopular. While his life time tenure as
an Article III federal judge protected Simpson's job, it did not
shield him from the abuse that he and his court brethren would
receive for their unpopular rulings. By 1960, Simpson was already
receiving angry phone calls and letters. He accepted the fact that it
was the people's right to criticize him but he was concerned about
the long term effect of criticizing the court as an institution. "I
grant anybody the privilege to criticize this Court, the Supreme
Court or any other Court," he said. "If a person doesn't like the
way we're doing the job, he has the right to complain," but some
of the criticism, he thought, was "of the sort tending to bring the
courts into ill repute." 20
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The Warren Court's rulings were also crucial for protecting
the rights of the accused. Map v. Ohio (1961), excluded evidence
seized without a warrant. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), a case
originating in Florida, guaranteed the right to council in criminal
cases. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) enjoined the police to read each
person their rights after arrests. While laudable to modern ears,
it must be remembered that many of the Warren court's rulings
were unpopular, especially among law enforcement personnel.
Expressing attitudes typical of the time, one commentator
charged that the "Supreme Court's movement into the field of law
enforcement violated traditional American attitudes toward state
predominance in enforcement of criminal law and represented a
substantial increase in federal judicial power." This discomfort was
true especially in the South-and Florida. As Fred P. Graham, a
southerner who covered the court in the 1960s noted, "It was 'as
painful as turning around in a briar patch. "' 21
Warren court rulings also made significant strides in
democratizing the voting process. Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1957)
declared that racial gerrymandering violated voting rights
guaranteed by the 15th Amendment. Baker v. Carr (1962) paved
the way for the "one man, one vote" concept and in Reynolds v.
Sims (1964) , Warren himself "articulated the need for legislative
districts based on population size. He noted that 'Legislatures
represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.' He declared that
the right to be represented equally in a legislature was the 'bedrock
of our political system. '"22 The question of civil and voting rights
for African Americans would be taken up by Congress in the early
1960s and during the first years of the Middle District's operation,
pivotal cases would be heard in the various courts in the district.
As the decade came to a close, Americans and Floridians
looked to the upcoming presidential election of 1960 with great
anticipation. The two candidates, John F. Kennedy (Democrat)
and Richard Nixon (Republican) , while nearly the same age,
provided striking contrasts. Nixon, Eisenhower's sitting vice
president, seemed a tired holdover from a previous generation-a
candidate committed to staying the course-while Kennedy exuded
21
22
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youth, confidence, idealism, and promoted the need to change.
The candidates contrasted strikingly on television. As a Harvardeducated war hero, Kennedy captured the imagination of many
Americans and his vigorous campaign promised to "get the country
moving agam.
Great changes were in the offing. Kennedy's
running mate, Lyndonjohnson, also inspired confidence, and his
Texas drawl was more reassuring to Floridians, even if Kennedy's
Boston accent was not.
Kennedy was particularly impressive to Burke Kibler, one of
Florida's leading lawyers, who eventually became chairman of
the Holland and Knight Law firm. Of Kennedy, the Lakelander
remembered, "He was just absolutely a magnificent speaker with
an extra-ordinary memory . . . . He had that incredible vitality
about him and charisma." Kibler confessed many years later that
Kennedy was the only Democratic presidential candidate for whom
he ever voted. 23 In the end, Florida went for Nixon as it had for
Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, but Kennedy won the national
election by a razor thin majority. The Kennedy-Johnson Era began
officially in January 1961, the day that Kennedy announced that
the "torch had been passed to a new generation of Americans."
Kennedy's election was crucial for the courts because
circumstances would permit him to make many appointments, and
thus the federal judiciary would bear Kennedy's imprint for years
to come. Also, in the selection of his brother Robert Kennedy as
attorney general, the Kennedy administration would vigorously
enforce federal laws in the civil rights area. Another of the new
attorney general's passions would be a vigorous attack against
organized crime. Both of these interests would have great relevance
to Florida. Of course, in the selection ofjudges "senatorial courtesy"
played a crucial role and both Florida's Senators Spessard Holland
and George Smathers were Democrats-albeit conservative
ones. Spessard Holland had been in the U. S. Senate since 1946,
winning his seat only one year after he left the governor's chair.
A World War I hero, prosecutor, state legislator, and judge before
becoming governor in 1940, the Bartow native was the most
respected politician in the state. The fact that he had signed the
"Declaration" did little to diminish his popularity. Holland had
worked hard to ban the poll tax in the Florida legislature. Banning
23
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the institution by constitutional amendment became his cause celeb
in the Senate, yet he vigorously opposed civil rights measures as a
blatant violation of state's rights.
By 1960, George Smathers had been Florida's junior senator
for ten years. Raised in Miami and the son of a prominent lawyer,
Smathers was successful in almost everything he attempted. A
basketball star at the University of Florida, Smathers excelled in
debate and attained nearly every available accolade and leadership
position at the university. Graduating in 1936, Smathers immediately
entered the law school and his circle of influential friends expanded.
Smathers's good looks and his winning personality destined him
for a life in politics. During his first year in law school he met
U. S. Senator Claude Pepper and eventually ran the senator's reelection campaign in Alachua County. After law school, Smathers
returned to Miami and worked in his father's law firm. In 1940
he took a job as assistant U. S. Attorney in the Southern District
of Florida. Based in Miami, Smathers soon gained the reputation
as a tough prosecutor. According to one historian, Smathers "was
blessed with a series of cases that propelled his name onto the front
page. His cases fascinated the public, usually featuring sex, greed,
and attractive women. "24
After Pearl Harbor, Smathers volunteered for service, became
a Marine and served in the Pacific theater. In 1946 Smathers was
elected to the U. S. House of Representatives, convincing one of
his closest friends from law school, George C. Young, to run his
Washington office. Joining Smathers in the House were two other
young veterans elected that same year: Richard M. Nixon and
John F. Kennedy. Smathers made friends rapidly in the House of
Representatives and Kennedy was among his closest friends .. They
made quite a pair.
It didn't take long for the ambitious Smathers to begin eying
greater opportunities, and Pepper's senate seat became the target.
While other Democrats contemplated deserting Harry Truman
in 1948, Smathers held true and reaped the benefits two years
later when the president supported the congressman's goal of
challenging Pepper. Smathers hammered Pepper's New Deal
liberalism, and charged that his soft stance on communism was
out of touch with Florida voters, and it was. In one of the nastiest
24
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political campaigns in Florida history, and a bell-weather for the
nation, Smathers prevailed. That same year in the California
senatorial race, mirroring Smathers's tactics, Richard Nixon
bested Helen Gahagan Douglas. Smathers labeled his opponent
"Red Pepper," while Nixon dubbed Douglas the "Pink Lady" (that
is, "pink right down to her underwear.") Two years later, John
Kennedy, also a rising star, entered the U.S. Senate.
While Smathers and Kennedy were close personal friends and
members of the Democratic Party, their views on important issues
often diverged. Both were "cold warriors" but Smathers believed
that questions regarding state's rights and civil rights had to be in
line with the majority of white voters in Florida. But these matters
were not immediately of concern to Smathers in 1960. For the
moment he could revel in Kennedy's election and feel sorry for his
old friend Richard Nixon. As a Florida Senator, even as the junior
one, Smathers was ready to play an important role in Kennedy's
appointments to the court. And that involvement would come
quickly as Congress soon after the election authorized a large
expansion of the federal judiciary.
The Omnibus Judgeship Act (1960) created seventy-one new
judgeships. In less than two years, Kennedy appointed 147 persons
to the federal bench. As one writer has concluded, "in one slambang stretch of 47 days, from August 11 through September 27,
1961, 69 judges were nominated or appointed, an average of
almost eleven per week. By mid-summer 1962 almost 40 percent of
federal judges were Kennedy appointees." 25
On February 20, 1961, William A. McRae became President
Kennedy's first nomination for a federal judgeship. He was nominated
to replace William Barker who had recently retired from the Southern
District of Florida. A Bartow, Florida, attorney at the time of his
nomination, McRae was practicing in Senator Spessard Holland's law
firm. Holland, Bevis, McRae, and Smith, the precursor of modernday Holland and Knight, under the leadership of Chesterfield Smith
at that time, was poised to become one of Florida's and the nation's
"power law firms." The 51 year old lawyer had one of the most
distinguished backgrounds of any Florida Judge. Born in 1909 in
Marianna, Florida, McRae graduated from the University of Florida
in 1932, and from its law school one year later. McRae won a Rhodes
25
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Judge William A. McRae on the Occasion of his Swearing In, March 20, 1961. (1.
tor.): George W. Whitehurst, McRae, Bryan Simpson, and Julian Blake. (Hodges
Collection, U.S. Middle District Court of Florida Archives, Orlando, Florida.

scholarship and continued his legal and literature studies at Christ
College of Oxford University. Returning to the United States, McRae
practiced law in Jacksonville from 1936-1940 and was on the law faculty
at the University of Florida when World War II broke out. He joined
the U.S. Army Air Force, attained the rank of colonel and served on
Gen. "Hap" Arnold's staff. According to Ted Mack, who served as
McRae's court reporter, McRae was Arnold's "top aide and paperwork
man." McRae and Arnold, he declared, "attended all the Summit
Conferences of that day, meeting Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill,
Anthony Eden (whom McRae had known at Oxford) and many other
celebrities." After the war, McRae served as an advisor to the First
General Assembly in the United Nations and as senior consultant
to the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1946 McRae joined Senator
Holland's law firm adding his name to the firm: Bevis, Holland, and
McRae. In 1952, McRae became president of the Florida Bar. 26
26
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With Holland's support, as well as the nominee's sterling
credentials, McRae's confirmation was a foregone conclusion.
McRae lived in Lake Wales at the time of his appointment and most
assumed that he would choose to reside in Tampa. Instead McRae
chose Jacksonville, a move that was disappointing to Kennedy's
next appointee to the federal bench.
Born 1916 in Cincinnati, Ohio, George C. Young's family
moved to Daytona Beach during the Florida Boom in the 1920s.
Young attended Seabreeze High School, worked on the high school
newspaper, and excelled in debate. Young enrolled at Rollins
College and then transferred to the University of Florida, where
he became president of Sigma Alpha Epsilon soical fraternity and
President of Blue Key. Young became president of the University of
Florida Debating Club, where he and his fraternity brother George
Smathers excelled. Both men attended law school together. Young
graduated in 1940 and worked briefly as assistant city attorney of
Winter Haven, Florida. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Young entered the Navy as communications officer, serving in
Key West, Miami, Grand Cayman, and Nassau. At the close of the
European war, Young was sent to Manila, Philippines, and became
a communications officer in what was one of the busiest ports in
the Pacific at that time. 27
After the war, Young took classes in taxation and administrative
law at Harvard University. In 1947, Youngjoined George Smathers's
father's law firm until he became chief of staff to the congressman.
Young worked in Washington for Smathers until resuming his
lawcareer in Jacksonville in 1952. While in Washington, Young
became attracted to a young secretary in Florida Congressman].
Hardin's Peterson's office. Young and Iris June Hart were married
in October 1951. As Smathers's chief of staff, Young interacted
frequently with other congressmen, including Congressman
John F. Kennedy, who presented him with an autographed copy
of Profi/,es in Courage. In later years, George and Iris Young both
remembered fondly their Washington going away party hosted by
Smathers which Congressman Kennedy and his beautiful fiancee
Jacqueline Bouvier attended. 28
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2008; Hall and Rise, 174.
George C. Young, interview transcript, August 4, 2011, LCCFH, 4.
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Judge George C. Young on the Occasion of his Swearing In, September 1961. Front:
(l. to r.): Julian A. Blake, Young; back row (l. to r.) : William A. McRae, Joseph P.
Lieb, George W. Whitehurst, Bryan Simpson , two unidentified, and Dozier DeVane.
(Hodges Collection, U.S. Middle District Court of Florida Archives, Orlando,
Florida).

In 1952 George and Iris Young settled in Jacksonville where
Young served briefly as Assistant U. S. Attorney until joining the
firm of Knight, Knight, Walrath, and Pegues. Young was very active
in the Jacksonville Bar association, served as its president, and
became a member of the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar.
By 1960, Young was one of the most respected lawyers in Florida
and his nomination by President Kennedy came as no surprise.
With Smathers and Holland each literally at his side before the
Senate Judiciary committee, his hearing as he recalled, "consisted
of the senators asking me my name, and was it true that I went to
Harvard. "29
After his confirmation, Young expected to be assigned to
Jacksonville. As he explained, "I thought at the time of the
appointment that McRae, who lived in Lake Wales, would be
29

Young, interview transcript, June 2003, SPOHP, 10.
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in Tampa because Tampa only had one judge, Judge Joseph
Lieb .... Then I was going to be in Jacksonville where I had my
.home and raised my children, because there was only one judge
there. As it turned out, Judge McRae decided he'd like to go to
Jacksonville, so he designated Jacksonville just a day or two before
I was invested." Instead, Young was designated a "rovingjudge" for
both the Southern and Northern Districts. 30 Young was a "floater"
for several years until he became permanently located in Orlando.
It was hard duty and he was often away from home for extended
periods of time. He recollected, "I was traveling to Miami every
year [for] about three months and then Tampa for about three
months or more, and then I came here to Orlando because they
didn't have a judge here at all, and I would hear cases here. Then
I went to north Florida for two cases then in Jacksonville, I would
sit there and hear cases. "31
That year President Kennedy also appointed Edward Boardman
U.S. Attorney and John E. McGuire U.S. Marshal for the Southern
District of Florida. Edward Francis "Eddie" Boardman was born
in New York City in 1912 but relocated as a child with his family
to Miami, Florida. Enrolling in the University of Florida in 1933,
Boardman earned two degrees, including a law degree. At Florida
Boardman excelled in academic, athletic, and social activities. After
graduation in 1938, Boardman returned to Miami and formed the
firm of Boardman & Bolles. In Miami he also served in numerous
public positions such as municipal judge, Dade County School
Board Attorney, and City Attorney for North Miami. In 1956 he
served as Adlai Stevenson's campaign manager in Florida, and he
also worked for the Kennedy campaign in 1960. 32
John E. Maguire was a native of Dobbs Ferry, New York, and
forty-four years old when his old Navy friend John F. Kennedy
appointed him U. S. Marshal of the Southern District of Florida.
Maguire served with the new president on board P. T. 109 in the
Pacific. With his official tie tack commemorating his service in the
navy, Maguire cut an impressive figure in the courtroom or when
performing official duties. Officials and persons around the court
referred to him as "109 Maguire." 33 As U.S. Marshal, Maguire was
30
31
32

Ibid, 10.
Ibid, 11.
Morison Buck. "Edward Francis Boardman: Judge Gregarious The First, 19121990." (2000). Digi,tal CoUection -Florida Studies Center Publications, Paper 2474.
http: / / scholarcommons.usf.edu/ flstud_pub/ 2474 (accessed June 20, 2013).
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responsible for maintaining the security of courtrooms and federal
proceedings. He was also responsible for the personal protection
ofjudges, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, and officers of the court. 34
Within a year after McRae, Young, Boardman, and Maguire
joined the U.S. Southern District of Florida, Congress, at Senators
Holland and Smathers's urging, created the U. S. Middle District
of Florida. The legislation had been a long time in coming. The
growth of South Florida and the distances involved necessitated
the move. As Judge Young explained, "the people in Miami wanted
to have their own clerk and their own marshal and their own U .S.
attorney, which they did not have up until that time mainly because
the district was in Jacksonville. That's where the clerk was. The
U. S. attorney, prior to the creation of the Middle District, was in
Tampa. After the district was created, Miami had their own people
that they wanted to have." 35
The act creating the Middle District of Florida took effect
on October 30, 1962 and the first sessions of the court met soon
thereafter. The legislation creating the new district contained no
authorization for new judges so the district inherited three judges
from the Southern District. Judges Bryan Simpson,Joseph P. Lieb,
and William A. McRae were permanently transferred to the Middle
District. Judge Lieb and his bankruptcy assistant, Alexander Paskay,
remained in Tampa. Judges Simpson and McRae remained in
Jacksonville. Judge George C. Young continued as a "rovingjudge"
for all three districts until 1964 when he was assigned to Orlando
as a permanent member of the Middle District ofFlorida. 36 Judges
George Whitehurst and William Barker, though retired, maintained
chambers in Tampa and filled in as needed. The district also made
use of visitingjudges to handle heavy case loads.
By most accounts the transition from the Southern to the
Middle District of Florida was not difficult. If not exactly seamless,
it moved forward with little disruption. Of course, new stationary
and forms had to be created, but in most cases the administrative
personnel were simply retained in their old jobs at the various
courthouses and federal buildings where they had labored before.
The Southern District's Clerk at the time was Julian A Blake, who
33
34
35
36

Salcines, Orlando Sentinel, December 20, 1990.
Robert Sabbag, Too Tough to Die: Down and Dangerous with the U. S. Marshals
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 53.
George Young Oral History, June 2003, SPOHP, p. 12.
Hall and Rise, From Local Courts to National Tribunals, 104, 112-13.
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had been with the clerk's office in Jacksonville for forty-one years.
The transition was a smooth one for Blake. He simply remained in
place. All that was necessary was to strike the word "Southern" and
add the word "Middle" to his stationary and office window.
Throughout its fifty year history the District has been the scene
of hundreds of cases that have contributed to the shaping of our
nation's judicial history. Civil rights cases, desegregation cases,
redistricting, First Amendment cases, employment discrimination,
voters rights, environmental rulings, death penalty, abortion rights,
the right to die, terrorist and espionage cases, and a whole host of
other types of cases have been litigated in its courtrooms. Some
of the nation's first major drug prosecutions came through the
Middle District of Florida. An interesting and sometimes notorious
cast of characters made up the defendants in Middle Florida
courtrooms, includingJimmy Hoffa, Manuel Noriega, Ted Bundy,
Santo Trafficante, Carlos Lehder, Glenn Turner, Donald Segretti
(of Watergate fame), and Hollywood movie star Wesley Snipes .
Many of America's most skilled trial lawyers argued cases there
as well. Florida political figures such as governors Farris Bryant
and Claude "Claudius Maximus" Kirk and Senator Ed Gurney also
appeared in Middle Florida courtrooms.
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Segregation/Integration in the Middle District
of Florida
by William Terrell Hodges, Senior U.S. District Judge

0

n a Monday May 18, 1896, the Supreme Court of the
United States announced its decision in Pkssy v. Ferguson.
The Court found that a statute in Louisiana requiring
railroad companies to provide separate passenger cars for the white
and black races did not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment. In its opinion, the Court relied upon decisions
of several state supreme courts which upheld the provision of
separate educational opportunities for children of both races.
For almost six decades, Pkssy v. Ferguson was accepted as Supreme
Court justification or authority for the maintenance of separate
school systems in the South including Florida.
It was a great irony that, on that same morning, May 18, 1896,
the Justices almost certainly read in the Washington Morning Times
that there was a race war going on in Florida. The newspaper
reported that it was happening in Manatee County, the irony of
which will appear later in the case commentaries.
Fifty-eight years later, to the very day, on May 17, 1954 the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas. The Brown decision held that the
provision of separate educational opportunities for the races
was inherently unequal and therefore in violation of the 14th
Amendment guaranty of equal protection of the law. Pkssy

William Terrell Hodges is a Senior Judge on the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. He was appointed by President Richard Nixon in
December 1971.
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v. Ferguson was overruled. The Supreme Court reserved for
subsequent decision in Brown the issue of how the remedy was
supposed to be implemented, and the Court's May 1955 decision
is commonly referred to as Brown II Brown II held that the remedy
of integration of the school districts should be pursued "with all
deliberate speed."
The Court's decisions in the two Brown cases were, without
question, two of the most important decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the last one hundred years. And
the consequences of those decisions, taken together with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, worked a sea change in the administration of
public institutions, not just the schools, but other governmental
institutions including the Middle District of Florida.
At the end of December 1970, our Court entered an Order
appointing several lawyers as Magistrates pursuant to the then
newly enacted Magistrates Act, 28 USC§ 631, et seg. On that day
in 1970, the Court entered an order appointing, among others, the
Honorable Joseph W. Hatchett as United States Magistrate. With
that appointment, Judge Hatchett became the first person of color
appointed to a federal judicial position anywhere in the South
since Reconstruction. In 1975, Judge Hatchett became the first
African American justice to serve on the Florida Supreme Court.
He remained there until 1979, when he was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In 1981, he transferred to
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, where he served until
1999, including a three-year period as ChiefJudge (1996-1999).
In 1990 Charles R. Wilson was appointed as United States
Magistrate Judge in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
Judge Wilson, who had served as Assistant County Attorney in
Hillsborough County began his career as a law clerk to Judge
Hatchett during his service on the Fifth Circuit Court. Judge
Wilson served as a magistrate on the Middle District Court until
1994, when he became U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of
Florida (1994-1999). He is currently a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District.
Other appointments that have diversified the Court include
that of Mary Scriven in 1997 as United States Magistrate Judge. A
graduate of Duke University and Florida State University College
of Law, Judge Scriven was nominated and confirmed to the US.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2008. The
Honorable Monte Richardson was appointed as a Magistrate Judge
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in the Jacksonville Division of the court in 2003 and still serves in
that division. Senior Judge Henry Lee Adams was appointed to
the Middle District Court by President Bill Clinton in 1993. The
Howard University School of Law graduate went on senior status in
2010. Charlene Honeywell was one of three judges appointed to
the District Court by President Barak Obama. A graduate of the
University of Florida College of Law, Judge Honeywell has served
on the Court since 2009.
In addition to the transformation of the bench, the Middle
District Court played an active role in school desegregation cases,
with sixteen cases litigated in the district. The first seven of those
cases were filed in the names of individual plaintiffs as class actions
brought by lawyers associated with the legal defense fund of the
NAACP, including Thurgood Marshall who was on the Complaint
in the Hillsborough and the Duval County cases. He subsequently
withdrew, of course, upon his appointment in 1961 to the United
States Court of Appeals for the 2°d Circuit, followed in 1965, by
his appointment as Solicitor General of the United States, and in
1967 as the first black justice on the Supreme Court of the United
States. Another litigant in those early years was an attorney named
Constance Baker Motley. In 1965, she became President of the
borough of Manhattan of the City of New York after having served
in the New York Senate for some six years. Then in 1966, she was
appointed as a DistrictJudge in the Southern District of New York.
Judge Motley was the first black female to be appointed to an
Article III position in the Unites States courts.
In the mid-l 960s after graduation from Yale Law School,
Drew S. Days, III, made an appearance before the Court as a staff
member of the legal defense fund of the NAACP in Mannings v.
Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County. 1 Interestingly, Days
had been a student or a pupil in the Hillsborough County school
system for a time as a small child when his father was stationed at
MacDill Air Force Base. Originally filed on December 10, 1958, by
Thurgood Marshall and Constance Baker Motley in the Southern
District, it was later litigated in the Middle District Court. As Days
noted in a 1992 Fordham Law Review article, Hillsborough County's

See Mannings v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Hillsborough County, 306 F.
Supp. 497, 500 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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school board "engaged in a variety of stratagems designed to delay
as long as possible the coming of meaningful desegregation. "2
Among the delaying procedures, "the use of pupil assignment laws,
one-grade-a-year desegregation, and freedom of choice proved
effective" 3 during the period 1968-1969. Days attributed successful
desegregation to several factors that started with the assignment
of Federal District Judge Ben Krentzman to Mannings. In April
1970, Judge Krentzman required the school board to "develop a
comprehensive desegregation plan using techniques approved
by the Supreme Court" in its recent ruling on Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 4 which included two-way busing,
pairing and clustering. The plan that emerged was developed by a
cross-section of the community and was accompanied by a "group of
educational enrichment programs." Mannings was closed on April
26, 2001, after pending on the docket for 42 years and 4 months-a
period that did not set the record for desegregation cases. At least
six judges presided over the case, from time to time, until it was
finally closed under the guidance of Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich
in 2001. The case was closed after the Court of Appeals found that
the Hillsborough County School System had attained unitary status
and was no longer deserving of supervision by the court.
Two years after the Hillsborough County case was filed, a related
case was filed in Duval County on December 6, 1960; it was closed on
February 13, 2002. In 1962,Judge Bryan Simpson enjoined future
operation of the system as a dual school system. The school board
had conceded in an earlier evidentiary hearing that indeed it was,
as a matter of law, conducting such a system. Judge Simpson then
ordered the School Board to produce a plan for the desegregation
of the Duval County schools. Phased in remedies were pursued in
those early years because of the rule in Brown II that the remedy
should be pursued with all deliberate speed (which, obviously, is
something less than "now" or "immediately").
There were basically two techniques that were applied in the
cases from 1958 until 1968. The first technique was a majority
to minority transfer rule so that any child in a school who was of

2

3
4

Drew S. Days, III, Symposium: Brown v. Board ofEducation and its Legacy: A Tribute
to justice Thurgood Marshall, The Other Desegregation Story: Eradicating the Dual
School System in Hillsborough County, Florida, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 33 ( 1962), 34.
Id.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1.
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the majority race in that school could request transfer to another
school where the child would be of the minority race. If the child
was attending an all-black school he or she could elect under that
transfer policy to transfer to a school that had been identified as an
all-white school where the black children were in the minority. The
second technique was the adjustment of the attendance zones of the
various schools in order to incorporate black neighborhoods into a
school zone that formerly served only white students. During that
10-year period, the second technique affected some desegregation
for students, but it had no impact whatsoever on desegregation of
faculty and staff.
On May 8, 1963, Judge Simpson entered an Order approving
the plan that had been submitted by the Duval County School
Board and ordered that the plan be implemented at the
beginning of the new school year in September of 1963. The
Court of Appeals adopted expedited rules for the handling of the
desegregation appeals and the order was affirmed after six months
on January 10, 1964. Judge Gerald Tjoflat entered an opinion with
a comprehensive plan of desegregation that was affirmed in twomonths' time. In the meantime, between 1963 and January 1964,
Judge Simpson's Order in the Duval County case had been placed
into effect.
In ruling on the desegregation cases, Middle District judges
expressed the hope that schools would be integrated without
violence. Although the judges themselves received numerous
death threats, desegregation occurred peacefully in Orange,
Pinellas, Hillsborough and Polk counties. However, in February
1964, the home of Iona Godfrey in Duval County was bombed,
apparently in retaliation for the enrollment of her first-grade son at
Lackawanna Elementary School, an all-white school, the previous
September following Judge Simpson's ruling. 5
Now looking forward, in 1968 and 1969, the Supreme Court of
the United States decided Green v. County School Board for New Kent
County 6 and Al,exandra v. Holmes County Board of Education. 7 These
cases held that the remedy authorized by Brown II was not proving
to be effective and the District Courts should take immediate action

5
6
7

Cynthia L. Garza,Jacksonville Times Union, February 10, 2003. See Jacksonville.
com/ tu-online/ stories/ 021003/ met_l 1705962.shtml
See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, (VA) , 391 U.S. 430.
See Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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to effect desegregation of the schools where de jure segregation had
been practiced. There was a whole new round of litigation in all of
the school cases in 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The docket sheet of
the Duval County case reflects that in response to those decisions
in 1969 and 1970,Judge William McRae entered an Order affecting
additional desegregation techniques to bring about a unitary .
school system in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in
Green. On June 7, 1971, the Court of Appeals remanded an appeal
from the Orders that were entered by Judge McRae in light of still
another Supreme Court decision, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
County Board of Education and ordered the immediate elimination
of the vestiges of the de jure segregation in the schools.
In the meantime, Judge Tjoflat had been appointed and
had been assigned the case by Judge McRae, and within two
weeks' time, Judge Tjoflat issued an opinion and lengthy order (I
have the original document in my file) ordering the immediate
desegregation of the Duval County school system. You will note
that the last entry on that excerpt from the docket sheet was that
the Order was affirmed on August 16, 1971, less than 2 months after
it had been entered. Judge Tjoflat's decree in the Jacksonville case
established the law of that case. The case was ultimately disposed
of in 2002 as a unitary school system.
I want to call attention briefly to the Orange County case 8
because it does hold the record for longevity. It was filed on April
6, 1962, and closed on November 15, 2010 by Chief Judge Anne
Conway, after having pended for 4 7 years and 5 months, which is
the record for the district. Judge George C. Young had the case for
34 years. You will notice that there was a docket entry in that case
on June 21, 1996. After presiding over the litigation for 34 years,
Judge Young directed the clerk to reassign the case to another
Judge in accordance with the Court's reassignment system. This
was a non-appealable order and I'm sure he knew that when he
entered it. If he was here I think we ought to give him a standing
ovation for his judicial labor in that case. And by the way, as I've
said before, the Orange County case was not attended so far as
we know by acts of violence due to his extreme effort, especially
during the early years of that litigation to avoid that, and he did so
successfully. This community should be forever in his debt for that

8

See Ellis v. The Board of Public Instruction of Orange County.
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accomplishment. And Judge Conway, by the way, presided over
the case for some 14 years, bringing it to a complete, successful
conclusion two years ago.
As I went back looking, finding these cases, and looking at
the docket sheets, and by the way that was no easy task, because
obviously all of these cases were disposed of before the automated
docket; they've all been sent off to archives, and sadly there are
some that are irretrievable. I think there may be some others out
there that we just weren't able to find. But we found the 16 as I
said before, and it brought back a lot of memories for me with
respect to those cases which I had on my docket for a number of
years, including the Pinellas County case. You will see that there's
a docket entry on December 29, 1971, which means absolutely
nothing to anybody in the room. But it meant a lot to me because
that Order transferring the case to me was entered less than 24
hours after my investiture. Here I was right there with the judges
at 4:00 on the afternoon of December 28, 1971 at my investiture
and the next morning the first Order I saw was the one that was
docketed there reassigning the Pinellas case to me.
This brings us to the Manatee County case. The Manatee County
case Harvest v. Board of Public Instruction of Mana"lee County was filed on
January 21, 1965 and it was assigned to Judge Joseph Lieb, initially. It
was closed on September 15, 1973 and it was more difficult than any
other case that we handled in the district. It was only pending for 8
years, 8 months . On June 27, 1969, Judge Lieb entered an Order
and this was after the decision in Green and Holmes clarifying the all
deliberate speed standard of Broum II and substituting instead the
requirement that desegregation occur now or immediately, at once and
without delay. He entered an Order in June. The case was reassigned
to Judge Krentzman on November 19, 1969. On December 17, 1969,
the Court of Appeals reversed the Order of June 27, finding it did
not sufficiently comply with Green and Holmes effecting immediate
relief. The school board then filed a proposed amendment to the
plan in response to the opinion of Court of Appeals. On January 26,
1970,Judge Krentzman held a hearing to consider the proposed plan
and what was necessary to comply with the mandate of the Court of
Appeals. Two days later on January 28, Governor Claude R Kirk, Jr.
moved for leave to intervene in the case. Judge Krentzman denied
that motion on the same day. and entered an Order confirming
the revised plan for desegregation by the Manatee County School
Board and the Manatee County Superintendent. The School Board
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immediately appealed that Order. On April 2, the Court of Appeals
denied a stay of the Order.
Anticipating some difficulty, on April 6, 1970,Judge Krentzman
designated and appointed the United States of America as amicus
curiae to help with respect to the enforcement of the Order if
it should become necessary. On that same day, April 6, Judge
Krentzman entered an Order directing the Governor to appear
the next day, April 7, 1970, and show cause why he should not be
held in contempt for interfering with the execution of the Order
of January 29. Governor Kirk, upon seeing the desegregation
plan that had been ordered by Judge Krentzman, entered an
Executive Order suspending the entire School Board of Manatee
County, suspending the Superintendent of Public Instruction of
Manatee County, and installing himself as both the Board and the
Superintendent in charge of all matters affecting the schools. In
the Executive Order, the Governor announced that he would not
comply with the Order of desegregation that had been entered.
On April 7, at the appointed time for the return by the Governor,
Judge Krentzman held a hearing. The Governor did not appear in
person but he did appear through counsel. That counsel moved
to quash the Order ofJudge Krentzman directing the Governor to
appear and show cause. The pleading was signed by none other
than Millard F. Caldwell, who some of the older Floridians will
remember, had been a prosecutor, a member of Congress in the
House of Representatives for two terms, Governor of Florida, a
member of the Supreme Court of Florida, and ChiefJustice of the
Supreme Court of Florida. Caldwell was a Floridian with one of
the longest records of public service in the state's history. But he
was, and there's no question about this, a fervent segregationist.
He filed this motion to quash Judge Krentzman's Order. That
motion was denied, and on April 9, 1970, Deputy Marshal
Mitchell Newberger together with his colleagues, Felix L. Sharpe
and John C. Barr, accompanied by Assistant U.S. Attorney Oscar
Blasingame, proceeded to Manatee County. The group went to
the school administration building for the purpose of reinstalling
the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Manatee County in
his office in order that the desegregation decree which had been
adopted by the Court might be placed in effect. Marshal Newberger
as a result of that incident had occasion to file an Affidavit, and I
have the original in my file. This is of particular interest to me
because I knew these people, each of them well.
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Newberger reported that when they arrived at the school
administration building in Bradenton on April 9, 1970, they were
met by a Mr. Hadelman who identified himself as an assistant to the
Governor, and they were also met by the Sheriff of Manatee County,
Richard Weisenfeld. Deputy Marshal Barr advised Hadelman of
his mission and served him with a copy of the Court's Order at
which time Mr. Hadelman responded with his position that he
was meeting them as ordered by the Governor of Florida to defy
this order and use whatever force was necessary in such defiance.
Marshal Barr replied that the position of the Government was that
Hadelman and Weisenfeld were to immediately depart from the
premises and that the Marshal would restore the school system to
the original School Board and the Superintendent, and that if they
did not comply with this Order, they would be arrested. Hadelman
stated his position and then requested that he be allowed to confer
with Sheriff Weisenfeld in the adjoining room. The conference
was held and ultimately the sheriff announced that he was directed
by the Governor of Florida that no one who had been arrested by
the Federal Marshal would be allowed to leave the premises and
that the Sheriff of Manatee County would use whatever force was
necessary to prevent Federal agents from leaving the premises with
anyone who was arrested. Further discussions took place. As a
result of this conference, Hadelman and Sheriff Weisenfeld were
arrested by Deputy Marshal Barr. An attempt was then made by
Barr and those arrested to leave the office at which time six Manatee
County Sheriff deputies blocked the door, making it physically
impossible to leave the room. Marshal Newberger then advised
these deputies that they were obstructing justice and that they were
subject to arrest for a Federal offense, and he asked each of them
their names. They gave their names, but they refused to step aside
and the Marshal informed all six that they were under arrest for
obstructing justice. These deputies still refused to step aside and
allow passage, and the Deputy Marshals were advised by the Sheriff
that additional Florida Highway Patrol Troopers were in the area
to render the necessary assistance to prevent Federal agents from
leaving the premises. The Affidavit ends by stating: "Realizing
at this point that we had received forcible resistance and that the
next step without doubt would be physical violence, Deputy U.S.
Marshals Barr, Sharpe and myself accompanied by Assistant U.S.
Attorney Blasingame departed the premises and returned to our
station in Tampa to report."
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The next day, of course, I think maybe that same afternoon,
Judge Krentzman entered an Order finding the Governor in
contempt and fining him $10,000.00 a day while he remained in
contempt, but with an opportunity to purge his contempt on April
13. I have not looked up these days in the perpetual calendar but I
think these events occurred on a Thursday or a Friday, and the 13th
of April was a Monday. So the Governor had until Monday to think
about it. On Monday all of those persons on the Governor's staff
filed an affidavit/ certificate before Judge Krentzman reciting that
they had been instructed by the Governor to comply with any order
the Court might enter. And three days later the case was simply
dismissed on stipulation of the parties.
If Oscar Blasingame had not been present on that occasion,
there is reason to believe that Johnny Barr would have killed
somebody. And probably would have been killed himself in doing
so. Johnny Barr was an excellent Deputy Marshal, and of the
mindset to carry out the orders of the court. I know in my heart that
it was fate, that if Assistant U. S. Attorney Blasingame hadn't been
there on that occasion to perform his duties as a lawyer exercising
restraint, there surely would have been physical violence and
several deaths. But it didn't happen, thanks to Oscar Blasingame.
All litigation finally came to an end between December 10,
1958 and November 15, 2010. The heroes are not the judges or
even the lawyers: the heroes are the people we now have after
this litigation like Joe Hatchett, Charles Wilson, Henry Lee Adams,
Mary Scriven, Charlene Honeywell and Monte Richardson. If their
presence with us in the room today can be attributed in any way to
this litigation then this litigation was a resounding success.
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The Complex Legacy of School Desegregation
in Duval County
Mims v. Duval County School Board, 329 F. Supp. 123
(M.D. Fla. 1971)
by 0 lga Balderas
n 1971, in Mims v. Duval County School Board, 1 United States
District CourtJudge Gerald Tjoflat, 2 with the goal of eliminating
the vestiges of legalized public school segregation, issued an
order re-assigning students in Duval County. 3 The order, which
mandated the closing of several schools4 and affected thousands of
students in schools across the county, 5 temporarily resolved years
of litigation 6 and resulted in the almost immediate integration of
Duval County schools. The Mims desegregation order has been
rightly praised 7 for resulting in the swift integration of Duval

I

Olga Balderas received herJ.D . in 2013 from the University of Florida Levin College
of Law and a B.A. in 2009 from the University of Florida. The author dedicates this
Comment to her parents, Santiago and Maria Balderas, and Stephen Bagge, who
have provided encouragement and support.
1
329 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
Judge Tjoflat was subsequently elevated to the United States Court of Appeals
2
for the Fifth Circuit in 1975. See Byron R. White, Presentation of the Fordham-Stein
Prize to judge Gerald Bard Tjojlat October 31, 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2405,
2406 (1997). Judge Tjoflat became a member of the Eleventh Circuit when
Congress created the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, removing Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama from the Former Fifth Circuit. Id.
3
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 125.
Id. at 137.
4
Id. at 129.
5
The case commenced in December 1960. See id. at 126.
6
See, e.g., William F. Jung, The Last Unlikely Hero: Gerald Bard Tjojlat and the
7
Jacksonville Desegregation Crisis 35 Years Later, 80 FLA. B.J. 10, 14 (2006); White,
supra note 2, at 2406.
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County schools; something that the Duval County School Board was
unable to accomplish voluntarily in the seventeen years following
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 8
Due to the impact of Mims, in 2001, the Eleventh Circuit, affirmed
the District Court's determination that the School Board had
"eliminate [ d] the vestiges of de juresegregation," marking the end of
federal court supervision of Duval County public schools. 9 Despite
this apparent success, Mims's legacy is perhaps more complex than
Judge Tjoflat and the litigants might have imagined forty years
ago because today, a significant number of public schools in Duval
County have reverted to single-race status. 10 This Comment will
first discuss the legal and factual background of school segregation
in Duval County. Second, this Comment will discuss the Mims order
itself. Finally, this Comment will examine the legacy of Mims.
Public School Segregation in Duval County
The roots of legalized public school segregation in Duval
County can be traced to the post-Civil War Reconstruction era. In
1873, the Florida Legislature, under the control of Republicans,
passed a law requiring equal accommodations and allowing, but
not mandating, integrated schools. 11 However, a Leon County
judge nullified the law. 12 Subsequently, in 1885, the Florida
Legislature passed a new constitution which explicitly mandated
segregated public schools, so long as "impartial provision was made
for both" 13 sets of schools. The Florida Legislature subsequently
passed a law that prohibited the teaching of black students in the
same buildings as white students. 14 The laws were so restrictive
that superintendents were required to ensure that books used by
white students were not used by black students. 15 In 1895, in P/,essy
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15

347 U.S. 483 (1954); seealso]ung, supra note 7, at 12.
NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 273 F.3d 960, 965-66, 976
(11th Cir. 2001).
As of 2001 , when federal supervision of Duval County schools ended, twentysix schools out of 144 in Duval County were primarily black. See infra note 86
and accompanying text.
Jerrell H. Shofner, Custom, Law, and History: The Enduring Influence of Florida's
"Black Code, "55 FLA. HIST. Q. 277, 285-86 (1977).
Id. at 286.
FLA. CONST. art. XII,§ 12 (1885).
See Mims v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 329 F. Supp. 123, 125 (M.D. Fla. 1971) ; see also
Shofner, supra note 11 , at 289.
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 125.
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v. Ferguson, 16 the Supreme Court confirmed the legality of state
mandated segregation by upholding a Louisiana statute requiring
"equal, but separate" accommodations in railroad cars. 17
In the 1930s, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) began a nationwide legal campaign to
end school segregation. 18 While schools and other facilities were
supposedly "separate but equal," the reality was that in Florida,
along with other Southern states, black schools were significantly
underfunded relative to white schools. 19 Due to this reality, and as
a culmination of the NAACP's efforts, in 1954 in Brown v. Board of
Education, 20 the Supreme Court held that public school segregation
denied black students equal protection under the law and was
therefore unconstitutional. 21 The Supreme Court reasoned that
separate schools violated the Equal Protection Clause because
separate schools were "inherently unequal." 22 The Court noted
that the separate schools created a sense of inferiority among black
students and deprived black students of the benefits that they
would receive in an integrated school system. 23

The Catalyst to Integration
By 1960, Duval County schools remained segregated. 24 A group
of black plaintiffs filed suit, alleging this continued segregation. 25
In 1962, District Judge Bryan Simpson held that the school board
and superintendent "have pursued ... a policy ... of operating
the public school system of Duval County on a racially segregated
basis .... "26 The school board and superintendent were enjoined
from operating a segregated school system and were ordered to
submit "a complete plan for the removal of dual attendance zones

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

163 U.S. 537 (1895).
Id. at 542, 548, 552.
Robert L. Carter, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1083, 1084 (1988) .
Abel Bartley, Reading, Writing and R.acisrn: The Fight to Desegregate the Duval
County Public School System, 86 J. NEGRO HIST. 336, 336-37 (2001).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id. at 494.
See Mims v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 329 F. Supp. 123, 125 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
Id. at 126.
Id.
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for the system-wide opening of all schools on a non-racial basis." 27
In 1963, Judge Simpson approved a desegregation plan that had
·two features. First, integration would occur one grade per year, so
that by 1974 all twelve grades would be integrated. 28 Second, the
plan permitted students to apply for admission or transfer to any
school in the district. 29
It soon became clear that this desegregation plan was not
effective. By 1965, only 137 black students out of 30,000 were
attending previously all white schools, and no white students
attended previously all black schools. 30 Thus, Judge Simpson
ordered the school board to establish a single system of non-racial
attendance zones for all grades and ordered the board to modify its
transfer policy to only permit "majority to minority" transfers. 31 As
well, Judge Simpson ordered the School Board to request a study
and desegregation plan from the South Florida Desegregation
Center at the University of Miami. After Judge Simpson's order, the
case was transferred 32 to Judge William McRae, who in 1967 held
that that school board had failed to follow Judge Simpson's order. 33
As a result, Judge McRae ordered the school board to submit a
desegregation plan to the court. 34
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issued two important decisions
addressing school desegregation. In 1969, in A"lexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education, 35 the Court made it clear that "the
obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems
at once and to operate [immediately] only unitary schools. "36 Second,
in 1971, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-

27
28

29
30
31
32

33
34
35
36

Id.
In other words, in the first year of the plan, students in first grade would be
integrated. In the second year of the plan, students in first and second grade
would be integrated. In the third year of the plan, students in first, second, and
third grade would be integrated, and so forth. See id.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Judge Simpson was elevated to the Fifth Circuit in 1966. Bill Would Name Jax
Courthouse After Simpson, FLA. B. EWS, Mar. 15, 2005, at 10. Aside from the
Duval County case, Judge Simpson issued orders in other cases desegregating
"pools, golf courses, and the zoo and sided with the Rev. Martin Luther King,
Jr. , in lifting a ban on nighttime civil rights marches in St. Augustine ... ."Id.
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 128.
See id.
396 U.S. 19 (1969).
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
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Mecklenburg Board of Education. 37 In Swann, the Supreme Court
analyzed two issues. First, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of court-mandated busing of students, even when students are
transported to schools outside of their neighborhoods. 38 Second,
the Court discussed the problem of single-race schools. 39 The Court
indicated that district judges should closely scrutinize plans which
"contemplate[] the continued existence of some schools that are
all or predominantly of one race .... "40
In the early seventies, the Duval County case was then
transferred to Judge Tjoflat.41 By this point, Duval County schools
had 122,549 students, 72% of whom were white and 28% of whom
were black. 42 The school board operated one hundred elementary
schools, twenty-two junior high schools, one junior-senior high
school, thirteen high schools, and one technical high school. 43
Of these schools, eighteen of them served only black students. 44
Between 54% and 57% of all black students attended black, or
virtually all black, schools. 45 The black schools were all located in
centralJacksonville. 46
In response to Judge McRae's 1969 order, the school board
developed a desegregation plan that called for the closing of several
black schools and the busing of both white and black students. 47
The school board and plaintiffs attempted to negotiate an out-ofcourt settlement ratifying the school board's plan, but were unable
to do so. 48 Therefore, it became Judge Tjoflat's role to consider
whether the desegregation plan put forth by the school board was
constitutional.

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 25-27.
Id. at 26.
It is unclear why the case was transferred from Judge McRae to Judge Tjoflat.
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130-36.
Id. at 130. While the Mims order does not explicitly state why the parties were
unable to come to an agreement, presumably it was because the plaintiffs
objected to the closure of several black schools. See infra notes 58 and 61 and
accompanying text.
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The plan treated elementary, junior high, and high schools
separately. 49 The court largely approved the elementary school
-portion of the plan. 50 The plan divided, with one exception, 51 all of
the county elementary schools into two groups, Group A and Group
B. 52 Within each Group, the school zones surrounding elementary
schools were grouped together such that each elementary school
would be comprised of between 24% and 34% black students. 53
The Group A schools taught students in grades one through six,
and the Group B schools were divided between elementary schools
teaching grades one through five, and sixth grade centers located
in predominantly black neighborhoods. 54 The plaintiffs did not
object to the Group A part of the elementary school plan, but they
did vehemently object to the Group B portion of the school plan. 55
The plaintiffs had two objections to the Group B portion of the
plan. 56 First, it would require black students in grades one through
five to be bused into formerly white schools, while only requiring
white students to be bused into formerly black schools in sixth
grade. 57 Second, the plan called for the closure of seven formerly
black schools, at least one of which was relatively new. 58
The court responded to the first argument by citing two
appellate court decisions where courts had approved plans which
had a similar impact on black students. 59 The court further noted
that there was "ample evidence in the record ... that the education
of the black children in the white schools" was "consistent with
sound educational principles and" would "be beneficial to the
children concerned. "60

49
50
51

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

60

Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 130.
Id.
The one exception was the Mamie Agnes Jones elementary school, located in
geographically isolated Baldwin. The court stated that it was "so isolated that
to merge it with another school would not be feasible." Id. n.24.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 132-33. (citing Allen v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 434 F.2d 902, 907 (4th
Cir. 1970), and Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 , 124 (2d
Cir. 1970)).
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 133.
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The court also defended the plan's closure of seven formerly
black schools. 61 The court noted that the plaintiffs' expert agreed
that three of the schools should be abandoned. 62 Additionally,
the court detailed reasons why the other four schools should be
closed. 63 For instance, Forest Park was clearly in a terrible location
for a school. 64 It was surrounded on one side by the city incinerator,
on another side by a polluted creek, and on a third side by a
slaughterhouse. 65 Two of the schools-Mt. Herman and John E.
Ford-were located directly next to I-95 66 and in the highest crime
areas ofJacksonville. 67 Vandals and truants frequently trespassed in
these schools, resulting in assaults on both students and teachers.
The other school to be closed was East Jacksonville Elementary.
The South Florida Desegregation Center had recommended the
closing of this school "as soon as possible" because the building was
"clearly unsuitable for education[]," and even the plaintiffs' expert
agreed that the school building was inadequate. 68
Judge Tjoflat revised one aspect of the elementary school
portion of the plan: a provision requiring the busing of sixth
grade students from the beach area of Duval County to the inner
city.69 Judge Tjoflat objected to this portion of the plan because
studies showed that it would take an hour and half each way to
transport students from the beaches to the inner city.70 Judge
Tjoflat reasoned that effective beach-area school integration
could be achieved by essentially treating the beaches area as its
own school system, which would avoid the need to bus students
from the beaches to the inner city. 71
The junior high school portion of the plan was similar to the
elementary school portion of the plan. The court made no change

61
62
63
64
65
66
67

68
69
70
71

Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 131-32
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. ("These schools are located in the area of the highest crime rate in the city,
where 80 % of the hard narcotics are trafficked. Influences in the neighborhood
make quality education at these schools a virtual impossibility. ").
Id.
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 133.
Id.Judge Tjoflat noted that this revision to the plan would result in an average
of 15% of black students in beach-area schools.
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with respect to the six schools that were already fully integrated
72
while the plan re-assigned students into fourteen of the twenty
..schools. 73 Under the plan, black students would consist of 21 % to
34% of those schools. 74 The plan closed one formerly all black school,
Darnell-Cookman, which was located directly next to I-95 and was
in a high crime area. 75 Finally, the plan allowed the continuance of
two virtually single-race schools: almost all white Sandalwood and
all black Northwestern. 76 The court reasoned that the geographic
locations of Sandalwood and Northwestern would make mandatory
integration between the schools unduly burdensome. 77
Lastly, Judge Tjofat addressed the plan's treatment of high
schools. The plan converted one school-Stanton-into a
vocational school. 78 The remaining schools would be between 7%
and 40% black. 79 While the plaintiffs argued that the white-black
ratio in each school should be close to the county-wide 72%-28%
ratio, Judge Tjoflat responded that the law did not require an
"adherence to a strict mathematical formula." 80 Judge Tjoflat did
reject one portion of the school board's plan for its high schoolsthat concerning Ribault and Raines. 81 Raines had previously been
an all black high school, and Ribault was 74% percent white. 82
The two schools were located in the same neighborhood. 83 Judge
Tjoflat ordered the two schools to reflect the black-white ratio of
that part of the community, which was 58% black to 42% white. 84
The Impact of Mims
Forty years after Judge Tjoflat's decision, the most important
impact of Mims is that it resulted in the eventual determination that

72
73
74
75
76
77

78
79
80

81
82
83
84

Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132, 134.
Id. at 134.
Northwestern was located in a predominantly African-American area in
Jacksonville, while Sandalwood was located in the "extreme eastern portion"
of Duval County. Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
See id. at 135 & n.38.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
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Duval County schools were legally integrated. This is particularly
relevant in light of the opposition that desegregation faced. 85 In 2001,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a later District Court's determination
that, due to compliance with the Mims order, Duval County had
eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation, and therefore was
"unified" and no longer needed federal court supervision. 86 This
judicial determination that Duval County was now "unified" was
made despite the fact that twenty-six out of 144 Duval County schools
were primarily black, an increase from eighteen schools in 1989.87
While acknowledging this fact, the Eleventh Circuit,in affirming the
District Court, stated that " [t] he Constitution does not require a
school board to remedy racial imbalances caused by external factors,
such as demographic shifts, which are not the result of segregation
and are beyond the board's control." 88
Another significant impact of the Mims order was that it may
have contributed to a decrease in white enrollment in Duval
County public schools. The percentage of white students in Duval
County public schools has decreased from 72% in 1969 to 39%
today. At present, 45% of public school students in Duval County
are black, even though a larger majority of the overall Duval County
population is white. 89 For a period of time, the number of students
enrolled in Duval County schools actually decreased while the
overall population of Duval County was increasing significantly. 90

85
86
87
88

89

90

See, e.g. , Jung, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that someone erected an "Impeach
Tojo" billboard).
See NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 965, 969, 976
(11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 962, 969 (discussing evidence presented to the District Court).
Id. at 975 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992)). But see William H.
Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 425,
443- 444 ( 1979) (reporting that statistical study showed that racial composition
was a factor, albeit one of many, in the movement of whites out of cities).
Id. at 970 (noting that the percentage of white students in Duval County schools
was 72 % in 1969); About DCPS, DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, http://
www.duvalschools .org/ static/ aboutdcps/ new% 20residen ts/ abou tdcps.asp
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (reporting that in 2010 the percentage of white
students was 39.4% and the percentage of black students was 44.8%); Duval
County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:/ / quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/
states/ 12/ 12031.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (reporting that the white
percentage of Duval County was 60.9% in 2010).
Richard L. Forstall, Florida: Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to
1990, us BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Mar. 27, 1995), http:// www.census.gov/
population/ cencounts/ fll90090.txt (reporting that the population of Duval
County rose from 455,411 in 1960 to 672,971 in 1990).
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Public school enrollment dropped from 119,738 in 1968 to 87,604
in 1983 before eventually increasing again. 91 While scholars have
debated whether there is a statistically significant link between
school desegregation and the White Flight phenomenon, 92 the two
certainly occurred simultaneously in Duval County.
Another important part of the Mims legacy is its impact on the
education of black students. In the aftermath of the desegregation cases
of the i 97os, some scholars lamented that while desegregating schools
was important, not enough attention had been focused on improving
the education of black students. 93 However, subsequent research has
confirmed that integration by itself results in long-term benefits for
black students, even ifthe short-term benefits are less clear. 94 Moreover,
some studies have reported that white students benefit from integration
as well. 95 Overall, the Mims order benefited both the black and white
students it enabled to attend integrated schools. 96
Unfortunately, since Duval County schools are increasingly
one-race, it appears that, going forward, a smaller percentage of
black students will benefit from integration than did so previously.
A study suggests that modern de facto segregation appears to have
a negative impact on FCAT9 7 scores. 98 The study noted that the" [r]
elative racial balance appears to matter only if schools are Black
segregated-students in schools with relatively racially balanced
91
92

93

94

95

96
97

98

See Bartley, supra note 19, at 344.

See Reynolds Farley, Toni Richards & Clarence Wurdock, School Desegregation and
White Right: An Investigation of Competing Models and Their Discrepant Findings, 53 Soc.
OFEDu. 123, 124 (1980) (acknowledging t11at various studies had come to different
results in determining the inlpact of school desegregation on white flight).
See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470, 471 (1976) ("The
espousal of educational improvement as the appropriate goal of school
desegregation efforts is out of phase with the current state of the law. ").
Kathryn M. Borman et al. , Accountability in aPostdesegregationEra: The Continuing
Significance ofRacial Segregation in Florida's Schools, 41 AM. EDUC. REs.]. 605, 607
(2004).
See also Robert Carda, The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REv. 600,
616-640 (2011) (arguing that integration benefits white students by improving
their academic outcomes and by preparing them to work in multicultural
workplaces).
Since not all schools were integrated, not all black students benefited from the
Mims order. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) is a standardized exam
taken by students in Florida public schools. The FCAT is used, in part, to
evaluate public schools. See Harriet A. Stranahan et al., School Grades Based on
Standardized Test Scores: Are They Fair?, 1]. ACADEMIC & Bus. ETHICS, Jan. 2009.
Borman et al., supra note 92, at 626.
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student populations and students in schools with relatively low
percentages of Black students appear to perform in a relatively
similar manner on the FCAT .... "99 This is significant because the
State of Florida provides additional funds to schools that receive
"A" scores on the FCAT. 10° Conversely, schools which do poorly on
the FCAT are threatened with the removal of funds. 101 The result
of this system is that "the best teachers, principals and staff are
drawn to the A-rated schools, [and consequently] disadvantaged
schools may be left worse off in the long run."102
The fact that white enrollment has dropped in Duval County
due to white families choosing to enroll their children in private
schools may also have a negative long-term impact on the education
of black students. Such a negative impact is likely to occur because
a "high share of private school students ... affects the public and
political will necessary to generate fair funding [for public schools]
through the state's finance system." 103 In other words, as more
students enroll in private schools, there is a corresponding decrease
in public concern for appropriate funding of public schools.
Looking back, it is apparent that the Mims order may have impacted
the Duval County school system in ways that the plaintiffs or Judge
1Joflat could not anticipate. While the Mims order benefited black
students in the short-term by mandating integration, unfortunately
in the long-term, some of those benefits were extinguished.
Consequently, white families have left Duval County public schools,
reducing the benefits of integration with black students.
Although these subsequent events have been unfortunate, it
would be erroneous to hold Judge Tjoflat at fault or criticize the
Mims order. Certainly, what happened is far superior to what would
have otherwise been continued dejuresegregation. Moreover,Judge
Tjoflat correctly applied the law and took practical considerations
into account when drafting the order. 104 The order did benefit the
public school students of Duval County, albeit temporarily.
99 Id.
100 Stranahan et al. , supra note 94, at 38, 39.
101 SeeTopher Sanders, Duval'sPlanforStrugglingSchools Rejected by State, FLA. TIMESUNION (Feb. 7, 2011) , http: / / jacksonville.com/ news/ metro/ 2011-02-07 /
storyI duvals-plan-struggling-schools-rejected-state (reporting that several
under-performing schools in Duval County were being threatened with the
removal of funds if they did not improve on the FCAT).
102 Stranahan, supra note 94, at 52.
103 Bruce D. Baker et al ., Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card 29 (2010).
104 For instance, Judge Tjoflat did not require students from the beach area to bus
into the inner city. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion

The ultimate lesson from the history of desegregation in Duval
County might be that while courts wield a significant amount of
power, that power only goes so far. Ultimately, the state and local
governments, not the court system, are responsible for ensuring
that each child had an equal opportunity of receiving a quality
education. In this case,Judge Tjoflat was empowered only to create
a remedy to ensure that the vestiges of de Jure segregation were
removed from Duval County schools. Once that occurred, the
District Court had fulfilled its responsibility. It is now up to the
Duval County School Board to ensure that the scourges of racial
discrimination do not overwhelm what progress has been made.
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Constitutional Law: Eradicating the Effects of
Past Purposeful Racial Discrimination in the
Public School System
Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla.
1979)
by Alexandra Moore
n 1979, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida issued the seminal decision of Debra P. v. Turlington,
which would help pave the way for creating a public school
system that was no longer marred by past racial discrimination.
Judge George C. Carr 1 presided for the court and ruled that
requiring students to pass a functional literacy test before receiving
a high school diploma disproportionately barred black students
from receiving diplomas due to the inferior education they had
received as a result of the past segregation of public schools. 2
Judge Carr held that the testing requirement violated the students'
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. 3

I

Alexandra Moore received her J.D. in 2012 from Florida State University College
of Law and a B.A. in Sociology in 2009 from the University of Florida. The author
thanks the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida for the opportunity to write this Comment and her family and
friends for their endless support.
1
The Honorable George C. Carr was nominated to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida by President Jimmy Carter
on November 21 , 1977 and was confirmed by the Senate on December 15,
1977. Judge Carr served as chief judge from 1989 to 1990. History of the Federal
judiciary, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENT
E R, http: / / www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid
=382&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl (last visited July 6, 2012).
2
DebraP. v. Turlington, 474F. Supp. 244, 257 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
3
Id. at 257, 267.
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In rendering this decision, the district court continued the task
initiated by Brown v. Board of Education- that of eradicating the
~ffects of past racial discrimination in the public school system.

Racial Disparities in Literacy Exam Passage Rates
In 1967, the Florida Legislature enacted a piece of legislation
known as the "Educational Accountability Act of 1967" ("Act")
in an effort to promote equal educational opportunities for all
public school students regardless of geographic location and to
create a system of accountability for education in the state. 4 A
subsection of the Act entitled "Pupil Progression" set forth the
standards for graduation from Florida public high schools, one
of which was satisfactory performance in functional literacy as
determined by the State Board of Education. 5 In 1978, the Florida
Legislature amended the Act to require passage of a functional
literacy examination prior to receipt of a high school diploma as
a means to measure such satisfactory performance. 6 Students who
completed the required number of credits to graduate but did not
pass the exam would receive a certificate of completion rather than
a diploma.7
The exam, known as the State Student Assessment Test, Part II
("SSAT II"), was first administered in October 1977. 8 The results of
the first three administrations of the test showed a much greater
rate of failure among black students than white students. 9 In May
1977, of the approximately 91,000 Florida public high school
seniors, 20.049% of black students had not passed the test and
were ineligible for a diploma compared with only 1.9% of white
students. 10 Suit was brought by the present and future twelfth grade
students who had failed or who would thereafter fail the SSAT II.
They filed a class action in federal district court against the state
and local officials responsible for adopting the exam, contending
that the SSAT II violated their Fourteenth Amendment due
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

FLA. STAT.§ 229.55(2) (a) , (d) , (f) (1976).
FLA. STAT. § 232.245(3) (1977). The legislation also provided for a
comprehensive testing program to evaluate students' basic skills development.
FLA. STAT.§ 229.57 (1976).
FLA. STAT.§ 232.246 (1979).
FLA. STAT.§ 232.246(3) (1979).
Debra P, 474 F. Supp. at 248.
Id. at 248-49.
Id.
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process and equal protection rights. 11 They claimed that the exam
was constitutionally invalid and served to perpetuate the effects of
past purposeful segregation. 12 Specifically, they argued that they
were given inadequate notice of the exam passage requirement
in violation of the due process clause. 13 The district court issued
an injunction enjoining the state from requiring passage of the
SSAT II as a condition of graduation for a period of four years
and held that utilization of the exam as a diploma requirement in
the present context violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection and due process clauses. 14
Eliminating Public School Segregation and its Effects
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the importance
of providing equal educational opportunities to public school
students regardless of their race. In 1955, the Court decided the
landmark case of Brown v. Board ofEducation (Brown I), where it held
that racial segregation in public schools deprives black students
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. 15 In that case, black public school students were denied
admission to schools attended by white students as a result of
laws requiring or permitting segregation based on race. 16 Such
legislation had been permissible under the prevailing "separate
but equal" doctrine, which allowed segregation based on race
as long as the races were provided substantially equal facilities. 17
Emphasizing the sense of inferiority such a system inflicted on
black students and the resulting negative impact it had on their
educational development, the Court concluded that separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. 18 Therefore, state
laws establishing separate public schools for students based on race
were unconstitutional. 19 This landmark decision helped to pave
the way for the integration of public schools. After this decision,
the Court separately addressed the issue of the relief to be awarded
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id. at 24~7.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 269.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
See id. at 495.
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in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II). 20 There, the Court held
that school boards were required to effectuate a transition to a
nondiscriminatory school system. 21
Although Brown I outlawed de Jure-or state-mandatedsegregation, the negative effects of decades of racial segregation
in public schools still prevailed after the case was decided. Over
a decade later, in Green v. County School Board, the Supreme Court
considered what responsibilities the states have with respect to
addressing the negative consequences of racial segregation in
public schools. 22 In that case, a school board implemented a plan
that allowed each student, regardless of race, to choose which public
school to attend in an effort to achieve a racially nondiscriminatory
school system as mandated by the Brown II decision.23 In Green, the
school district contained only two schools; one that had historically
been designated for white students while the other was reserved
for black students. 24 During the first three years of the plan's
operation, 115 black children had enrolled in the historically white
school, but no white students had chosen to attend the historically
black school. 25 The school board contended that by enacting
the plan, it had fully discharged its obligation under Brown JI 26
The Court disagreed, holding that the plan was not sufficient to
effectuate a transition to a unitary system as required by Brown II
because the school system was effectively still a dual system. 27 The
Court explained that it was the school board's duty to take the steps
necessary to completely eradicate racial discrimination in public
schools. 28 After Green, school boards were required not only to put
an end to the physical segregation of public schools, but they must
also eliminate the effects of the past purposeful discrimination. 29
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 300.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id. at 431-32, 437.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 437-38.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. , 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); see also
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1979) (holding that
a school board had an affirmative duty to eliminate the dual school system);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (holding that a
school board had a continuing duty to eradicate the effects of intentionally
segregated schools) .
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One way in which negative impacts of past racial discrimination
in educational systems are manifested is through policies that
require passage of a literacy test prior to obtaining a particular
right. For example, in Gaston County v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that requiring individuals to pass a literacy test before
becoming registered voters served to perpetuate the past denial
of equal educational opportunities in the state. 30 Noting that
the county had deprived black residents of equal educational
opportunities through its history of racial segregation in public
schools, the Court found that it was reasonable to infer that black
children would achieve a markedly lower degree of literacy than
would their better-educated white contemporaries. 31 In striking
down the literacy test requirement, the Court held that impartial
administration of the test was impermissible while these racial
discrepancies in literacy still prevailed. 32 The Court reasoned that
the requirement served only to perpetuate past inequities in a
different form. 33

The Debra P. Decision
In Debra P. , the district court was presented with issues similar
to those considered in Gaston County. Like the Supreme Court in
that case, the instant court invalidated a facially neutral testing
program that perpetuated past racial discrimination. 34 The court
ruled that requiring students to pass a functional literacy test, the
SSAT II, before receiving a high school diploma disproportionately
barred black students from receiving diplomas due to the inferior
education they had received as a result of the past segregation of
public schools. 35 The requirement thus violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. 36 The inadequate notice
provided to students before instituting the diploma requirement
was also a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. 37

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

395 U .S. 285, 296-97 (1969) .
Id. at 291 , 295.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 257 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.
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Citing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the essential role
of public education in our society, 38 the district court stressed
the importance of administering education in a manner that
comports with our historical and constitutional notions of fairness
and equality. 39 In its decision, the instant court emphasized the
grave significance of denying high school diplomas to students,
explaining that students would face a number of economic and
academic deprivations if they did not receive diplomas. 40 The court
noted that very few jobs were available to students who had no
high school diploma and that these students would also be unable
to attend college. 41 As a result, the court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs had a property right in graduating from high school with
a standard diploma. 42 The court further found that the plaintiffs
had a right to be free of the adverse stigma associated with receiving
a certificate of completion instead of a diploma, which created a
protected liberty interest in the diploma. 43 Thus, the court held
that denial of a diploma without adequate notice of the new SSAT
II passage requirement was a violation of due process. 44
In considering the SSAT II requirement's validity under the
equal protection clause, the district court rejected the plaintiffs'

38

39
40
41
42

43
44

Id. at 268. In Brown I, the Supreme Court explained: Today, education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today is it a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Debra P , 474 F. Supp. at 269.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Citing the Supreme Court's holding in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that
students have a property right in attending school, the district court noted
that Florida law required students to attend school and that "graduation is the
logical extension of successful attendance." Debra P, 474 F. Supp. at 266.
Id.
Id. at 267. The evidence presented to the court indicated that only two months
of school instruction were available between the distribution of the SSAT II's
functional literacy objectives to the teachers and the first administration of the
test. Id. at 263. A report by the Task Force on Educational Assessment Programs
found that the schedule for implementing the new graduation standards was
too severe, noting that students had been informed of the changes "at the
eleventh hour and with virtually no warning." Id. at 265.
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claim that the test contained racially biased questions, finding that
the test had been developed using generally accepted methods and
that any unfairness based on race was minimal. 45 The court further
opined that the test was rationally related to a valid state interest,
and thus the test instrument itself was constitutional. 46 However, the
court explained that a facially neutral testing program would still
be invalidated if it served to perpetuate past racial discrimination. 47
Thus, the issue was whether it was unconstitutional to use the test
as a diploma requirement during a time when black students
remained at a disadvantage due to the inferior education they had
received in prior years.
Noting that ten times as many black students as white students
were ineligible for diplomas because they were unable to pass the
SSAT II, the instant court found that the disproportionate impact
of the diploma sanction on black students was clear.48 The court
examined the history of Florida public school education- which
had been subject to state-mandated segregation until 1967 and
remained segregated until 1971- and found that schools attended
by black students during that time were inherently inferior to those
attended by white students. 49 It was clear to the court that this
disparity in educational opportunities was a direct cause of many
black students' inability to pass the SSAT II. The court emphasized
the school system's affirmative duty not only to eliminate the
physical segregation of schools, but also to remedy the effects of
such segregation. 50 In the instant case, the Florida public school
system's efforts to eradicate the learning deficits created during the
dual school period had not sufficiently addressed the educational
disparities caused by segregation, as evidenced by the SSAT II
results.51 Thus, the school system had not met its burden of
rectifying the negative effects of segregation.
The district court opined that utilization of the SSAT II as
a diploma requirement served to punish victims of past racial

45
46

47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 260-62.
The court found that the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring the
functional literacy of public high school graduates and that the SSAT II was an
adequate measure of students ' functional literacy. Id. at 261.
Id. at 254-57.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256-57.
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discrimination for deficits created by an inferior educational
environment, which was neither sufficient to remedy the negative
effects nor to create better educational opportunities. 52 Use of the
testing requirement in the present context, the court held, was a
violation of the equal protection clause. 53 The court explained that
although the SSAT II was facially neutral, it could not be used as a
diploma requirement until the effects of the dual school system no
longer placed some students at a disadvantage due to their race. 54
As a remedy, the court enjoined the state from requiring passage of
the SSAT II prior to receiving a high school diploma for a period
of four years. 55
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that use of the SSAT II
in the present context violated equal protection. 56 The Fifth Circuit
agreed that the test and the diploma sanction served to perpetuate
past purposeful discrimination. 57 Because the Florida state officials
could neither demonstrate that the disproportionate failure of
black students was not due to the effects of past segregation nor
that the diploma sanction was necessary to remedy those effects,
the court concluded that the immediate use of the sanction would
punish black students for deficiencies created by the dual school
system. 58
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit also elaborated on the notion
announced by the instant court that students have a valid property
interest in receiving a diploma upon graduation from a public high
school. The circuit court noted that although the State of Florida
was not constitutionally obligated to establish a public school
system, by doing so and requiring children to attend, the state
had created an expectation that successful students would receive
a diploma. 59 Such an expectation, the court held, constituted a
property interest that would be afforded constitutional protection. 60
52

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 257. Creating better educational opportunities was one of the stated
goals of the Educational Accountability Act of 1976. FLA. STAT. § 229.55 (2) (a)
(1976).
Debra P., 474 F. Supp. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
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Thus, the circuit court affirmed the instant court's holding that
the implementation schedule of the test violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee. 61
Debra P. 's Emphasis on Eradicating Past Discrimination

The Debra P. case served to recognize the significance of a
student's interest in receiving a diploma upon graduating from a
public high school by granting constitutional protection to that
interest. The district court's frequent references to education's
crucial role in our society throughout the opinion indicate its
substantial concern for having a quality public education system.
The case also served to acknowledge the gravity of the situation that
past purposeful discrimination in public schools had created for
black students. The instant court's holding as well as its repeated
emphasis on the need to achieve fairness and equality in the public
school system illustrate our court system's eagerness to eliminate
not only racial segregation itself, but also the effects of the dual
system.
The significance of the court's objective to eradicate the effects
of past purposeful discrimination becomes more apparent when
comparing the instant case to other similar cases, which did not
place as much emphasis on establishing a public school system
where all students received the same opportunities regardless of
their race. After DebraP., other suits were filed that challenged state
laws requiring the passage of a literacy exam prior to graduating
or being promoted to the next grade level on the basis that these
requirements resulted in racial discrimination. 62 Compared to the
instant case, these cases had only limited success in the courts. 63
Issues similar to those considered in Debra P. were presented
in GI Forum v. Texas EducationalAgency. 64 In that case, students and

61
62

63

64

Id.
See, e.g., GI Forum v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000)
(challenging the passage of a literacy exam as a graduation requirement
because disproportionate numbers of black and Hispanic students failed the
exam); Erik V. v. Causby, 977 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (challenging a
requirement that students pass a state standardized test before being promoted
to the next grade).
Rachel F. Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools,
34 AKRON L. REv. 107, 128-29 (2000) (noting the legacy created by the Debra P
decision).
87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
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advocacy organizations filed a class action challenging the use of the
Texas Academic Assessment System (TAAS) exam as a graduation
requirement, arguing that the test discriminated against minority
students and violated due process. 65 Like in Debra P., evidence
presented to the GI Forum court indicated that the TAAS exam did
have a disproportionate negative impact on minority students. 66
The court nevertheless upheld the exam requirement, holding
that the policy did not perpetuate prior educational discrimination
and therefore did not violate due process. 67
One notable difference between the instant case and GI Forum
is how the courts treated the plaintiffs' claims that the literacy
testing requirement violated the equal protection clause. The GI
Forum court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, finding that there was
insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination for those claims
to go to trial. 68 In contrast, the Debra P. court also found insufficient
evidence of intentional discrimination, but still struck down use
of the SSAT II as a graduation requirement. 69 Evidence of the
inferiority of black students' education under the dual system and
the disproportionate failure rates of those students on the exam
were sufficient to persuade the court that the exam requirement
violated equal protection.
In the absence of intentional discrimination, the GI Forum
court did not find an equal protection violation based on the
perpetuation of past racial discrimination, but it explained that
intent to discriminate was not required for such perpetuation
to constitute a violation of due process. 70 However, the court
required plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the TAAS exam perpetuated disparities in education based
on race. 71 Evidence of the state's history of racial discrimination
in public education and the statistics showing that the exam
requirement had a disproportionate impact on minority students
were insufficient to convince the court that the exam requirement
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 668.
In 1991 , 67% of black students and 59 % of Hispanic students failed the exam,
compared to only 31 % of white students. Id. at 671, 673.
Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 670.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 254-55 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
Id. at 670.
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served to perpetuate discrimination. 72 In contrast, the Debra P.
court, when presented with the same type of evidence, found this
evidence was indeed sufficient to show that the SSAT II perpetuated
racial discrimination.
Much of the Debra P. court's analysis with respect to this issue
centered on the precedent set out in Green v. County School Board
that required states to eliminate not only physical segregation of
public schools, but also the effects of the discrimination. 73 Judge
Carr was clearly very concerned about eradicating the effects of
past discrimination. Perhaps this explains his willingness to find
perpetuation of such discrimination based only on the fact that
black students had higher failure rates on the SSAT II than whites
did when the same evidence had not been sufficient to persuade
the GI Forum court. Another possible explanation for the seeming
disparity between the two cases is the fact that GI Forum was decided
over two decades after the end of public school segregation,
whereas Debra P. came about only seven years after segregation
ended. Regardless of the specific reason, what is clear is that the
Debra P. court was determined to remedy any possible effects of
past discrimination so as to promote a public education system that
afforded equal opportunities to all students regardless of race.
This resolve to correct racial discrimination is also apparent
when considering the lack of deference Judge Carr afforded the
state concerning decisions about public education. In Debra P., the
court held that while using the SSAT II as a graduation requirement
was unconstitutional, the exam could be administered to identify
students' learning deficiencies. 74 Thus, the court did not feel
compelled to defer to the state's judgment about how the SSAT II
should be used. In contrast, other courts have afforded significant
deference to states that implement similar testing requirements.
In Erik V. v. Causby, a North Carolina district court rejected a
challenge to a state requirement that students pass an exam before
being promoted to the next grade, noting that "federal courts have
no business substituting their judgment for that of the local school
board when it comes to qualitative achievement standards." 75
Similarly, the court in GI Forum upheld use of the TAAS exam
72
73
74
75

Id.
Debra P., 474 F. Supp. at 256-57.
Id. at 244, 269.
977 F. Supp. 384, 388, 390 (E.D.N.C. 1997).
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as a graduation requirement even though state officials did not
meet their burden of showing a causal connection between the
test's administration and students' improved performance. 76
The court reasoned that policies regarding education were the
responsibility of state governments and that courts should avoid
intruding on these decisions. 77 Judge Carr's decision not to
provide this same deference to the state's use of the SSAT II in
Debra P. further illustrates the concern for rectifying the effects of
past discrimination.
Conclusion
Even today, the disparities in educational opportumt.Ies
created by decades of racial segregation in public schools are widely
prevalent, as evidenced by the inferior facilities and resources often
characteristic of predominantly black public schools. 78 However,
equality in education has improved significantly compared to the
days when de Jure segregation was the law of the land. Our court
system has played a substantial role in effectuating much of this
progress. Brown !7 9 and Brown T/30 brought an end to state-mandated
segregation and required public schools to create a unitary system.
Green v. County School Board then imposed an affirmative duty on

76

77
78

79
80

Such a showing was required as the state officials bore the burden of
establishing that the test was educationally necessary. Rachel F. Moran, Sorting
and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. R:Ev. 107,
126-27 (2000).
GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
See, e.g., Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the Sensitivity of Education Costs to Racial
Composition of Schools and Race-Neutral Alternative Measures: A Cost Function
Application to Missouri, 86 PEABODY]. EDUC. 58, 60-61 (2011) (explaining that
predominantly black schools are assigned lower quality teachers than schools
with mostly white students); Howard Blume, LAUSD Agrees to Revise How English
Learners, Blacks Are Taught, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11 , 2011, availab/,e at http:/ I
articles.latimes.com/ 2011 I oct/ l l / local/la-me-1012-lausd-feds-201ll011
(explaining that schools with predominantly black student enrollment had
lower quality technology and library resources compared to schools serving
mostly white students); Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd &Jacob L. Vigdor,
School Segregation Under Color-Blind jurisprudence: The Case of North Carolina, 16
VA.]. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 46, 58 (2008) ("[I] n a world where schools attended
by white and middle class students tend to have better resources and more
qualified teachers than schools populated by low-income and disadvantaged
students, segregation leads directly to resource disparities.").
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 295 (1955).
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states to eliminate the effects of past purposeful discrimination. 81
Following in these progressive footsteps, the district court in Debra
P. continued the Supreme Court's legacy of striving for racial
equality in public schools by protecting black students' right to be
free from punishment for deficits created by past discrimination.
Our society depends on courts to uphold the Constitution's dictates
of equality and fairness when laws are passed that pose a threat to
these values. Thus, it is incumbent on courts to invalidate laws that
perpetuate racial discrimination in our educational system. The
instant court recognized this duty when it ruled on Debra P., and it
thereby upheld the values most cherished by our society.

81

391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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History in More Than Black and White:
The Story of One District Judge Who Faced
Down a Fiery Desegregation Controversy and
Created a Lasting Legacy
Harvest v. Board of Public Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269

(M.D. Fla. 1970)
by Lauren Millcarek
n January 29, 1970, Judge Ben Krentzman 1 ordered the
school board of Manatee County, Florida, to desegregate
through the use of busing. 2 This ruling seems innocuous
enough in hindsight, certainly a common event in that era. At
the time, however, the case of Harvest v. Board of Public Instruction3
prompted a clash between the determined district judge from the

0

Lauren Millcarek earned a J.D. 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law;
B.A. 2009, University of Florida. The author thanks the members and staff of the
Florida Law Review for their hard work, both on this Comment and on the journal in
general. Special thanks to Professor Dennis Calfee, without whom I would neither
have written this piece nor would I be privileged enough to have the opportunity to
clerk in the eminent Middle District of Florida.
Judge Isaac Benjamin "Ben" KrentzmanJr., a graduate of both the University
1
of Florida and the University of Florida College of Law as well as a World War
II veteran, served the Middle District of Florida from 1967 until his death in
1998. Biographical Directory of Federal judges: Krentzman, Isaac Benjamin Jr. , FED.
Jun. CTR., http:/ / www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=1319&cid=999&ctype=na
&instate=na (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
2
Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
3

Id.
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Middle District of Florida4 and the firebrand, reelection-seeking
Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr. 5-a controversy that made national
news. 6 And though these juicy facts 7 have long since faded into
the past, the ramifications of the Harvest decision are still being
felt today. This Comment will describe the legal and sociopolitical
history giving rise to this litigation, unpack the Harvest decision
itself, and finally examine the lasting legal and practical relevance
of the case.

Historical Background
We begin with the landmark 1954 U.S. Supreme Court case
of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) ,8 in which black children
were denied entry to white schools because of segregation laws. 9
The students challenged the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson 10 on the ground that segregated schools were not equal
and deprived them of equal protection under the law. 11 The Brown
I Court agreed, 12 overruling Plessy and holding: "[I] n the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 13 The
Court reasoned that segregation had negative psychological effects
on black children, even if the physical markers of equality (such
as school facilities equal to those of whites) were present. 14 Thus
began the wave of school integration that would slowly wash across

4

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Judge Krentzman received several death threats as a result of his involvement in
this case, and local newspapers called for his impeachment. See, e.g., Benjamin
Houston, Voice of the Expwited Majority: Claude Kirk and the 1970 Manatee County
Forced Busing Incident, 83 FLA. HIST. Q. 258, 266 n.11, 267 (2005), available at
http:/ / wwwjstor.org/ stable/ 29720193.
In a turn of phrase that sums up both his character and his role in this case,
Governor Kirk described himself as a "tree-shaking son-of-a-bitch." Randy
Sanders, Rnssling a Governor: Defiance, Desegregation, Claude Kirk, and the Politics
of Richard Nixon's Southern Strategy, 80 FLA. HIST. Q. 332, 345 (2002), available
at http://wwwjstor.org/ stable/ 30149242.
The New York Times covered the case on its front page for a week, and many
national television news broadcasts also picked up the story. See id. at 351.
See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 487-88.
163 U.S. 537 (1896) .
Brown L 347 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 494-95 & n.11.
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the country in the following decades.
Just as importantly, the remedy phase of the case was decided the
-following year in Brown !L 15 The Court held that district courts only
had to assess whether school authorities were taking steps to admit
students on a nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate speed."16
School authorities requesting additional time to desegregate were
merely required to show that they were attempting to implement
Brown I in good faith and that allowing the extra time was in the
public interest. 17 This undemanding standard gave the school
districts that were still entrenched in institutional racism plenty of
leeway, allowing them to proceed quite deliberately.
More than a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
the South's continued fight against integration in Green v. County
School Board. 18 The case concerned "freedom of choice" integration
plans, which nominally gave students the chance to choose their
schools, but which, in reality, simply maintained the segregated
status quo.19 In Green, the small school system of New Kent County,
Virginia, operated just two schools: one entirely white and one
entirely black. 20 After Brown I, the county switched to a token
"freedom of choice" desegregation plan in order to qualify for
federal aid. 21 Such plans were commonly used in the South to
maintain segregation because most students simply "chose" the
schools to which they had always gone. 22 The issue in the case
was whether such a plan satisfied Brown ls mandate of a "unitary
system," one free from all types of segregation. 23 The Green Court
held that "freedom of choice" plans, in and of themselves, were
not adequate desegregation methods. 24 It emphasized that while

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown![), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Jd.at441.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433-34.
See, e.g., id. at 441 n.5 (citing the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (noting
that children chose to attend the same schools due to such factors as: fear of
retaliation and harassment by black students for choosing white schools; public
officials' influence on black families to keep their children in black schools;
poverty that may have prevented black students from paying special fees at
white schools or buying clothing thought to be suitable for white schools; and
improvements in black schools that attracted black students to stay put)).
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 440.
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"freedom of choice" might be one step toward desegregation, it
was a means rather than an end. The Court also noted that if there
were "speedier and more effective" means of conversion to a unitary
system in a particular district, such as rezoning, then a "freedom of
choice" plan would be inadequate. 25 Therefore, schools could no
longer use "freedom of choice" to blatantly circumvent Brown I
The Harvest Orders

The Green decision brought things to a boiling point in the
South. 26 In 1969, a year after Green was decided, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 27
filed the Harvest action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in an attempt to force the Manatee County School
Board to comply with the new desegregation requirements. 28 The
county tried to skirt the issue by submitting a token redistricting
plan, but the court found the plan inadequate because it left eleven
county schools completely segregated. 29 The court struck down the
plan and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the court's decision. 30
The school district went back to the drawing board and
submitted three new potential desegregation plans. Two of the
plans were unacceptable because they still left certain segregation
issues unresolved; the third was the forced busing plan that Judge
Krentzman ordered inJanuary 1970, 31 to be implemented by April
6 of that year. 32 What followed this desegregation order was an allout, albeit one-sided, political war. Governor Kirk enthusiastically
rallied against integration in defiance of the order, while Judge

25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 441.
Houston, supra note 4, at 264.
The NAACP was often the party that initiated desegregation enforcement
suits in order to eliminate discrimination. In this case, the NAACP filed suit
through the plaintiff schoolchildren.
Houston, supra note 4, at 265.
Id.
Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 425 F.2d 1224, 1224 (5th Cir. 1970) ; see also
Houston, supra note 4, at 266.
Houston, supra note 4, at 266.
Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269, 275 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
Judge Krentzman ordered the defendants to submit a Notice of Compliance
by April 15. Id.
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Krentzman neutrally issued a series of orders upholding and
enforcing his plan. 33
The first skirmish took place closely on the heels of the January
desegregation order. In February, the defendant school board
moved to stay the desegregation order pending another appeal to
the Fifth Circuit. 34 The district court, citing the potential damage
to the public interest of postponing the desegregation, denied the
motion. 35
Intervenors 36-not described fully in the case but presumably
members of the antibusing movement gathering strength in
the South-then got involved. They moved for a new trial and a
rehearing, both of which the court denied in the same February
order. 37 The intervenors made four principal arguments: (1)
the desegregation order ignored the impact of Florida's Pupil
Assignment Law, which required the school board to take into
account each individual student's welfare in assigning schools; (2)
the order violated the 1964 Civil Rights Act by mandating busing;
(3) the order created racially motivated disturbances in the county
that were not present before the order was issued; and ( 4) the
court failed to consider whether the county had been operating as
an integrated school system before the order was issued. 38
The court addressed and rejected each argument separately,
dismissing the first, third, and fourth points rather quickly. First, the
court noted that the Pupil Assignment Law and the desegregation
mandate were not truly in conflict, and even if they were, the federal
33

34
35
36
37
38

The case under discussion actually comprises several orders issued by Judge
Krentzman in early 1970: the original order to desegregate, issued January 29
(which was quoted at length in the opinion but appears to be unavailable in its
entirety); orders denying intervenors' motion for a new trial and a rehearing
and defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal, issued February 26; an order
appointing the United States as arnicus curiae on April 6; another order issued
the same day ordering the Governor to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt for interfering with the court's desegregation order and a temporary
restraining order preventing him from doing so; an order the following day denying
the Governor's requested continuance; judgments finding the Governor and his
aides in civil contempt for failure to follow the court's orders on April 11; and finally,
an order that same day asserting jurisdiction over the Governor and denying the
Governor's motion to transfer the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 271-82.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 274-75 (citing Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. , 419 F.2d
1211 (5th Cir. 1969)).
They are described only briefly as "Mrs. Maryann Mona and others." Id. at 271.
Id. at 271, 275.
Id. at 271 .
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law would preempt state law. 39 The court also tersely dismissed the
intervenors ' third concern by noting that the fact that segregation
may keep the peace does not mean that the law will deprive
children of their constitutional right to an integrated school. 40
Finally, by quoting its original desegregation order, the court
briefly noted that it had, in fact, considered whether the county
had been operating under an integrated system and answered that
question in the negative because certain schools were still one-race
and the faculty remained largely segregated. 41
Turning to the crucial issue, the court devoted the majority of
its February order to thoroughly analyzing the intervenors' second
argument that the 1964 Civil Rights Act's antibusing proviso
prevented the court from ordering forced busing to achieve
desegregation. 42 The relevant provision of that Act read:
[NJ othing herein shall empower any official or court of
the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a
racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students from one school to another or one
school district or another in order to achieve such racial
balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to
insure compliance with constitutional standards. 43
The court rejected the intervenors' argument, emphasizing that
this statutory section did not limit the existing power of courts to
enforce their orders; rather, the statute provides that it was neither
meant to enlarge that power44 nor to place a duty on courts to use
busing in order to reduce racial imbalance. 45 Thus, although the
statute stated that courts need not use busing, the courts were still
free to do so if necessary to effect their desegregation plans.
Next, the court found that the provision in question did not
even apply because the desegregation order relied "not on the
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 274.
A unitary system requires schools to be desegregated at all levels, including
faculty. Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing United States v.Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 880 n.96
(5th Cir. 1966)). The court went on to emphasize that the bill's legislative
history also supported this interpretation. Id.
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[1964 Civil Rights] Act but on [the court's] inherent powers to
correct deprivations of constitutional rights." 46 Furthermore, the
-antibusing proviso did not apply where the purpose of the busing
was to "end state-imposed segregation." Rather, the statute applied
only where the purpose of the busing was "to achieve a racial
balance, that is, to arbitrarily obtain a certain racial mix, for the
sole purpose of having a certain percentage of black and white
students in a particular school." 47 The court, however, defined the
purpose of its order narrowly: it was "not done to achieve racial
balance, although that may be a result, but to counteract the legacy
left by the [School] Board's history of discrimination." 48 No matter
how the intervenors tried to frame the issue, the court refused
to let politics prevent it from desegregating the school district in
accordance with the law of Brown I It appeared, then, that the
school district would be forced to desegregate.

Governor Kirk and Political Fallout
As the deadline for the plan's implementation loomed, however,
things became even more contentious: Florida's Governor got
involved in the case. Governor Kirk, the first Republican Governor
to be elected in the state since Reconstruction, was a fiery and
outspoken leader of the antibusing movement. 49 Busing was a divisive
political issue at the time, and the Governor, in part seeking publicity
to invigorate his reelection bid later that year, personally interfered
with the implementation ofJudge Krentzman's order. 50 In early April,
the Governor drove from Tallahassee to Bradenton (where Manatee
County's superintendent was seated) and forcibly took over the school
board, which had finally undertaken plans to implement the judge's

46
47
48
49

50

Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Sch . Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1130 (7th Cir.
1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Deirdre Cobb-Roberts & Barbara Shircliffe, The Legacy ofDesegregation inRorida,
in EDUCATION REFORM IN FLORIDA: DIVERSITY A D EQUITY IN PUBLIC POLICY
i 9, 31 (Kathryn M. Borman & Sherman Dorn eds., 2007).
Id. Governor Kirk lost his bid for reelection. George Bennett, Claude Kirk,
1926-2011, Remembered as Flamboyant, Game-Changing Florida Governor, PALM
BEACH POST (Sept. 28, 2011 , 11:36 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/ state/ claude-kirk-1926-20 l l-remembered-as-flamboyant-game-1884386.
html. One can only speculate as to whether part of the reason he lost was due
to the public's perception that he scuffled with Judge Krentzman.
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order. 51 The Governor suspended the superintendent-even kicking
him out of his office52-and ordered state troopers to physically take
control of Manatee County's schools. 53
On April 6, 54 Judge Krentzman, alerted by local newspapers
of the Governor's brash actions, issued an order to the Governor
temporarily restraining him from interferingwith the desegregation
plan. 55 The judge also ordered the Governor to appear in court
the following day to explain to the judge why he should not be
found in contempt. 56 The Governor refused to appear, 57 though
he requested a continuance through counsel. 58 The judge denied
the Governor's motion to continue, reset the contempt hearing for
April 10, and ordered the superintendent to go back to work and
to ignore any instructions from the Governor to the contrary. 59
On April 9, prompted by Judge Krentzman's order, three federal
marshals and an Assistant U.S. Attorney arrived at the superintendent's
office to recapture it forcibly from the Govemor. 60 The incident
culminated in a standoff better suited to barrooms in the Old West
than classrooms in tiny Bradenton. The Governor's aides stated
that they had been instructed to ignore the court order. In tum, the
federal marshals retorted that the aides' defiance would mean their
arrest; the marshals then threateningly revealed their firearms. One
of the Governor's aides, a former law enforcement officer himself,
proceeded to reveal his gun. Fisticuffs then broke out, with the aides
retreating behind a locked door and the marshals pounding on it
from the outside, while reporters looked on in amazement. 61

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Cobb-Roberts & Shircliffe, supra note 49, at 31.
The Governor even answered the telephone in the superintendent's office with
the cheeky greeting, "Good morning, this is your superintendent." Houston,
supra note 4, at 268.
Cobb-Roberts & Shircliffe, supra note 49, at 31.
In addition to the restraining order and the show cause order, Judge Krentzman
also issued an order on April 6 appointing the United States as amicus curiae in
the case. Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269, 275 (M.D. F1a. 1970).
Id. at 276.
Id.
Governor Kirk was actually giving his State of the State address, in which he called
the Manatee County situation a "collision of the sovereignties." Houston, supra
note 4, at 275 (quoting Governor Kirk) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harvest, 312 F. Supp. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
Houston, supra note 4, at 276.
Id. at 277-78.

Published by STARS, 2013

79

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

248

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

The Governor was not present at this incident, but rather was
in Tallahassee for the birth of his son. Told by reporters that he
-might be arrested for failure to follow court orders, he quipped:
"I know jujitsu, don't worry." 62 Later, when a journalist asked if he
would personally face off with the federal marshals, the Governor
flippantly replied, "One marine, even an old one like me, can take
on 100 of anything else." 63
In the end, after protracted telephone negotiations and slights in
the press, 64 the Governor agreed to appear in court. 65 On April 11, 66
Judge Krentzman, unmoved by the Governor's bravado, held him in
civil contempt and fined him $10,000 per day67 until the Governor
backed down and allowed the desegregation plan to proceed. 68 A
week later, the busing plan went into effect69 and the media spotlight
faded away from the little town of Bradenton. However, the actions
ofJudge Krentzman had much more lasting consequences.
The Impact of Harvest and its Integration Legacy
The judge's ruling was eventually affirmed: the initial
desegregation plan was upheld per curiam by the Fifth Circuit, which
noted that the district court "clearly" did not abuse its discretion. 70
And just one year later, the wisdom of Judge Krentzman's ruling
was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, which upheld the use of

62
63
64
65
66

67
68
69
70

Id. at 278 (quoting Governor Kirk) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 280 (quoting Governor Kirk) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Governor's aide apparently claimed that if the federal marshals attempted to
reenter the school board building, the marshals would be "fired upon." Id. at 278.
Id. at 280.
On this date, the judge also denied the Governor's motion to transfer the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp.
269, 279 (M.D. Fla. 1970). Perhaps evincing his somewhat oversized ego, the
Governor claimed that his position essentially made him a "State" and that
the case was therefore between a State and the United States, making the U.S.
Supreme Court the proper forum for the dispute. Id. The judge, relying on a
long line of precedent holding that state officials are subject to the jurisdiction
of the district court, denied this motion and noted that" [ t] he argument that a
federal court may not interfere with the discretionary acts of state officials has
been rejected on innumerable occasions." Id. at 280.
The judge also held the Governor's aides in civil contempt. Id. at 281-82.
Cobb-Roberts & Shircliffe, supra note 49, at 32.
Houston, supra note 4, at 282.
Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 429 F.2d 414, 414 (5th Cir. 1970).
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forced busing in desegregation plans. 71 In that case, the trial court
adopted a desegregation plan that relied on both rezoning and
busing to reach a racial ratio mirroring the population in each
school. 72 The Court upheld the plan 73 and emphasized, "Once a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." 74 The Court, using
virtually identical reasoning to Judge Krentzman's analysis in
Harvest, 75 discounted the school board's reliance on the antibusing
proviso of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in its argument that the trial
court could not order busing. 76 The Court held that forcible busing
was an appropriate "tool" of desegregation. 77 Thus, one determined
district court judge, with proper analysis of precedent and statutory
authority, had a hand in the creation the law of the land.
It is also crucial to look beyond that legal history, though. When
scholars examine historical cases, their tendency is to focus on legal
relevance-how the case impacted the doctrinal landscape, whether
other courts will follow or depart from the case's reasoning, and so on.
However, the social relevance of such cases is sometimes overlooked,
and those that are analyzed in that way are typically only the watershed
cases cemented in the popular consciousness as well as the legal one:
the Browm, 78 the Mirandas, 79 the &(}3. 80 But the fact remains that

71
72
73
74
75
76

77
78
79
80

402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971).
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 15.
See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 17. Though the Court did not explicitly cite to Harvest,
the similarity in language and reasoning is striking. Compare Harvest v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 312 F. Supp. 269, 272-73 (M.D. Fla. 1970) ("The
[1964 Civil Rights Act] does not on its face prohibit the courts from doing
anything, but only stresses that the Civil Rights Act is not to be construed as
a conferral of new power.... The Court relies for its authority in issuing its
desegregation orders not on the Act but on its inherent powers to correct
deprivations of constitutional rights."), with Swann, 402 U.S. at 16--17 ("The
language and the history of [the 1964 Civil Rights Act] show that it was
enacted not to limit but to define the role of the Federal Government ....
There is no suggestion of an intention to restrict those powers or withdraw
from courts their historic equitable remedial powers.").
Swann, 402 U.S. at 30.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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district court cases-small, perhaps, when viewed in the shadow of
these landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions-actually have a huge
-impact, not only on the litigants involved in the particular case, but on
their families, their descendants, and their regions, as well. 81
In the case of Harvest, Judge Krentzman's order is still the
controlling law, nearly half a century later. Manatee County's school
board remains under judicial supervision. 82 It has maintained
a lesser degree of racial disparity than other schools whose
desegregation orders were subsequently lifted. 83 The students who
have grown up in these integrated schools in Manatee County
are necessarily profoundly different than those elsewhere, where
schools have resegregated or where they were never forcibly
desegregated in the first place. 84 These students' children, many of

81

82

83

84

Cf ScottA. Moss,

The OverhypedPathfromTinker to Morse: How the Student Speech
Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions-for the Law and for the Litigants,
63 FLA. L. REv. 1407, 1408 (2011) (describing the practical impact of the U.S.
Supreme Court's major student speech cases on the students themselves and
noting that the district courts' orders often had a more lasting effect on the
litigants than the much-delayed, anticlimactic U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
Florida State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, Desegregation of Public School Districts in Florida 41 (2006) , available at
http:/ / www.usccr.gov/ pubs/ 022007_FloridaDesegreport.pdf. Indeed, Manatee
County, unlike several other school districts in the area, has not attempted to
end this supervision in the past several decades. Id.
A recent report by the state shows that schools with "unitary status"-that is,
those that have been declared to be finally integrated by a court and released
from judicial supervision-have a "greater degree of racial separation than
those districts still under a Court Order," such as the one in place in Manatee
County. See id. at 58. The report notes, however, that "unitary status" schools
generally have higher enrollments and higher minority student percentages
than others; these differences may account for some of the racial separation. Id.
While this may be a factor, it is unconvincing that the lack ofjudicial oversight
has not contributed to the resegregation of these schools. And regardless of
the reasons for the racial disparity, the fact is that counties still under court
order are more integrated than others, which necessarily impacts the students
themselves. See infra note 84.
For just a few accounts of the exhaustive social science research showing the
lastingeducational, career, and social advantages of integrated schooling for
students of all races, see John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New
Racial Piety and the &segregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1719, 1766
n.216 (2000) (citing James M. McPartland & Jomills Henry Braddock II,
Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 141, 152 (Willis
D. Hawley ed., 1981); Janet W. Schofield, Promoting Positive Peer R.elations in
Desegregated Schools, in BEYOND DESEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF QUALITY IN
AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOOLING 91, 93 (MwalimuJ. Shujaa ed., 1996);Janet
W. Schofield, R.eview of Research on School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary
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whom have grown up in those same schools, have doubtless been
affected by this different upbringing.
Aside from the personal impact of Harvest, there is a regional
impact to consider, too. Scholars have argued that Florida's current
educational problems85 can be linked to the resegregation of many
Florida schools that has occurred since the original desegregation
wave in the 1970s. 86 Integrated schools thus provide important
opportunities to examine the difference between those schools

and Secondary School Students, in HA DBOOK OF RESEARCH o MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION 597, 610 Qames A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 1995) ;
Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of
School Desegregation, 64 REv. EDUC. REs. 531, 541-52 (1994); Christopher Jencks
& Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An Introduction, in THE BLACKWHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 9, 26, 31 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips
eds., 1998); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in
Desegregated Schools, in THE CoNSEQUE CES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATIO 103, 10325 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983)); Michael]. Kaufman,
PIGS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of RaceConscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 21 n.107
(2006) (citing Robert E. Slavin & Eileen Oickle, Effects of CoojJerative Learning
Teams on Student Achievement and Race Relations: Treatment by Race Interactions,
54 Soc. EDUC. 174, 178 ( 1981); Amy Guttman, Unity and Diversity in Democratic
Multicultural Education, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZE SHIP EDUCATION 71 Uames
A. Banks ed., 2004)); Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling
Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REv. 923, 943
n.151 (2002) (citing Carl Bankston III & Stephen J. Caldas, The American
School Dilemma: Race and Scholastic Performance, 38 Soc. Q. 423, 428 (1997);
Marvin P. Dawkins & Jomills Henry Braddock II, The Continuing Significance of
Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American
Society, 63]. NEGRO EDUC. 394, 397-400 (1994); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity
Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Omo ST. LJ. 733 (1998);
Robert E. Slavin, Effects of Biracial Learning Teams on Cross-Racial Friendships, 71
]. EDUC. PsYCHOL. 381, 386 (1979)). See generally Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White
Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REv. 599 (2011) (describing the social,

85

86

psychological, and cross-cultural competence benefits to children who attend
integrated schools); Willis D. Hawley, Who Knew? Integrated Schools Can Benefit All
Students, EDUC. WK., May 5, 2004 (explaining that integration benefits students
of all races); UC Study Finds Integrated Schools Benefit Students, UC DAVIS (May 10,
2006) , http: //news.ucdavis.edu/ search/ news_detail.lasso?id=7727 (noting that
students in integrated schools "are more likely to feel safer, less bullied, and less
lonely" than those in racially disparate schools).
Florida's education system has long been middling to low in national rankings.
Its graduation rate is near the bottom, as is its per-student spending. And it
ranks in the bottom half of the nation for testing on grade level. See, e.g.,
Ron Matus, Schools Still Rank Near the Bottom, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005,
availab/,e at http:/ / www.sptimes.com/ 2005/ 03/ 06/ State/ Schools_still_rank_
ne.shtml.
See, e.g., Cobb-Roberts & Shircliffe, supra note 49, at 44.
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and resegregated schools-opportunities which may afford experts
ideas on how to improve Florida's educational system as a whole.
Conclusion

In the end, it is tempting to look back at history as a tidy blackand-white photograph: one can readily conjure the mental image
of a young black girl, lunchbox in hand, being escorted to school
by federal marshals in fedoras and suits. Yet the real story is often
far more complex than that faded picture. While segregration may
seem superficially to be buried in the past, it is crucial to remind
ourselves that the problem is still very much alive. In Manatee
County, however, thanks to the legacy of one steadfast district court
judge, that image is both a thing of the past and, perhaps, a way
forward.
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Civil Cases of the Middle District of Florida
by Circuit Judge Susan Black, District Judge Harvey
Schlesinger, and Sylvia Walbolt

Editor's Note: Judges Black and Schlesinger and Attorney
Sylvia Wal bolt presented the overview of the civil cases as a
panel discussion using slides to illustrate case points. Their
presentation has been modified for a reading audience.
Bankruptcy Judge Karen Jennemann introduced the
panel.
Judge KarenJennemann's Introduction of the panel participants:

The Honorable Susan H. Black is truly the judge's judge in so
far as she has had judicial offices in virtually every capacity in the
State of Florida. She served as a Duval County Judge from 1973
to 1975 and then became a Circuit Judge in the Fourth Judicial
Circuit in 1975 and served there for four years until President
Jimmy Carter appointed her to the federal District Court on May
22, 1979. Consistent with Professor Denham's comments, the
confirmation process was completed quicker in those days and she
was actually confirmed just about 5 or 6 weeks later on July 23.
Upon joining the District Court, Judge Black made her name
quickly in the Jacksonville area, while she also earned a Masters
from the University of Virginia in 1984. She served as ChiefJudge
from 1990 to 1992. I think in virtually every one of those positions
she was the first woman to do all of it. So she is truly a trend setter.
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush appointed her to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Once again, she sped through
[253]
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confirmation and has been on the Eleventh Circuit since then.
In February of last year, she took senior status, although from my
conversation with her I don't think she is any less busy than she was
before.
Judge Harvey Schlesinger was born in New York, went to
college at the Citadel and then entered law school at the University
of Richmond. He served in the U.S. Army as a captain for three
years before he came to Florida. He ultimately went to work in the
U.S. Attorney's office inJacksonville and, in 1975, was appointed as
a Magistrate Judge in the Jacksonville Division. In 1991, President
George H.W. Bush nominated Judge Schlesinger to the District
Court, replacing his good friendJudge Howell W. Melton.
In June 2006, Judge Schlesinger entered senior status. He,
however, is also no less busy. If anyone in Jacksonville needs
something done, the first person you ask is Judge Schlesinger and
he is the one with the reputation that will get whatever needs to be
done completed. I have had the privilege of working with Judge
Schlesinger on the historical project since roughly 2006 and it has
been a joy to work with him on these projects and get to know him
much better. He has been a wise and kind man and I look forward
to hearing his thoughts on the civil cases you'll hear about.
And last, but certainly not least, we have attorney Sylvia Walbolt
on the panel. She has been practicing almost from the creation of
our District. She is an appellate lawyer who has handled hundreds
of appeals in all types oflaw from torts to products liability, business
disputes, construction, securities, antitrust, and employment. It is
indeed a pleasure to have someone with her breadth of experience
on our panel. She is a certified Appellate Lawyer in the State of
Florida. She is a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers
and now is devoting much of her time to teaching young lawyers
the skills of trial and appellate advocacy and I know that they all are
benefiting from her instruction and assistance. As I prepared my
introduction ,I wondered how many of the cases arising out of the
District have seen her involvement.
Sylvia Walbolt:
As you might guess, there have been hundreds and hundreds
of civil cases coming out of this District over the last 50 years and it
was a lot of fun reading many of them and picking out which ones
our judge panel would discuss.
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Judge Susan Black:
Judge Schlesinger and Sylvia Walbolt and I spent a couple of
hours talking about cases and we thought "how can we do this in
[the] thirty minutes [allotted for the session]?" We have picked a
potpourri of cases and narrowed the number to six: I will discuss
three cases and Judge Schlesinger will discuss three.
Costello v. Wainwright is the first case. Let me begin in 1972
with two inmates - one being Michael V. Costello who alleged that
the overcrowding in the state prison system and lack of minimally
adequate mental care in Florida systematically violated the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. At the time
of the complaint, roughly 10,300 inmates were incarcerated in a
prison system designed to accommodate 7,000 and, at most, 8,300
during emergencies. In the plaintiffs' prison, for instance, the
actual inmate population was nearly double its recommended
capacity. One cell roughly housed four persons.
In 1975, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
found substantial constitutional violations on a state-wide basis,
including severe overcrowding that exacerbated deficiencies in the
delivery of adequate medical care. The court entered a preliminary
injunction that was very broad and required the State of Florida to
reduce prison population or increase prison capacity. Ultimately,
there was a settlement agreement and, at that time, those who were
involved thought that was the end of the case. The settlement
agreement, however, was not the end of the case.
The inmates' challenges to prison conditions continued into
the early l 990's and the State of Florida was accused of routinely
breaching the terms of the settlement agreement by failing to
alleviate the prison conditions of overcrowding and inadequacies
in the delivery of medical care. Dick Julian, the former dean at the
University of Florida College of Law, was appointed special master
to insure substantial compliance by the State with the conditions of
the settlement agreement. It sounded simple. It was not simple,
but it was the work of dedicated lawyers and Dean Julian's constant
surveillance - and I call it that because rather than just serving as a
special master, he became very involved in the case and learned a
great deal about prisons.
The District Court entered a final judgment in the Costello case
in 1993, reasoning that, unlike most prison litigation cases that
remain open indefinitely, state officials had provided significant
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assurances that the improvement of the prison conditions would
be sustained. Dean Julian's recommendations were adopted and
remained in force. Over 20 years after it began, the District Court
supervision ended, the litigation was deemed a success, and the
case was closed in the Middle District of Florida.
Sylvia Walbolt:

And so was that, Judge, essentially the end of that case after
that judgment was entered?

Judge Susan Black:
It was the end of the case. The state-wide litigation ended but
it was not the end of litigation. Litigation became pinpointed.
There would be particular institutions that were alleged to be
inadequate either because of overcrowding or medical conditions.
One example was the Thomas v. Bryant case that was appealed in
2010 and that was an Eighth Amendment challenge to the use
of chemical agents on mentally ill inmates. One of the Middle
District judges entered the order in the case and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed that order.
This is an example of continuing litigation in the state prison
system but this state litigation ended and I think I would be remiss as
a postscriptifI didn't at least mention the Ruiz case, which was heard
in the Fifth Circuit. It is a Texas case that started in 1972 at the same
time the Middle District case was filed. It followed a similar track but
ended almost 12 years after the Middle District case ended, costing
the State of Texas millions of dollars that the State of Florida was
spared by the ending of the litigation earlier in Florida.
The next case law area, admiralty, has an important impact
in the State of Florida and especially so in the Middle District. A
glance at a map of the Middle District will show two major Cargo
Gateway ports in Tampa and Jacksonville. These deepwater ports
are the source of much of the admiralty litigation. We will present
a Tampa case and a Jacksonville case.
The Skyway Bridge case, which is familiar to many, began in
May 1980. It arose from a tragedy in which a shipping vessel, the
Summit Venture, struck the Sunshine Skyway Bridge and caused
a collapse of the bridge that led to the deaths of 35 people and
countless injuries. Twenty-six of the dead had been passengers on a
Greyhound bus that went off the bridge.
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Hercules Carriers, owner of the Summit Venture, sought
exoneration from or limitation of liability in response to the Florida
Department of Transportation's Motion for SummaryJudgment that
asserted the ship's pilot caused the accident by failing to reduce speed
or anchor once visibility was limited. Hercules Carriers contended
that the accident's legal and proximate cause was the onset of sudden
high intensity storms and that the pilot's navigation decisions were
reasonable in light of the circumstances. I think that every admiralty
lawyer in the State of Florida participated in this litigation.
Based on principles of admiralty, Hercules Carriers was entitled
to exoneration only if it could show the storm was the sol£ cause of
the collision. The District Court reasoned that inclement weather
was merely a condition related to the accident. It did not present
inherent dangers sufficient to cause the accident independent of the
pilot's negligence. The major contributing cause of the disaster, the
court held, was the pilot's failure to anchor ship once visibility was
reduced below one mile. By continuing, as he did, to go full speed and
navigating solely by reference to radar, the pilot was the legal cause of
the accident and Hercules Carriers was not entitled to exoneration.
About the same time in Jacksonville, construction was
scheduled to get underway on the Dames Point Bridge that would
connect Duval and Nassau Counties across the St. John's River.
After several years of false starts, the Jacksonville Transportation
Authority received approval to begin construction of the bridge
in 1979. But before construction commenced, a group of
businessmen challenged the administrative decision and along
the grounds that you would expect: first, the permit authorizing
the construction was invalid because the agency never articulated
the basis for its decision; second, the agency's decision to issue the
permit was arbitrary and capricious; and, third, if not arbitrary and
capricious, the decision was invalid because the agency failed to
conduct appropriate risk assessments studies.
It was interesting that the risk assessments study issue, which is
the last one mentioned, was of course on deferential agency review.
However, the timing of this case provides an interestingjuxtaposition.
This case was filed in 1979 and the Skyway Bridge accident was in
1980, but the allegations here were made before the Skyway Bridge
accident. Part of the claim was that the channel is narrow and if you
don't go through the center of the channel, you can hit the bridge
and endanger lives. The District Court for the Middle District of
Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the agency on all
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issues. Thus, the agency's decision was upheld. The Dames Point
Bridge is now the third busiest bridge in Jacksonville, with more than
seven to eight thousand vehicles crossing it daily.

Judge Harvey Schlesinger:
In deciding which three cases to select for historical purposes,
Sylvia Walbolt provided us with a list of all the Middle District of
Florida cases that went to the U. S. Supreme Court and then refined
the list to discover how may times these cases were cited by other
courts to give us some idea of what importance the Middle District of
Florida civil cases have played. Out of that list, I selected three. The
first case is, as Judge Black said, an admiralty case -Atlantic Sounding
vs. Townsend. The issue in this case was whether a common law claim
for lack of maintenance and cure, if the conduct was willful and
intentional, could lead to punitive damages for an injured seaman. I
ruled that it could, the decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit,
and when it went to the Supreme Court it turned out that there
was a 5/ 4 affirmance by the Supreme Court. The four dissenters
were Justices Samuel A. AlitoJr.,John G. Roberts Jr., Antonin Scalia
and Anthony M.Kennedy. The five who affirmed the decision were
Justices Clarence Thomas,John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth
Badar Ginsberg and Stephen G. Breyer. This was the first time that
the four, for lack of a more specific term, the supposed four liberals
agreed and joined in an opinion written by Justice Thomas.
Never happened before, never happened again and to bring a
little humanistic side to the story- after the case came down,Justice
Thomas was speaking at the University of Florida Law School. I
hopped in the car and went down there. I took a slip opinion of
Atlantic, hoping to have him autograph it. And Justice Thomas has
a very good sense of humor. For those of you who attended the
dedication of the new Orlando courthouse, you probably don't
know this but a day before the ceremony I got a phone call from
Judge Patricia Fawsett who said "could you do me a favor and bring
one of your extra robes to Orlando because Justice Thomas needs
one and you are about the only one on the court that is the same
size." Which I did. When I spoke to Justice Thomas at the University,
we started laughing about the way the Supreme Court had lined up
in this case and I said "what am I supposed to tell people about the
lineup," and he remarked, "well, remember in Orlando when you
loaned me a robe,just tell them I owed you one."
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Although it was listed as an admiralty case, the that the Supreme
Court had to resolve was a common law complaint - whether the
Jones Act or the Death on the High Seas Act did away with the
common law right to bring a punitive damage claim for lack of
maintenance and cure. And I had concluded that the Miles case,
in which the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act precluded
recovery for loss of consortium, didn't apply because this was a
claim for punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit already had decided that you couldn't get punitive damages
but the Supreme Court went the other way.
I want to read one portion of the dissenting opinion: "Endorsing
what was termed as a principal of uniformity, Miles teaches that if a
former relief is not available on the statutory claim we should be
reluctant to permit such relief on a similar claim brought under the
General Admiralty Law." Talking to Justice Thomas about it, that
sounded to me like a little bit of what you would call an activist judge
deciding "I am going to take a statute and make it apply to common
law when the statute didn't say we repeal whatever, whatever." And,
that was the thought that I wanted to share with you.
Two other cases that I am going to talk about are the Barnett
Bank of Marin Kennedy v. Gallagher, and the Lords v. Medtronics.
These two preemption cases moved from the Middle District of
Florida during the same term of the Supreme Court in 1996; they
had identical preemption issues, and both wten to the Supreme
Court. In one case I held there was no federal preemption and was
reversed; and, in one case I held there was preemption, and I was
reversed. I picked one of each and nobody agreed with me except
in the first case, Barnett Bank.
Barnett Bank acquired an insurance agency and started selling
life insurance out of a bank. This action violated a Florida Insurance
regulation that prohibited national banks from selling insurance in
cities with populations of less than 5,000. A provision in the 1913
Federal Reserve Act allowed for the sale of insurance in these small
communities. I concluded that because, inl863, the Supreme Court
had ruled that life insurance - or an insurance policy- was not covered
by the Commerce Clause, Congress could not regulate insurance
under the Commerce Clause, a ruling that was not changed until
roughly 1942. I concluded that there was no way when the Federal
Reserve Act was written in 1913 that Congress could have imagined
themselves controlling insurance sales in national banks and that
this was a banking statute, not an insurance statute.
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When the case went up to the Eleventh Circuit, Ed Judges Cox,
Peter T. Fay and Emmett Ripley Carnes agreed with me and held
that, under the McCarren Ferguson Act, state law would prevail
over the federal law in this, an insurance matter. Unfortunately,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court ruling in an
opinion written by Justice Breyer. There was total preemption by
the Federal Reserve Bank. I continue to disagree with the ruling
but when people ask "how do you feel after a decision that you
have made gets reversed by the Supreme Court on a 9 to nothing
vote?" my answer is "don't ask me, but ask those three judges who
agreed with me and got reversed."
The Lohr case was a very interesting one and that it turned
out thatjudge Black was on the Eleventh Circuit panel. That case
involved leads on an electronic pacemaker. When the leads failed, a
female patient almost died. The legal question that I had to address
was whether the Medical Device Act preempted a common law
negligence claim under Florida law. I ruled that the Medical Device
Act ("MDA") did preempt because this device had been approved by
the FDA and a claim could not be brought under Florida law.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the state law claim of
negligent manufacturing was preempted by the MDA, the claim
of negligent failure to warn was also preempted, but the negligent
design claim was not preempted and the strict liability claim was
not preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. The Court ruled basically that the medical device act did
not preempt any of the state claims that were brought. In this
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit was affirmed in the part in which they
said there was no preemption and was reversed on the part where
they said that there was preemption.
Sylvia Walbolt:
As illustrated by this small sample of Middle District of Florida
decisions rendered in the past fifty years, the Middle District of
Floridajudges have interpreted complex and nuanced legal issues
confronting the polity and issued precedential decisions that
impacted beyond the district's border. To this day, the opinions
of Middle District Florida continue to exemplify scholarly and
thorough analysis of cutting-edge legal issues affecting all facades
of daily life. It is this jurisprudential legacy, which will dictate the
Middle District's next fifty years.
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You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Stripping
Pornography from America's Workplace
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.

1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
by Tara R. Price
n Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,1 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida became the first
court in the country to hold that the presence of pornography
in the workplace-by itself-could constitute a hostile working
environment for women,2 actionable under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 3 Prior to Robinson, courts frequently concluded
that Title VII offered no protection to women who felt victimized
by the presence of "sexually-oriented pictures and sexual remarks"
in the workplace, so long as overt actions targeting particular
female employees did not also exist. 4 The opinion-written by

I

Tara R. Price received her J.D. in May 2012 from Florida State University College
of Law. She also holds a B.A. in Political Science (2001) from the University of
South Florida. She is currently serving as a judicial clerk for the Honorable Robert
L. Hinkle of the United States District for the Northern District of Florida. She
thanks her husband, Trey Price, for his love and support and gives special thanks to
the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for the opportunity to write a comment on this historically significant case.
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991 ) .
1
2
Id. at 1523; Tamar Lewin, Nude Pictures are Rul,ed Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1991 , atA14.
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
4
Robinson, 760 F. Supp at 1525.
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Judge Howell W. Melton, Sr. 5-was quickly lauded 6 and criticized.7
This Comment considers the groundbreaking aspects of Judge
Melton's opinion in Robinson and analyzes how Congress and the
courts have responded in the twenty-one years that have elapsed
since the decision.
"Hey, Pussycat:" Robinson's Story

Lois Robinson was one of only a few female skilled craftworkers
employed by Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. USI) .8 JSI was known
as "a boys club" and "more or less a man's world,"9 and it never
employed a woman in a leadership role. 10 In this male-dominated
environment, pictures of nude and partially nude women were
posted throughout the workplace in several forms, including:
photographs ripped from magazines, plaques on the wall, and
advertising tool supply calendars. I I These pictures typically featured

5

6

7

8

9
10

11

The Honorable Howell W. Melton, Sr., was nominated to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida by President Jimmy Carter
on March 29, 1977, and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on April 25, 1977.
Judge Melton assumed senior status on February 1, 1991. History of the
Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CE TER, http: //www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nG
etlnfo?jid=l 617&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl&highlight=null (last accessed
July 6, 2012).
·
See, e.g., Amy Horton, Comment, Of Superoision, Centerfolds, and Censorship:
Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 403, 406 & n.17 (1991) (citing news articles and stating that
Robinson "was immediately hailed in the national news media as a milestone
for women's rights" and "a ground-breaking decision for women in maledominated trades") .
See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST. LJ. 481 , 540 (1991) (criticizing the court
for "not tak[ing] the [F]irst [A]mendment issue seriously"); Paul B. Johnson,
The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 619, 624 (1993) ("[T]hejudge abandoned his role as trier of
fact on the most critical issue in the case and turned it over to social experts ..
. . [T] he judicial overkill that took place in Judge Melton 's courtroom cannot
be justified.").
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491. Robinson began working for JSI in 1977 as a
third-class welder and was promoted to a second- and first-class welder by 1991.
Id.
Id. at 1493.
Id. (stating that no woman ever worked as a leaderman, quarterman, assistant
foreman , foreman , superintendent, coordinator, vice-president, or president
of the company).
Id.
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"women in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or
submissive poses." 12
The pornography posted by JSI employees was "a visual assault
on the sensibilities offemale workers ... that did not relent during
working hours." 13 The pictures depicted women with their breasts,
buttocks, and pubic areas exposed. 14 One of the pictures depicted
two nude women "engaged in lesbian sex." 15 Male JSI employees
also wrote sexually suggestive graffiti and drew pictures of nude
women on the walls. 16 One of the drawings was "a frontal view of a
nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it." 17
Phrases scribbled on the walls included: "'lick me you whore dog
bitch,' 'eat me,' and 'pussy. "' 18
JSI employees also routinely made comments of a sexual nature
while Robinson was in the presence of the pornography, including
"Hey pussycat, come here and give me a whiff," "The more you
lick it, the harder it gets," "Black women taste like sardines," and
"I'd like to have some of that." 19 After Robinson complained to
her supervisors about the pictures and comments, her complaints
became the subject ofridicule. 20 Some of her coworkers nicknamed
her "boola-boola," an apparent "reference to sodomous rape," and
even yelled it at her in a parking lot. 21
Robinson's supervisors made her feel embarrassed over
her complaints. 22 Even her female coworkers asked her to stop
complaining because the male coworkers had begun to bring

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20

21
22

Id. Conversely, JSI employees stated that they would not have tolerated the
distribution of calendars with pictures of nude or partially nude men, as such
items would "probably [be] throw[n] ... in the trash." Id.
Id. at 1495. The pictures were so pervasive that Robinson was unable to recount
every one. Id.
Id. at 1495-96 (providing a plethora of examples, including one "picture of a
woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it") .
Id. at 1496.
Id. at 1495.
Id.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1498; see also id. at 1500 (providing examples of sexually harassing
comments heard by one of Robinson 's few female coworkers, including that a
female worker would "go to hell for culling pussy" or that a measurement was
"a cunt hair off').
Id. at 1498-99. Many ofJSI's employees felt that their behavior fell outside the
definition of sexual harassment because they felt that such harassment was
limited to propositioning a woman for sexual favors. E.g., id. at 1498.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1513.
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"hard pornography" into the JSI office to show female workers. 23
After Robinson made a formal complaint inJanuary 1985, she was
told that the "nudity on television was as bad as the pictures at JSI,
and [that] she should Uust] look the other way" 24 She was also
informed that it was her choice to work atJSI and that "the men
had 'constitutional rights' to post the pictures." 25 Robinson then
filed a complaint with the local Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission(EEOC), which performed only a "cursory"
investigation before determining that "being subject to sexually
explicit pornography" was not a cause for discrimination. 26 The
EEOC's rejection gave Robinson the right to sue in federal court.
Robinson filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, focusing her claim on her male
coworkers' demeaning comments about women and JSI's tolerance
and refusal to remove the nude and partially nude pictures. 27 She
sought damages for her losses and injunctive relief requiring JSI
to adopt and enforce an expansive sexual harassment policy. 28
Judge Melton held that Robinson had an actionable claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 because the presence
of pornography alone could constitute a sexual harassment claim
based on a hostile work environment. 30
The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Claims

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to outlaw a variety
of discriminatory practices. 31 Title VII, as it was amended in 1972,
23
24

25

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1515. Additionally, one supervisor made it expressly clear that "the
shipyards were a man 's world and that the rules against vulgar and abusive
language did not apply to the 'cussing' commonly heard" atJSI. Id. A union
representative told Robinson that she "was spending too much time attending
to the pictures and not enough time attending to her job." Id. at 1516. Union
leadership forcibly withdrew a union grievance Robinson filed about the
pictures . at 1516-17.
Id. at 1515. In a subsequent meeting, the Vice-President of one of JSI's
shipyards told Robinson that none of the posted pictures were pornographic
because only pictures "depicting intercourse, masturbation, or other sexual
activity" fell within that definition. Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1517.
Id. at 1490.
Id. at 1519.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
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prohibited employment discrimination "against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. "32 Title VII also prohibited the "limit[ation],
segregat[ion] , or classification of a person's] employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect [the individual's] status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 33
Title VII did not explicitly state that sexual harassment on the basis
of sex was considered discrimination; however, the EEOC-which
is responsible for enforcing federal laws against discrimination 34had issued guidelines recognizing that sexual harassment claims
were prohibited forms of discrimination under Title VII. 35
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the United States Supreme
Court first recognized that sexual harassment that created a hostile
working environment was an actionable claim under Title VII. 36
Mechelle Vinson filed a sexual harassment suit against her employer
and supervisor, alleging that her supervisor's demands for sexual
favors created a hostile environment. 37 Vinson's supervisor denied
that he ever made sexually suggestive remarks or had a sexual
relationship with her. 38 The district court denied Vinson relief, stating
that any sexual relationship "was a voluntary one having nothing
to do with her continued employment ... or her advancement or
promotions. "39 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's holding, finding that
Congress intended two avenues of relief under Title VII: 1) loss of
employment due to refusal of unwelcome sexual advances; and 2)
relief from a pervasive sexual harassment at work. 40
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39

40

Id. at§ 2000e-2(a) (1).
Id. at§ 2000e-2 (a) (2).
For more information about the EEOC, see About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU ITY COMMISSION, http: //www.eeoc.gov/ eeoc/ index.
cfrn (last visited March 30, 2012) .
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1985)).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980) , rev'd
fry 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded by Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Vinson, 753 F.2d at 144-145.
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After the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, the bank
asserted that under Title VII, Congress was only concerned
with prohibiting discrimination that resulted in an economic
loss and not "purely psychological aspects of the workplace
environment." 41 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the
majority and rejecting the bank's argument, 42 found that there was
not much legislative history to guide the Court's interpretation of
discrimination-based on sex-under Title VII. 43 However, the
Court reasoned that Title VII was intended "'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women. "' 44 The court
also recognized that EEOC guidelines-while not "controlling
upon the courts"-also considered sexual harassment resulting
in noneconomic injury a violation under Title VII. 45 Noting that
several courts had recognized Title VII claims where discriminatory
practices resulted in a hostile environment, 46 the Court held that
a plaintiff would have an actionable claim if the sexual harassment
was so "severe or pervasive" as to "create[] a hostile or abusive work
environment." 47 So long as the plaintiff could demonstrate that the
41
42
43

44
45

46
47

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 64 (noting that the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex
"was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives").
Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
Id. at 65. The EEOC guidelines stated that sexual conduct would be considered
prohibited sexual harassment under Title VII where "such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interferring with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (3) (1985) ).
Id. (citing cases involving actionable claims of harassment based on race,
religion, and national origin).
Id. at 66-67. The Court also cited with approval an Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion stating the same. Id. (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982)). The Henson Court stated that-based on EEOC guidelines
and legal precedent-the five elements necessary for proving a claim of sexual
harassment that creates a hostile work environment were:
The employee belongs to a protected group ....
The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment....
The harassment complained of was based upon sex ....
The harassment complained of affected a term, condition or
privilege of employment. ... [and]
(5) Respondeat Superior. Where ... the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-905 (citing cases and EEOC guidelines).
(1)
(2)
(3)
( 4)
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actions "alter[ed] the conditions of[] employment," the employee
did not need to show economic loss. 48
Only a few months after Meritor, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company4 9 whether
sexual comments by a coworker and nude or partially nude pictures
of women in the workplace were sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to create a hostile workplace. 50 Vivienne Rabidue had
filed a complaint alleging sexual discrimination and harassment
under Title VII after she was terminated from her employment. 51
Her complaint centered on the comments of a male supervisor and
the actions of male coworkers. 52 The supervisor was "a crude and
vulgar man," who often made obscene comments about women and
used "words like 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits.'" 53 Other male employees
routinely posted pictures of nude or partially nude women in
their offices or around the common areas. 54 The district court
determined that these actions did not constitute an actionable
claim under Title VII, finding that while they may have been "a
problem, [they were] not so pervasive a problem as to substantially
interfere with [Rabidue 's] employment." 55
The Sixth Circuit agreed, stating that sexually hostile
environments were characterized by the frequent occurrence of
harassing incidents and conduct. 56 While the court found the
supervisor's comments "annoying," it concluded that they were
"not so startling to have affected seriously the psyches of [Rabidue]
or other female employees." 57 The court concluded that the
48

49
50
51
52
53

54
55
56
57

Meritor, 4 77 U.S. at 67 (quoting H enson, 682 F.2d at 904). ChiefJustice Rehnquist
wrote that '"a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."' Id. (quoting
Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 615.
Id. The supervisor led another section of the company and did not exercise
authority over Rabidue. Id.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd
by 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17 ( 1993). The supervisor also called Rabidue a "fat ass" on at least one
occasion Id.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
Id. at 622.
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pictures of nude women had only "a de minimis effect" on female
employees when society at large "condones and publicly features
and commercially exploits ... pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on
prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places. "58
The court discounted other cases where harassment was found
to have created sexually hostile workplaces as involving "more
compelling circumstances" than Rabidue presented and noted
that the instant case could not be a violation because it "involved
no sexual propositions, offensive touchings, or sexual conduct of
a similar nature." 59 Further, the Sixth Circuit found that Title VII
served a very limited purpose:
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines
may abound [in some work environments]. Title VII was
not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgotten
that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle
for equal employment opportunity for the female workers
of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII
was designed to bring about a magical transformation in
the social mores of American workers. 60
Judge Keith, however, dissented and criticized the majority
for its failure to see Rabidue's workplace as "an anti-female
environment." 61 The dissent wrote- that in using the standard
of the reasonable person-the majority failed to recognize the
"wide divergence" between women's and men's perspectives on
appropriate sexual conduct. 62 Rather, the proper standard was
that of the reasonable victim, in this case, the "outlook of the
reasonable woman." 63 Finally, Judge Keith strongly disagreed that
because society condoned similar behavior, nude pictures and
58
59
60
61

62
63

Id.
Id. at 622 n.7 (citing cases).
Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430).
Id. at 623 (Keith,]., dissenting).Judge Keith alluded to several harassing and
discriminatory incidents not detailed within the majority opinion, including
the male supervisor's comment about Rabidue: "All that bitch needs is a good
lay." Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
Id. (emphasis added). The dissent also criticized the majority for suggesting
that women assumed the risk of working in sexually hostile environments
through their voluntary choice to accept employment. Id. "[NJ o woman
should be subjected to an environment where her sexual dignity and
reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally, or physically assaulted as a matter
of prevailing male perogative." Id. at 626-27.
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sexual comments in the workplace had only a minimal effect
on women workers. 64 Noting that society also condoned slavery,
the dissent rejected that society's opinion of the conduct was the
controlling analysis. 65

Judge Melton's Groundbreaking Holding
By sharply diverging and criticizing the standards established
in Rabidue, the Middle District in the instant case became the first
court in the country to hold that nude pictures in the workplacealone-could constitute an actionable sexual harassment claim
under Title VII. 66 Following the lead of Meritor and Henson v. City
of Dundee, 67 Judge Melton analyzed the five elements necessary to
prove a discrimination claim of sexual harassment that creates
a hostile work environment. 68 Judge Melton quickly concluded
that, under the first element, Robinson belonged to a protected
category. 69 Additionally, under the second element, the evidence
was clear that Robinson did not welcome, and in fact took offense,
to the complained of conduct. 70 In considering the third elementwhether Robinson could show that she was harassed because of
her gender-Judge Melton held that behavior could, but did
not have to include sexually explicit conduct or demonstrate an
animus toward one gender. 71 Instead, the Court held that behavior
would also be considered harassment based upon sex where it
demonstrated that it was "disproportionately more offensive or
demeaning to one sex," even ifthe intent of the behavior was not to

64
65

66
67
68

69
70
71

Id. at 627.
Id. Judge Keith stated that "I hardly believe reasonable women condone the
pervasive degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in
American culture." Id.
Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-1532 ("(l) [The P]laintiffbelongs to a protected
category; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex; ( 4) the harassment complained
of affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) respondeat
superior, that is, defendants knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt, effective remedial action." (citing cases)); see also
supra note 47 (detailing the five elements).
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23.
Id.
Id. at 1522.

Published by STARS, 2013

101

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

270

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

offend persons of that gender. 72 Under this standard, the pictures
of nude or partially nude women-by themselves-sufficiently
constituted harassment based upon sex. 73
Under the fourth element-the impact of the harassment on
Robinson and the work environment-Judge Melton concluded
that the working environment should be evaluated under a totality
of the circumstances test, requiring subjective and objective
elements. 74 Under the subjective analysis, Robinson would have to
show that she was as or more affected than a "reasonable person
under like circumstances"; under the objective analysis, Judge
Melton adopted the "reasonable woman" standard articulated by
Judge Keith's Rabidue dissent. 75 Criticizing Rabidue for minimizing
the impact of pornographic pictures by inappropriately considering
"social context," Judge Melton stated that the Sixth Circuit
overestimated society's opinions on pornography and failed to
understand that women may be more threatened by pornography
in the workplace than in society at large. 76 Further, Judge Melton
held that Title VII was enacted to reduce hostility and ensure that
women would be treated fairly in the workplace. 77 Judge Melton
concluded that Title VII would become a meaningless promise if
it failed to protect women who were not willing to accept abuse in
historically sexually hostile workplaces. 78
Finally, under the fifth element of liability, Judge Melton
refused to allow JSI to employ an "ostrich defense" that it had no
knowledge ofRobinson's and other female employees' complaints. 79

72

73
74
75
76

77
78

79

Id. at 1522-23. The Court found a variety of harassing behaviors in the instant
case demonstrating sexually explict conduct, showing an animus toward
women, and presenting a disproportionately offensive and demeaning impact
on women. Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
Id. The evidence was clear that Robinson was as, or more, affected than a
reasonable person under the same circumstances. Id.
Id. at 1526 (citing Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1212 .118 (1989)). When a woman
is not at work, she has the option of protesting or avoiding pornography. Id.
Inside the office, the posted pictures are the unavoidable daily speech of her
supervisor or coworkers. Id.
Id.
Id. The Court held that to implement Title VII protections properly, courts
must take into account "women 's sensitivity to behavior once condoned as
acceptable." Id.
Id. at 1529-30.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

102

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

STRIPPING PORNOGRAPHY FROM AMERICA'S WORKPLACE

271

Personal participation in sexual harassment was not required if the
employer failed or refused to act when its employees complained of
inappropriate behavior. 80 Despite Robinson's meeting all five of the
required elements, Judge Melton was only able to award her nominal
damages-one dollar-because Robinson's estimated losses were
not sufficiently precise under the requirements of Title VII. 81
The Court did, however, provide Robinson with injunctive
relief, mandating that JSI adopt and enforce a comprehensive
sexual harassment policy. 82 Judge Melton also engaged in a detailed
analysis of the First Amendment's free speech requirements and
held that, despite the objections of the defendants, the First
Amendment did not bar the Court from issuing the injunction. 83
Importantly, Judge Melton found no less than six reasons why
the First Amendment did not protect defendants' desires to post
pornographic pictures in the workplace. 84
Robinson Changes the Future of Sexual Harassment Law

The publicity of Robinson, along with her economic recovery
of only one dollar, helped lead to Congress's enhancement of
the remedy provisions of actions under Title VII. 85 Robinson
illustrated that economic damages were only available to replace
actual financial loss, and only if the plaintiff had well-documented

80

81
82
83
84

85

Id. at 1528. The Court found that JSI did not adequately respond to the
complaints of sexual harassment that it received and in fact handled complaints
in such a way as to discourage future reporting. Id. at 1530-31.
Id. at 1519-21 , 1532-33.
Id. at 1534; see also id. at 1538-39 (detailingJSI's requirements).
Id. at 1534-1538.
The six reasons are that: 1) JSI disavowed that it sought to express itself
through the pictures; 2) the pictures acted as discriminatory conduct, and
thus, could not be considered protected speech; 3) regulating discriminatory
speech at work is simply a time, place, manner regulation; 4) female employees
at JSI were a captive audience; 5) even if the speech was fully protected, the
government was allowed to regulate the speech because it had a compelling
interest in ensuring female workplace equality and the regulation was narrowly
tailored to this interest; and 6) analogizing public employee speech cases, the
Court could require a private employer to restrict speech in the workplace to
remedy a demonstrated harm on other employees. Id.
Kristen H. Berger Parker, Comment, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII:
Reconsidering the Workplace Environment, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 945, 954-55
(2008) (stating that the "paucity of available remedies" under Title VII made
vindication of rights "an empty quest").
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records; there was no provis10n for compensatory or pumt1ve
damages as a result of the emotional harm many plaintiffs had
suffered. 86 Due to the stress surrounding her harassment, Robinson
sent a letter to Congress instead of providing testimony in person
about the inadequacy of the remedies available under Title VII. 87
She listed many of the terrible abuses she had suffered, and stated
that she "recovered nothing to compensate [her] for the misery"
she suffered and that the "whole experience ha[d] taken years out
of [her] life." 88 Robinson's injuries demonstrated the necessity
of reform, and in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to authorize
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for unlawful
intentional discrimination, including sexual harassment claims
based on a hostile work environment. 89
In the more than two decades since Robinson, courts have
continued to support the principle that egregious conduct, like
that of JSI's management and coworkers, can be an actionable
claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. 90
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 91 reiterated that
requiring employees to work in a discriminatory or hostile work
environment was a violation ofTitle VII. 92 As opposed to the posting
of pornography in Robinson, Harris involved repeated sexually

86

87

88

89

90
91
92

Id. at 954 (citing cases). "[S]exually harassed women" who suffered great harm
were "rarely compensated for the actual nature and extent of the harms that
they suffer[ed]." Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond
Damages Control, 3 YALEj.L. & FEMI ISM 299, 300 (1991) (stating that women
suffered from a number of injuries, including "stress; high blood pressure;
nausea; insomnia; weight Joss; anorexia; and damage to self-esteem, personal
relationships, and reputation").
Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Before the H. Comm. On
Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 590 (1991) (written statement of Lois
Robinson) , reprinted in 1 THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1991: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 102-166 77 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. & Fay Couture, eds.
1994).
Id. at 81. Robinson also stated that her award of one dollar was "a slap in the
face." Id. at 82. She doubted the effectiveness of the Court's injunction because
the order was released on a Friday, and she saw more pornographic pictures
at work the following Monday. Id. (suggesting that without a financial penalty,
"the company simply does not have much incentive to change").
See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a) (1) (2012) (providing that a plaintiff may recover
compensatory and punitive damages in addition to any damages based on
actual financial loss proven with well-documented records).
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, Employment Discrimination Law: Visions of Equality in
Theory and Doctrine 137 (3d ed. 2010).
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 21.
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harassing comments, 93 but the principle remains the same: conduct
that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"
is forbidden. 94 Further, the Harris Court stated that a victim is not
required to show that the harassment caused psychological harm
because "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown. "95
The Harris Court, however, did appear to reject indirectly
Robinson's "reasonable woman" standard. The district court had
analyzed Harris's claims from the viewpoint of a "reasonable
woman," but the Supreme Court twice stated that the standard was
how a "reasonable person" would view the work environment. 96
More recently, in Oncal,e v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 97 a case
involving male-on-male sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
again used the "reasonable person" standard. 98 The Oncal,e Court
did elaborate, however, that the standard was that of a "reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position," meaning that courts needed to
give "careful consideration of the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." 99 Under this
standard, the Oncal,e Court rejected-like the Robinson Court-the
idea from Rabidue that sexually lewd material in the workplace could
not be offensive or lead to a hostile work environment because
society condoned it on television and in certain magazines.
Following Robinson, a number of scholars alleged that Title VII's
prohibitions on a hostile work environment conflicted with the First
Amendment's free speech protections. 100 These scholars assert that
93

Id. at 19 (providing examples, including the company's president asking
female employees to get coins from his front pocket and telling Harris to "go
to the Holiday Inn" with a supervisor to renegotiate her salary).
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 21-22. Both Justices Scalia and Ginsberg also concluded that
"reasonable person" was the best standard available by which to analyze the
conduct. See id. at24 (Scalia,]., concurring); id. at25 (Ginsberg,]., concurring).
97 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
98 Id. at 81.
99 Id. (stating that a football coach smacking a player on the butt after a good
play would likely not be considered as abusive where smacking his secretary
("male or female") on the behind in his office would reasonably be perceived
as abusive or hostile).
100 Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment, Sexual
Harassment, and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGE RS L. REv.
461 (1995) (discussing two prominentscholars'-Eugene Volokh and Kingsley
Browne-arguments in detail).
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Title VII violates the First Amendment because it makes certain
types of speech illegal based on the speech's content and message. 101
_The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue but has
appeared to disregard these assertions. In RA. V v. City of St. Paul, 102
the Court used Title VII as an example of permissible regulation
that did not violate the FirstAmendment. 103 One year later in Harris,
the Supreme Court ignored any potential conflict between Title VII
and the First Amendment, despite the fact that both parties and two
amici had briefed the issue. 104 Like Robinson, a number of courts have
concluded that Title VII prohibitions of a hostile work environment
do not run afoul of the First Amendment where the government
is merely regulating conduct, not the speech itself. 105 Other courts
appear to remain unsatisfied with this analysis. 106
Robinson was a crucial step toward implementing Title VII's
intended promise to safeguard the workplace from harassment
based on sex. Robinson was groundbreaking for several reasons:
it held that pornography alone could sufficiently create a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII, that society's condoning
the behavior on television and in other commercial media was not
the appropriate standard to use to evaluate the behavior, and that

101 Id. at 463-64. For additional information, see Kingsley R. Browne, Titl,e VII as
Censorship: Hostil,e Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST.
LJ. 481 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992).
102 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
103 Id. at 389-90 (stating that "sexually derogatory 'figh ting words"' may be subject
to regulation because when the government does not regulate conduct on
the basis of "expressive content," the fact that the conduct also expresses a
"discriminatory idea" will not shield the conduct from regulation); cf. id. at
409-10 (White, J., concurring) (using Title Vll protections as an example of
laws that should not, but might run afoul of the First Amendment under the
majority's ruling).
104 Sangree, supra note 100, at 504 n.188. The Supreme Court has subsequently
recognized that it provided Title VII "as an example of a permissible contentneutral regulation of conduct" in R.A. V. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
487 (1993).
105 See, e.g., Booth v. Pasco Cnty, No. 8:09-cv-2621-T-30TBM, 2012 WL 555854,
at *7-9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (citing cases and holding that threatening
speech in the workplace that violates Title VII did not run afoul of the First
Amendment).
106 See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 n.7
(5th Cir. 1995) (calling the Supreme Court's rulings "unilluminating" and as
sidestepping the First Amendment issue due to a lack of sufficient evidence,
even though the Fifth Circuit felt applying Title VII would have resulted in the
regulation of speech because of content).
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employees could not post pictures of nude women at work by using
the First Amendment as a shield and a sword to continue sexually
harassing behavior. Looking back with today's perspective, it is
hard to imagine that-only twenty-two years ago-these behaviors
were tolerated, and in some instances entrenched, in America's
workplaces. A more definitive ruling from the Supreme Court
on the constitutionality of legislation banning sexual harassment
remains necessary, but in the two decades since Robinson, the law
has continued to evolve to protect both men and women from
employment discrimination based on sex that creates hostile
workplaces.
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Limiting the Implied Rights of Action
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Dismissing Private Claims Brought Under
Section 19
Raymond J ames & Assocs., Inc. v. Nat'lAss'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1504 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
by Seth]. Welner
mplied private remedies, often cited as a judicial infringement
on congressional power-that is, a violation of the separation
of powers-have become commonplace in some areas of
securities regulation . The better practice, however, is to limit private
litigation in the securities arena and promote an internal resolution
of conflicts within self-regulatory organizations (SROs) with the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) acting as a congressional
watchdog. This was the approach thatJudge Elizabeth Kovachevich 1
endorsed in Rayrrwndjarneswith respect to§ 19 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, an approach that remains today's standard. This

I

Seth]. Welner received his JD. in May 2012 from Florida State University College of
Law and received a B.A. from the University of Florida in 2009. The author wishes
to express his deepest thanks to the Historical Society of the Middle District of
Florida for coordinating this special edition of the Florida H istorical Quarterly.
1
The Honorable Elizabeth Anne Kovachevich was nominated to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by Ronald Reagan on
January 26, 1982, and confirmed by the United States Senate on March 4,
1982.Judge Kovachevich served as ChiefJudge from 1996-2002. History of the
Federa!Judiciary, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGe
tlnfo?jid=l313&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl&highlight=null (last visited Sept.
25, 2012) .

[276]
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comment considers the possible implications of an alternative
holding, and concludes that Judge Kovachevich's ruling prevented
further chaos in an already burdened securities industry.

Factual Background
In 1987, Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (Raymond
James), a Florida corporation and registered securities dealer/
broker, underwrote and sold partnership units in Family Group
Broadcasting Limited Partnership to more than thirty individually
named defendants in the instant case. 2 The majority of the
transactions were completed prior to March 25, 1987-with only a
few extending past that date. 3 Subsequently, the individually named
defendants contacted the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), a former self-regulatory securities organization,
seeking mandatory arbitration against Raymond James pursuant
to NASD's internal procedures. 4 The claim for arbitration alleged
that Raymond James "failed to conduct reasonable and adequate
due diligence prior to marketing the Family Group offering to
the public." 5 Additionally, t11e purchasers argued: (1) that the
charged underwriting and management fees, as associated with
the partnership units, were excessive; (2) Raymond James lacked
a "reasonable basis for recommending the security to the public;"
and (3) RaymondJames made several material misrepresentations
while also failing to disclose material facts during the sale of the
partnership units.6
In an effort to avoid the arbitration, Raymond James moved
for a partial dismissal of the Investors' (the named defendants
that purchased the Family Group partnership units) Statement
of Claim, arguing to the NASD Director of Arbitration that the
2
3

4

5
6

Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. at'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. , 844 F. Supp.
1504, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
Id.
Id. In 2007, the NASD merged with NYSE Regulation, Inc., a subsidiary of
New York Stock Exchange LLC, and formed the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc. (FINRA). See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National
Association of Security Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related
Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory
Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc. , SEC Release No. 34-56145
Quly 26, 2007).
Raymond fames & Assocs., 844 F. Supp. at 1506.
Id.
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six year statute of limitations had run and, therefore, the claims
in arbitration were barred. 7 The director noted that while there
.was a technical deficiency with the original filing of the Uniform
Submission Agreement for arbitration, the statute oflimi tations did
not bar the proceeding. 8 With the intent of permanently enjoining
the arbitration, Raymond James filed an interlocutory appeal of
the director's decision with the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida. 9 Integral to the plaintiff's argument was
that the Director failed to comply with the internal rules of the
NASD which, as a self-regulatory organization, violated § 19 (g) ( 1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 1934 Act). That section
provides, in relevant part, "Every self-regulatory organization
shall comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and its own rules." 10 NASD and the other
named defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1)-asserting a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.11 The court granted Defendants' motion, holding
that because § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not
create a private right of action, there was no federal question and,
consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 12

Historical Backdrop to Raymondjames
For the district court, the issue presented-that is, whether

§ 19 of the 1934Act contained an implied private right of actionwas a matter of first impression. 13 Indeed, the matter was of first
impression to the circuit generally; however, implied private rights
of action within other sections of the 1934 Act had undergone
frequent litigation in other circuits. 14 To deal with the rise in

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

Id.
Id.
Id.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(g)(l) , 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (1) (2006)
(emphasis added).
Raymond James & Assocs., 844 F. Supp. at 1506.
Id. at 1508.
See id. at 1507 ("Plaintiff maintains that the NASD violated the duty imposed by §
19(g) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act by not complying with its own rules, e.g.,
the six year statute oflimitations. This is a case of first impression in this circuit.").
Only one court explicitly considered an implied private right in § 19 prior
to the instant case. See Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1254
(S.D.N.Y 1986) (discussed in detail below). Because the decision was not
appealed, no circuit court of appeal had ever considered the issue.
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litigation related to implied rights in the 1934 Act, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals designed a test specifically to identify
_ congressional intent in the implied private remedies arena. IS
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit identified two primary factors
for consideration: ( 1) whether the particular rule in question was
designed "for the direct protection of investors;" and (2) if it was
so designed, "whether the conduct involves more than mere errors
of judgment or negligence and is 'tantamount to fraud.' "I 6 This
test, however, was not universally accepted and largely fell to the
wayside with the development of approaches seemingly simpler to
apply-such as those taken by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit found that a claimant seeking a private
right of enforcement under the 1934 Act is best situated when the
internal exchange rule is a "substitute for regulation by the SEC"
and "imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law."I 7
For example, in Colonial Realty Corporation v. Bache & Company
the Second Circuit considered § 6 (b) (5) of the 1934 Act which
provides that rules adopted by an exchange, such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), should promote 'just and equitable
principles of trade" with the goal of protecting investors and the
public interest. IS Essentially, the court found that a private right of
action might be implied in § 6 of the 1934 Act, but "civil liability
for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by a member
cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged
by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature of
the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme."I 9 The
burden of proving that an implied right to civil liability exists befell
the party seeking its application-and that burden was substantial. 20
Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded that finding an implied
right in all§ 6 cases would prove "disruptive" and would require the
courts to undergo burdensome litigation-with the end purpose of
developing a "new body of broker-customer law." 2 I

15 See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch , Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135,
142-43 (7th Cir. 1969) .
16 See Sacks v. Reynolds Sec. , Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(quoting Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 142-43 (7th Cir. 1969)).
17 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. , 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966).
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b) , 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2006).
19 Colonial Realty Corp., 358 F.2d at 182.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 183.
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In the 1970s, however, the United States Supreme Court
drastically altered the implied rights landscape in several landmark
-decisions. Those decisions often concluded that a private right
of action was not implied in the statute. 22 This approach marked
a shift away from a more liberal analysis used in finding implied
rights, most notably with respect to§§ 14 and 6 of the 1934 Act, and
began the Court's general abandonment of those earlier decisions
in the decades that followed. 23 Much of the analysis in the Court's
revised approach was informed by a four-pronged test, of its own
making, revealed in Cort v. Ash. 24 The test synthesized some of
the analytical points raised by the Second and Seventh Circuits
and asked: (1) whether the party seeking enforcement is a class
member for whose protection the statue was enacted, (2) whether
there is an indication that the legislative intent supporting the
statute's enactment cautions for or against private remedies and
private enforcement, (3) whether a private right of enforcement is
consistent with the general underlying regulatory scheme, and ( 4)
whether the pleaded cause of action typifies traditional state law
enforcement or regulation .25 From there, the issue boiled down
to "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action." 26
With the Cort opinion setting the stage, the Supreme Court later
noted in a case concerning the 1934 Act that "implying a private
right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous
enterprise, at best." 27 Thus, where the "plain language of the
provision weighs against implication of a private remedy, the fact
that there is no suggestion whatsoever in the legislative history that

22
23

24
25
26
27

See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
See, e.g.,]. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964) (holding in relation

to § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, "While [the statutory] language makes
no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is
the 'protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result."). Barak '.s abrogation was later
recognized in Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001)
("Since our decision in Barak, we have retreated from our previous willingness
to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one. Just last
term it was noted that we 'abandoned ' the view of Barak decades ago, and
have repeatedly declined to 'revert' to 'the understanding of private causes of
action that held sway 40 years ago."') (internal citations omitted)).
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Id.
Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575.
Id .. at 571.
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§ 17 (a) may give rise to suits for damages reinforces our decision
not to find such a right of action implicit within the section." 28
Moreover, the Touche Ross Court pointed to several examples in the
1934 Act where a private right of action was expressly provided for
in the statutory language; such was the case in§§ 16(b), 18(a), and
9(e). 29 According to the Court, "Obviously, then, when Congress
wished to provide a private ... remedy, it knew how to do so and
did so expressly. "30
Perhaps most analogous to the Raymond James case is a 1986
opinion from the Southern District of New York-Brawer v. Options
ClearingCorp. 31 In Brawer, the plaintiff was a stock option investor for
two SROs-the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (AMEX) and The
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) .32 Pursuant to the internal
rules of these SROs, when a securities-affecting reorganization is
announced, an internal securities committee must fairly adjust the
exercise price to option contract holders and writers. 33 The plaintiff
claimed that the SROs' decision to make no adjustment in the face
of his proposed recapitalization plan violated their own internal
rules-resulting in a lack of compliance with §§ 6 (b), 17 (A) (b)
(3), and 19(g) (1) of the 1934 Act. 34 The plaintiff sought private
enforcement of these statutory provisions under the theory of an
implied private cause of action. 35 Ultimately, the court granted
the defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (6) because no implied right existed. 36
The court's analysis began with the 1975 Amendments to the
1934 Act, relying heavily on the increased regulatory oversight of
the SEC as evidencing congressional intent to leave enforcement

28
29
30
31
32

33
34
35
36

Id.
See id. at 572.
Id.
633 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
Id. at 1255. Self-regulatory organizations are the manifestation of Congress's
intent to highly regulate national exchanges while nevertheless avoiding a
direct governmental burden; that is, "the exchanges take the leadership with
Government playing a residual role. Government [stores] the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the
hope it [will] never have to be used. " WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS &JAMES ALLEN,
DEMOCRACY A D FINANCE 82 (1940).
Brawer, 633 F. Supp. at 1255-56.
Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id. at 1262.
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of§§ 6(b) and 19(g) in the SEC's capable hands. 37 For support,
the court cited to a Senate report from the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs that stated, "'self-regulation would be
continued, but the SEC would be expected to play a much larger
role than it has in the past to ensure that there is no gap between
self-regulatory performance and regulatory need. "' 38 The court
reasoned that largely due to the 1975 Amendments, the previous
thirty years of scattered precedents supporting the existence of an
implied private cause of action in § 6(b) had lost influence and
credibility. 39 Though the plaintiff relied on the Second Circuit's
1944 largely-followed opinion in Baird v. Franklin, 40 the court
found that more recent Supreme Court precedents, along with the
1975 Amendments, muddied the reasoning of that opinion and its
progeny. 41 Further relying on the Cort opinion, the court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted because a private cause of action did not exist in §§ 6(b)
and 19(g)(l) of the 1934Act. 42
From Cort and Brawer, Came RaymondJames
Keeping with the general trend discussed in Brawer, Raymond
James relied on a straight legislative intent approach in refusing
to find an implied private cause of action in § 19 of the 1934
Act-further solidifying the national mood against finding
implied causes of action. 43 Unlike most of the 1934 Act's implied
rights cases, however, the instant court considered a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction-as opposed to the
standard dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted. 44 Nevertheless, the district court relied on much of
the same reasoning described above. Even before addressing the
jurisdictional issue, the instant court noted that the burden of proof
for finding a proper invocation of the court's jurisdiction befell the
37
38

Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1258 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94m Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in [1975]

39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 1257.
Brawer, 633 F. Supp. at 1257-58.
Id.
See Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 844 F.

44

Supp. 1504, 1507 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
Compare id. with Brawer, 633 F. Supp. at 1262.

U.S. CODE, CONG. &An. NEWS 179, 181).
141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
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plaintiff, Raymond James. 45 Next, and still before addressing§ 19
of the 1934 Act specifically, the court looked to § 27 to identify the
Act's general jurisdictional statute. The court cited to the following
pertinent language:"' [t]he district courts of the United States . . .
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter . . .
and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter .... "' 46 Because the
defendants violated a duty created under the chapter, or so the
plaintiff argued, § 27 provided appropriate jurisdiction in the
district court. 47
After setting the backstage for§ 19(g) (1) and describing the
NASD's alleged breach of its own rules, the instant court classified
the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations as "unique." 48 The court
labeled the issue as a matter of first impression and limited the
issue before it to exclude the nature of the NASD rules at issue and
focus, exclusively, on the plaintiff's contention that the NASD was
civilly liable under§ 19(g) (1) by not complying with its internal
six-year statute of limitations arbitration rule.49
The bulk of the court's remaining analysis addressed the
plaintiff's analogy between §§ 6 and 19 of the 1934 Act. 50 The
plaintiff argued that since the regulatory scheme of § 6, which
provided for a minimum level of internal rule oversight for an
exchange's continued registration, was closely aligned with the
scheme in§ 19, which required a SRO comply with its own rules,
it would follow that an implied private cause of action under § 6
would attach to§ 19 as well. 51 The court disagreed. 52 Despite the
instant court's recognition that other courts (and possibly Congress
through its silence on the matter during the 1975 amendments)
condoned a private cause of action under § 6, the court refused
to hold that an implied right in § 6 (assuming that one existed),
which dealt with exchanges, could or should apply to § 19 of the
Act, which dealt with SROs. 53

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Raymond James & Assocs., 844 F. Supp. at 1506 (citation omitted).

Id. at 1507 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)). ·
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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According to the Raymond James court, "While Plaintiff has made
some very interesting and complex arguments about finding a private
right of action in§ 19 [],the Court concludes that these arguments are
smoke and mirrors." 54 The court simply did not buy into the argument
that an implied right in § 6 could be imputed to § 19 because a review
of legislative history revealed no grounds for finding congressional
intent. 55 Thus, the court "refused to be the first" to find an implied
right. 56 The court summarized its position: "Regardless of whether
there is a right of action in § 19 ... and regardless of what party filed
what document with the NASD and when they filed it[], the fact is that
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this case . ... "57 Because there
was no federal question (in the court's view) arising under§ 19, there
was no subject matter jurisdiction. 58
Comparing the Consequences of the Implied Remedy in§ IO(b)
and Rule 10(b)(5) with the Modern Trend Toward Limiting
Implied Remedies Generally as Evidenced in Raymondjames

Since the disposition of Raymond James & Assocs., no court has
found a private right of action in § 19 (g) of the 1934 Act. Though
parties continue to litigate the issue, courts consistently find that
Congress did not intend for a private right of action to exist in that
section of the code. 59 The treatment of§ 19 is consistent with the
general trend over the last thirty years to avoid implied rights, both
in the context of the 1934 Act and other federal acts. 60

54
55
56
57
58
59

60

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1508.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., MM&S Fin., Inc. v. at'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 364 F.3d 908, 910
(8'" Cir. 2004) ("MM&S wisely abandoned its claim based on section 78s(g)
(1) [§19], as the weight of authority precludes such a private right of action."
(citing Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209,
1213 (9th Cir.1998) ("It is undisputed, even by [the plaintiff], that a party has
no private right of action against an exchange for violating its own rules or for
actions taken to perform its self-regulatory duties under the Act. Thus, to the
extent that [the plaintiff] seeks private relief for NASD['s] ... breach of its own
rules, its claims are barred."))).
See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION 439-40 (6'" ed.
2009) (" [F] or more than thirty years the Supreme Court has been narrowing
the number of implied remedies available under federal statutes . . . . The
restrictive trend of the implication cases generally has not bypassed the
securities laws.") .

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

116

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF r 934

285

Today, the most relied-upon implied right of the 1934 Act is
in § IO(b) and its complement, Rule lOb-5; consequently, it has
also caused the most litigation. 61 The question to be answered in
these implied rights cases extends from Congress's intent both in
passing the Act initially and in its several amendments; that is, at
what point do civil litigation costs incurred by participants in the
securities markets outweigh investor protection efforts? Courts and
academics have failed to reach a consensus on this issue. 62 Though
the trend has been to avoid private remedies, § 10 (b) litigation
continues to effectuate large costs on market participants. 63 As
for§ 19 of the 1934 Act, litigation is significantly less prevalentpossibly because no court has ever recognized a private remedy
under that section. 64
One of the most recent cases to consider the issue of an implied
right of action in § 19 is the Eighth Circuit's MM&S Financial
v. NASD decision, which held the same as Brawer and Raymond
james. 65 In MM&S Financial, the court considered whether the
plaintiff could sue NASD for violating its own rules-in relation
to arbitration dismissals-and held that § 19(g) (1) creates no
private right of action. 66 "A simple review of section 78s(g) (1) 's
plain language prompts us to conclude Congress did not draft that

61

62

63

64
65
66

Id. at 441. This Comment does not review the plethora of case law concerning
implied rights under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 expressly. However, it does
consider the issue implicitly in terms of the general impact increased litigation
costs have on participants in the securities markets.
For scholars supporting implied rights in the 1934 Act, see Robert H.A.
Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to
Barak, 7 N.W. U. L. REv. 227 (1984); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action,
67 VA. L. REv. 553 ( i 981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under
Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities
Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 ( i 980). For scholars against
finding implied rights in the 193 Act, see Michael]. Kaufman, A Little "Right"
Musick: The Unconstitutional judicial Creation of Private Rights of Action Under
Section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 287 (1994); David
S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5:Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57
N.W. U. L. REv. 627 (1963).
See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the
Securities Acts, 10 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 62, 63 (2004) ("The judicially created
remedies have upset the balance that Congress struck between investor
protection and costs imposed on the securities markets. In addition, Rule
lOb-5 actions eclipse or almost nullify express rights of action that Congress
provided in the 1934 Act.").
See MM&S Fin., 364 F.3d at 910.
Id.
Id.
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section with an eye toward creating private rights of action against
the NASD defendants for violating their own rules." 67 Thus, the
Raymond James opinion was consistent with the trend at the time to
move away from implied rights in federal statutes and remains in
line with the federal courts' subsequent path. A review of the Cort
factors, with emphasis placed on congressional intent, supports
this course.
Of the four Cort factors (protected class, legislative intent,
underlying purpose oflegislative scheme, and state law relegation),
legislative intent is given the most weight. 68 One of the primary
arguments against a congressional intent to have private rights of
action in the 1934 Act, even with respect to§ lO(b) and Rule lOb5, is the existence of express private rights of action in the Act. 69
Express private rights appear in the following sections: (a) § 9,
providing for private remedies for securities manipulation listed on
a national exchange; 70 (b) § 16 (b), providing for a private recovery
of short-swing profits; 71 (c) § 18, providing for private rights of
action where misrepresentations are made in specific SEC filings; 72
(d) § 20A, creating a private remedy for insider trading; 73 and (e)
§ 29 (b), allowing for suits to void contracts created in opposition to
specific provisions of the 1934 Act and SEC rules and regulations. 74
These express rights indicate that where Congress wanted private
recourse, it provided that option explicitly. 75 The lack of a private
right in a specific section, then, indicates that Congress did not
intend for a private remedy to exist. This reasoning is consistent
with the canon of statutory construction inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius (inclusion of one is exclusion of another); 76 that is, where
67
68

69
70
71
72
73
74
75

76

Id. at 911 (relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)).
See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94
(1981) ("[U]nless the congressional intent can be inferred from the language
of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential
predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.").
Gordon, supra note 63, at 74-75.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2006).
Id.§ 16(b) , 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
Id.§ 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (added as an amendment in 1988).
Id.§ 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l (a).
Id.§ 29(b) , 15 U .S.C. § 78cc(b).
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 63, at 77. The Touche Ross Court also relied on
this construction when it held that Congress, when intending for private
enforcement,knew how to do so through the adoption of express language so
providing. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560 at 572.
Gordon, supra note 63, at 74.
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Congress provides a right or condition (or the like) in one section
of an Act, but leaves it out of other sections within that same Act,
that right or condition is not imputed to other sections-rather, it is
impliedly excluded. 77 Indeed, even in Brawer, where the existence
of an implied remedy in § 19 was first considered, the court found
a lack of legislative intent through congressional silence. 78 Brawer
noted that while congressional silence as to a private remedy does
not "foreclose" the possibility of an implied right, "the [1975
Amendments] Senate Report shows that Congress did consider
the necessity of improved enforcement and chose to invest that
power in the SEC. The Report expresses a legislative intent to
preserve self-regulation in the industry and to rely on the SEC for
enforcement of SROs' performance." 79
Those supporting implied rights in this area of the law
tend to rely on a theory of congressional acquiescence; that is,
Congress knew of the federal court decisions providing private
rights and did nothing to thwart that common-law development
through amendments. 80 Indeed, Raymond James relied on the
congressional acquiescence argument, but the argument failed. 81
Assuming a theory of specific acquiescence (where Congress has
acquiesced to private remedies imputed to specific sections of
the Act-not the Act generally), § 19 remains outside the scope
of conceivable congressional acquiescence because no court has
ever found a private right of action implied in that section. 82
Additionally, the congressional acquiescence argument is routinely
rejected by courts, 83 and, quite plausibly, by Congress itself:
"Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be
deemed to create or ratify any implied private right of action, or to

77
78
79
80
81
82

83

Id.
Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ).
Gordon, supra note 63, at 87.
Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
1504, 1507 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
See Gordon, supra note 63, at 87 ("The acquiescence argument is simple.
Congress is fully aware that the federal courts have crated implied remedies
under the securities acts. However, Congress has not reversed any implied right
of action or stopped the courts from creating them, even though Congress has
amended the securities acts several times. Therefore, Congress has acquiesced
in what the courts have done. ") .
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
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prevent the Commission, by rule or regulation, from restricting or
otherwise regulating private actions under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. "84
The importance of the Raymond James opinion emanates from
what Judge Kovachevich did not do, rather than from what she did.
That is to say, she did not broaden the scope of implied remedies
in the 1934 Act and, therefore, did not open the floodgates of
litigation. A finding of an implied remedy in § 19 might have
resulted in the unbridled litigation attempts now seen with § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5-which indeed stemmed from a single 1946 district
court opinion. 85 The Raymond James court explicitly noted that no
court had ever found an implied right in§ 19-and it "refuse[d]
to be the first." 86 Had the court held differently, § 19 could have
been the subject of monstrous litigation efforts. 87 This would
prove problematic in light of Congress' intent to balance investor
protection against regulatory costs in the securities markets and
would also contradict recent congressional actions broadening
SEC oversight of SROs. 88 With§ 19 specifically, and with respect to
the 1934 Act more generally, the better practice is the one that has
dominated since Touche Ross and Raymond James: unless expressly
provided in the section, Congress did not intend a private right of
action. Such policy guards the balance between investor protection
and litigation costs on participants in the securities markets.

84

85

86
87

88

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 203, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 ( 1995). "This section shows that in 1995 Congress believed that it had
not previously ratified the general process of creating implied rights o action
under the securities acts; otherwise the language would be moot. " Gordon,
supra note 63, at 92.
Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Section lO(b)
cases are now among the most heavily litigated issues in securities law. See supra
text accompanying notes 59-61.
Raymond fames & Assocs., 844 F. Supp. at 1507.
Though the RaymondJames court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the majority of courts have dismissed similar actions for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Brawer v. Options Gearing
Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
See Gordon, supra note 63, at 93 (noting that uncertainties in implied remedy
litigation "have caused voluminous civil litigation and enormous expense.
Much of this expense has ultimately been borne by investors-both plaintiffs
and other shareholders of corporations. It is a particularly expensive way to
make federal law.") .
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Lives Revisited: Drawing the Line Between
History and Hollywood
Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 204 F. Supp.
2d 1338 (M.D Fla. 2002)
by Brian M. Stewart
o one knows exactly what happened on the final voyage of
the fishing vessel Andrea Gail or the exact circumstances
surrounding how the six crew members aboard met their
demise. However, many became familiar with the story of the
Andrea Gail and her crew through Sebastian Junger's book about
the one-of-a-kind weather phenomenon that caused those six men
to perish at sea. 1 Many more became familiar with the story when
Warner Bros. Pictures ("Warner Bros.") released the film The Perfect
Storm based on Junger's book, featuring a number of high-profile
actors such as George Clooney, Diane Lane, and Mark Wahlberg. 2
Warner Bros., however, never sought permission to depict any
of the individuals featured in the film and never compensated
any of those people or their families in any way. 3 Six plaintiffs,
comprised of one former crewmember who quit after the Andrea

N

Brian M. Stewart received a J.D. (2013) at the University of Miami School of Law.
He earned a B.A. in Political Science at New College of Florida in 2009.
1
SEBASTIAN juNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A ThuE STORY OF ME AGAINST THE
SEA (1997).
THE PERFECT STORM (Warner Bros. Studios 2000).
2
3
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne If), 336 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.
2003).
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Gails penultimate voyage 4 as well as the surviving children and
spouses of two Andrea Gail crewmembers, brought an action
against the producers of the movie in the Middle District of Florida
asserting claims for unauthorized commercial misappropriation
and invasion of privacy. 5 The plaintiffs asserted claims for
unauthorized commercial misappropriation not only of their own
likenesses, but also for the decedents' likenesses, and claims for
the invasion of privacy, including allegations of both false light
invasion of privacy and public disclosure of private facts. 6 Judge
Anne C. Conway7 held that the term "commercial purpose" in the
commercial misappropriation statute 8 does not extend to the use
of an individual's name or likeness in an expressive work that has
no commercial advertising purpose 9 and that the plaintiffs had no
standing to bring a relational right to privacy claim and presented
no evidence of any violation of their own privacy rights. 10
Tyne I helped to clearly define the rights of filmmakers when
creating expressive works based on real circumstances and real
people. By deciding Tyne Jin favor of Warner Bros., Judge Conway
recognized that expressive works that depict real persons are entitled
to full First Amendment protection, whether the works are fiction,

4

5

6
7

8
9
10

Michael McLeod, Troubled Waters: There Is Supposed to Be Calm After Nature's
Fury. But That Peace Escapes One Woman, Caught in a Twisted Tale of Hollywood, the
Legal System and a Lasting Love, ORLA DO SE TI EL, May 1, 2005, at Fl. Doug
Kosko, who served as a cook aboard the Andrea Cai~ left the swordfishing trade
altogether after having a "deep spiritual communication" with a swordfish he
slaughtered on the second-to-last trip of the Andrea Gail Id.
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne/), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2002). Although the Andrea Gail was based out of Gloucester, Massachusetts, the
captain and two deckhands lived in Manatee County, Florida. Eric Alan Barton,
Perfect Storm Ads Upset Late Captain's Ex-wife, Su SENTINEL, June 5, 2000, http:/ I
articles .sun-sen tin el. com/ 2000-06-05 I news/ 0006040307 _l _andrea-gail-billytyne-movie. The decedents' survivors continued to reside in Southwest Florida,
bringing this action as a diversity suit in the Middle District of Florida.
Tyne I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
Judge Conway was appointed to the Middle District of Florida by President
George H .W. Bush in 1991. Since 2008 she has served as the Chief Judge for
the Middle District of Florida. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Conway,
Anne C., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http:/ / www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetinfo?jid=500
(last visited Sep. 16, 2012).
FLA. STAT.§ 540.08 (2001).
Tyne I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-42.
Id. at 1343-44.
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non-fiction, or a combination of the two. 11 Such a finding ensures
that storytellers are not forced to make the "Draconian choice" of
" [confining] their story to documented facts, [setting] their story in
a wholly mythological world, or [submitting] to the censorship and
pecuniary demands of real-life characters and/ or heirs. "12

The Evolution of Privacy Rights in Florida
Determining whether someone's likeness has been
"misappropriated" involves a delicate balance. Section 540.08 of
the Florida Statutes is used to prevent exploiting another's likeness
"for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes," 13 but determining
what falls into that category has significant implications for First
Amendment rights. 14 Individuals are entitled to the right to privacy
in the details of their lives, but journalists, authors, musicians, and
filmmakers must have some leeway in relating the stories of real
people and real events. 15
Before "moving pictures" existed, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis warned of the need for a right to privacy, or as Judge
Thomas M. Cooley put it, the right "to be let alone." 16 Warren

11

12
13

14

15

16

Arnicus Curiae Brief of the Motion Picture Ass'n of Arn. , Inc. , et al. , Supporting
Defendants Time Warner Entm 't Co. at 4, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm 't Co. ,
901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (No. 03-1251) .
Id. at 2.
FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2012) ("No person shall publish, print, display
or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or
advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any
natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use ... ").
The Supreme Court has held that motion pictures are entitled to free speech
and free press protection guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
See]oseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
FLA. STAT.§ 540.08(4) (2012) ("The provisions of this section shall not apply
to: (a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of
any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or
other news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or
presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such
name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes; (b) The use of such
name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the resale or
other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other articles
of merchandise or property where such person has consented to the use of
her or his name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connection with
the initial sale or distribution thereof; or (c) Any photograph of a person
solely as a member of the public and where such person is not named or
otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such photograph.").
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY 0 TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).

Published by STARS, 2013

123

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

292

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

and Brandeis were particularly concerned with technological
developments that allowed a person's image to be captured and
~eproduced. Both Warren and Brandeis believed that individuals
needed legal protection from "invasion either by the too
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds." 17
As the television and motion picture industries evolved, so too
did the law surrounding the right to privacy. The common law
progressed toward greater protection of privacy rights, as four
distinct torts emerged: 1) intrusion into one's seclusion or solitude;
2) public disclosure of private facts; 3) false light invasion of privacy;
and 4) appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for the
defendant's advantage. 18 Many states codified such laws, including
Florida, which established a prohibition on the appropriation of an
individual's name and likeness for commercial purposes in 1967. 19
In Loft v. Fuller, the Fourth District Court of Appeal helped
to define the reach of both Section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes
and the common law. 20 Loft involved a book21 and a movie 22 that
portrayed events related to the fatal crash of Eastern Airlines
Flight 401. 23 Following the crash, numerous crew members and
passengers on subsequent Eastern Airlines' flights reported seeing
the ghosts of Flight 401 crew members, including the captain of
that flight, Robert Loft. 24 Loft's widow and two children brought
an action for invasion of privacy and unauthorized publication of
Loft's name and likeness as a "reappearing ghost" in the book and
the movie. 25
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination
that the defendants' actions did not constitute commercial
misappropriation. The Loft court narrowly interpreted Section
540.08 to prohibit only the unauthorized use of a name or likeness
"to directly promote the product or service of the publisher." 26
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 206.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 652A-652l (1977).
Fla. Stat. § 540.08.
408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
JOH G. FULLER, THE GHOST OF FLIGHT 401 (1976).
THE GHOST OF FLIGHT 401 (Paramount Television 1978).
Loft, 408 So. 2d at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622-23.
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The court refused to believe that the term "commercial" was used
in the statute to encompass the unauthorized use of all names in
publications sold for a profit. The court did believe that to read
it as such would result in serious conflict between the statute and
the First Amendment. 27 The Loft court also dismissed the plain tiffs'
common law invasion of privacy claims, taking the majority view
that generally the deceased's relatives may not maintain an action
for invasion of privacy. 28 However, the court did not want to create a
blanket law completely foreclosing the relatives of decedents from
bringing invasion of privacy claims and stated that if circumstances
were sufficiently egregious, a relational right to privacy claim could
be maintained. 29 In order to meet the heavy burden of establishing
a relational right to privacy action, though, the relatives must have
experienced an independent violation of their own privacy rights
based on the nature of the publication. 30
Film and literature are not the only media protected as
expressive works under Section 540.08. In Valentine v. C.B.S., Jnc., 31
a witness in the murder trial of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter objected
to her portrayal in a song written by Bob Dylan and Jacques Levy
about Carter's unjust conviction. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to damages because her name was not used to directly
promote any particular product or service. 32 The Val,entine court
reiterated that "the use of a name is not harmful simply because
it is included in a publication sold for profit."33 Furthermore, the
court expressed concern that an interpretation of Section 540.08

27
28

29
30

31
32
33

Id. at 623.
Id. See, e.g., Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc. , 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969);
Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co. , 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Maritote v.
Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965); Starrels v. Commissioner,
304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962) ; but see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 200
S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1973) (holding that a relational right to privacy cause of action
could be maintained).
Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624.
Id. An example given by the court included the display of grotesque pictures
of the deceased 's corpse . Id. at 625. However, when police officers displayed
photographs and a video of a fourteen-year-old boy's autopsy in a private
setting, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the burden was not met
due to the limited display of the video and photographs. Williams v. City of
Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 433.
Id.
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that absolutely barred the use of an individual's name without
consent would raise "grave questions as to its constitutionality." 34
Florida courts have also been reluctant to find liability in cases
alleging the public disclosure of private facts. In Cape Publications,
Inc. v. Hitchner, 35 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of the tort, which
creates liability only if the matter disclosed is highly offensive and
not of legitimate concern to the public. 36 In Hitchner, a newspaper
published confidential information about a child abuse case that
had been lawfully obtained from government records. 37 The
Supreme Court of Florida stressed that the public's interest in
obtaining information often outweighs an individual's desire for
privacy. 38 The court upheld the long-standing belief that "'the truth
may be spoken, written, or printed about all matters of a public
nature, as well as matters of a private nature in which the public has
a legitimate interest. "' 39 However, in order to maintain an action
of public disclosure of private facts, the facts must be true. 40 If the
facts are untrue, the appropriate claim to bring would either be
defamation or false light invasion of privacy. 41
Navigating the Federal and State Courts
In Tyne I, the plaintiffs contended that the marketing and
distribution of the movie constituted a commercial purpose under
Section 540.08. 42 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that First
Amendment protection did not extend to The Perfect Storm because
of the substantial and material falsity throughout the film. 43

34
35
36

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id.
549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives publicity
to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a)
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not a legitimate
concern to the public.").
Hitchner, 549 So. 2d at 1375.
Id. at 1377-1378.
Id. at 1378 (quoting Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652D special note on relation of§ 652D
to the First Amendment to the Constitution ( 1977).
See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1230 (7th Cir. 1993).
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne[), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1340 (M.D.
Fla. 2002).
Id. at 1341.
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Judge Conway found the facts of Tyne I to be similar to Loft
v. Fuller. 44 Judge Conway interpreted Section 540.08 using the
definition of "the purposes of trade" outlined in Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition. 45 This interpretation emphasizes
that the use of another's identity in a movie is not ordinarily an
infringement of one's rights unless specifically used to attract
attention to a work unrelated to the individual. 46 While the
defendants admitted selling promotional materials such as t-shirts
and posters, no such promotional material bore the likenesses of
any of the plaintiffs or the deceased. 47 Thus, Judge Conway could
not find any genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs'
likenesses or the decedents' likenesses were used to directly
promote the film. 48
Judge Conway also considered the plaintiffs' argument that
Warner Bros. was liable under Section 540.08 because the studio
held the movie out to be a true story despite containing numerous
fictionalized elements. 49 Whether the studio claimed the movie was
fiction or non-fiction was immaterial to the court. Judge Conway
noted that no Florida court has ever considered falsity to be an
element of a cause of action under Section 540.08 and suggested
that the plaintiffs may have confused the ideas of unauthorized
publication of one's likeness with the common law claim of false
light invasion of privacy. 50 Judge Conway was unwilling to extend

44
45

46
47
48
49

50

Id.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 47 (1995) ("The name, likeness,
and other indicia ofa person 's identity are used 'for purposes of trade' under
the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in advertising the user's goods or
services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in
connection with services rendered by the user. However, use 'for purposes
of trade' does not ordinarily include the use of a person 's identity in news
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in
advertising that is incidental to such uses.").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF u FAIR COMPETITIO § 47 cmt. c (1995).
Tyne I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
Id. at 1342.
Id. The film contained a message at the beginning of the film stating, "THIS
FILM IS BASED 0 A TRUE STORY" A disclaimer in the closing credits
explained that "This film is based on actual historical events contained in
'The Perfect Storm' by Sebastian Junger. Dialogue and certain events and
characters in the film were created for the purpose of fictionalization." Tyne
v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne!!), 336 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
Tyne I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1342-43.
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the law in the plaintiffs' favor, finding Florida law in this area to be
"well-settled and unambiguous." 5 1
The claims of false light invasion of privacy of the decedents
were also decided according to the precedent set in Loft. Judge
Conway held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring an
invasion of privacy claim on behalf of a dead relative. 52 Regardless
of the nature of the personal relationship with the deceased, the
common law right of privacy is strictly personal. 53 Neither the scenes
depicting the decedents nor the scenes depicting their relatives
were sufficiently egregious to establish an independent cause of
action for the plaintiffs. 54 Although two of the surviving children
were depicted in the film, neither of the actresses portraying the
girls spoke any lines. Moreover, all of the scenes in which the
children were depicted were factually accurate. 55 Consequently,
Judge Conway held that the plaintiffs had not presented any
evidence showing there was a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the required independent violation of their own privacy
rights. 56
Finally, Judge Conway addressed the plaintiffs' claim for
public disclosure of private facts. Although the plaintiffs argued
that their lives, as depicted in the film, were of no public concern,
Judge Conway never reached that issue. 57 Judge Conway found that
there was a fatal flaw in the plaintiffs' claim because the allegations
stated that the entire depiction of the plaintiffs was completely
fabricated. 58 Because the plaintiffs did not allege that the private
facts disclosed were true, they were unable to maintain the cause
of action. 59 Although the plaintiffs may have had a valid claim for
defamation, that claim was never asserted. 60

51
52
53
54
55

56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 1343 n.l.
Id. at 1343.
Id. (citing Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
Id.
Id. One scene showed a photograph of the two girls that their father kept in
the wheelhouse of the boat. Another scene showed the girls at the memorial
service for the Andrea Gail crew. The two admitted that they did attend the
memorial service and that their father did keep a picture of them in the
wheelhouse of the Andrea Gail. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Unwilling to give up a potential share of the film's profits, the
plaintiffs appealed the Middle District's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 61 The plaintiffs
dropped the public disclosure of private facts claim but continued
pursuing both the false light invasion of privacy and commercial
misappropriation claims. 62 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
false light invasion of privacy claim de novo and came to the same
conclusion as Judge Conway. The Tyne II court agreed that the
plaintiffs could not maintain a relational invasion of privacy claim
under Florida common law. 63 Although the plaintiffs claimed that
the movie's depiction of the Andrea Gails captain was "egregiously
painful and injurious," the court did not believe that the film's
depiction met the rare and unusual circumstances necessary to
pursue a derivative invasion of privacy claim. 64 The court went
on to state, "We do not believe that the Florida courts, in crafting
this limited 'relational' right to privacy, intended to extend the
exception to depictions that are merely inaccurate or dramatized. "65
On appeal, the plaintiffs attempted to reshape their commercial
misappropriation claim by placing greater emphasis on the statutory
construction aspect of the argument. Thus, the plaintiffs argued
that an interpretation of Section 540.08 that barred the use of one's
likeness for "any commercial or advertising purpose" could not be
limited merely to promotion; such an interpretation would render
the term "commercial" to be mere surplusage. 66 Unwilling to delve
into the intricacies of Section 540.08's scope and the applicability
of Loft, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida: "To what extent does Section 540.08 of
the Florida Statutes apply to the facts of this case?" 67
The Florida Supreme Court subsequently rephrased the
certified question to read: "Does the phrase 'for purposes of trade
or for any commercial or advertising purpose' in Section 540.08(1),
61
62

63
64
65
66
67

At the time of the Middle District's decision, the film had grossed more than
150 million. Id. at 1341.
Jordan Tabach-Bank, Missing the Right of Publicity Boat: How Tyne v. Time
Warner Entertainment Co. Threatens to "Sink" the First Amendment, 24 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REv. 247, 275 (2004).
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne II) , 336 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.
2003) .
Id.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1291.
Id.

Published by STARS, 2013

129

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

298

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Florida Statutes, include publications which do not directly
promote a product or service?" 68 The Florida Supreme Court did
~ot find persuasive the plaintiffs' argument that applying Section
540.08 to only those activities that "directly promote a product or
service" would limit the statute's reach to only advertisements. 69
Tracing the progression of cases interpreting Section 540.08, the
Florida Supreme Court found it telling that in the nearly forty
years since the Florida Legislature had enacted the statute, the only
amendment to the statute was to rephrase it into gender neutral
terms.70 Essentially, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with Judge
Conway's conclusion that the term "commercial" in Section 540.08
applied only to promotion of a product or service and agreed that
the First Amendment protects such expressive works. 71
Implications for Film and Media
In deciding Tyne I in favor of the First Amendment, Judge
Conway helped to establish just how far filmmakers can go when
dramatizing historical events. The distinction in determining the
extent of the right to privacy in cinema is perhaps even more
important than any other form because film is such a "powerful
medium in the construction of our national myths." 72 Filmmakers
have the ability not only to report history, but the ability to rewrite
history. For a significant portion of the population, The Perfect Storm
is the only conduit to the lives of the crew members of the Andrea
Gail. Although the term "BASED ON A TRUE STORY' indicates
to the public that certain events or characterizations may be
dramatized for effect, it is nearly impossible to discern what is real
and what is not.
A broad interpretation of Section 540.08 would require
filmmakers to obtain consent from not only all of the individuals
depicted in the film, but also from the relatives of any decedents
depicted.73 A broad interpretation of a false light invasion of privacy

68
69
70
71
72
73

Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne Ill) , 901 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 2005) .
Id. at 808 (quoting Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23).
d.
d. at 810.

Paul A. Lebel, M isdirecting Myths: The Legal and Cultural Significance of Distorted
History in Popular M edia, 37 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 1035, 1053 (2002).
Tabach-Bank, supra note 62, at 283.
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claim would require all media to portray events in a singular form
that is universally agreed upon as true by all of the participants. 74
Allowing relational right to privacy claims would extend that circle
even farther. Such a development would give an endless number
of people the right to censor non-fiction expressive works, making
such works cost-prohibitive to produce. 75
In an era where digital video recording is portable and
inexpensive, how common law rights to privacy will be construed
in the future is an issue of great concern. More than one hundred
and twenty years removed from the warnings of Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis that "numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops, "' 76 nearly all individuals
now have the ability to capture and reproduce images of others
without their knowledge or consent. Those images can then
be disseminated to an audience of potentially billions over the
Internet. Although Tyne I determined how Section 540.08 applies
to modern film, how the same statute would apply to such media
as YouTube, Flickr, and other file sharing websites is still unclear.
Calls for increased rights to privacy have emerged as information
becomes easier to collect, easier to distribute, and easier to store
permanently. Whether the protections offered to films will extend
to emerging media is yet to be known.
Furthermore, in an era of reality television, 24/ 7 news networks,
and instantaneous communication, those portions of someone's
existence that appear to be controversial or salacious essentially
become issues of general public interest. Thus, those matters an
individual would hope to keep private are also the matters of most
interest to a society with a never-ending curiosity and an insatiable

74

75
76

Since Tyne I was decided, the Florida Supreme Court held that it would no
longer recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy. Jews for J esus, Inc.
v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) . Instead, the court determined that
the tort of defamation by implication protected all of the same interests as
false light invasion of privacy without raising as many constitutional concerns
(" [B]ecause the benefit of recognizing the [false light invasion of privacy]
tort, which only offers a distinct remedy in relatively few unique situations,
is outweighed by the danger of unreasonably impeding constitutionally
protected speech, we decline to recognize a cause of action for false light
invasion of privacy."). Id. at 1115.
Tabach-Bank, supra note 62, at 288.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 195.
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hunger for gossip. 77 Publishers and producers have a significant
amount ofleeway in reporting such matters because Section 540.08
does not extend to materials deemed "newsworthy." 78 Although
Judge Conway did not reach the issue of whether The Perfect Storm
fell within the "newsworthy" exception to Section 540.08, she did
indicate that the movie would fall within the boundaries of that
rule. 79 What is still unclear is the boundary "at which the dignity
and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of
the public welfare or of private justice." 80
A primary goal of the film industry is to leave a lasting
impression on the viewer. In order to do so, filmmakers must
often embellish or dramatize certain scenes for effect, even in a
production based on a true story. However, given the ability to
manipulate the senses through soundtracks, special effects, and
star power, film also has the ability to supplant reality with its own
artificial images. Filmmakers must be aware that while they have
substantial artistic license when retelling tragedies, the survivors
and relatives of the victims have a vested interest in the portrayal
of those events. Hopefully studios will become more cognizant of
the sentiments of decedents' relatives when recounting their tales.
Although it may not have been possible to obtain consent to use
the likenesses of all of the individuals portrayed in The Perfect Storm,
perhaps determining what was offensive to the deceased's survivors
before creating a finished work would have prevented litigation
and helped to find the balance between the right to privacy and the
First Amendment without the courts' assistance.
77

78

79
80

Warren and Brandeis expressed serious concern regarding the correlation
between the press, gossip, and the right to privacy: The press is overstepping
in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is
no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip,
which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. Id. at 196.
The "newsworthy" exception reads: The provisions of this section shall not
apply to: (a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness
of any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast,
or other news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or
presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such
name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes. FLA. STAT. §540.08( 4)
(2012).
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co. (Tyne I), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (M.D.
Fla. 2002).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 214.
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A Guiding Light: Safety Harbor
In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa 456 B.R. 703
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
by Nicholas E. Williams
1

' ' T h e sky is falling! The skyisfalling!" Oris it? Today, courts
across the country face a difficult task in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision regarding bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction, Stern v. Marshall. 2 Stern held bankruptcy courts
are constitutionally proscribed from entering final judgment based
on a private, state-law counterclaim "that is not resolved in the
process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim." 3 A bankruptcy
court must now consider Stern when a litigant objects to the court's
authority. With over 3,000 adversary proceedings pending in the
Middle District of Florida for the month of July 2012 alone, 4 Stern

Nicholas E. Williams received his JD in 2013 from the University of Miami
School of Law. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do
not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. courts, its judicial officers, or the
University of Miami, it faculty, staff, or employees.
CHICKEN LITTLE (Walt Disney Pictures 2005); see In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.,
1
462 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) ("Since [Stern's] release, a maelstrom
of opinions and articles have been written about the scope of Stern, ranging in
tone from 'much ado about nothing' to 'the end of the bankruptcy world as we
know it."'); see also In re Teleservices Grp., Inc. , 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011) ("[B]ombshell does fairly describe Stern's impact upon the more
practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what the [bankruptcy]
[c]ode still calls us to do.")
2
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
3
See id. at 2620.
4
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, Statistics
for the Middle District of Florida Quly 2012), http: / / www.flmb.uscourts.gov/
statistics/ 2012/ july. pdf.
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could notably impact how districts manage bankruptcy cases. A
broad reading of Stern could mean many bankruptcy matters must
be added to the already crowded district courts' dockets, while a
narrow reading will only minimally affect the current division of
labor.
In In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 5 the Honorable Michael
G. Williamson 6 analyzed Stern and provided a guiding light in our
common law. This Comment examines Safety Harbor, preliminarily
to provide its factual background. In order to explicate the Safety
Harbor decision, this Comment then reviews the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority
and the modern bankruptcy code ("the Code"). Thereafter, this
Comment provides a summary of Safety Harbor and an analysis of its
interpretation of Stern.

Factual Background: Setting Up Safety Harbor
Before filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, the would-be
debtor, Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, LLC (SHS), obtained a loan
from Wells Fargo Bank. 7 The debtor's parent company, Olympia
Development Group (Olympia), guaranteed the loan. 8 Subsequent
to SHS's Chapter 11 filing, Wells Fargo Bank sold the SHS loan
to German American. 9 The loan included a $13.8 million secured
claim and a $15.9 million unsecured claim. 10 In bankruptcy,
SHS proposed a reorganization plan requesting that Olympia be
released from the guaranty in exchange for contributing substantial
assets deemed necessary for the debtor's reorganization. 11 SHS
proposed to satisfy German American's claim through (1) a $3
million contribution from Olympia, (2) the sale of land, and (3)
the restructuring of the loan. 12
5
6

7
8

9
10
11
12

456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
The Honorable Michael G. Williamson has served as a bankruptcy judge in the
Middle District of Florida since his appointment in 2000. 1 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERALJUDICIARY, 11th Circuit, at 64 (Megan Rosen ed., 2012). Before that
Judge Williamson practiced with Kay, Gronek & Latham. Id. Judge Williamson
graduated from Duke University in 1973 and from the Georgetown University
Law Center in 1976. Id.
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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German American objected to the plan, specifically Olympia's
release, and moved the court to impose "lock-up" restrictions 13 on
Olympia and the reorganized SHS in order to protect the value
of the loan's balance. 14 In lieu of generally releasing Olympia
from its guaranty, the court enjoined German American from
pursuing Olympia for four years. 15 As part of confirming the plan,
Judge Williamson imposed the "lock-up" restrictions on SHS and
Olympia.16 SHS objected on the basis of Stern v. Marshall and claimed
the bankruptcy court did not have the constitutional authority
to impose "lock-up" restrictions on Olympia. 17 Accordingly,
to determine whether the court could impose the "lock-up"
restrictions on Olympia, Judge Williamson had to "review[] the
Stern decision." 18
Ultimately, Judge Williamson held bankruptcy courts'
constitutional authority to impose "lock-up" restrictions was not
affected by Stern v. Marshall19 and "lock-up" restrictions were
integral to confirming Safety Harbor's plan. 20
A Brief History: Bankruptcy Courts Under Scrutiny
The United States Supreme Court has twice invalidated
bankruptcy courts' power to enter final judgment in certain civil
actions.
As Article I states, bankruptcy courts cannot constitutionally
enter final judgment on the basis of a state-law claim against a non-

13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20

"Lock-up" restrictions are restrictions on a reorganized debtor's post-confirmation
behavior. In this case, the creditor suggested that the debtor and its parent
company be prohibited from the following: "(i) issuing additional equity interests
to anyone other than the non-debtor guarantors; (ii) borrowing any additional
funds; (iii) transferring or encumbering their equity interests in the [d]ebtor; (iv)
materially changing their management personnel or the business in which they
are engaged; or (v) purchasing other companies." Id. at 707.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706-07.
Id. at 705.
See id.
Id. at 707.
Congress vested bankruptcy courts with the power to "hear and determine .. .
all core proceedings ... and ... enter appropriate orders and judgments ... "
28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1) (2006). Congress also provided an illustrative list of
core proceedings, including "matters concerning the administration of the
estate" and "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate."§ 157(b)(2).
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 719.
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consenting party. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., the Supreme Court decided whether the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 conferred jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts beyond that
allowed to non-Article III courts. 21 A Chapter 11 debtor brought
suit against another company on the basis of a state-law claim. 22 The
Supreme Court held that allowing a bankruptcy court to adjudicate
those claims violated the doctrine of separation of powers. 23 The
plurality opinion 24 explained that the Constitution requires that
federal judicial power be held in an independent judiciary, defined
as judges guarded by the protections enumerated in Article III. 25 The
plurality rejected the claims that bankruptcy courts are territorial
courts, military courts, or adjuncts of the district courts. 26 Implying
that bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority derives from the
"public rights" nature of the claims those courts adjudicate, the
opinion posited that discharging debts "may well be a 'public right,"'
but adjudicating private, state-law claims "obviously is not." 27 While
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's concurrence 28 did not agree that
reaching the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was necessary, 29 his analysis was
similar to the plurality's. Thus six justices agreed on the conclusion
that a bankruptcy court cannot adjudicate purely state-law claims
(without the defendant's consent).
In 1984, Congress amended the Code to ameliorate the
constitutional problems announced in Northern Pipeline. 30 Although
21

22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29

30

458 U.S. 50, 52 (1982) (plurality opinion). After deciding that the bankruptcy
court could not hear the state-law claim, the Court analyzed whether the rule
should be applied retroactively. Id. at 87-89. Because it is not relevant to the
discussion of Safety Harbor, the retroactivity analysis is not addressed in this
Comment.
The state-law claims included, inter alia, a breach of contract claim. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56.
See id. at 87; see also id. at 91-92 (concurring in the judgment) .
The plurality was authored byJustice Brennan and joined byJustices Blackmun ,
Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 51.
Id. at 57-60. Article III requires that judges enjoy lifetime appointment during
"good behavior" and protection of their compensation from diminution. U.S.
Co ST. art. III,§ 1.
See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at64-67, 77-83 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 71.
Justice O 'Connor joined the concurrence. Id. at 89 (concurring in the
judgment).
Because the filing of the suit was not part of the bankruptcy action, the
bankruptcy court is not exercising power given to it by the 1978 Bankruptcy
Act. See id. at 89-90 (Rehnquist, CJ.).
In 1984, Congress amended the Code and created the modern jurisdiction
of bankruptcy courts. District courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction
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many expected the Court to decide the constitutionality of these
changes in Granjinanciera v. Nordberg, the Supreme Court passed on
- that broad question. 31
Almost twenty-five years after Northern Pipeline, a widow alleged
her husband's son tortiously interfered with her husband's will,
and she filed suit in a Texas probate court. 32 Before the tortious
interference claim was decided in Texas, the widow filed for
bankruptcy. 33 In Stern v. Marshall, the son filed a proof of claim and
a defamation suit in the bankruptcy court. 34 The widow filed her
counterclaim to the defamation action in the bankruptcy court,
and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the widow
in both suits. 35 The son appealed, challenging the bankruptcy
court's authority to adjudicate the widow's counterclaim. 36
According to Stern, the bankruptcy court had statutory but
not constitutional authority to adjudicate the counterclaim at
issue. 37 Congress specifically enumerated counterclaims brought
by the estate as "core proceedings" that the bankruptcy court has
authority to hear. 38 However, the Court also analyzed whether
the bankruptcy court had constitutional authority to hear the
counterclaim. 39 The Court analogized the counterclaim at issue
in Stern to the claim at issue in Northern Pipeline. 40 As in Northern
Pipeline, the Stern Court explored the possibilities that could allow

31

32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40

over all cases under title 11 of the Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006). The
district courts may refer cases to the bankruptcy judges in the district. § 157 (a).
Bankruptcyjudges are appointed by the United States Courts of Appeals. § 152 (a)
(1). For more information regarding the jurisprudential and legislative history
of the Code, see generally ELIZABETH WARRE & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 104-05 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009)
(summarizing the development of the modern bankruptcy code).
In Granfinanciera, the "sole issue . . . is whether the Seventh Amendment
confers on [a person who did not submit a claim against but was sued by the
bankruptcy estate for a fraudulent conveyance] a right to a jury trial in the
face of Congress' decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the
claims against them." 492 U.S. 33, 36, 50 (1989).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
"Core proceedings" always arise under Title 11 or in a Title 11 proceeding, and
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) specifically enumerates the counterclaims brought by
the estate. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604-05; see also supra note 19.
See 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2) (C) (2006); see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2404-05.
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2404-05.
See id. at 2609-11.
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the bankruptcy court to adjudicate the claim. The Court noted
that the claims at issue were not "public rights." 41 Additionally,
·the Court reasoned that bankruptcy courts are neither "adjuncts"
of the district courts 42 nor part of an agency scheme. 43 In Stern
and Northern Pipeline, both claims were state-law claims brought
against parties that did not consent to the court's jurisdiction over
the claim. 44 Concluding that adjudicating those claims required
judicial power that Congress improperly bestowed on a non-Article
III court, the Court held that the bankruptcy court did not have
constitutional authority to enter finaljudgment. 45
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented 46 and warned of the potential
practical consequences of the majority's decision:
Because the volume of bankruptcy cases is staggering ... a
constitutionally required game of jurisdictional ping-pong
between courts would lead to inefficiency, increased cost,
delay, and needless additional suffering .... 47
The majority answered the dissent's concerns: "[W] e are not
convinced that the practical consequences ... are as significant as
[the debtor] and the dissent suggest." 48 The majority asserted that the
Code already prohibits the bankruptcy courts from exceeding their
constitutional authority. 49 Further, its holding did not "meaningfully

41
42

43

44
45
46
47
48
49

See id. at2611-15; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at67-71 (plurality opinion);
Northern Pipeline, 458 U .S. at 91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618-19; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-64,
81-86 (plurality opinion); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-71 (plurality
opinion); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89-91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in
the judgment).
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
See id.; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91-92
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
Joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia M. Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2619 (majority opinion).
Specifically, the opinion refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2006), which provides
that bankruptcy courts may abstain from certain claims related to state law. Id.
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1) (2006) requires district courts to review
de novo, prior to entering final judgment, matters "related to" bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 2620.
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change[] the division of labor in the current statute" because the
issue in Stern was "narrow" and Congress only exceeded its authority
in "one isolated respect." 50 Whatever the scope of the opinion, Stern
must be considered to determine the constitutional relationship
between bankruptcy courts and district courts.
Presently, district courts have original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases and proceedings, 51 but district courts may refer
those cases and proceedings to bankruptcy courts. 52 After referral,
bankruptcy judges may enter final orders in "core proceedings" 53
but still must submit "proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court" for review in "non-core proceedings. "54
Parties may appeal bankruptcy orders, both interlocutory and final,
to the district courts. 55 The way courts interpret Stern v. Marshall
will shape the future of modem bankruptcy proceedings.
A Summary of Stern: The Safety Harbor Decision
Safety Harbor set forth an accurate, narrow reading of Stern v.
Marshall, holding that the bankruptcy court had the constitutional
authority to impose "lock-up" restrictions on Olympia as part of
confirming SHS's plan. 56 Exhibiting sound interpretation and
jurisprudence, Safety Harbor argued that the Stern decision did not
alter bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority regarding "core
proceedings" not at issue in Stern. 57
In his analysis, Judge Williamson briefly restated the Supreme
Court's declaration that Article III of the Constitution prohibits
Congress from giving bankruptcy courts the jurisdiction of Article
III courts. 58 Then, he recounted the Supreme Court's discussion of
Northern Pipeline and the applicability of the "public-rights" exception
for non-Article III courts. 59 Judge Williamson also reviewed Stern's
rejection of the following arguments: ( 1) the counterclaim in Stern is
50
51
52
53
54
55

56
57
58
59

Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
See Id.§ 157(a).
See§ 157(b) (1).
See§ 157(c) (1).
See Id. § 158(a). While some bankruptcy orders may be appealed directly to
the courts of appeals, see id., this practice is not as common as appeals to the
district courts.
In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.; see also infra section IV.
Safety Harborat 710-11.
See id. at 711.
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a "public right," (2) the filing of a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
court impliedly consents to the adjudication of related counterclaims,
.and (3) the bankruptcy courts are adjuncts of the district courts. 60
After that, Judge Williamson analyzed Stern's holding and
scope. 61 According to Judge Williamson, Stern held, "the bankruptcy
court lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment
on a state-law claim that was not resolved in the process of ruling on
a creditor's proof of claim." 62 Thrice quoting language from Stern for
support, he explained that Stern's holding was "narrow," and it will
not '"meaningfully change' the division of labor under section 157"
because "Congress only exceeded the limits of Article III in 'one
isolated respect. "' 63 Judge Williamson pointed out that not even all
state-law counterclaims were removed from the realm of bankruptcy
courts. 64 The bankruptcy courts may still hear counterclaims
that either stem from bankruptcy law itself or leave nothing to be
adjudicated once the proof of claim has been decided. 65 In fact,
"nothing in [Stern] actually limits a bankruptcy court's authority to
adjudicate other 'core proceedings' identified in section 157(b)
(2) ." 66 Further supporting its position, the court asserted that Stem
did not limit bankruptcy courts' authority to adjudicate any "core
proceeding," except those listed under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (C). 67
Judge Williamson's Safety Harbor opinion provided a well-reasoned
argument that Stern should be read narrowly.
Prudent Jurisprudence: Safety Harbors Narrow Reading of Stern

Judge Williamson's early reading of Stern is demonstrably
prudent. While Stern may be viably interpreted both broadly
and narrowly, numerous courts have agreed with Safety Harbors
interpretation. 68 Some districts, including the Middle District of
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

68

See id.
See id. at 715.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Quigley Co ., 676 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enjoin the debtor and its parent company
from taking action on certain pending litigation ); In re Appalachian Fuels,
LLC, 472 B.R. 731 , 739-41 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (citing Safety Harbor repeatedly and
approvingly) .
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Florida, have adjusted local procedures in light of Stern's fallout.
Moreover, reading Stern broadly could prevent meaningful
appellate review.
In the wake of Stern v. Marshall, bankruptcy and district judges
alike must decipher the impact of the decision on the constitutional
authority of bankruptcy courts to decide "core proceedings."
Challenges based on Stern will be raised through objections in
bankruptcy courts and motions to withdraw reference in district
courts. The breadth of Stern's application will determine the depth
of its consequences.
Stern's holding is inconsistent with its analysis, so courts
disagree on the scope of the majority's opinion. 69 The rationale
in Stern was broad 70 because the Court distilled years of Supreme
Court precedent into a number of considerations relevant to the
bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority. 71 These cases draw
from several substantive contexts, illustrating the potentially
broad application of the constitutional authority analysis. 72
However, narrow interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding
are justifiable because the majority in Stern explicitly limited the
decision's application. 73 Furthermore, the majority did not even
invalidate the relevant subsection of§ 157. 74 In fact, the majority

69

70

71

72

73
74

Compare In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 320 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2011) (holding the bankruptcy court did not have constitutional authority to
enter final judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action after analyzing Stern
among other cases), with In re Bujak, No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038,
at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011) (holding the bankruptcy court did have
constitutional authority to hear fraudulent conveyance actions after analyzing
Stern).
George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Acts
Summary/P!Amary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 NORTON J. BAN KR. L. &
PRAC., 1, 9 (2012).
See Stern v. Marshal4 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609-13 (2011) (citing, inter alia, Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932)).
In Murray's Lessee, the solicitor of the treasury issued a distress warrant. See 59
U.S. at 274. In Northern Pipeline, a bankruptcy judge entered final judgment
for a debtor's state-law claim. See 458 U.S. at 50-57. In Crowel4 a deputy
commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission
ruled on an employee's claim against his employer. See285 U.S. at 36.
See supra notes 49-51, 65, and accompanying text.
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (discussing the limited circumstances where
28 U.S.C § 157(b) (2) (C) (2006) grants bankruptcy courts unconstitutional
authority).
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predicted its decision would not result in sweeping changes. 75
Nevertheless, a broad rationale combined with limiting language
.allows for both broad and narrow interpretations.
Many courts have approved of Safety Harbors narrow reading
of Stern. 76 In an order denying a motion to withdraw reference,
the Middle District of Florida's Chief Judge Anne C. Conway
cited Safety Harbor positively. 77 The Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the
Southern District of Florida, the Honorable Paul G. Hyman, cited
Safety Harbor throughout an order that overruled an objection to
a bankruptcy court's adjudicating a fraudulent transfer action. 78
In the Southern District of New York, Judge Scheinlin also cited
Safety Harbor, among other decisions, in support of her argument
that Stern has not been given an "expansive effect." 79 In less than a
year, Safety Harbor has been cited in more than twenty decisions in
at least seventeen separate districts. Many courts have agreed that
Judge Williamson provided a compelling interpretation of Stern in
Safety Harbor. 80
In the post-Stern world, districts across the country have adjusted
local procedures. For example, Chief Judge Conway amended the
Middle District of Florida's standing order of reference on February
22, 2012. 81 It directed bankruptcyjudges to enter proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law if they conclude they do not have
constitutional authority to enter a final judgment. 82 Additionally,
Chief Judge Conway's order explicitly allows the district court
to treat final orders issued by the bankruptcy court as proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 83 Other districts have issued

75

76
77
78

79
80
81
82
83

See id. at 2620 ("We do not think the removal of counterclaims such as [the
debtor's] from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully changes the division
of labor in the current statute .. .. ").
See, e.g., In re Connelly, No. 11-03315-KRH, 2012 WL 1098431 , at *6 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2012).
In re Land Resource, LLC, No. 6:11-cv-1808-0rl-22 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2012).
See In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R 901, 905-06, 908, 910 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2011) (citing Safety Harbor, 456 B.R 703, 715, 717, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011), for several points and holding the Internal Revenue Service consented
to bankruptcy court jurisdiction).
See In re Extended Stay, Inc., 466 B.R 188, 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011).
In re Standing Order of Reference Cases arising Under Title 11 , United States
Code, 6:12-mc-26-0rl-22 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2012).
See id.
See id.
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similar standing orders of reference. 84 These steps may diminish
the impact of a broad reading of Stern because district judges
can more efficiently administrate bankruptcy courts' incorrect
rulings. But even before these changes, Judge Williamson's pointby-point examination of Stern presented an insightful, accurate
interpretation. These district-wide changes evidence courts'
recognition that Stern's fallout must be managed carefully.
In this author's opinion, part of that management must
include a jurisprudential choice because applying Stern broadly
at the bankruptcy-court level could create a systemic problem. To
understand how narrow applications of Stern facilitate appellate
review, it is necessary to understand how Stern objections will arise.
A bankruptcy judge faces a discrete set of choices when
presented with a particular matter for adjudication. The bankruptcy
judge may issue a final order85 or propose findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court. 86 Like the orders of all
Article I courts, every bankruptcy order has two distinct analyses:
the threshold question of constitutional authority and the merits
of the issue.
For an appellate court to hold whether the bankruptcy
court applied Stern correctly, the bankruptcy court must enter
final judgment. If a bankruptcy judge issues a final order and it
is appealed to the district court, the district judge can affirm the
order, remand for additional proceedings, or reverse and enter
its own order. If a bankruptcy judge proposes findings of fact and
conclusions of law, no Stern issue will be in the record because the
district court will have entered final judgment. An appellate court

84

85
86

See In re Standing Order of Reference Re: Title 11 (D. Del. Feb. 29, 2012)
("The district court may treat any order of the bankruptcy court as proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the event the district court concludes
that the bankruptcy judge could not have entered a final order or judgment
consistent with Article III."); In re Standing Order of Reference Re: Title 11 ,
o. 12 Misc. 00032 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 1, 2012) (same).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Theoretically, bankruptcy judges
could also abstain based on the principles of federal court abstention. The
abstention doctrine is the idea that courts will not hear a case for a particular
reason, usually involving deference to a different court's authority. See, e.g., R.R.
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). These concepts do not cover the
relationship between district courts and bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy courts
could abstain based on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), but this would also leave entry of
a final order for the district court.
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cannot evaluate the bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority if
the final order is entered by the district court not the bankruptcy
_court. The issue would not be properly before the court. For this
reason, interpreting Stern in bankruptcy courts too broadly may
deprive appellate courts of the opportunity to review the issue.
Judge Williamson's interpretation of Stern is more than just
intellectually honest. It also preserves issues for appeal and allows
Article III courts to declare bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction in light
of Stern. From North Carolina87 to Hawaii, 88 Safety Harbor has been
used to bolster and inform discussions of Stern. 89 As an article in
the Florida Bar Journal aptly observed, "Tampa Bankruptcy Judge
Michael G. Williamson grappled with some of the issues raised by
Stern v. Marshall and seems to have put the decision in its proper
.
,,go
perspectlve ....

87
88
89

90

See In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc. , 466 B_R. 750, 767, 771 (Bankr.
M.D . . C. 2012).
See In re The Mortgage Store, Inc. , 464 B.R. 421, 425 (D. Haw. 2011) (quoting
Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 717).
See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Group, Inc. , 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011)
("This is the correct view of Stern v. Marshall and of the Court's jurisdiction
and constitutional authority in this case."); In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC,
No. 09-14547, 2011WL5417098, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2011); In re
Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 645 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
Roberta A. Colton & Stephanie C. Lieb, Is Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction in Flux
Because of Anna Nico/,e Smith?, FLA. BJ., Jan. 2012, at 39.
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American Yearbook: An Early Portrait of the
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause
American Yearbook v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D .
Fla. 1972 )
by Cem Akleman

I

n American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 1 a threejudge 2 panel3 of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida upheld
several Florida laws requiring that printed materials purchased

Cem Akleman is aJ.D. Candidate (2013) at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law. The author thanks Paul Pakidis, Zack Smith, Erica Perdomo, and Kathryn
Kimball, each of whom kindly provided input and encouragement.
1
339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
2
The opinion was written by then-District Court Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, who
was later appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. When
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was created by
Congress, Judge Tjoflat was reassigned to it and later served as chief judge
from 1989 to 1996. See Biographical Directory ofFederal judges: Tjojlat, Gerald Bard,
FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=2674&cid=999&cty
pe=na&instate=na (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Judge George C. Young also
served on the panel. Judge Young was a member of all three district courts in
Florida and served as the Middle District's ChiefJudge from 1973 until he took
senior status in 1981. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Young, George
Cress/.er, FED.JUD. CTR., http:// www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=2393&cid=9
99&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). The final judge on the
panel was Judge David Dyer, who served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and then on the newly created Eleventh Circuit until his passing
in 1998. See Biographical Directory of Federal judges: Dyer, David William, FED. Juo.
CTR., http:/ / www.fjc.govI servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=675&cid=999&ctype=na&inst
ate=na (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
Threejudge panels were formerly required to issue "an interlocutory or
3
permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of
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by the state be manufactured in Florida. 4 The court held that the
laws were proper under the Dormant Commerce Clause 5 and
· the Equal Protection Clause 6 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
constituted a proper delegation of power by the Florida Legislature
under the Florida Constitution. 7 The opinion was later summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court8 and subsequently cited 9 by the
Court in opinions that set forth the market participant exception 10
to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
This Comment explains the background of the case and relates
the history of the relevant doctrines on which the district court
relied to make its decision. Finally, this Comment discusses how
American Yearbook was forward-looking and quite possibly the first
case to set forth the then-unformed market participant exception.
American Yearbook Company operated an out-of-state business
printing yearbooks for secondary schools and colleges, both public
and private. 11 Prior to 1970, American Yearbook won contracts to

4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11

a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality." 28 U .S.C. § 2281 (repealed
1976). A threejudge panel carries with it an appeal of as a matter of right
to the Supreme Court. 28 U .S.C. § 1253 (2006). However, in 1976, Congress
repealed most statutes requiring the use of threejudge panels. The remaining
statutes requiring threejudge panels include 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2006), which
involves actions "challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of ... d
istricts or ... legislative bod[ies]," and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a)(5) (2006), which requires panels in cases about voter qualifications
in suspect jurisdictions. See generally ROBERT L. STERN & Eu GE E GRESSMA ,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 90-140 (5th ed. 1978) (discussing appellate
jurisdiction over threejudge panels).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 719-20, 725.
Unlike the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Dormant
Commerce Clause (also called the Negative Commerce Clause) is not expressly
stated in the Constitution. Rather, it is a constitutional doctrine that courts
have developed to address the negative or converse implied by the Commerce
Clause. It is premised on the idea that when a state passes a law that unduly
burdens interstate commerce, that law improperly infringes on Congress'
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n
v.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
U.S. Co ST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720-21, 725.
Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
See infra notes 49- 73 and accompanying text.
In brief, the market participant exception provides that when a state is
participating in the marketplace like a private business (rather than acting in
its governmental function as a sovereign), it is not regulating commerce and
thus is not subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause. For a fuller explanation
of this principle, see infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720.
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print yearbooks for schools in Florida. 12 In 1970, the company bid on
a yearbook contract at the University of South Florida. 13 Even though
it entered the lowest bid, the university denied American Yearbook
the contract because the company did not have any manufacturing
facilities within the state, and state law14 prohibited the out-of-state
fulfillment and manufacturing of public printing contracts. 15
American Yearbook then brought suit in the Middle District of
Florida, challenging the constitutionality of the printing statutes on
three separate grounds. 16 First, the company argued that the Florida
Legislature had, in violation of the Florida Constitution, improperly
delegated to the Department of General Services the power to
determine whether printings were Class A (those printings ordered
by the Florida Legislature or Florida Supreme Court) or Class B
(all other state printings). 17 The court dismissed this argument on
its face, reasoning that while it is true that the Florida Legislature
cannot delegate its legislative power, it had clearly defined the classes
of printings-the legislative portion of the governmental act-and
only allowed the Department of General Services "to regulate the
manner by which Class B contracts can be let. "18 Thus, the Legislature
had not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
Next, American Yearbook argued that the state statutes violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

12
13

14

15
16
17
18

Brief for Appellant at 5, Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U .S. 904 (1972) (No.
72-25).
Id. At the time of the action, the university had campuses in Tampa and St.
Petersburg, Florida, the heart of the Middle District. See USF History, UNIV.
S. FLA., http: / / www.usf.edu/ About-USF / usf-history.asp (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
The company focused primarily on three subsections of Section 283 of the
Florida Statutes. See Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 719-20 nn.1-3. Section 283.03
required that" [a] ll the public printing of this state shall be done in the state."
FLA. STAT.§ 283.03 (1927) (repealed 1983). Section 283.04 divided printing
into two classes: Class A was defined as "printing required for the legislative
department of the state government," and Class B was defined as any printing
by the state "not included in class A." FLA. STAT. § 283.04 (1969) (repealed
1983). Section 283.10 loosened the requirements for Class B printings, but still
required that the printer "manufacture the [printings] within the state." FLA.
STAT.§ 283.10(1) (1969) (repealed 1983). The printings at issue were Class B
as defined by the statutes.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 5.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 720.
Id.
Id. at 720-21.
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differing in their treatment of public and private contracts. 19 To
begin its analysis, the court distinguished the two types of power
_that a state exercises with respect to the Commerce Clause.
One type is governmental power, which is the use of power by
the sovereign to govern and regulate its people. The other is
proprietary or business power, which arises when the state acts to
requisition property through public contracts or otherwise provide
for the internal needs of the government. 20
The court looked to the rationale in Atkin v. Kansai2 1 to
answer the question of whether the printing contracts fell within
the governmental function or proprietary function of the state. 22
In Atkin, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute imposing criminal liability on employers who forced
their employees to work more than eight hours per day on a state
contract. 23 The Court found no equal protection violation, even
though that same conduct was legal when working on a private
contract, because placing conditions on a state contract fell
within the proprietary function of the state. 24 The Supreme Court
further explained that " [ t] he rule of conduct prescribed by [the
law] applies alike to all who contract to do work on behalf ... of
the State .... "25 Similarly, with respect to public school printing
contracts, the statute applied equally to all printers, even though it
did not apply to printing contracts at private schools. 26
To counter the unfavorable rule from Atkin, American
Yearbook argued that the rulings of the Supreme Court in Shapiro
v. Thompson27 and Graham v. Richardson28 undermined the holding
in Atkin such that the Equal Protection Clause required the court to
strike down the printing statute. 29 Shapiro and Graham invalidated

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 720. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Co ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 721.
191 U.S. 207 (1903).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 721-22.
See Atkin, 191 U.S. at 207-08, 223-24.
/d_ at 222-23.
Id. at 224.
Cf Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 723 (finding no Equal Protection Clause
violation).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 722.
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state welfare laws that discriminated against protected classes. 30 The
American Yearbook court distinguished those cases on the ground
that welfare is clearly a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary,
function of the state, while the action in this case was proprietary;
additionally, those cases discriminated against suspect classes
whereas the instant case did not involve any protected classes. 31
Therefore, the court found that the statutes did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, and most importantly, American Yearbook argued
that the printing statute was such an undue burden on interstate
commerce that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 32 The
court again deployed the distinction between the governmental
and proprietary functions of the state. 33 It drew on Field v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 34 a Supreme Court case analyzing a Missouri
statute that required that asphalt for a public paving project
originate from a specific asphalt deposit. 35 The plaintiff in Field
pointed out that some of the required asphalt was from a foreign
country, and argued that, by bypassing asphalt available from other
states, the statute burdened interstate commerce. 36 The Court
rejected this argument, noting that while there was some burden
on interstate commerce, the effect was too remote to be considered
a direct interference with Congress' exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce. 37 The American Yearbook court used this rule
as support for the proposition that while proprietary purchases do
affect interstate commerce, the effect must be substantial enough
to trigger an examination under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The court also considered MacMillan Co. v. Johnson, 38 which
upheld a Michigan statute specifying the condition of textbooks
purchased by state school districts. 39 The plaintiffs in MacMillan
argued that by dictating the condition of books that school districts
could purchase, the state controlled the price of books shipped

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See id.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 723.
Id.
194 U.S. 618 (1904).
Id. at 619.
See id. at 623.
See id.
269 F. 28 (E.D. Mich. 1920).
Id. at 29, 32-33.

Published by STARS, 2013

149

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

318

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

into the state. 40 The MacMillan court reasoned that the law merely
required that when the state enters into a contract to buy books,
-those books must be of a certain quality. 41 Similarly, the printing
statute only specified the manner in which the contract could be
fulfilled, rather than controlling the interstate price of printing.
The court then surveyed various state supreme court decisions
about trade regulations. 42 The court stated that the general rule from
those cases and subsequent Supreme Court cases 43 was that while
trade regulations are subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny, "statutes
that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are not." 44
The court rejected a contrary opinion in Garden State Dairies
of Vineland, Inc. v_ Sills. 45 In Sills, the New Jersey Supreme Court
examined a statute requiring any vendor supplying milk to a state
agency to certify that it had purchased at least that same amount of
milk from a producer within New Jersey. 46 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reasoned that although the purchase of milk fell within the
proprietary function of the state, the expansion of proprietary
activities was "troublesome" enough that the state could not take
advantage of the presumption that those proprietary activities place
insubstantial burdens on interstate commerce. 47 Rejecting the
rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the American Yearbook
court noted that " [ t] o subject every job specification to an ad hoc
measurement of its effect on interstate commerce would unduly
interfere with state proprietary functions .... "48 Thus, drawing on
Field, MacMillan, and the trade regulations cases, the court held
40
41
42

43

44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 30.
See id. at 31.

The court cited cases from Arizona (Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 255 P.2d
604 (Ariz. 1953)), Colorado (City & Cnty. ofDenverv. Bossie, 266 P. 214 (Colo.
1928)), Idaho (ExparteGemmill, 119 P. 298 (Idaho 1911)), Mississippi (State
ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 76 So. 258 (Miss.
1917)), Missouri (Pasche v. S. St.Joseph Town-Site Co., 190 S.W.
30
(Mo. Ct.
App. 1916)), Montana (Herseyv. Nelson, 131P.30 (Mont.1913)), and North
Dakota (Knight v. Barnes, 75 N.W. 904 (N.D. 1898)). See Am. Yearbook Co. v.
Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 724 n.29 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
The court cited Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) and Polar
Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964). Am. Yearbook, 339
F. Supp. at 724 nn.31-32. With the exception of the Arizona Supreme Court
decision, these cases were decided after the state court cases cited in note 42.
Id. at 725.
217 A.2d 126 (NJ. 1966).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
Am. Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 725.
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that because the statutes fell within the proprietary function of the
state, they did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The American Yearbook court's presumption, and later affirmance
by the Supreme Court, that proprietary functions of the state do not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause directly contributed to the
development of the market participant exception. The exception
allows a state acting like a private producer or purchaser of goods
or services to evade scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court first expressly introduced 49 this doctrine in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 50 four years after American Yearbook
was decided. In Alexandria Scrap, Maryland instituted a regulatory
scheme that paid a monetary reward to processors located in the
state for destroying automobile hulks that were previously titled
in the state.51 The Supreme Court heard the appeal from a threejudge panel that struck down the regulatory scheme on equal
protection and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 52
Applying the balancing test created by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 53 the district court in Alexandria Scrap
explained that "any evaluation of the validity of the impact of a
state statute upon interstate commerce depends not only upon the
strength of local interests, but upon whether those interests can
be promoted by other means." 54 In its rationale, the district court
in Alexandria Scrap performed an in-depth analysis of American
Yearbook's discussion of proprietary and governmental functions
of the state. 55 Ultimately, the Alexandria Scrap district court
incorrectly cited American Yearbook as support for the proposition
49
50
51
52
53

54
55

But see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
426 U.S. 794 (1976) .
Id. at 797.
Id. at 796.
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
(citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960))). The Pike balancing test is still used to evaluate Dormant Commerce
Clause cases that do not fall within the market participant exception. See, e.g.,
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 346 (2007); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond
Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70
Omo ST. LJ. 1179, 1205-06 (2009) (analyzing the Supreme Court's use of the
Pike balancing test in United Haulers).
Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 60 (D. Md. 1975).
Id. at 54-55.
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that the Maryland regulatory scheme was within the state's police
power, but not within its proprietary function. 56 The district court
therefore held that the regulatory scheme was not exempt from
scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
When the Supreme Court evaluated the Commerce Clause
claim in Alexandria Scrap, it did not dispute that Maryland's
regulatory scheme imposed a burden on interstate commerce.
Rather, it questioned whether "Maryland's action [was] a burden
which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect." 57 This
was exactly the rationale that the American Yearbook court used when
it explained that a state can impose any conditions on purchases
it chooses to make. 58 The Supreme Court held that nothing
"prohibits a State, in the absence of Congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." 59 Similarly, the American Yearbook court found
that Commerce Clause did not prevent the facially discriminatory
Florida printing statute from favoring Florida citizens.
After Alexandria Scrap, the Supreme Court heard many seminal
commerce cases, including City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 60 Hughes

56

57

58
59
60

Id. at 55. The Akxandria Scrap district court focused on the purpose of the
purchases, which was to enact the regulatory scheme. Both the American Yearbook

court and the Supreme Court, however, only drew the distinction between a
state entering the market and the direct exercise of police powers. It did not
matter that the purpose of the market participation was to enforce a regulatory
scheme that could othenvise be effected through the state's police powers.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976).Justice William
Brennan 's dissent cited American Yearbook for the proposition that restrictive
purchasing statutes only applied to goods purchased for their "end use. " Id.
at 824 (Brennan,]., dissenting) ("[E]ven those courts and commentators that
have concluded that facially restrictive state purchasing statutes are permissible
under the Commerce Clause ... have restricted this conclusion to instances
where the State in a 'proprietary' capacity is purchasing items of commerce for
end use .... ").This is not quite what the court in American Yearbook actually
concluded. Rather, the court said that a state could set conditions on its
purchases and that the Commerce Clause does not require an inquiry into
the burden on interstate commerce for purchases the state makes. See Am.
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Akxandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
437 U.S. 617 (1978). In City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court struck down,
on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, a ew Jersey law that facially
discriminated between in-state and out-of-state trash, banning the latter. Id. at
629.
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v. Oklahoma, 61 Hunt v. Washingt,on State Appl£ Advertising Commission, 62
and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana. 63 The 1970s and
'80s were an important time for trade regulation, and while these
cases fleshed out Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities
Clause issues related to state regulations on trade, they did not
specifically address the market participant exception. It was not until
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 64 the next market participant case decided by the
Supreme Court, that American Yearbook again reemerged.
In Reeves, the Supreme Court considered a trade regulation case
from South Dakota. The state had opened a cement plant in the
early twentieth century to reduce its chronic cement shortages. 65 The
plant provided cement to the state and several other states in the
region until 1978, when, facing high demand and technical problems
resulting in supply shortages, the State Cement Commission began
fulfilling in-state orders before out-of-state orders. 66 An out-of-state
concrete distributor that relied on cement from the plant sought
an injunction against the facially discriminatory practice. 67 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that South Dakota
had "simply acted in a proprietary capacity," and therefore did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 68 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the decision because of its ruling in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 69 but on remand, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Hughes

61

62

63

64
65
66
67
68
69

441 U.S. 322 (1979). Hughes was a Dormant Commerce Clause case that
struck down a law limiting the number of minnows that could be removed
from Oklahoma rivers. Id. at 338. The Court rejected the legal fiction that a
state owns the animals or resources within its boundaries and, thus, may use
discriminatory regulations. Id. at 339.
432 U.S. 333 (1977). Hunt struck down, on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds, a North Carolina statute that banned the sale of apples bearing an
inspection grade from any organization or government agency other than the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Id. at 352- 53.
436 U.S. 371 (1978). Baldwin upheld the practice of price discrimination
in hunting licenses against out-of-state residents who wanted to hunt within
Montana, despite claims that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 393-94.
447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 433 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230, 1232 (8th Cir. 1978)).
For a brief summary of the case, see supra note 61.
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and reaffirmed its earlier decision, setting the stage for a second
review by the Supreme Court. 70
On further review, the Supreme Court noted the distinction
between market regulators and market participants, citing
American Yearbook along with Alexandria Scrap. 71 It found that the
South Dakota cement plant was a market participant and that it
therefore fell within the exception set forth in Al,exandria Scrap. 72
Citing American Yearbook, the Court explained "that the intrinsic
limits of the Commerce Clause do not prohibit state marketplace
conduct." 73
As a district court in Tennessee later observed, "While Al,exandria
Scrap is often regarded as the Supreme Court's first acceptance of
the market participant doctrine, four years earlier, the Court had
affirmed a lower court's ruling sustaining a Florida statute requiring
all public printing ... be done within the state." 74 The summary
affirmance by the Supreme Court in American Yearbook75 is binding
precedent, 76 and as such it should be credited as the first market
participant exception case. While American Yearbook did not lay out
the exception as clearly as did A1£xandria Scrap or Reeves, it laid
out very similar principles. American Yearbook was forward-looking
and arguably the first court to recognize the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, an important piece
of jurisprudence that has lasted for decades.

70

71
72
73
74
75
76

Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1979), afj'd sub nom. Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U .S. 429 (1980). Citing several cases, including American
Yearbook, the Eighth Circuit explained that its previous decision was not based
on the rationale in Hughes and noted that " [a] state may freely purchase to
meet its needs. " Id. at 737 & n.l.
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9. The Court cited as additional support almost a
dozen state cases, including two that also cited American Yearbook. Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 438 n.10.
Barker Bros. Waste v. Dyer Cnty. Legislative Body, 923 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 n .16
(W.D. Tenn. 1996).
Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904, 904 (1972).
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).
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"Otherwise Qualified": The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Origin of the Direct
Threat Defense
Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, No. 3:82-cv00305:JHM (M.D. Fla. 1983)

by Patrick D. Flemming
n an effort to integrate individuals with disabilities into society
and abate employment discrimination, Congress passed the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act) .1 While the Act more clearly
applied to certain individuals with disabilities, the Act's construction
seemingly left undefined whether individuals with contagious
diseases were afforded the same coverage. The case giving rise to
the Supreme Court's landmark employment law decision resolving
the matter was the unreported, oral opinion of Arline v. School

I

Patrick Flemming received his J.D. from Florida State University College of Law in
2012 and a B.S. in Finance from Florida State University in 2009. The author thanks
the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for providing the opportunity to write this Comment and his loving family
for their support.
1
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U .S.C. §§ 701-796 (2006)). While the Act historically used
the term handicap, Congress amended the Act in 1992 to replace the term
with disability, the "preferred terminology of persons protected by the Act."
Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Impl.ementing the ADAs Direct Threat Defense,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1279, 1280 n.10 (2001); Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992). In this Comment, the
term handicap has been replaced with disability except for its usage in quoted
material and references to statutory definitions.
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Board of Nassau County,2 which was decided in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. This Comment
examines the district court's opinion, comparing the holding to
similar decisions interpreting the Act, and illuminates how Arline
resulted in the Supreme Court articulating the transformative
"direct threat" defense test, which was adopted by Congress and
codified in both the Rehabilitation Act3 and its counterpart, the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 4
After thirteen years of service as an elementary school
teacher, Gene Arline was fired from her position upon suffering
her third relapse of tuberculosis in a two-year span. 5 The School
Board of Nassau County, Florida (School Board), terminated
Arline not "because of any misfeasance, malfeasance, inadequate
performance, or inability to perform the essential functions of
her job"; 6 rather, the School Board fired Arline because of her
"continued reoccurence [sic] of tuberculosis"-fearing that she
would infect others. 7 Arline filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, contending that the School
Board discriminated against her solely on the basis of her disability,
in violation of Section 504 of the Act. 8 Specifically, before the court

2

3
4

5

6
7
8

No. 3:82-cv-00305:JHM (M.D. Fla. 1983). The district court issued an
unreported, oral opinion after a nonjury trial. Therefore, the discussion of
that court's holding and reasoning is derived from Arline's subsequent history
in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, and the district
court's opinion after the Supreme Court's remand. Arline v. Sch. Bd. , 772 F.2d
759, 760 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273 (1986); Arline v. School Bd. , 692
F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 8, 102 Stat. 28, 3132 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (D) (2006)).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2006). Congress recently amended the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the newly amended act also explicitly incorporated the
standards set out by the Supreme Court in Arline. MyLinda K. Sims, When
Pigs Fly: Does the ADA Cover Individuals with Communicable Diseases Such as Novel
NlHl Influenza, "Swine Flu"?, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 463, 469 (2010) (citing ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(b) (3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008)).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 276. Arline had been receiving antituberculosis treatment
since her first relapse in 1977 but tested positive for tuberculosis colonies twice
in 1978. Arline, 692 F. Supp. at 1290.
Arline, 692 F. Supp. at 1290.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 276 (alteration in original).
Arline v. Sch. Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11th Cir. 1985), ajf'd, 480 U.S. 273
(1986); Rehabilitation Act ofl 973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
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were the questions of whether Arline was a "handicapped person
under the terms of the statute" and, if so, whether the School
Board's actions constituted illegal discrimination. 9 Judge Moore
held that Arline was not a "handicapped person" as protected
by the Act, because Congress did not intend to cover individuals
with contagious diseases; and even if she were protected, Judge
Moore added, she was not otherwise qualified for the position. 10
Therefore, he held that the School Board did not violate the Act by
firing Arline solely on the basis of her disability. 11
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Coverage and Exceptions
The Act was the first federal "rights" legislation designed
to protect people with disabilities. 12 Congress designed the Act
to maximize, through the use of federal incentives, the equal
treatment and inclusion of disabled individuals in society, especially
in the field of employment. 13 To effectuate this goal, Congress
included an antidiscrimination provision into the Act, Section 504,
which originally stated that" [n] o otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the

9
10

11
12

13

Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (No. 85-1277).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 277. The Honorable John H. Moore II was appointed to
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida by President Ronald
Reagan in 1981 and served on the bench until his death on July 19, 2013.
Federal Judicial Center, http: / / www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=l676&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
Rehabilitation Act § 504 (prohibiting covered entities from discriminating
against people with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities); see a/,so Lauren
RS. Mendonsa, Note, DualingCausation and the Rights ofEmployees with HIV Under
§504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 13 SCHOLAR 273, 274 (2010). Before protections
for individuals with disabilities found their home in the Rehabilitation Act,
several members of Congress had attempted to "amend titles VI and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include prohibitions of discrimination against"
these individuals. Donald Jay Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:
Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 171, 174 n.19
(1980).
See 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)-(b) (2006); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 626 (1983). Olenick, supra note 12, at 174 & n.17 (noting that
discrimination against people with disabilities in the fields of education,
employment, housing, and law led to their segregation and isolation from the
rest of society).
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benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 14
As first drafted, the Act was concerned primarily with increasing
federal support for vocational rehabilitation, and the definition
of "handicapped individual" reflected this fact, including only
those individuals whose impairment limited their employment
opportunities and who could reasonably be expected to benefit
from vocational rehabilitation. 15 The next year, Congress expanded
its efforts to increase employment opportunities for individuals
with disabilities by proscribing employment discrimination in
the fields of "housing, education and health care." 16 Accordingly,
in 1974, Congress defined the term "handicap" for purposes of
Titles IV and V of the Act to include "[a] ny person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 17

14

15

16

17

Rehabilitation Act§ 504; Arline, 480 U.S. at 277; Consolidated Rai4 465 U.S. at
626 (noting that Congress extended the private rights of action found in "Title
VI of the Civil Rights of 1964 to victims of discrimination in violation of §504 of
the Act") . Congress has expanded the scope of entities subject to Section 504
since the inception of the Act. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 122,
92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing that
disabled individuals shall not be discriminated from "any program or activity
conducted by the Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service")) ;
Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Seroices, and Activities Accessible to All, 14 STA .
L. & PoL'Y REv. 389, 395-96 (2003) (citing Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794(b) (2006))) (noting that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 broadly
expanded the impact of Section 504 to "all of the operations" of an entity if any
part of the entity was receiving federal funds).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 278 n.3. As enacted in 1973, the Act defined "handicap
individual" as "any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap
to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to
titles I and III of this Act. " Rehabilitation Act§ 7 (6) , 87 Stat. at 361.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 291 n.3 (noting that while the original definition of
"handicapped individual" was sufficient for vocational rehabilitation under
Titles I and III of the Act, Congress inserted an additional definition to
provide broader protections in additional fields); Consolidated Rai4 465 U.S.
at 632 (noting that Congress's amendment to Section 504 clearly signaled a
desire to prohibit disc1imination more broadly).
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111 (a) , 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2006)).
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The second and third prongs of this definition further expanded
upon prior protections for people with disabilities by proscribing
discrimination against individuals who may not actually be impaired
at the time of the discrimination. 18 This broad definition was
designed to protect both handicapped individuals and those who
"may at present have no actual incapacity at all" 19 from "archaic
attitudes" and insensitivities based upon misperceptions about
people with disabilities. 20
Although these broader statutory definitions increased the
class of individuals who could qualify as "handicapped" under the
Act, the Act further required that an individual also be "otherwise
qualified" for the position sought in order to fully qualify
for protection under Section 504. 21 A "qualified handicapped
individual" in regards to employment is one who "with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job." 22
Thus an employer potentially has a duty to accommodate an
individual with disabilities. This duty is conditional, though, and
an employer is not required to substantially modify the essential
functions of the job nor bear an "undue financial or administrative
burden" accommodating an individual. 23 Likewise, an employer is
not required to retain or hire an employee who poses a safety or
health risk to others.
Although the Act did not initially contain express language
permitting an employer to make adverse employment decisions
based upon the safety risks an individual presents, the Supreme
Court indicated that the "otherwise qualified individual" provision

18

19
20
21
22
23

Id.; Edna Ruth Vincent, Children with Aids: Protecting Their Rights in the Classroom
Through the Arline Decision and Department of Education Enforcement of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2ADMIN. LJ. 391, 406 (1988).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6 (1979)).
Id. at 277 & n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974) ).
Rehabilitation Act ofl 973, Pub. L. o. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
Regulations Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 Fed. Reg.
22676, 22678 (May 4, 1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12) (emphasis added).
C.f Se. Cmty. Collegev. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1978) (providing that, in the
field of postsecondary education, Section 504 does not require an educational
institution to substantially modify a program's standards); see Regulations
Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act at 22,688 (noting that
reasonable accommodations may include restructuring nonessential duties)
(emphasis added).
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provided that option. 24 That is, the question of whether an individual
poses a significant health and safety risk to others is wrapped into the
determination of whether an individual is otherwise qualified for
the position sought. 25 Congress ratified this concept with the 1978
amendments to the Act, which codified a "direct threat" provision
and excluded from coverage those individuals whose use of alcohol
or drugs posed a danger to the safety of others or prevented the
users from performing the duties of their jobs. 26 Importantly, this
exception to the definition of"handicapped individual" was initially
proposed to deny coverage to all individuals addicted to alcohol
or drugs; 27 the enacted version, however, rejected the blanket
exclusion and instead applied narrowly, excluding only those
whose use of alcohol or drugs prevented them from performing
the duties of the job or caused them to pose a "direct threat" to
property or others. 28
•
After Congress enacted this provision, courts began to analyze
whether other types of impairments-not just the limitation
on alcohol or drug abuse-would constitute a "direct threat or
significant risk to thesafetyofothers" and exclude anindividualfrom
coverage. 29 For example, in Strathie v. Department of Transportation,
the plaintiff had a hearing impairment and challenged his denial
of a school bus driver's license, arguing that he was otherwise
qualified for the position. 30 The department of transportation had
a regulation requiring drivers to meet certain hearing standards
without the use of a hearing aid. 31 The court rejected numerous
safety concerns that the defendant presented and defined the

24

25
26

27
28
29

30
31

Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1299 & n .98 (citing Sou theastern Community CoUege
and noting that the initial regulations implementing the Act described an
"othenvise qualified individual" as one who did not pose a "significant risk to
the health and safety of others").
Id. at 1280 & n .99.
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) ).
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n.14 (1986) (citing 124 Cong. Rec. 30322 (1978)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (b) (1978)).
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1299; see ewYork State Ass ' n for Retarded Children
Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the New
York City Board of Education violated Section 504 by discriminating against
children who were carriers of hepatitis B when the Board failed to show that
the children posed a significant risk of transmitting the disease to others) .
716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 230.
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proper inquiry as whether accommodating a driver with a hearing
aid would pose not just some risk but rather an "appreciable risk
to the safety and control of school bus passengers." 32 The court
could not find that the plaintiffs hearing aid use would pose an
appreciable risk such that modifications to accommodate him
would be unreasonable. 33
In Doe v. New York University, a plaintiff, who had been diagnosed
with "Borderline Personality Disorder" and who had a history of
severely violent outbursts and self-destructive conduct, lied about
her emotional health on her medical school application. As a
result, she was expelled from the program. 34 The court considered
whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of a Section
504 claim. 35 The court reviewed expert medical testimony and
concluded that "there [was] a significant risk of recurrence of the
[plaintiff's] self-destructive and harmful conduct." 36 Based upon
the severe harm a recurrence of the plaintiffs episodes might
present and the likelihood of her having another disturbance, the
court found plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits-i.e.,
that she was likely not "otherwise qualified" for admission to the
medical program. 37
This case law expanding the applicability of the direct threat
provision is harmonious with Congress's repudiation of a blanket
exclusion of certain individuals. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida's decision in , as it turns out, was not.
The Arline Decision: Contagious Diseases and the Act

Gene Arline's potentially contagious disease, tuberculosis,
presented another opportunity for a court to consider whether an
impairment was a "handicap" covered under the Act and whether
to expand the safety risk (i.e., direct threat) inquiry further beyond
the scope of alcoholism and drug abuse. Arline argued that her
tuberculosis qualified her as a "handicapped individual" as covered

32

33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 234. The court concluded that the department had not presented
sufficient evidence to support its safety concerns and thus denied the
department's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 232-34.
See id. at 232-34.
666 F.2d 761, 765-66, 778 (1981).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 779 (emphasis added) .
See id. at 777.
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under the Act and that the School Board-as a recipient of federal
funds-violated the Act by terminating her position solely by
reason of her disability, even though she was otherwise qualified
for the position. 38
After a nonjury trial, the district court rendered an unreported,
oral opinion in which it found for the School Board on nearly every
relevant point of contention. First, the court dismissed the notion
that Congress intended contagious diseases to be covered by the Act
and, therefore, found that tuberculosis was not a "handicap" within
the meaning of the Act. 39 While the court acknowledged that Arline
no doubt suffered or had suffered from an unfortunate disability,
the court maintained that the sometimes-infectious disease of
tuberculosis was not a "handicap" within the meaning of the Act. 40
Second, the court noted that even if Arline's contagious disease was
covered under the Act, she was still not an "otherwise qualified"
individual. 41 The court found that she "lacked the qualifications
to teach outside of elementary education." 42 Although the School
Board had a policy that permitted teachers to teach in other fields
while gaining new teaching certifications, the court held that the
School Board was not obligated to offer Arline that option. 43 Finally,
the court acknowledged that Arline might have posed less of a health
and safety risk had she been permitted to teach older students-as
opposed to children in the third grade-but the court nevertheless
determined that the School Board had no obligation to provide
her with an alternative position because of the School Board's
"overriding duty to protect the public from contagious diseases." 44
The record reveals that the district court made no findings of
fact regarding the severity of Arline's tuberculosis, whether she was
in fact contagious at the time of her termination, or the likelihood

38

39
40
41
42
43
44

Arline v. Sch. Bd. , 772 F.2d 759, 760-61 (11th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 273
(1986). The regulations promulgated to aid in effecting the Act define
"otherwise qualified" individual as one "who would be qualified for a specific
job if given 'reasonable accommodation' by the employer." Id. at 760 n.2
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (1)).
Id.
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1986); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note
9, at 5-6.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
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that she would communicate the infection. 45 Further, the court
did not consider whether the School Board could have reasonably
accommodated her. 46 Unlike the courts in Strathie and Doe, which
both considered the severity of the risk and whether the safety
risk posed by the individual was an "appreciable" or a "significant
risk," the court in the instant case did not reach the question of the
nature of the impairment; rather, the court's analysis stopped after
an exercise of statutory interpretation, identifying that Congress
likely did not intend the definition of "handicapped individual" to
cover contagious diseases. 47
Contrary to the holding of district court, on appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals confidently concluded that the statutes,
in "every respect," supported the coverage of contagious diseases
under the Act. 48 Indeed, the court found that the record made clear
that a person afflicted with tuberculosis "has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits ... major life activities, since
the disease can significantly impair respiratory functions." 49 Had
Congress intended to exclude those with contagious diseases from
the protections of the Act, the court reasoned, Congress would have
explicitly excluded them along with abusers of alcohol and drugs. 50
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the
question of whether Arline's contagious disease of tuberculosis
could qualify as a "handicap" under the Act. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, found Arline to be a "handicapped
individual" because of her record ofimpairment. Like the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court drew support for its
conclusion from the Department of Health and Human Services's
regulations implementing the Act. The Court found Arline's
acute tuberculosis to be a physical impairment that affected her
respiratory system, one of the bodily systems mentioned in the
regulations. 51 Second, the Court classified her tuberculosis as

45
46
47
48

49
50
51

Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.

Id.
See id. at 277.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 764 (noting that the Act's coverage of contagious diseases

clearly promoted legislative intent of reducing "unthinking and unnecessary
discrimination").
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §706(7) (B)) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1986) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3U) (2) (i)
(1985)).
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an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.52
To support its conclusion, the Court noted that Arline had been
hospitalized in 1957 during a bout with the disease and explained
that an impairment which requires hospitalization necessarily and
substantially limits at least one major life activity. 53
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, criticized
the majority's holding. 54 Like Judge Moore in the district court,
Justice Rehnquist found that Congress was decidedly silent as to
coverage of individuals with contagious diseases. 55 More important
for Justice Rehnquist, though, was that he would not have declared
such an individual to be "handicapped," because that person poses
a direct threat. 56 This analysis misses the mark.
The majority did not ignore the possibility that a person with a
contagious disease could pose a direct threat and, as a result, would
not be covered under the Act. Instead, Justice Brennan followed
the line of cases from Strathie to Doe and the legislative history, all of
which indicate that such an inquiry is explored when determining
whether the impaired individual is "otherwise qualified" for
the position, not when determining whether one meets the
"handicapped individual" definition.57 The Court noted that "[a]
person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not otherwise be qualified
for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate
that risk." 58 The purpose of reserving that analysis until after the
"handicapped individual" inquiry and not categorically excluding
contagious individuals at the outset-as the district court did-is to
further the aim of the act. That aim was to ensure that employers
make individualized inquiries into the true risks and abilities of
a person so as to avoid decisions based on misconceptions. 59 The
Court acknowledged that "society's accumulated myths and fears

52
53
54
55
56
57

58
59

Id.
Id.; see45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (1985) (mentioning "caring for one's self'' as a
major life activity).
Id. at 292 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 293 (arguing that the majority's "meager proof of congressional intent"
should "not be determinative") .
Id. at 292.
Id. at 285 n.14 (majority opinion) (citing Strathie v. Dept. ofTransp., 716 F.2d
227, 232-34 (3d. Cir. 1983) ; Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 775
(1981)).
Id. at 287 n.16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 284-85.
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about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." 60
Drawing upon the different tests and phrases used by the circuit
courts that had addressed health and safety risks presented by
individuals with disabilities, the Court defined the proper inquiry
for determining whether an individual afflicted with a contagious
disease is otherwise qualified for the position. The Court noted
that this inquiry will normally be an individualized one and that
courts should normally "defer to the reasonable medical judgments
of public health officials" when finding these facts. 61 Courts must
make findings of fact about:
(a) the nature of the risk (how long the disease is
transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the
carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the
potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities
the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm. 62
Studies have shown that people generally fear the unknown and
uncontrollable more so than potential harms that they understand
or believe to be within their control. 63 And even well-meaning
individuals perceive risks askew of true, statistical probabilities. 64
This reliance on imperfect information leads to stereotyping of
people with disabilities and their relative abilities or risks. 65 Cognitive
biases exacerbate the problem: they are largely subconscious and
thus can result in discrimination or altered perceptions "whether

60
61

62
63

64
65

Id. at 284; see Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1302.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Supreme Court drew a comparison between
medical judgments made by private physicians and public health officials but
did not indicate whether a private physician should be accorded the same
validity. Id. at 288 n.18. The Court in Bragdon v. Abbott later indicated that
private health professionals could serve "as objective third-party experts" but
that courts should expect them to rely upon sound scientific evidence in the
profession. Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1280 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 649 (1998)).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1281 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 691-703 (1999));
id. at 1290 & n.49 (collecting studies detailing popular misconceptions ofrisk
based on levels of control).
See id. (citing Lawrence 0. Goslin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study
of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 59, 66 (1999)).
Id. at 1289.
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we intend it or not, whether we know it or not." 66 Thus we can see the
wisdom of the significant threat test articulated by the Supreme
Court, because it attempts to rectify these natural human reactions
and perceptions by requiring a rigorous, fact-specific review of the
health and safety risks one might pose, as determined by sound
and objective medical evidence. Arline's medical condition, on the
other hand, was not subject to this level of review at the district
court, which "made no findings as to the duration and severity"
of her disease nor the risk of transmission or the harm it could
impose. 67 Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings-to determine if Arline was
otherwise qualified for the position; that is, whether she posed a
significant risk to the health and safety of others and, therefore,
could not be reasonably accommodated. 68
Upon remand, Judge Moore of the district court employed
the four-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court to determine
the severity of the risk Arline's tuberculosis posed and, ultimately,
her protection under the Act. After painstakingly analyzing her
tuberculosis, relying on the "reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge" at the time of Arline's termination,
Judge Moore found that the nature of the risk was minimal; 69 the
duration of the risk ended prior to Arline's termination; 70 the risk
66

67

68
69
70

Id. at 1293 (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 4 7
STA . L. REv. 1161 , 1186-1210 (1995)). While the stereotypes and cognitive
biases discussed above are usually unintentional, Congress was well aware
of the more pernicious, intentional discriminatory actions of employers in
furtherance of their own self-interest. Id. at 1296 (noting that some employers
make hiring and termination decisions based upon fears of increased
insurance, increased workers compensation, and negative public reaction);
Olenick, supra note 12, at 173 (noting that employers' often unsubstantiated
fears of higher insurance premiums results in hiring significantly fewer
disabled individuals).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Court raised but did not answer the question as
to whether an individual who was a carrier of a contagious disease such as
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus could be considered
handicapped based solely on the basis of the contagiousness of the disease. Id.
at 282 & n.7.
Id. at 289.
Arline v. School Bd., 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Id. Although Arline tested positive for "cultures," indicating the presence of
the disease, in March and November of 1978, her "smear test"-"the threshold
indicator a person with the tuberculosis germ is capable of communicating
it"-became negative in August of 1977 and never was positive again. Id. at
1288-89, 1291.
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that tuberculosis posed was "not severe"; 71 and that she "posed no
threat of transmitting tuberculosis to the schoolchildren she was
teaching." 72 Based on these findings, the district court held that
Arline was otherwise qualified for the position of a school teacher at
the time she was terminated because she did not pose a significant
threat to the health and safety of others. 73

The Direct Threat Test Takes Hold
The Arline decision provided an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to display the broad protections provided in the
Rehabilitation Act to people with disabilities. In harmony with the
ambitious goals of the Act, the Court developed a direct threat
test, with a mandate for a searching medical review, to "balance[]
the potentially competing interests of individuals with disabilities
and society at large." 74 Arline's direct threat test, which initially was
limited to cases of infectious diseases, has since been codified in
the Rehabilitation Act75 and its newer counterpart, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) .76 Now, courts are using the test to
determine whether one poses a direct threat if one suffers from
various types of potentially threatening disabilities, such as HIV,
attention deficit hyperactive disorder, depression, diabetes, bipolar
disorder, narcolepsy, and epilepsy. 77
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist, similar to Judge Moore of
the district court, found that Congress's silence on the issue of
contagious diseases compelled the "conclusion that contagiousness
is not a handicap within the meaning of § 504," 78 a majority of

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

78

Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
See Deborah Leigh Bender, Echazabal v. Chevron: A Direct Threat to Employers in
the Ninth Circuit, 76 WASH. U. L. REv. 859, 871 (2001).
See supra note 3.
See supra note 4.
See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 648-651 (1998) (HIV); Haas v. Wyoming
Valley Health Care System, 553 F. Supp. 2d 390, 398-99 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing
Robertson v. euromedical Ctr., 161F.3d292, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1998) (attention
deficit hyperactive disorder); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 143-45 (1st
Cir. 1997) (depression); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101F.3d1090, 1094
(5th Cir. 1996) (diabetes); Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 231
(3d Cir. 2000) (epileptics operating potentially dangerous machinery); Ross v.
Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (narcolepsy)).
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1986) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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Supreme Court held that an individual with a contagious disease can
be covered under the Act. 79 Whether one qualifies as an "individual
.with a disability," at least under the ADA, should no longer be as
much of a sticking point. Congress's recent amendments to the
ADA substantially relaxed that classification, furthering goals
similar to those addressed in the Rehabilitation Act and identified
by the Arline Court. 80 As a result of these amendments, courts will
increasingly encounter Arline's direct threat test, and individuals
will more easily bypass the threshold disability question that
temporarily derailed Gene Arline's lawsuit in the district court. 81
Importantly, Arline's direct threat test has not only served both to
protect the rights of people with disabilities and shield employers
from potential liability, it also has fostered a greater understanding
of our society and the people within it.

79
80
81

Id. at 289 (majority opinion).
ADAAmendmentsActof2008, Pub. L. 110-325, §§ 1, 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55
(2008).
See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,009
(Mar. 25, 2011) (citing 2008 House Judiciary Committee Report, at 7) (noting
that "clearing the initial [disability] threshold is critical, as individuals who
are excluded from the definition never have the opportunity to have their
condition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determination made as
to whether they [are] otherwise qualified" (alterations in original) (internal
quotations omitted)).
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A Speedbump on the Information
Superhighway: Pushing Copyright Law
into the Online Era
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552

(M.D. Fla. 1993).
by Benjamin H. Eisenberg
eorge Frena owned and operated a small-scale subscription
bulletin board service ("BBS") 1 that was freely accessible
to customers online via telephone modem. 2 The BBS
functioned much like an online library, allowing customers who
had either paid a fee or purchased a certain amount of products
from Frena to connect via the Internet and "browse through
different BBS directories to look at pictures" and "download . . .
copies of the photographs . .. from Frena's computer onto their
home computer." 3 In addition to general file-sharing, one of the
BBS's more popular features was that subscribers could, among

G

Benjamin H . Eisenberg received hisJ.D. in May 2012 from Florida State University
College of Law and a B.A. in 2008 from Cornell University. He served as ajudicial
clerk for the Honorable Robert M. Gross of the Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal. The author thanks his parents, Jim and Georgene, and his fellow editors at
the Florida State University Law Review for their support throughout. Special thanks
to the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida for the opportunity to write this Case Comment and to Senior United
States District Court Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger who was kind enough to discuss
this case with the author.
1
For a more in-depth description of how a BBS operates, see Timothy L.
Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rukmaking Alternative, 35 SAN Drnco L. REv. 219, 225-26 ( 1998).
Playboy Enters. , Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
2
Id. Frena's actual fee for access was twenty-five dollars per month . Id. at 1558.
3
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other things, upload and download "adult content matter" to
and from Frena's BBS, and thus his computer. 4 Unbeknownst to
· Frena, however, users subsequently uploaded 170 copyrighted
photographs taken from fifty separate issues of Playboy Enterprises,
Inc.'s ("PEI") flagship magazine, Playboy. 5
In 1993, PEI filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that Frena, by
virtue of owning and operating the website that contained the
copyrighted images, committed copyright infringement, trademark
infringement, and unfair competition. 6 In response to PEI's three
motions for partial summary judgment, Frena admitted that the
images were posted on the BBS, that the images were downloaded
from the BBS by users, that he had not obtained authorization to
display the images, and that the images were "substantially similar
to copyrighted PEI photographs." 7 Frena argued, however, 8 that
liability was nonetheless improper since he had not personally
uploaded the copyrighted photographs to the BBS and that
once he became aware of the situation through the summons, he
immediately removed the images from the website. 9 Judge Harvey
E. Schlesinger, 10 presiding for the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, rejected Frena's argument, granting PEI's
three motions for partial summary judgment and holding Frena
strictly liable for all copyrighted images found on his website, even
though it was not shown that he personally uploaded the images,
authorized their addition, or even knew of their presence.11
4

5
6
7
8

9
10

11

Id. at 1554.
Id.
Id.
Id.
As discussed later in this Comment, Frena's argument ultimately raised an
issue of first impression for the federal courts. See David . Weiskopf, The Risks
of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practitioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REv.
1, 20 (1998) ("The widely discussed Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena was the
first case to consider liability for direct copyright infringement by a defendant
conducting activity on the Internet."); see also infra note 47 and accompanying
text.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
The Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger was nominated to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida by President George H. W.
Bush on May 23, 1991. Judge Schlesinger assumed senior status on June 5,
2006. History oftheFederaljudiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.
gov / servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=21l4&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl (last visited July
6, 2012).
See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (" [T] here is no dispute that
Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of
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The Frena decision, although a straightforward application of
the traditional copyright law standard of strict liability, ignited an
outpouring of debate concerning the ramifications that such an
approach could have on the burgeoning modern "online society."
Scholars argued that Judge Schlesinger's decision, while an
application of proper precedent, was "innocent or naive as to the
policy considerations concerning liability on the Internet," 12 since
instantaneous uploads and downloads made the online context,
in their view, inherently "different" from the other means of
publication from which copyright law was derived. 13 In this regard,
Judge Schlesinger's holding proved to be an essential catalyst for
initiating a much needed national debate on the issue, eventually
resulting in the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in
1998, which in turn largely rejected Frena's line of reasoning and
ushered copyright law into a new modern era.
Copyright Law and the Application of Strict Liability
Copyright law in the United States originates from Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution 14 and is primarily governed by the
Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), which establishes "an exclusive
ownership right in a form of expression" through three means
of liability: direct infringement, contributory infringement,
and vicarious liability. 15 For direct infringement (and copyright
infringement generally), the plaintiff must show" ( 1) ownership of
a valid copyright, and (2) copying [by the defendant] of constituent

12
13
14

15

a copyrighted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did
not make the copies himself."). While it is not the focus of this Comment, it
should also be noted that the Frena court also found the defendant liable for
trademark infringement and unfair practices. Id. at 1561-62.
Weiskopf, supra note 8, at 21.
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
Justin Williamson, Online Service Provider Copyright Liability: Is the Digital
MiUennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. LJ. 987, 989 (2000) (quoting Lewis
C. Lee & ]. Scott Davidson, InteUectual Property and the Internet, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY FOR THE I TERNET §§ 1.1, 1.7 (Lewis C. Lee &J. Scott Davidson eds.,
1997) ). See generally 17 U.S.C. (2006) (detailing the provisions of the 1976 Act).
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elements of the work that are original." 16 In this regard, direct
infringement, in the traditional sense, is a strict liability offense and,
_thus, "does not require intent or any particular state of mind." 17
Rather, knowledge is only instrumental in determining whether
a damages award should be reduced. 18 By contrast, contributory
liability expressly requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
had knowledge that another party was engaged in infringing
activity and that the defendant "induce [ d], cause [d] or materially
contribute[d] to the infringing conduct." 19 Somewhat similarly,
vicarious liability focuses on whether the defendant had sufficient
ability to control and authorize the direct infringer's actions and
thereby received gains derived from that authorization. 20
Since "copying," as is required in the second prong for
copyright infringement, can rarely be shown through direct
evidence, courts have found that it "may be inferentially proven
by showing that [the defendant] had access to the allegedly
infringed work, that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work, ... and that one of the [exclusive]
rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners is implicated." 21
These "exclusive rights," as guaranteed to the copyright owners
by the courts, are delineated in Section 106 of the 1976 Act and
consist in part of "the right to reproduce the copyrighted work,
the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies
to the public, and the right to publicly display the work. "22 As a

16

17
18

19

20
21
22

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 50l(a) (2006) (providing liability for "[a]nyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner").
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. etcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
See 17 U-8.C. § 504(c) (2) (2006) (stating that a court may reduce statutory
damages in certain situations in which the infringer "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright").
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. , 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) ; see also Noah Levine, ote, Establishing Legal Accountability for
Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1544 (1996)
("The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement is not derived from the
language of the Copyright Act and is therefore a distinct concept developed
independently by courts.").
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993)_
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3) & (5) (2006) ).
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result, it is well-established that "[e]ngaging in or authorizing
any of these categories without the copyright owner's permission
- violates the exclusive rights of the copyright owner and constitutes
infringement of that copyright." 23
In a traditional setting, such as with a printing press 24 or a
magazine publisher, courts routinely placed the onus on the
publisher to monitor its product and thus have "held distributers
and publishers strictly liable for any copyright infringement that
appeared in their publications." 25 In De Acosta v. Brown, 26 for
example, the defendant, a national magazine distributor, was held
strictly liable for unintentionally publishing a copyrighted short
story. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
basing its decision primarily on the overwhelming precedent,
recognized that it was "usual to hold an innocent publisher of a
copyrighted book liable [for direct infringement] ." 27 Thus, the
court reasoned that it was best to put the responsibility on the
publisher that "published [the copyrighted document] at its peril,"
regardless of the publisher's assertion of genuine ignorance. 28
To critics, such "traditional" precedent seemed distant when
applied to the budding spread of Internet usage, which theorists
argued could result in "unreasonable and impractical results." 29
Even before Frena, courts began questioning this logic in Internet

23
· 24

25
26
27
28
29

Frena, 839 F.Supp. at 1555-56(citing17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006)).
The Statute of Anne, which was codified in 1710 in Britain, represented the
origination of copyright law and "was an attempt to control the power of
the printing press." Darrin Keith Henning, "The Big Chill": The Supreme Court
Adopts an Inducement Standard for Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability,
Leaving Innovation in the Cold, 29 U. ARK. LITrLE RocK L. REv. 165, 165 (2006)
("Technological innovation and copyrights are generally seen as being in
conflict, with copyright pitted against progress.").
Elizabeth Schuerman, Note, Internet Seroice Providers and CofrYright LiabilityDon't Touch! . .. Or at Least Not Too Much, 30 S. ILL. U. LJ. 573, 575 (2006).
146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945).
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Am. Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publ'g. Co., 120 F. 766, 768 (7th Cir.
1902), appeal dismissed, 193 U.S. 675 (1904)).
Schuerman, supra note 25, at 576; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law
and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright
Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 345, 349
(1995) ("Applying copyright law in a digitized environment creates both
conceptual and substantive problems. The conceptual problems reflect the
fact that copyright law tailors itself to address the special needs of the print
technology-needs rendered invalid in a digitized environment.").
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settings. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuSeroe, lnc., 30 for example, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held, in
the context of defamation, that passive online BBS administrators
are not liable when the infringing actions are performed by
unaffiliated BBS members. In CompuSeroe, the plaintiff brought a
defamation suit against the owner and administrator of a real-time
chatroom when users anonymously posted defamatory statements
about the plaintiff. 31 The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
made any of the statements, but rather that the defendant passively
allowed the statements to be posted without taking steps to
moderate effectively and police the website. 32 The defendant, on
the other hand, argued "it was a distributor ... , as opposed to
a publisher of the ... statements," and thus should not be held
strictly liable for the actions of others. 33
The CompuSeroe court declined the plaintiff's reasoning,
citing practicality concerns since "CompuServe ha[d] no more
editorial control over such a publication than does a public library,
book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially
defamatory statements than it would be for any other distributor to
do so. "34 Specifically, the court noted that, " [o] bviously, the national
distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor
each issue of every periodical it distributes." 35 Since the defendant
30
31

32

33

34
35

776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
Id. at 137-38. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted libel, business disparagement,
and unfair competition. Id. The defendant's website was similar to the BBS in
Frena in that it was an '"electronic library' that subscribers [could] access from
a personal computer or terminal. ... Subscribers [could] also obtain access to
over 150 special interest 'forums.'" Id. at 137.
Id. at 138. The defendant in Compuserve did not have a contract to review the
actions of users nor did the defendant have the "opportunity to review [the]
contents before [they were uploaded] into CompuServe's computer banks,
from which it [was made] immediately available to approved ... subscribers."
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139. In the context of defamation, one who "republishes defamatory
matter is subject to liability as if he originally published it." Id. (quoting Cianci
v. New York Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)). On the other
hand, "distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither
know nor have reason to know of the defamation. " Id. (quoting Lerman v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y 1981) ).
Id. at 140.
Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir.
1984) , cert denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)). The court further stated that "[a]
computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional news
vender." Id.
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did not have knowledge of the postings, the court reasoned that
applying a strict liability standard would be "an undue burden on
the free flow of information. "36
The Frena Decision: Initiating the Debate
By contrast, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in Frena declined to follow this "practical"
reasoning in the context of copyright law, relying instead on a
literal interpretation of the 1976 Act to find strict liability as the
appropriate standard. 37 In Frena, it was not disputed that PEI had
copyrights for the photographs in question, that the photographs
had been uploaded to and downloaded from Frena's website, and
that the images were substantially similar to PEI's copyrighted
photographs. Thus, the accessibility and substantial similarity
elements of "copying," as are required for direct copyright
infringement, were effectively satisfied. 38
As to the third element, an implication of PEI's "exclusive
rights," the court found that, by virtue of having the photographs
on his website, Frena violated PEI's display and distribution rights. 39
In this context, the court defined the applicable distribution right
as "the exclusive right to sell, give away, rent or lend any material
embodiment of his work." 40 Since Frena had stored and shared the
images on the Internet, he had "supplied a product containing
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work." 41 In the same vein,
the court also held that Frena violated PEI's display rights, which
the court defined as the "unauthorized transmission of the display
from one place to another, for example, a computer screen." 42

36

37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. As such, the Compuserve court held that, in the context of defamation, courts
must determine whether the defendant "knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory ... statements." Id. at 141. The court also found that the
defendant was not liable under a theory of contributory or vicarious liability
because the plaintiffs did not present any facts to show that the defendant had
reason to know of the defamatory statements. Id.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
See id. at 1556 ("There is no dispute that PEI owns the copyrights on th e
photographs in question .... Access to the copyrighted work is not at issue ....
Substantial similarity is also a non-issue in this case.").
See id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1556 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 8.11 [A],
at 8-124.1 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 1557.

Published by STARS, 2013

175

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1

344

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Once again, since the images were available on the Internet, the
court held that the BBS was "open to the public" and accessible
· in a medium where "a substantial number of persons outside of
a normal circle of family and its acquaintances [are] gathered," 43
thereby satisfying the requirements for a display rights violation.
Despite the fact that PEI satisfied the necessary prongs to prove
direct infringement, and the case law distinctly demonstrated that
knowledge or volition is not an element of the offense, Frena
argued that his actions should be excused due to the passive nature
of his conduct. 44 The court rejected this argument, instead invoking
the traditional view that" [i] ntent or knowledge is not an element
of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable." 45
Furthermore, the court stated that, even in the context presented
in Frena, the element of knowledge was only of importance "when it
fixes statutory damages. "46 Thus, given the definitions of distribution
and display rights, the perceived realization from Frenawas that any
defendant owning a website could be held strictly liable for any
copyrighted items uploaded by an outside user-a realization that
many believed could result in massive national litigation.
The Movement Away from Frena
When Frena was decided in 1993, the Internet was in its infancy,
as is illustrated by the fact thatFrenawas a case of first impression for
the federal courts.47 Therefore, relying on a literal reading of the
1976 Act and a straightforward application of related precedent,
the Frena court's decision was not only the most logical outcome

43
44
45
46

47

Id. (quoting 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 8.14[C], at 8-169).
Id. at 1559.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990)). It
should be noted that the Frena court also rejected the defendant's argument
that the display of the images was a "fair use" because (1) Frena used the
website for a commercial purpose, to make money; (2) the images were exact
factual replications, rather than fantasy or fiction; (3) the photographs were an
essential part of the copyrighted work, Playboy magazine; and (4) the conduct
would greatly effect PEI's potential market. Id. at 1557-59.
See Kristin Ashurst Hughes, Cojryright in Cyberspace: A Survey of National Policy
Proposals for On-Line Service Provider Cojryright Liability and an Argument for
International Harmonization, 11 AM. U. J. I T'L L. & PoL'Y 1027, 1033 (1996)
(stating that, in the context of copyright law, "[r]eevaluation [wa]s necessary
to adjust the laws to this new mode of communication")
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but also was seemingly required under the law. 48 Legal theorists
and jurists, however, immediately contested this view, calling for a
change in policy based on the realization of the potential effects
the holding might cause during the rise of the new online age. 49
Distinctly, many recognized that distribution via the Internet
presents a separate problem from traditional, physical distribution
in that the Internet provides "prompt, accurate, and inexpensive
distribution of digital information means that practically anyone
can receive or disseminate" through remote personal computers at
any given time. 50 Most importantly, as was illustrated in Frena, the
Internet is distinct in that, unlike a hardcopy periodical distributor,
it allows outside users to easily and instantly upload (and download)
copyrighted information to a website on a massive basis without the
administrator's knowledge or authorization.
As a result, while several state and federal courts followed the
Middle District's lead, 5 1 the majority of courts quickly declined to

48

49

50

51

See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text; see also Weiskopf, supra note 8, at
21 ("[Frena] might objectively be viewed as the most literal application of the
strict liability nature of the Copyright Act to Internet activity.").
See, e.g., Dexter M. Campbell, III, Internet Law-Surfing Without a Board? A
Look at Copyright Infringement on the Internet and Article I of the Digital Millennium
Act, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 279, 284-85 (2002) (discussing the "ridiculous"
repercussions that the Frena holding would hold for webpage owners); Bruce
W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment in an Online World, 28 CoN . L. REv. 1137, 1160 (1996) ("After
all, if a marketplace of ideas has ever really existed, the Internet is it, and
strict prohibitions against transferring ideas from one person to another
may gut the very promise the Internet offers."); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Seroice
Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the
First Amendment, 88 GEO. LJ. 1833, 1834 (2000) (noting that on the Internet
"practically anyone with access to a copyrighted work can duplicate it, adapt it,
or disseminate it").
Yen, supra note 49, at 1834; see also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 49, at 1160
(arguing that extensive copyright protection "will only diminish the Internet's
value").
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1039 (S.D. .Y 1996) (finding a BBS owner was strictly liable when the owner
solicited customers and distributed the copyrighted product); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a BBS operator was
liable after encouraging users to upload and download video games from the
website); State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ohio 1998) (citing Frena for the
proposition that exclusive rights were implicated because "[p]osting software
on a bulletin board where others can access and download it is distribution"
and "[p]osting also implicates the display rights of copyright owners").
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follow Frena's holding due to practicality concerns. 52 Most significantly,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held in Religi,ous Technowg;y Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Services, Inc. 53 that passive Internet service providers ("ISPs") should
not be held strictly liable for the actions performed by outside users
on the Internet service they provide. In Netcom, the plaintiffs, two
non-profit corporations, alleged that a former Church of Scientology
minister committed copyright infringement by posting copyrighted
texts from L. Ron Hubbard54 on a BBS. 55 The plaintiffs subsequently
joined the BBS administrator and the ISP, Netcom, when both refused
to forcibly remove the copyrighted items from the website after being
asked to do so. 56 Much like the reasoning in Frena, the plaintiffs stated
that Netcom had not voluntarily added the copyrighted material on
the website, but should nonetheless be held strictly liable because
Netcom had stored, and thus copied, the copyrighted materials onto
their own database.57
The plaintiffs were able to show that they had valid copyrights
for the materials, 58 and, relying on MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 59 that the defendant had "copied" the materials. 60 Nonetheless,
the Netcom court recognized the importance that Netcom did not
initiate the copying of the materials onto the database. 61 And while
Netcom had the theoretical power to monitor the website for
copyright infringement, it had chosen not to do so, instead opting

52

53
54

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir.
2001) (requiring that the defendant know of the infringement even though
the plaintiff argued that Frena should apply); Playbo
y
Enters., Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-15 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that a
volitional act on behalf of the ISP is required for direct infringement) .
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
L. Ron Hubbard controversially founded and developed the Church of
Scientology through a series of writings particularly focused on a self-help
system entitled Dianetics. See An Introduction toL. Ron Hubbard, LRo H UBBARD.
ORG, http: / / www.lronhubbard.org/ ronseries/ profile/ introduction.html (last
visited July 6, 2012).
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1366, 1372.
Id. at 1367.
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that saving data from storage to
random access memory (RAM) was copying).
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
Id. at 1368-69 ("[T]he mere fact that Netcom's system incidentally makes
temporary copies of plaintiffs' works does not mean etcom has caused the
copying.").
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to supply merely an Internet connection. 62 As a result, the Netcom
court refused to accept that there was a violation of an "exclusive
right" that triggered strict liability; rather, the court, much like
CompuServe, compared a service provider to a more traditional
means of distribution, finding that Netcom's relationship with the
offender was "not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine
who lets the public make copies with it." 63 Given the inherent
uncertainty and litigation costs of monitoring online databases, 64
the court recognized that "courts [should] analyze the machine
owner's liability under the rubric of contributory infringement, not
direct infringement," thereby requiring an element ofknowledge. 65
The Netcom court distinguished Frena, concluding that "the
[Frena] court was looking only at the exclusive right to distribute
[and display] copies to the public, where liability exists regardless
of whether the defendant makes copies." 66 The plaintiffs in Netcom,
on the other hand, focused their claim on the fact that Netcom
stored copies of the material on their database. 67 While the court
left the reasoning for the distinction between distribution and
display as against storage relatively unclear, the overarching effect
was that Netcom greatly retracted Frena's potential reach.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardenburg, lnc., 68 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio furthered Netcom's
approach by holding that for ISPs to be held strictly liable for
copyright infringement, they must take affirmative steps to manage
their databases. In Hardenburg, the court found the defendant ISPs
strictly liable only after the defendants (1) encouraged outside users
to upload items to the website and (2) had a screening procedure
in which the defendants' employees viewed all of the files and
manually moved them onto the website. 69 The court found that" [ t]

62
63
64

65

66
67
68
69

Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
See id. ("Plaintiffs' theory would create many separate acts of infringement
and, carried to its natural extreme, would lead to unreasonable liability."); idat
1372 ("[I]t does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability
of countless parties.").
Id. at 1369. Thus, the court held "there should ... be some element of volition
or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party." Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1370 (emphasis added).
Id.
982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
Id. at 513.
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hese two facts transform[ed the] Defendants from passive providers
of a space in which infringing activities happened to occur to active
·participants in the process of copyright infringement." 70 As a result,
a distinction was made between a passive operator and one that
encourages, in effect finding that ISPs that have policies to monitor
such behavior should be held accountable for their failings. 71

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Given the uncertainty created by the case law spawned from
Frena, interested parties lobbied for a firm national consensus that
resolved these divergent policy perspectives. 72 In 1998, Congress
reached a compromise in the form of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which remains in effect today and
leaves the "current law in its evolving state" by creating a series
of "safe harbors," in the form of limited liability, for certain
common activities of service providers. 73 Specifically, Title II of
the DMCA, entitled the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act," directly seeks to "clarif[y] the liability faced by
service providers who transmit potentially infringing materials
over their networks. "74
The DMCA states that service providers are given limited
liability in four distinct scenarios: " ( 1) transitory communications,

70
71

72

73
74

Id.
The court held that the defendants were liable because of "policies of active
participation in the infringing acitivities." Id. Subsequent cases have held that
there were specific circumstances in which a somewhat passive ISP could be
held liable for direct infringement. See, e.g., Playbo
y
Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld,
968 F. Supp. 1171 ( .D. Tex. 1997) (holding thata website owner was liable for
images posted by customers because, unlike Netcom, the website owner was
being paid for selling the images, not for providing internet); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), afj'd 163 F.3d 486 (5th
Cir. 1999) (same); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Sanfilippo, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding liability where the owner gave the third party
authorization).
As could be expected, the national debate pitted copyright owners and ISPs
against one another. Copyright owners embraced the ruling from Frena, which
would force service providers to actively police all of their websites for possible
infringement. Service providers, on the other hand, proffered a "notice and
take down" approach, whereby service providers could only be found liable
if the copyright infringement had been recognized and brought to their
attention. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID IMMER, NIMMER o COPYRIGHT§
12B.Ol [B][2] (Mathew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011).
Id.§ 12B.Ol [B] [3] (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ).
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
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(2) system caching, (3) information stored on systems or networks at
the direction of users, and ( 4) information location tools." 75 First,
to be privy to such liability protection, the defendant must be a
"service provider" as defined by the statute. 76 Thereafter, the
service provider must (1) implement "a policy that provides
for the termination in appropriate circumstances of . . . repeat
infringers" 77 and (2) "accommodates and does not interfere with
standard technical measures. "78
More important, as related to Frenasituations, Section 512(c) of
the DMCA "protects service providers for information stored on its
system at the direction ofusers" 79 so long as the service provider"(!)
does not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing, (2)
does not receive a financial benefit from the infringing activity,
and (3) removed the infringing material expeditiously upon
notification." 80 Thus, the DMCA can be seen as a relative adoption
of the reasoning of CompuServe and Netcom in that purely passive
service providers are only liable when it is known that the service
provider had specific knowledge of the infringement.
While the reasoning of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena was
ultimately severely narrowed by United States copyright law, the
case's relative importance is not in question. Through the passage
of the DMCA, purely passive BBS owners such as Frena are now
shielded from copyright liability so long as they act prudently
to remove copyrighted information when notified and are not
benefiting financially from the infringement. The effect, therefore,
is a compromise of sorts such that only those with a culpable mind
may be liable, thereby forcing "traditional" notions of copyright
law to give way to the information superhighway's seemingly iconic
free flow of information. Thus, as can be seen from the resulting
law, Frena, while at times heavily criticized, represented a crucial
first step towards conforming the law to the online conglomerate

75
76

77
78
79
80

Schuerman, supra note 25, at 580 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d) (2006)
(emphasis added)).
As applicable to database owners such as Frena, a service provider is defined
as "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefore." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (B) (2006).
Id.§ 512 (i) (1) (A).
Id.§ 512 (i) (1) (B).
Schuerman, supra note 25, at580(citing17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)).
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(i-iii) (2006)).
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that society has become, fusing the old policy with new concerns,
and bringing legitimate copyright issues to the national forefront.
_A nd, in many ways, such is representative of the natural method
of copyright law, a never-ending battle where innovation leads the
way, leaving the law to later react and adapt. 81 As such, Frena can
be remembered as the bridge between these two phases, ushering
copyright law into the modem online era.

81

Determinations as to the requisite knowledge for the DMCA "safe harbors," for
example, still remain a hotly litigated issue for major Internet websites, such
as YouTube and Google. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 103270-cv, 10-3342-cv, 2012 WL 1130851, at *34 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding
that the DMCA "requires knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances
that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement").
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Like Oil and Water: The Past, Present,
and Future of American Waterways Operators,
Inc. v. Askew in the Ongoing Federal-State
Relationship in Regulating Oil Spill Recovery
American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F.
Supp. 1241 (1971)
by Zack Smith
ederal and state attempts to regulate recovery for oil spill
damages often go together as well as oil and water. Given
the recent large-scale and well-publicized Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, 1 the federal-state relationship in regulating oil
spill recovery has once again come to the forefront after spending
nearly two decades on the backburner since the Exxon Valdez
incident in 1989. 2 However, the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida (Middle District) was forced to deal
with this federal-state relationship long before either of these
events occurred. 3 In 1971, the Middle District took up the case of

F

Zack Smith received his J.D. in 2013 from the University of Florida Levin College
of Law and a B.A. in History and Political Science from the University of Florida in
2009. Much love and thanks to Tommy and Debbie Smith and Anna Harageones.
1
Sheila Pulham etal.,BPOilSpill:AnlnteractiveTimeline, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,2010),
http:/ / www.guardian.co.uk/ environment/ interactive / 2010 / jul/08/ bp-oilspill- timeline-in teractive.
2
See Exxon Valdez, EPA, http://epa.gov/ oem / content/learning/ exxon.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012). See generally William H. Rodgers et al., The Exxon
Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Sett/,ements and Roads Not Taken, 22
ALASKA L. REv. i35 (2005) (exploring the course oflitigation in the wake of
the Exxon Valdez incident and providing guidance for future oil spill recovery
efforts).
3
Am. Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (1971).
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American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, where it was asked by a
conglomerate of shipping interests to consider whether the Florida
Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act (Florida Act) 4 was
preempted by the federal Water Quality Improvement Act (Federal
Act) .5 In this instance, a threejudge panel of the Middle District6
held that the Florida Act was preempted and that Florida's state
statute was unconstitutional under Article III, Section 2, Clause I
of the United States Constitution because the states surrendered to
the federal government all power to enact substantive legislation
relating to admiralty and maritime matters. 7
Of course, this was not the first time that a federal court
was asked to consider whether a state statute affecting maritime
jurisdiction was constitutional. 8 In fact, this area of law has a
rich and distinguished history. As far back as 1872 in the case of
Steamboat Company v. Chase, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state
wrongful death statute which created a cause of action in state
court for wrongful deaths that occurred on navigable waterways

4

5
6

7
8

The Florida Statute read, in part:
Because it is the intent of this chapter to provide the means
for rapid and effective cleanup and to minimize damages, any
licensee and its agents or servants, including vessels destined for
or leaving a licensee 's terminal facility, who permits or suffers a
prohibited discharge or other polluting condition to take place
within state boundaries shall be liable to the state for all costs of
cleanup or other damage incurred by the state and for damages
resulting from injury to others. In any suit to enforce claims of the
state under this chapter, it shall not be necessary for the state to
plead or prove negligence in any form or manner on the part of
the licensee or any vessel. If the state is damaged by a discharge
prohibited by this chapter it need only plead and prove the fact of
the prohibited discharge or other polluting condition and that it
occurred. FLA. STAT.§ 376.12 (1973).
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
A threejudge district court panel must be convened if a party is seeking an
interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by
an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes ... upon the
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed
1976) . A threejudge panel was necessary in this instance because Section 2281
has been held to apply to any challenge of the constitutionality of a statewide
statute of general applicability. See ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMA '
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (4th ed. 1969).
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction .... "U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See infra notes 14-20.
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even though a similar cause of action in federal court did not exist
under federal maritime law. 9 In 1893, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in The City of Norwalk
held that states can legislate in the maritime area in order: (1) to
establish general rights for persons within the state's limits, (2) to
exercise police power, and (3) to establish maritime regulations of
a strictly local nature. 10
However, the trend of expanding states' rights to legislate in
the maritime domain was quickly curtailed by the U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. ]ensen.11 In Jensen, the
Supreme Court held that a state's workers' compensation statute,
when applied in the maritime context, interfered with the goal of
national uniformity of the laws affecting interstate commerce. 12 The
Court felt uniformity was mandated by the Constitution and that
it could only be promoted through exclusive federal jurisdiction
over maritime matters. 13 Thus, the Supreme Court declared the law
unconstitutional and struck it down .14 Congress was displeased with
this result, though, and passed legislation making federal maritime
jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims nonexclusive to
the federal government. 15 However, the Supreme Court, not to
be outdone, ruled this congressional grant of non-exclusivity itself
unconstitutional a few years later in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 16
This was the background against which the Middle District
confronted the issue in Askew.
In Askew, the Middle District agreed that national uniformity of
the laws within the maritime context was paramount and relied on
the Supreme Court's decisions in Jensen and Knickerbockerto support
its conclusion. 17 The Middle District quickly dismissed Florida's two
primary arguments that the Florida Act was constitutional. First,
it addressed Florida's argument that the "gap theory" permits
certain state regulations pertaining to oil spill recovery where
federal regulations are inadequate. 18 The "gap theory" states that
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. 522, 533 (1872).
City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y 1893).
244 U.S. 205, 218 (1918).
Id.
Id.at217.
Id. at 217-18.
Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
Am. Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1248-49.
Id.
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where Congress fails to provide a comprehensive remedy in certain
situations, the states are free to fill in the gaps left by the federal
legislation with their own state-level legislation. 19
The Middle District rejected this argument based on the U. S.
Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. This
case involved the application of Florida's wrongful death statute to
a longshoreman who was killed aboard a vessel while it was within
the navigable waters of the State of Florida. 20 Unfortunately for
the longshoreman and his family, maritime law did not provide a
remedy, or any recovery, for his death. 21 So, Florida attempted to
apply its wrongful death statute to the situation.22 The Supreme
Court struck down such an application, however, and concluded
that the absence of a "federal statute or a maritime rule on the
subject [does not compel] the conclusion that state law must
govern." 23 The Court remanded the case and ordered the district
court to shape an adequate remedy under maritime law. 24 The
Middle District analogized Moragne to the case before it in Askew
and concluded that if the states are precluded from legislating
in the maritime area when there is not a federal statute on point
dealing with an issue, then they surely must be barred from
legislating when there is a federal statute on point dealing with a
particular maritime matter. 25
Second, the Middle District rejected Florida's argument that
the "savings clause" of the Federal Act allowed the state to enact the
Florida Act. 26 The Federal Act stated that "Nothing in this section
shall be construed as preempting any State or political subdivision
thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect
to the discharge of oil into any waters within such State." 27 The
Middle District, relying on Knickerbocker stated that "it has long
been recognized that Congress is powerless to confer on the states

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Brief for Appellant at 83-84, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973) ( o. 71-1082), 1971WL134330, at *83.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1248-49; see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 376 (1970).
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375.
Id.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1249 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375) .
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1249.
Id.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (o) (2) (1970)).
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authority to legislate within the admiralty jurisdiction." 28 Even
so, the Middle District did not read the "savings clause" of the
Federal Act as a congressional attempt to confer upon the states
this power, but rather read it as simply stating that the states are
free to "enforce pollution control measures that are within their
constitutional prerogative." 29 The Middle District did not find the
Florida Act to be within the state's constitutional prerogative, and
thus struck down the Florida Act in its entirety. 30
However, the State of Florida appealed directly to the U. S.
Supreme Court. 31 Upon hearing the case, the Court reversed
the Middle District's decision and held that the Florida Act was
not preempted by the Federal Act. 32 Weighing heavily on the U.
S. Supreme Court's decision was the fact that the Federal Act
specifically contained the "savings clause." 33 The Supreme Court
seemed to soften its own prior holding in Knickerbocker by holding
that such "savings clauses" which allow states to legislate in the oil
spill recovery domain are okay as long as they make clear that the
state legislation must be consistent with the federal legislation. 34

28
29
30
31

32
33
34

Id. at 1249 (citing Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 170).
Id.
Id. at 1249-50.
Under the applicable statute, where a threejudge district court panel hears a
case for an interlocutory appeal in any civil action where such a threejudge
panel is required, the party to whom the decision is adverse may directly appeal
the decision to the United States Supreme Court. See28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).
The importance of tl1is case to the states, as a whole, can be seen by the large
number of amicus briefs other states submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court
supporting Florida's position. See e.g. Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus
Curiae, Askew V. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 711082) , 1972 WL 136393; Brief for the State of Hawaii as Amicus Curiae, Askew
v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL
136391; Brieffor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136387; Brieffor
the State of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136390; Brief of the State
of Texas as Amicus Curiae, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136396; Brief of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Amicus Curiae, on Behalf of the Appellants, Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (no. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136392; Amicus
Curiae Brieffor the State of Washington, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S.325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136395.
Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 331-32.
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The Supreme Court also rejected the Middle District's
repudiation of the "gap theory,'' by relying on a theory that was
p.ot mentioned in the Middle District's decision, namely that the
traditional police powers of the State of Florida were sufficient to
allow the state to regulate recovery from oil spills which occurred
within the state's territorial waters. 35 Beginning with the appeal from
the Middle District's decision in Askew, the Court retreated from
its stance that all laws affecting maritime matters are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and has again shown
a willingness to revert to its very early non-exclusivity positions. 36
Due to the passage of time, the Federal Act is no longer the
primary statute through which oil spill recovery is regulated. 37
After the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, Congress passed the
comprehensive Oil Pollution Act (OPA) which regulates recovery
for damages from oil spills. 38 The OPA also contains "savings
clauses" similar to those found in the Federal Act. 39 Just as the
Federal Act's "savings clauses" were at issue in Askew, so too have
OPA's non-preemption provisions, or savings clauses, been a
frequent source of friction between federal and state attempts at
regulation, 40 and much litigation has resulted from this friction. 41
As a result of this litigation, and the precedent set by the Supreme
Court's decision in the appeal from the Middle District's decision
in Askew, a consensus has developed that states may enact statutes
that impose liability for oil spills that go beyond the liability

35

36

37
38
39
40

41

Id. at 336; for a broader discussion of state police powers within the maritime
context, see Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 273, 284
( 1999).
See generally Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (allowing a state
wrongful death statute to govern an admiralty action after a determination
that its application would not harm the uniformity of admiralty law).
See Oil PollutionActofl990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 420l(a), 104 Stat. 484, 523
(codified at33 U.S.C. § 132l(c) (2006)).
Patrick Nash, The Adequacy of the Oil Pollution Acts Compensation Scheme in the
Case of a Catastrophic Oil Spill, 7]. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 105, I 05 ( 1991).
See Oil Pollution Act ofl990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1018(a) (1), 104 Stat. 484,
505 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1) (2006) ).
See Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade, 36 TuL. MAR. LJ.
I, 25-26, 48-49 ( 20 I I) (examining disputes relating to OPA's jurisdictional
limits as well as the statute's presentment requirement).
Id. at 48.
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limits established by the federal OPA. 42 Further, this litigation
has established that private individuals may recover under these
state statutes, especially those individuals who suffer non-physical
shoreside injuries, which in large-scale oil spills is likely to affect a
significant number of individuals. 43
The Supreme Court's decision overturning the Middle
District's decision in Askew is still good law and has recently gained
even more importance, and renewed interest, after almost forty
years since it was originally issued. This revival is due, in large part,
to suits that have developed from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
that began on April 20, 2010, 44 when the Deepwater Horizon oil
rig exploded, collapsed into the Gulf of Mexico, and eventually
spilled approximately 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf,
making it by far the largest oil spill to ever occur in U.S. waters. 45
By comparison, the Exxon Valdez incident spilled eleven million
gallons of oil into the waters in, and surrounding, Prince William
Sound with only the state of Alaska being affected by this spill. 46 In
addition to catastrophic spills such as these, smaller oil spills occur
within federal and state waters on a regular basis. 47 The U.S. Coast
Guard estimates that a minimum of 1.3 million gallons of oil are
spilled into U.S. waterways each year. 48 As a result of the frequency
of these spills, at least twenty-five states have statutes providing for
the recovery of damages that result from oil spills. 49
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Eastern District) which
is handling the multi-district litigation (MDL) consisting of

42
43
44

45
46
47

48
49

See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000) (citing Askew v. Am.
Waterways Operators, Inc. 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973)).
Injuries of this type could include property damage, loss of business revenue,
etc. See id.
Dr. Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 86
WASH. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2011) (detailing the blowout and asserting that "while
the flow has stopped, the legal saga has only just begun").
Id.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476-78 (2008).
David lvanovich & Kristen Hays, Offshore Drilling Safer, but Small Spills Routine:
Hurricanes Can Pose Particular R isks, Hous. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at Al,
available at http: / / www.chron.com / business/ article/ Offshore-drilling-saferbu t-small-spills-routine-1589037.php.
Oil Spills, FUEL ECONOMY.Gov, http:/ / www.fueleconomy.gov/ feg/oilspills.
shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
See Nash, supra note 29, at 110.
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"hundreds of consolidated cases, with thousands of claimants,'' 50
arising from the Deepwater Horizon spill, has indicated a hostility
~oward allowing state statutes to be applied in conjunction with
OPA and other federal maritime laws in order to permit states
and individuals with a right to recover under those state statutes. 51
Thus, its position is closer to the Middle District's decision in Askew
than it is to the Supreme Court's decision in the appeal from the
Middle District's decision.
In justifying its results, the Eastern District emphasized the
Supreme Court's Jensen and Knickerbocker line of cases which
themselves emphasize the need for harmony and uniformity in
federal maritime rules, 52 just as the Middle District did in Askew.
The Eastern District brushed aside the Supreme Court's holding in,
and the plaintiff's reliance on, the Court's decision in Askew. The
Eastern District justified this result by focusing on the fact that the
statute at issue in Askew, allowed the state and private individuals
the right to recover damages from oil spills that occurred within
the state's territorial waters. 53 The Eastern District took notice of
the "savings clauses" of the OPA which prevent preemption of state
laws in determining liability for oil spill damages, but glossed over
them by stating, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court observed that the
savings clause in OPA preserved state statutes relative to liability, it
did not declare a rule so broad as to allow state liability statutes to
apply to oil spills outside of state water." 54 In this way, the Eastern
District's decision in the MDL litigation is similar to the Middle
District's decision in Askew.

50

51
52
53
54

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010 (Deepwater Horizon), 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011)
Q.P.M.L. 2010) (creating MDL No. 2179). Multidistrict Litigation is a process
by which similar cases, usually resulting from products liability claims or claims
resulting from a natural disaster, are consolidated in one federal district court
for all pretrial and discovery work. If a case is not settled during this pretrial
and discovery period, it is remanded back to the district court from which it
came for trial. However, because of the complexity and magnitude of many
claims involved in multidistrict litigations, many, if not most cases, are settled at
the pretrial and discovery phase. For more information regarding multidistrict
litigation, see Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. Lee, III, From Class Actions to
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KA
L. REv. 775, 777 (2010).
Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953-54.
Id. at 954 n.7.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.
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To further bolster its conclusion, the Eastern District relied
on the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in International Paper Co.
v. OueUette. 55 The Ouellette case involved the question of whether
a state common law nuisance action may be brought in the
state where the nuisance occurs if the source of the nuisance,
presumably pollution, originates in another state. 56 The case also
involved the issue of whether such a state common law action is
preempted by the federal Clean Water Act. 57 In deciding the case,
the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that a state common law claim
was permissible regarding pollution of the type regulated by the
Clean Water Act; however, it held that the law of the state where
the pollution originated was the correct law under which to bring
the claim. 58 The Eastern District reasoned that since the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill originated in federal waters, the only applicable
law under which to bring a claim was federal maritime law, thus
finding "it appropriate to limit state-law claims purportedly saved
by OPA," even though such limitations had not previously been
applied.59 It againjustified its determination by invoking the need
for uniformity in national maritime law, 60 just as the Middle District
did in Askew. 61 In limiting the state law claims available under OPA,
though, the Eastern District overlooked important nuances in the
existing case law. In Oullette, the Supreme Court was concerned
about the uniformity of the law; if states were permitted to set
their own pollution standards through common law adjudication,
confusion would overcome the Clean Water Act's carefully drawn
standards.62 However, no such risk exists under OPA.
State statutes, like the ones with which the Eastern District
were confronted, would not undermine a carefully drawn federal
regulatory scheme since these statutes only allow states and
individuals to obtain adequate compensation for damages caused by
oil spills and would not undermine a presently existing, prospective
federal regulatory scheme. This latter view is more in line with

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 956.
See lnt' I Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 487.
Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
Id.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 218 (1918)).
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Askew. 63 More importantly, the
Eastern District seemingly brushed aside part of the congressional
i_n tent in enacting OPA, namely, allowing states to enact pertinent
legislation in the area of oil spill recovery, 64 which the Supreme
Court, in its decision in the appeal from the Middle District's
decision in Askew, said is permissible. In fact, when enacting OPA,
preemption was the most frequently discussed topic in Congress, 65
and after this protracted discussion, Congress explicitly included
the savings clauses, thus preventing federal preemption of state
statutes permitting recovery for damages sustained from oil spills. 66
Therefore, the current status, and underlying rationale, of
the Middle District's decision in Askew may, unfortunately, be
experiencing a revival. While the Supreme Court's ruling in the
appeal from the Middle District's decision has enjoyed a resurgence
of recognition by the plaintiffs' bar in the wake of catastrophic
oil spills such as Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon, its status
among federal courts seems less certain, and as evidenced by
the Eastern District's recent decision, lower federal courts seem
to again be embracing the Middle District's rationale. However,
for now, based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the appeal
from the Middle District's decision in Askew, it is clear that unless
expressly preempted, states have the power to legislate in the area
of recovery for damages from oil spills that occur within their
territorial waters. Less clear, however, are states' powers to legislate
regarding recovery for damages from oil spills that do not originate
within their respective jurisdictions. It seems, based on the
Supreme Court's trend of expanding the non-exclusivity of federal
maritime jurisdiction that states will be allowed to legislate in order
to recover damages from oil spills unless to do so would undermine
a federal regulative scheme. This includes damages from spills that
do not originate from within their jurisdictions.67 However, the

63
64
65
66
67

See Askew, 411 U.S. at 325.
See Valerio Spinaci, L essons from BP: Deepwater Oil Drilling as an Abnormally
Dangerous A ctivity, 35 NOVA L. REv. 803 , 812 (2011).
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 101-94, at 17 (1989)).
Id.; see also Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No . 101-380 § 1018(a) (1), 104
Stat. 484, 505 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1) (2006)).
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking
the Theory of Damages in a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1o5 3, 107 5 ( 2o 1 1 )
(discussing proposed reforms for damage recovery within the oil spill context).
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need for uniformity and the massive amount of damages being
sought across several jurisdictions may again cause courts to lend a
sympathetic ear to the Middle District's decision in Askew.
Certainly, the Eastern District of Louisiana is doing so, even
if it does not explicitly, or tacitly, admit this fact. Still, the Eastern
District's concern with the need for uniformity in federal maritime
law, in this instance, seems tenuous, at best, since only five states
border the Gulf of Mexico. 68 Certainly, allowing these five states to
provide recovery for their citizens beyond that allowed by the OPA
would not undermine a federal legislative scheme. While only time
will tell what the ultimate impact of the Middle District's decision in
Askew will be on states' ability to regulate the recovery of damages
from oil spills, one fact is certain; federal and state attempts to
simultaneously regulate damage recovery from oil spills often go
together as well as oil and water.

68

These states include Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi , and Texas.
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Crimes Defining Our Time: Notable Criminal
Cases from the First Fifty Years of the Middle
District of Florida
by Anthony E. Porcelli, Magistrate Judge
ince the inception of the Middle District of Florida in 1962,
the breadth of cases prosecuted in the District during the first
five decades has covered the spectrum of the federal criminal
code. The courthouses in the District have certainly housed many
nationally significant and high profile cases, all worthy of extensive
discussion and debate. Given the nature and scope of the many
significant prosecutions, it is a difficult task to select just a few
notable criminal cases. The nine cases discussed below have not
been selected based upon the success of the government or defense
in the case, but rather have been selected to be briefly summarized
based upon the nature of the charges and the national significance
of the prosecution.
As Central Florida grew economically and culturally during the
District's first 50 years, as exemplified by the cases below, the societal
changes impacted the scope and sophistication of the prosecutions
in the District. Not surprisingly, some of the first notable cases
from the District's early years were RIC0 1 prosecutions. Then,
as cocaine became prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s, the District
produced arguably three of the most significant drug or money
laundering related prosecutions in United States history. At the

S

Anthony E. Porcelli is a United States Magistrate Judge, Middle District of Florida,
Tampa Division.
1
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(also known as the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970).
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turn of the century, substantial cases in the District included
the prosecution of one of the largest ever corporate frauds, the
conviction of the highest ranking United States military officer for
espionage, one of the first terrorism related trials after September
11, 2001, and one of the largest health care fraud prosecutions in
the United States.
For nearly the first decade of the District's existence the
investigative tools and the scope of federal jurisdiction over
crimes was limited in comparison to current conditions. The
types of federal crimes pursued included cases such as interstate
transportation of stolen cars, bank robberies, and fugitives. How
these cases were prosecuted and defended is a vast difference from
today's federal criminal procedures. 2 As former Eleventh Circuit
Judge Joseph W. Hatchet commented during the 50th Anniversary
panel presentation 3 "the system has changed a great deal since
the early 60s." Judge Hatchet observed that "in the old days there
were no public defenders, every lawyer in the district was a public
defender, all it took was a call from the judge, who'd say you have
volunteered to represent such and such defendant . .. , there was
no authorized plea bargaining ... , no sentencing guidelines, [and]
discovery was by ambush."
Arguably, during the District's early years one of the more
significant developments relating to federal criminal prosecutions
was when Congress passed the RICO Act in 1970. The very next

2

3

Notably, during the District's infancy in the 1960s, the United States Supreme
Court issued a number of rulings that drastically changed how federal
criminal cases were investigated, prosecuted, and defended. See, e.g., Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (holding that statements obtained
from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated
atmosphere without full warning of constitutional rights are inadmissible
as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-43 (1963)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel extends to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, establishing an accused's right to
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search is
inadmissible).
On October 26, 2012, the District hosted the Middle District of Florida 50th
Anniversary Academic Symposium in Orlando, Florida. At the Symposium,
Judge Hatchett, Senior United States District Judge William J. Castagna, and
Stetson University College of Law Professor Robert Batey participated in a
panel discussion on major criminal cases in the District's history.
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year in 1971 to combat the prevalent "bolita" 4 gambling enterprises
in Central Florida, the government pursued RICO charges against
Harlan Blackburn, a.k.a. "The Colonel," and numerous others in
what is believed to be the first RICO prosecution in the State of
Florida. Blackburn was the boss of a crew of gamblers and thieves
called the "Cracker Mob," which had about 20 bolita bankers and
200 sellers. 5 However, as a result of the successful prosecution,
Blackburn's organization was essentially dismantled. 6
It was believed that Blackburn was at one time a partner
in gambling enterprises with Santo Trafficante, Jr., who law
enforcement had doggedly pursued through the 1970s and early
1980s for racketeering activities. 7 As detailed by Senior United
States DistrictJudge WilliamJ. Castagna during the 50th Anniversary
panel presentation, the government's pursuit of Trafficante, Jr.
came to a head in 1983 when he was charged along with eleven
other men as being members of the "La Cosa Nostra" or "Mafia"
engaged in racketeering activities, to include gambling, extortion,
interfering with commerce by threats of violence, and bribery.
The core of the government's case was the result of an investigation
known as "Operation Coldwater," which specifically included the
extensive efforts of Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent
Joseph D. Pistone, who under the assumed identity of "Donnie
Brasco," 8 infiltrated the criminal enterprise through his contacts
with Benjamin "Lefty" Ruggiero and Sonny Black. As explained by
Judge Castagna, a significant part of the government's case focused
on the defendants' alleged efforts to engage in illegal gambling
activities at the King's Court, which was later revealed to be an
undercover gambling club owned and operated by the FBI. The
majority of defendants were found guilty of a number of the alleged
racketeering activities. However, Black was not charged in the case

4

Bolita is akin to a lottery game, in which normally one-hundred numbered
balls were placed in a bag, mixed up, and the winning number would be
drawn. The game was brought to Florida by Cuban immigrants and was
very popular in Central Florida with many variants of the game abound. See
SCOTT M. DEITCHE, CIGAR CITY MAFIA, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE TAMPA

5
6

7
8

U DERWORLD ch. 15 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
The compelling story of Agent Pistone's undercover work is portrayed in the
Hollywood motion picture Donnie Brosco. DONNIE BRASCOE (TriStar Pictures
1997).
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because his decomposed body was located in a creek in 1982, prior
to the indictment. As noted by Judge Castagna, it was presumed
that Black's death was attributable to him bringing Brasco into
the criminal enterprise. Trafficante, Jr. was not convicted on any
charges. Judge Castagna explained during his panel presentation
that the charges against Trafficante,Jr., were dismissed based upon
the insufficiency of the evidence. Judge Castagna noted that the
government argued that a significant piece of evidence against
Trafficante, Jr. was an audio-recording during which Tafficante,
Jr. could allegedly be heard taking a $1000 payment secreted in a
greeting card from Black. However, as recalled by Judge Castagna,
not only did the recording evince that Trafficante, Jr. did not be
take any such payment, but as Black repeatedly offered the payment
to Trafficante, Jr., the only response heard on the recording was
Trafficante,Jr. stating "forget about it."
As the 1980s came, so did the proliferation of sophisticated
narco-trafficking organizations. In response, the United States
became fully engaged in the war on drugs. Three cases from the
District exemplify the government's efforts to combat the epidemic ·
of cocaine distribution: the prosecution of Carlos Enrique Lehder
Rivas ("Lehder"); the case against the Luxembourg-based Bank of
Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI"); and the ongoing
investigation known as "Operation Panama Express."
In 1981, Lehder was indicted9 for smuggling approximately 3.3
tons of cocaine from 1978 to 1980. 10 During trial in November
1987, it was argued that "[Lehder] was to cocaine transportation
[what] Henry Ford was to automobiles." 11 At that time, Lehder
was considered to be the highest-ranking member of the Medellin
Cartel to face trial in the United States. 12 The trial detailed

9
10

11

12

See Indictment at Dkt. No. 1, United States v. Lehder Rivas, o. 3:81-cr-82:J25MCR (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 1981 ).
Reportedly, Lehder was responsible for eighty percent of the Colombian
cocaine smuggled into the United States. Mary T. Schmich, Colombian is Called
'Henry Ford' of Drugs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 11, 1988, available at http:/ I
articles.chicagotribune.com/ 1988-05-11 I news/ 8803l60096_l_carolos-lehherrivas-cocaine- columbian.
Barry Bearak, Mother Delivered Drug for Trip to Disneyland, Witness Says: Odd
Moments Lace Tame Lehder Cocaine Tria~ L.A. TIMES , Mar. 12, 1988, available at
http:/ I articles.latimes.com / 1988-03- 12/ news/ mn-840_l_carlos-lehder.
Jean Thompson, Prosecutor: Lehder Fostered Fledgling Drug Trade, SUN-SE TINEL,
ov. 17, 1987, available at http: / / articles.sun-sentinel.com/ 1987-11-17 /
news/ 8702060168_l_mr-merkle-carlos-lehder-rivas-cocaine-transportation.
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Lehder's rise in becoming one of the most significant cocaine
distributors in the United States, starting when he met George
Jung in federal prison. 13 Lehder quickly developed a sophisticated
and extensive organization, which was based in Norman's Cay in
the Bahamas, where he controlled the entire tropical island, had
a fleet of one dozen aircraft, and commanded an army of drug
smugglers. 14 Lehder's trial was reported as the "most important
drug prosecution in U.S. history . . . . "15 Lehder was convicted
after a seven-month trial and was originally sentenced to life
imprisonment plus an additional 135 years, but Lehder's sentence
was reduced to fifty-five years of imprisonment based upon his
cooperation with the United States against the fallen Panamanian
dictator, Manuel Noriega. 16 Lehder is still actively seeking to have
his sentenced reduced to thirty years based upon his cooperation
against Noriega.17
In the latter part of the 1980s, it was revealed that BCCI
laundered millions of dollars for Colombian cocaine cartels and
other significant drug traffickers. 18 BCCI was one of the world's
largest private banks operating in seventy-three countries with
offices in France, Panama, England, New York, Los Angeles,
Tampa, and Miami. 19
Based upon an extensive two-year
undercover operation known as "C-Chase," BCCI and nine of its
officers were indicted in 1988 for participating in a drug-related,
money-laundering scheme. 20 At the conclusion of the elaborate
undercover operation, agents orchestrated a phony wedding and
arrested the majority of the defendants at a staged bachelor party,
including Amjad Awan, who laundered millions of dollars for
Noriega, and Gonzalo Mora, Jr., who laundered millions of dollars
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20

The partnership between Lehder and Jung is fictionalized in the Hollywood
motion picture Blow. BLOW ( ew Line Cinema 2001).
See supra note 11.
See supra note 10.
Order on Motion to Compel, Motion to Implement Sentence Adjustment,
Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Status Conference at
Dkt. o. 1485 n.l, United States v. Lehder Rivas, No. 3:81-cr-82:J-25MCR (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 23, 2011).
Id.
See Indictment at Dkt. o. 1, United States v. Awan, No. 8:88-cr-330-T-26 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 4, 1988).
Associated Press, Ex-Banker to Noriega is Convicted in Scheme to Aid Drug Traffickers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, available at http: //www.nytimes.com/ 1990/ 07/ 30/
us/ ex-banker-to-noriega-is-convicted-in-scheme-to-aid-drug-traffickers.html.
Id.
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for the Medellin Cartel. 21 As part of a plea deal, BCCI agreed to
forfeit to the United States fourteen million dollars, which at that
time was hailed as the "largest cash forfeiture ever" by a financial
institution in the United States. 22 Awan and Mora, Jr., along with
others, were convicted after a lengthy trial. The verdicts were
hailed by the government as "significant victories in our efforts to
dismantle the drug cartels' ability to hide their tainted profits in
the worldwide banking system." 23
Since the late 1990s to date, law enforcement in the District has
been engaged in "Operation Panama Express," which, according
to the United States, led to 308 high-seas interdictions, resulting
in the seizure or destruction of more than one-thousand tons of
cocaine and the prosecution of 1,843 defendants. 24 The Operation
focuses on the transportation of multi-ton quantities of cocaine
transported by boat in the Eastern Pacific Ocean from Colombia
destined for the United States. The Operation consists of a collective
effort between multiple governmental agencies, including, among
others, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the FBI, the United States
Coast Guard, and the United States Navy. 25 Notable defendants
prosecuted as a result of the Operation include Joaquin ValenciaTruillo ("Valencia") and Jose Castrillon-Henao. 26 Described as "the
biggest catch ever netted by Operation Panama Express," Valencia
acted as a member of the Cali Cartel, which reportedly ran "one of
the largest-ever maritime drug shipping operations. "27

21

22

23
24

25
26

27

See ROBERT MAZUR, THE INFILTRATOR, MY SECRET LIFE INSIDE THE DIRTY BA KS
BEHIND PABLO ESCOBAR's MEDELLIN CARTEL 288-305 (1st ed. 2009) (describing
"the takedown" from the eyes of the undercover agent).
Douglas Frantz & Ronald J. Ostrow, Bank P/,eads Guilty to Handling Drug Profits:
Noriega: A Luxemborg Institution Linked to Panama's Ousted Strongman Forfeits $15
Million in Assets to the U.S., L.A. TIMES,Jan. 17, 1990, available at http:! / articles.
latimes.com/ 1990-01-1 7/ news/ mn-103_l_in ternational-bank.
See supra note 20.
Additionally, Operation Panama Express reportedly also conducted the largest
one-time seizure of cocaine when twenty-one tons of cocaine was seized during
an interdiction. See Elaine Silvestrini, 21 Tons of Cocaine Seized from Vessel, THE
TAMPA Thrnu E, Mar. 22, 2007, available at http: / / tboblogs.com/ index.php/
newswire/ story / 21-tons-of-cocaine-seized-from-vessel/?imw=Y
Id.
See United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, No. 8:02-cr-329-T-17EAJ (M.D. Fla. filed
Aug. 22, 2002); United States v. Castrillon-Henao, No. 8:98-cr-164-T-24TBM
(M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14, 1998).
See Carrie Weimar, Drug Trial Could Shake Colombia, TAMPA BAY TIMES, July 9,
2006, available at http: / / www.sptimes.com/ 2006/ 07 / 09/ Tampabay/ Drug_
trial_ could_shak.sh tm 1.
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In addition to the prevalent and all-too-common drug crimes
of the time, wide-scale and complex fraudulent crimes came to the
forefront and became commonplace from the mid-l 990s through
the next century. Unfortunately, the District was not spared
from the rising tide of fraud. In 1994, the National Heritage Life
Insurance Company lost more than 450 million dollars, causing
catastrophic loses to its 25,000 policy holders, half of whom were
Floridians. 28 National Heritage's collapse came about as the
result of "the largest insurance company failure caused by fraud
in the nation's history." 29 After a five-year investigation into the
massive fraud, numerous defendants were convicted, including
the noted orchestrator of the fraud, Sholam Weiss. 30 Weiss, who
fled the country at the end of his nine-month trial and before
the jury returned a verdict, was sentenced in absentia to 845
months imprisonment and ordered to pay 125 million dollars in
restitution.31 Weiss was eventually apprehended one year later,
and after a contentious extradition process, was subsequently
transferred to a federal prison to serve reportedly "the longest
sentence ever handed down in federal court." 32
After the horrific tragedies of September 11, 2001, the
United States investigative priorities justifiably pivoted to
homeland security. Coinciding with this shift in focus, in 2001 ,
George Trofimoff, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Reserve,
became the highest-ranking U.S. military officer ever convicted
of espionage. The KGB recruited Trofimoff to spy for it through
the use of one of Trofimoff's childhood friends, who had grown
up to become the archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Vienna. 33 From 1969 through 1994, Trofimoff received hundreds
of thousands of dollars from the KGB as payment for the United
States' secrets he gathered by taking photographs of military

28

See Susan Clary & Jim Leusner, 4 Guilty in Insurer's Collapse, ORLA oo SENTINEL,
Nov. 2, 1999, available at http:/ / articles.orlandosentinel.com/ 1999-11-02/
news/ 9911020042_1_weiss-heritage-life-national-heritage.

29
30

Id.
See United States v. Shalom Weiss, No. 6:98-cr-99-0rl-19KRS (M.D. Fla. filed

31

32
33

Apr. 29, 1998) .
See Joe McDonald, Scranton Super Thief's Story to Air on CNBC, Sc RA TO TIMES
TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2010, available at http:/ / thetimes-tribune.com/ news/
scran ton-su per-thief-s-story-to-air-on-cnbc-1. 676238.
Id.
See United States v. Trofimoff, No. 8:00-cr-l 97-T-24EAJ (M.D. Fla. filed June 14,

2000).
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documents with a Minox camera. Reportedly, Trofimoff's decadeslong theft of government secrets constituted the longest lasting
case of espionage in United States history. 34 Assistant Secretary of
the United States Department of Defense John P. Stenbit requested
that the court sentence Trofimoff to life imprisonment, asserting
in a letter that "a sentence short of life imprisonment does not
adequately address the scope and consequences of Trofimoff's
actions, and would fail to serve as an appropriate deterrent for
others who would contemplate violating a trust to protect our
nation's security." 35 Indeed, Trofimoff received a life sentence. 36
In early 2003, in what one reporter called "one of the
government's most significant prosecutions since the attacks
of September 11, 2001," the United States pursued charges
against Sarni Al-Arian, an outspoken advocate for Palestinian
independence. 37 The case against Al-Arian 38 was described as
a "flashpoint for debates over . . . the government's expanded
powers under ... the ... Patriot Act, 39 and its strategy in terror
investigations before and after the September 11 attacks." 40 After
a six-month trial stretching from 2005 to 2006, the jury acquitted
Al-Arian on eight counts and remained deadlocked as to the other
nine counts. Al-Arian subsequently entered a plea of guilt for
conspiring to make or receive contributions of funds, goods, or
services to or for the benefit of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
was accordingly sentenced to fifty-seven months of imprisonment. 41
As the District approached its 50th Anniversary, the debate
over health care in the United States arguably reached an all-time

34

35
36
37

38
39

40
41

See Dong-Phuong Nguyen, Trofimoff, 75, Sentenced to Life in Prison for Spying,
SAi T PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001 , available at http: / / www.sptimes.
com/ News/ 092801 / Hillsborough / Trofimoff_75_sen ten .sh tml.
Id.
Id.
See Eric Lichtblau, From Advocacy to Terrorism, A Line Blurs, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2005, available at http:/ / www.nytimes.com / 2005/ 06/ 05/ national/
nationalspecial3 I 05terror.h tml?pagewan ted=all&_r=O.
See United States v. Al-Arian, o. 8:03-cr-77-T-30TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Feb. 19,
2003).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub.L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
See supra note 34.
See Judgment at Dkt. No. 1574, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-cr-77-T30TBM (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2006).
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high with the passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act. 42 At that same time, in what was described as "one
of the largest health care fraud cases in the United States," the
government pursued WellCare Health Plans, Inc. ("WellCare")
and its officers for Medicaid and Medicare fraud. 43 In 2009,
WellCare entered into a deferred prosecution with the United
States in which it agreed, among other things, to pay eighty million
dollars in restitution and penalties, accept full responsibility for
the fraudulent conduct, and retain an independent monitor to
review and regularly report on WellCare's compliance with federal
and state regulations. 44 In 2011, the Government indicted five
of WellCare's officers, including the President, General Counsel,
and Chief Financial Officer, with multiple counts relating to the
healthcare fraud. 45 On June 10, 2013, upon the conclusion of a
lengthy trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict as to at least one count
against each of the WellCare officers.
As exhibited by the brief descriptions above about these
few selected criminal cases, the first 50 years of the District has
undoubtedly witnessed some significant and important criminal
prosecutions.
Although fascinating and interesting from a
historical perspective, here is hoping that in the next 50 years
Central Florida will not have to endure such criminal activity again.

42
43

44
45

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (commonly known as "Obamacare").
See Kevin Graham & Kris Hundley, Wellcare Admits Shortchanging Medicaid
Patients, Will Pay $80 Million, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 5, 2009, available at
http: / / www.tampabay.com/ news/ business/ wellcare-admits-shortchangingmedicaid-patien ts-will-pay-80-million / 998325.
Id.
See United States v. Farha, No. 8:11-cr-115-T-30MAP (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 2,
2011).
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Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections:
The Constitutionality of Florida's Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act
by Erika Concetta Pagano and Emily Horowitz

Introduction
On a sunny South Florida morning,Josh, an eighteen-year-old
honor student, borrowed his older brother's car to go to an earlymorning orthodontist appointment.
Somewhere before reaching his doctor's office, Josh spotted
the alternating assault of blue and red lights in the rear view mirror.
He pulled over and respectfully engaged in a conversation with the
officer, who cited Josh for a broken taillight. Before concluding the
vehicle stop, the officer recognized the car, and announced that
he needed to take a peek inside. Without hesitation,Josh agreed.
Though ts of perfectly aligned teeth were quickly interrupted by
the unexpected clank of handcuffs. The officer found a backpack
containing a bottle of valium with the prescription label crudely

The views and opinions expressed in this Comment are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, its judicial staff, or its employees.
Erika Pagano is Managing Editor, University of Miami Law Review and a J.D.
Candidate 2013, University of Miami School of Law. In 2008 she received a B.S.F.S.
at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. She
acknowledges with gratitude her family, mentors, and loved ones.
Emily Horowitz is Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review and aJ.D. 2012,
University of Miami School of Law. She earned a B.A. in 2003 and a M.S. in 2008,
both from the University of Miami. The author thanks her family and friends for
their continued support.
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scraped off in the car's passenger seat, 1 and now Josh was under
arrest for violating Florida Statute§ 893.13, the state's Drug Abuse
-Prevention & Control Act ("DAPCA"). 2 Under the act, Josh would
potentially face the possibility of criminal conviction for a nonstrict liability crime without consideration of mens rea.
The Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court have
been locked in a ten-year battle over whether the state can convict
individuals for drug possession under DAPCA without establishing
knowledge as an element of the crime. In a landmark decision,
Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, United States District
Judge Mary Scriven 3 declared DAPCA an unconstitutional affront
to Floridians' basic freedoms. This comment argues that Judge
Scriven's decision in Shelton is correct.

Facts-A Guilty Act Without A Guilty Mind?
In 2004, Mackle Vincent Shelton was arrested and charged
in an eight-count indictment, including one count of delivery
of cocaine. 4 A state court jury found Shelton guilty of five
counts, including delivery of cocaine. 5 Shelton was sentenced to
eighteen years in prison. 6 Pursuant to Florida's post-2002 Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act amendment of§ 893.101, the
jury was not instructed that knowledge was an element of the
offense. 7 Rather, the state only had to prove two elements beyond
a reasonable doubt: "[I] That Mackle Vincent Shelton delivered
a certain substance; and [2] That the substance was cocaine." 8
Shelton's appeals were denied by both the trial court and Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal. However, Shelton eventually filed a

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8

State v. Washington, No. Fll-11019, 6 n.9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011).
FLA. STAT.§ 893.13 (1997).
Judge Mary Scriven was nominated to the Middle District of Florida by George
W. Bush. She was confirmed by the Senate on September 26, 2008, and
received commission on September 30, 2008. Prior to her nomination, Judge
Scriven served as a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Middle District.Judge Scriven
received her B.A. from Duke University in 1983, and her JD. from Florida
State University College of Law in 1987.
Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1295-6.
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petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida. 9 Ruling on the petition,
.Judge Scriven held that because Section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes
lacked a mens rea requirement, DAPCA, as written, violated the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 10 According to
the federal court, the Florida Legislature unlawfully attempted to
transform drug possession into a strict liability offense. 11
History-Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act: Child
of Conflict

Prior to May 2002, Florida's drug statutes lacked a knowledge
requirement. In response, the Florida Supreme Court chimed
in: "We believe it was the intent of the legislature to prohibit the
knowing possession of illicit items ... Thus, we hold that the State
was required to prove that [a defendant] knew of the illicit nature
of the items in his possession." 12 In Chicane v. State, the Florida
Supreme Court further held that the trial court erred in denying
the defendant's request for a special jury instruction regarding
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances. 13
Six years later, the Florida Supreme Court once again
highlighted the need for a knowledge requirement. In Scott v. State,
the court not only reiterated its holding in Chicane, but also declared:
( 1) that "knowledge is an element of the crime of possession of
a controlled substance," (2) that "a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on that element," and (3) that "it is error to fail to give
an instruction even if the defendant did not explicitly say he did
not have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance." 14
Within a few months, the Florida Legislature, in "direct and
express response" to Chicane and Scott, contravened the court's
conclusion, enacting amendments to the DAPCA,15 codified in

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 1296.
See id. at 1297.
Id. at 1296.
Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 1996).
Id. at 746.
Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 170-72 (Fla. 2002).
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
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Section 893.101 of the Florida Statutes. 16 In one sweeping motion,
the Florida Legislature flouted the state judiciary by transforming
-possession into a general intent crime, eliminating the mens rea
requirement, and shifting the responsibilities of the state and the
defendant. The state no longer had to prove that the defendant
was aware of the contraband's illegal nature. The DAPCA
amendment also forced the defendant to assert lack of knowledge
as an affirmative defense, rather than an essential element of the
crime that should be met by the state. Recharacterizing knowledge
as an affirmative defense is a remedy that is worse than the disease.
As a result, the state's case becomes less burdensome to prove.
The defendant, in asserting knowledge as an affirmative defense,
now faces the Hobson's Choice of either conceding knowledge or
raising it as an affirmative defense, thus making it more difficult for
the defendant to rebut both the presumption and the associated
prejudice that comes with it. 17
Nearly a decade later, the conflict between Florida's judicary
and legislative branches was reawakened in Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections.
Instant Case-The Storm Reawakens in Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections

'"Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea'-except in Florida,"
wrote Judge Mary Scriven, opening her opinion in Shelton v.
Secretary, Department of Corrections with a bold declaration of the

16

17

FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2002). Florida Statute§ 893.101 became effective May
13, 2002:
( 1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scottv. State ... and Chiconev. State ...
holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the
illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or
constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
(2) The legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack
of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an
affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative
defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled
substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive
presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the
substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where
such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the
permissive presumption provided in this subsection. Id.
See Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21,25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
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eyebrow-raising uniqueness of the state's Act. 18 Judge Scriven
characterized the 2002 DAPCA amendment as a "draconian and
unreasonable construction of the law" that refashions the DAPCA
into a strict liability crime "without regard to whether [someone
delivers a controlled substance] purposefully, knowingly, recklessly,
or negligently." 19
The Shelton court found it impermissible that" [u]nder Florida's
statute, that conduct is rendered immediately criminal if it turns out
that the substance is a controlled substance, without regard to the
deliverer's knowledge or intent." 2 First,Judge Scriven stressed that
the mens rea requirement for proving guilt in criminalized conduct
"is firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence." 21 Then, Judge
Scriven further underscored the inextricable relation of a mens rea
requirement to American criminal law:

°

A relation between some mental element and punishment
for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,' and has
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of
retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution. To constitute any crime there must first be a
vicious will. 22
Shifting focus and setting her sights on the Florida Legislature,
Judge Scriven continued by recognizing the freedom of state
legislatures to enact strict liability crimes, "but not without severe
constraints and constitutional safeguards." 23 The Shelton opinion
evidenced the "rare" occasion when a legislature is silent to
knowledge requirement, giving rise to a judiciary responsibility to
"engraft a knowledge requirement to cure the state's infirmity and

18
19
20
21
22

23

"The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind also be guilty." Shelton,
802 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1297.
Id. (citing State v. Bell, 649 N.W.2d 243, 252 ( .D. 2002), for the proposition
that the culpability requirement of "willfully" has been an element of the
offense of possession of a controlled substance, and State v. Brown, 389 So.
2d 48, 51 (La. 1980), for the proposition that crafting possession law into a
strict liability crime impermissibly allowed an innocent person to be convicted
"without ever being aware of the nature of the substance he was given.").
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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follow the common-law presumption" barring punishment without
proof of knowledge. 24 In the legacy of Chicane and Scott, Shelton
·represented another attempt-this time, by a federal court-to
cure the faulty decisions of the Florida Legislature.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the DAPCA,Judge Scriven
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Staples v. United States.
The Staples court held that a mens rea requirement is a rule rather
than an exception when a statute is otherwise silent. 25
The Staples standard for strict liability crimes applies a threeprong test, holding strict liability crimes constitutional only if:
(1) the penalty imposed is slight, (2) a conviction does not result
in substantial stigma, and (3) the statute regulates inherently
dangerous or deleterious conduct. 26 Before applying the Staples
test, Judge Scriven noted that strict liability offenses are usually
"accorded a generally disfavored status." 27
In Shelton, Judge Scriven explained how DAPCA fails each
of the three prongs promulgated in Staples. First, the penalty for
violating the DAPCA is anything but "slight"-those found guilty
face a second-degree felony punishable up to fifteen years, and
habitual offenders face up to thirty years with a ten-year minimum
mandatory. 28 "No strict liability statute carrying penalties of the
magnitude of [the Act] has ever been upheld under federal law,"
notedJudge Scriven. 29 She pointed to UnitedStatesv. Heller, where the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated an interstate kidnapping
statute that, similar to the DAPCA, lacked a mens rea requirement
and imposed a twenty-year maximum penalty. 30 Accordingly,Judge
Scriven held that "the penalties imposed by Florida's strict liability
drug statute are too severe to pass constitutional muster ... doubly
so when considered in conjunction with the other two factors." 31
Resulting in felony convictions for both first-time and habitual
offenders, DAPCA fails the second prong of the Staples test by

24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
See Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). This requirement was necessary
for two reasons: first, to protect punishment of the innocent, and second, to
protect against the stigma associated with hard penalties. Id. at 616.
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
Id. At 1300.
See id. at 1298.
Id. at 1300.
Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
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creating a substantial stigma. 32 Supporting this finding, Judge
Scriven highlighted everyday personal and professional privileges
enjoyed by most citizens but denied outright to felons-including
the right to vote, sit on a jury, serve in public office, obtain certain
professional licenses, and receive federal student loans. 33 "The
label of 'convicted felon' combined with a proclamation that the
defendant is so vile that he must be separated from society for
fifteen to thirty years, creates irreparable damage to the defendant's
reputation and standing in the community," 34 Judge Scriven noted.
Florida's DAPCA ultimately fails the third and final prong of
the Stap"les test. The statute does not regulate inherently dangerous
conduct; in fact, it does just the opposite: it regulates inherently
innocent conduct. According to Judge Scriven, the elimination of
a mens rea requirement in DAPCA offends due process because it
results in overly broad criminalization and threatens traditional
forms of societal interaction. "Where laws proscribe conduct that
is neither inherently dangerous nor likely to be regulated, the
Supreme Court has consistently either invalidated them or construed
them to require proof of mens rea in order to avoid criminalizing 'a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct."' 35 DAPCA's catch-all
criminalization interferes with the long tradition of the exchange
of goods in all forms of human interaction-public transportation,
commerce, schools, and work. The Shelton court then contrasted the
present case and subject matter-possession and delivery of illicit
goods-with Supreme Court precedent on inherently dangerous
conduct like possessing hand grenades, 36 concluding that DAPCA

32

33
34
35

36

Id., see also United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a mens rea element must be inferred by judicial construction as not to
offend due process: "if Congress attempted to define a Malum prohibitum

offense that placed an onerous stigma on an offender's reputation and that
carried a severe penalty, the Constitution would be offended.").
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
Id.

Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). In Liparota, the Supreme Court held
that state legislatures were bound by constitutional constraints; specifically, the
charged offense of unlawfully acquiring food stamps required proof that the
accused knew the stamps were acquired unlawfully.
See generally United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 ( 1971) (upholding a tenyear maximum sentence for possession of hand grenades without a mens rea
requirement because "one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession
of hand grenades is not an innocent act").
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still fails to pass constitutional muster. 37 Unlike hand grenades,
which no person could think are innocent, defendants like Josh, this
-comment's innocent protagonist, are regularly-and genuinelyunaware of the illicit nature of the item in their possession.
Judge Scriven then noted that the legislature further acted
unconstitutionally in prompting the state to shift the burden of
proof of the essential mens rea element to the defendant, because
the state's responsibility firmly remains to prove every element
beyond a reasonable doubt. 38 In sum, DAPCA puts an unfair onus
on defendants: plead guilty or find themselves forced into a trial
in which they are presumed guilty. If they do proceed to trial, the
defendant must overcome the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of
proving his innocence for lack of that unconstitutionally presumed
knowledge, (which is no longer an element the state must prove) .39
Through her decision in Shelton, Judge Scriven boldly "declin[ed]
to grant the State broad, sweeping, authority" to unconstitutionally
eliminate the mens rea requirement in Florida's drug laws. Instead,
she prudently declared DAPCA unconstitutional, igniting an
impetus for statewide change. 40

Analysis-Shelton in Law and Practice
The potential changes in Florida's criminal code sparked by
Shelton affect petitioners, practitioners, and the judiciary alike.
Administratively, the Shelton opinion prompted an onslaught of
motions and appeals from defendants around the state who now
contended their convictions under DAPCA were unconstitutional.
This sudden Achilles' Heel to judicial efficiency poses a threat to
the timely disposal of an already crowded docket. 41
37

38

39
40
41

Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. Judge Scriven contended that characterizing
mens rea as an affirmative defense "purports to dispense with the fundamental

precept underlying the American system of justice-the presumption of
innocence." Id. at 1307.
Morissette v. U.S. , 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also United States v. Blankenship,
382 F.3d 1110, 1127 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A defendant is never obligated to prove
anything to ajury.").
See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
Id.
See Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138,141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). The First District
Court of Appeal underscored the systematic upset caused by Shelton and called
for "an expeditious decision from the Supreme Court addressing [DAPCA's]
constitutionality" to "promote the consistent administration of justice by
resolving the issue for the trial courts, thereby allowing drug prosecutions to
proceed." Id. at 141.
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InJuly, 2012, the Florida Supreme Court found DAPCAfacially
constitutional despite its lack of a mens rea requirement in State v.
Adkins. 42 The Adkins decision marked the third time the Florida
Supreme Court contemplated Florida's drug possession and
delivery laws.
In a brief filed with the Supreme CourtofFloridaauthored by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida attorneys
annunciate the practitioners' perspective for prompt adjudication
of DAPCA's constitutionality. They begin by recognizing the threat
posed by DAPCA to the integrity of Florida law: "so sweeping is
Florida's elimination of the mens rea requirement for this offense
that it patently contravenes the stated 'General Purposes' of the
entire Florida Criminal Code." 43 The brief's authors allege that
DAPCA fails to give adequate warning to those charged with
the nature of the conduct proscribed, is impermissibly vague in
defining the material elements of the charged offense, and simply
does not adequately safeguard "conduct that is without fault or
legitimate state interest from being condemned as criminal." 44
Further, the brief's authors echo sentiments in Shelton,
espousing the floodgates argument: "if this court finds constitutional
a strict liability statute under which draconian prison sentences
are available, there is nothing to prevent future legislatures from
undertaking a sweeping, wholesale elimination of any mens rea
requirements in their criminal law." 45 DAPCA does not protect
public welfare; it threatens the very interactions that make the
American public free to intermingle without fear of unpredictable
criminal consequence. "Wholly passive, innocent, or no conduct
whatsoever ... is precisely what the State of Florida has permitted
to be targeted by the stripping of any mens rea requirement at all
from its controlled substance law." 46
The deluge of cases and state-level cross-circuit controversy
brought about by the Shelton decision in such a short period of time
denote the importance of the Act's constitutionality as perceived by
both the state 'sjudiciary and its prosecution and defense advocates.
Thousands of defendants and their families await adjudication of
42
43
44
45
46

State v. Adkins, No. SC 111878, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.July 12, 2012).
Brief for Luke Jarrod Adkins, et al. at 7, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees,
State v. Adkins, (Fla.) (November 28, 2011) (No. SCll-1878) .
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 16.
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their potential exoneration. Both the systematic and practical stress
exerted by the figurative hold placed on cases pending a decision
-on the DAPCA issue is unfair to the very people affected most by
the statute.
In its third encounter with DAPCA, the Florida Supreme
Court should have followed Shelton and mandated the inclusion
of a mens rea requirement. Striking down DAPCA would send
a strong, cautionary, and disciplinary message to the Florida
Legislature that the Florida Supreme Court's stance on DAPCA
remains unchanged. Such a stance would not only underscore
the Court's interpretation of Florida statutes, but also destroy
legislative discretion to chip away at previously established mens
rea elements in other criminal statutes. Restoring this balance of
powers between the two branches of state government would ease
the recent turmoil caused by the Act.
Conclusion
Shelton sliced a much-needed hole into the overly wide and
utterly unconstitutional criminalizing net cast by DAPCA. The
fruits of the current Act cannot be championed as victories in the
war against drugs, but rather as successes in a climate where the
chances of unconstitutional conviction are high.
Systematic concerns aside, the constitutionality of the Act can
be reduced to the fundamental American principle of fairness. In
this spirit, the Florida Supreme Court has a responsibility to adopt
Shelton's analysis and restore the state's citizens' freedom of contact
without fear of criminal misconduct, so defendants like Mr. Shelton
and this comment's anecdotal Josh, are no longer forced to face
the possibility of conviction without consideration of mens rea.
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A Pioneer in Prison Reform:
Costello v. Wainright and its Paradoxical
Legacy in Florida Prisons
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla.

1975)
by Mariko K. Shitama

Introduction

In 1972, prisoners Michael V Costello and Robert K Celestino
filed separate pro se complaints in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida alleging overcrowded conditions
and inadequate health care in Florida prisons. 1 These claims were
consolidated, amended by court-appointed counsel, and authorized
by Senior United States District Judge Charles Ray Scott2 as a class
action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all present

Mariko K. Shitama, received theJ.D. 2013 at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law. The author thanks the Historical Society for the U .S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, the Florida Historical Quarterly and the Florida Law
Review for the opportunity to write this Comment and learn some intriguing Florida
history. She also thanks Nicholas Outman and Tamara Van Heel for their valuable
feedback and support.
1
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 21 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Opinion and
Order at 5-6, Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (Case
Nos. 72-109-Civ:J-14, 72-94-Civ:J-14).
Judge Scott was nominated to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
2
of Florida by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, assumed senior status in
1976, and served in the district until his death in 1983. Biographical Directory of
Federal judges: Scott, Charles Ray, FED.Jun. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ servlet/nGe
tlnfo?jid=2129&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited July 4, 2012).
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and future Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates. 3 In
their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the overcrowding
-and inadequate medical care in Florida prisons constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 4 The plain tiffs sought a preliminary injunction ordering
defendant Louie L. Wainwright, as Director of the Florida Division
of Corrections, 5 to reduce Florida's inmate population to "normal
capacity" within the following year and to close Florida's prisons to
new inmates. 6 Judge Scott initially denied the injunction without
prejudice, finding it was "moot" because defendant Wainwright had
himself"closed the prison system to additional inmates because of the
danger to the health and lives of the inmates." 7
By 1975, the legislature had refused to provide funds sufficient
to address the overcrowding problem, and Florida Governor
Reubin Askew-up for a difficult reelection 8-ordered the
defendant to lift the ban on the entry of new inmates. 9 Within three
months of this order, the inmate population increased from 11, 420
to 12,748 prisoners, 10 and the plaintiffs renewed their motion for

3

4

5

6

7
8
9
10

Costello, 397 F. Supp. at 21-22; Opinion and Order, supra note 1, at 5-6; see also
Celestineo v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258, 259 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (Opinion and
Order Granting Final Judgment of Costello). This Comment refers to all Florida
Department of Corrections prisons as both DOC prisons and Florida prisons.
Costel/,o, 397 F. Supp. at 21. The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," and is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
In 1978, the Florida Division of Corrections was renamed the Florida
Department of Corrections. Timeline: A History of Corrections in Florida, FLA.
DEP'T OF CORR., http:/ / www.dc.state.fl.us/ oth/ timeline/ l 976-l 979a.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012). Other defendants in the case included the Director
of the Division of Mental Health and members of the Florida Parole and
Probation Commission.
Costello, 397 F. Supp. at 34 n. l 0. Normal capacity was defined by the American
Justice Institute (AJI) and the defendants as "that population which an
institution can properly accommodate on an average daily basis .... It should
include some vacant beds, to accommodate population surges, and to allow
for different classifications of inmates ... ." Id. Normal capacity at the time of
the order was 7,000 inmates, and emergency capacity was 8,300. Id. at 22. The
actual number of inmates in DOC custody was approximately 10,300
. Id.
Id. at 22.
Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions
Litigation, 44 LAW & Soc'y REv. 731, 740 (2010).
Costello, 397 F. Supp. at 34.
Id. at 22. At this time, normal capacity was 9,313 prisoners. Id.
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a preliminary injunction, the basis for the decision in Costello v.
Wainwright. JI At trial, the district court made extensive factual
findings regarding Florida's prison conditions, relying primarily
on a comprehensive health survey of all DOC facilities. 12 Based on
these findings, Judge Scott concluded that severe overcrowding
in Florida prisons-which were operating well above "emergency
capacity" 13-had led to the systemic denial of adequate medical
care for inmates and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 14
To remedy these constitutional violations, Judge Scott issued a
preliminary injunction ordering defendant Wainwright to reduce
Florida's inmate population to emergency capacity within the
following year and to normal capacity by December of 1976. 15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially
affirmed Judge Scott's ruling. 16 Yet upon a rehearing en bane, it
vacated the ruling on the grounds that the preliminary injunction
required approval by a threejudge panel. 17 After granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court reversed the en bane opinion and reinstated
the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision affirming the injunctive order
on its merits. 18 Two years later, the parties reached a settlement
agreement in which they stipulated that no individual DOC prison
could exceed "maximum capacity" for more than five days and the

11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18

Id.
Id. at 23-32; see also infra notes 65-68.
The AJI and the defendants defined "emergency capacity" as:
[T] he population beyond which the institution must be considered
critically, and quite probably, dangerously overcrowded. It includes every
bed in the institution which ... can safely be occupied at times of peak
populations .... Costello, F. Supp. at 34.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Costello v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1239, 1252 (5th Cir. 1976). In 1976 the
"former" Fifth Circuit encompassed the Middle District of Florida, and all of
what was subsequently divided into the current Fifth and Eleventh Circuits on
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. Prichard, 661F.2d1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
bane). Fifth Circuit cases decided prior to October 1, 1981 are binding in the
Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1209.
Costello v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 1976).
Costello v. Wainwright, 430 U.S. 325, 326 (1977), opinion reinstated, 553 F.2d
506, 507 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated in part, 539 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd,
430 U.S. 325, 326 (1977).
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inmate population of the entire DOC could not exceed "design
capacity" plus one third. 19
Costello was at the forefront of the movement to protect
prisoners' rights through judicially imposed prison reform,20 and
has had a profound and lasting impact on Florida's prisons. While
Costello averted a prison overcrowding disaster in Florida, it was also
used-perhaps ironically-to campaign for the State's significant
expansion of its prison system. 21 Judge Scott did not mandate
any particular approach to remedying the State's constitutional
violations, but his opinion seemed to contemplate a balanced
approach to reducing prison overcrowding. This Comment
considers the possibly unintended consequences Costello has had
on prison reform and the criminal justice system in Florida.

A Brief History of the Eighth Amendment and Institutional Prison
Reform
To understand the legal framework and the remedy employed
in Costello, it is necessary to examine the context in which the case
was decided. Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education22 in 1955,
federal courts began actively enforcing the constitutional rights
of individuals in state institutions through injunctive remedies. 23
However, it was almost two decades before the courts expanded this
role to protect prisoners' rights from unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. 24
First, courts had to establish that prisoners retain their
constitutional rights once their freedom has been lawfully deprived.
In Jackson v. Godwin, 25 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
19

20

21
22
23
24
25

Settlement Agreement at 5-8, Costello v. Wainwright, Case os. 72-109-CivJ-S, 72-94-Civ:J-S (M.D. Fla. 1979). The agreement defined "design capacity"
as forty to ninety square feet of space for inmates living in individual cells and
at least fifty-five square feet per inmate for those living in dorms, and defined
"maximum capacity" as approximately 33% less space than design capacity per
inmate with double bunking allowed along outer walls. Id.
See, e.g., Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 626, 636-37 (1981); Robert E. Buckholz et al., Special Project, The
&medial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Co LUM. L. REv. 784, 788-89
(1978).
See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
349 U.S. 294, 349 (1955).
See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA.
L. REv. 639, 641 (1993).
See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
400 F.2d. 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
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decision denying relief to a black prisoner who claimed that the
Florida State Prison had deprived him of equal protection of the
law when it denied his requests to receive black reading materials. 26
The Fifth Circuit rejected the view that prisoners lose their
constitutional rights when they forfeit their freedom, and held that
they lose only those rights "expressly or by necessary implication"
taken by law. 27
Still, the question remained whether prison conditions
themselves could constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In Trop
v. Dulles, 28 the Supreme Court defined the scope and meaning of the
term "cruel and unusual" as provided in the Eighth Amendment. 29
It concluded that the standard is founded on the notion of the
"dignity of man" and is therefore necessarily a flexible one, most
aptly measured by "society's evolving standards of decency." 30
With this standard in mind, 31 courts began to sanction prisoners'
allegations that the conditions of their confinement were so
afflictive as to offend basic notions of human decency and to order
prisons to undertake extensive remedial action. 32
Then, in 1970, the Eastern District of Arkansas in Holt v. Sarvei33
became the first court to find the conditions of an entire state's
penal institution to be cruel and unusual, and to take equitable
action to remedy them. 34 The court outlined the deplorable
conditions within the Arkansas Penitentiary System, including the
brutal practices of using chain gangs and a "trusty" system, where
inmates and not civilians were employed as guards. 35 These trusty

26
27
28
29
30
31

32
33
34

35

Id. at 530. The prisoner filed this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Id. at 532.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. at 99-101.
Id. at 100-01.
In Estell,e v. Gambl,e, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), the Supreme Court affirmed this
as the appropriate standard for Eighth Amendment claims regarding prison
conditions, when it concluded that inhumane conditions of imprisonment do
not comport with "evolving standards of decency." Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
See Sturm, supra note 23, at 641.
Holt, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Id. at 365 ("As far as this Court is aware, this is the first time that convicts have
attacked an entire penitentiary system in any court .... ") . The court found that
the Eighth Amendment is not limited to punishment directed at an individual,
and that prison conditions "shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized
people" constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 369-71, 373-74.
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inmates wielded guns and unfettered power over their fellow
inmates, and inflicted extreme violence upon them. 36
The district court issued a very general injunctive order
commanding the State of Arkansas to "move in good faith and with
diligence" 37 to bring its trusty system, barracks, and isolation units
in compliance with the Eighth Amendment. 38 The district court was
not willing to condemn the trusty system outright, however, 39 and its
vague order gave little concrete guidance to the State. 40 Although
the court understood its duty to protect the constitutional rights
of Arkansas prisoners, precedent did not provide a roadmap for
implementation.
The Fifth Circuit attempted to expand and clarify the
parameters of judicial intervention in Gates v. Collid 1 and Newman
v. State of Alabama, 42 two cases that affirmed injunctive orders
requiring institutional prison reform. 43 In Gates, the district
court went a step further than the court had in Holt. It found
that the Mississippi Penitentiary's trusty system and conditions of
confinement44 constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and
ordered the prison to take very specific remedial steps, including
the elimination of the trusty system. 45
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, finding
that this remedy was neither "burdensome" nor "beyond the
remedial jurisdiction of the district court." 46 While the circuit court
recognized that it was clearly outside the authority of federal courts
to "undertake to run the prison," it concluded that the required
measures were merely "parameters for administration," and
were the minimum safeguards necessary to cure the State's grave
constitutional violations.47 The Fifth Circuit stated unequivocally
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47

Id. at 373-76.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 383.
Id.
See id. at 382-85.
501F.2d1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974).
Gates, 501 F.2d at 1322; Newman, 503 F.2d at 1322.
Gates, 501 F.2d at 1309. These conditions included overcrowding, lack of
inmate classification by severity of offense, lack of supervision by civilian
guards, and a generally abhorrent lack of adequate protection against physical
abuse by fellow inmates. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309- 10.
Id.
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that, regardless of any funding shortage, "if the State chooses to
run a prison it must do so without depriving inmates of the rights
guaranteed to them by the federal constitution." 48
In Newman v. Alabama, 49 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court order requiring the State of Alabama to provide adequate
medical treatment to inmates. 50 Echoing language from its
opinion in Gates, the circuit court noted that "deference which
shields officials engaging in intemperate action and which excuses
judicial myopia is incompatible with our role as arbiters of the
Constitution." 51
The Delicate Business of Judicial Intervention

The essence of the Gates and Newman decisions is that
while district courts are clearly not authorized to exercise the
administrative duties of the executive branch or the lawmaking of
the legislature (such as deciding how much money to spend on
prisons or even whether to have them), it is undoubtedly the duty
of the courts to protect prisoners from unconstitutional action (or
inaction) of the state. This authority includes the power to issue
injunctions compelling states to remedy constitutional infirmities
they have failed to address on their own. 52
Judge Scott understood this nuanced role in the instant case,
Costello v. Wainwright. He balanced the court's duty as arbiter of
the Constitution with its duty to refrain from intervening in
the administration of the DOC beyond setting parameters for
compliance with the Constitution. 53 Judge Scott noted that the
district court had been "reluctant to intervene in the overcrowding
crisis" for at least three years, during which time defendant
Wainwright had closed the prisons to new inmates on three
occasions. 54 However,Judge Scott decided to act once the Governor

48
49
50

51
52
53
54

Id. at 1320.
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1331. Two years later, in Estel/,e v. Gamb/,e, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ,
the Supreme Court held that the "elementary principles [of the Eighth
Amendment] establish the government's obligation to provide medical care"
to those whom it incarcerates.
Newman, 503 F.2d at 1329.
See id.
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 34 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
Id. at 34.
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of Florida prohibited the defendant from refusing new inmates
in spite of "overwhelming evidence" that Florida's prisons were
overcrowded and operating under unconstitutional conditions. 55

Evidentiary Findings: Cruel and Unusual Conditions in Florida's
Prisons
Specifically, the district court found clear evidence in the
record that the Florida DOC was violating its "affirmative duty"
to provide adequate routine and emergency medical care to its
inmates, and that severe overcrowding had "greatly exacerbated"
these systemic deficiencies. 56 The evidence in Costello came
primarily from a comprehensive health survey of all Florida prisons
(Report), conducted by an independent, court-appointed doctor. 57
The Report outlined the "gross systemic deficiencies" in medical
care 58 and recommended a reduction in the inmate population to
protect the "physical and psychiatric wellbeing of the inmates." 59
The defendants stipulated to the key findings of the Report,
including its proposed remedies. 60
The district court also detailed the findings of the key expert
witnesses at trial, 61 including medical opinions that the DOC was
housing excessive numbers of inmates in areas much too small,
creating increased racial tension; increased possibility of riots; 62
increased danger of epidemics of communicable diseases; and
increased confinement leading to emotional problems and
greater use of tranquilizers. 63 Although the defendant was not

55
56

57
58
59
60

61

62
63

Id.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 23. The parties stipulated that: (1) the plaintiffs were not receiving
medical treatment required by the Report's guidelines; (2) the Report
described "necessary improvements to the delivery of medical services within
the prison system . . . a major factor in meeting minimal constitutional
standards"; and (3) "severe overcrowding may be injurious to the physical and
mental health of the Plaintiffs" and should be eliminated. Id. at 23-24
Id. The expert witnesses included the defendant's own employee who was
working as a doctor within the DOC, as well as "a physician internist and
consultant to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,"
affiliated with the DOC. Id. at 24, 30.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.
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a medical expert, he corroborated these findings through his
testimony. 64 The district court found "overwhelming evidence"
of a "direct ... correlation between severe overcrowding ... and
the deprivation of minimally adequate health care," and that
the overcrowding endangered the lives of inmates by increasing
violence within prisons. 65
As part of its fact-finding the district court visited one of the
DOC's medical facilities, Lake Butler Reception and Medical
Center (RMC). 66 RMC was an intake center for classifying and
treating new inmates before sending them to permanent housing
facilities. It was operating at double normal capacity: 768 inmates
were living in dormitories designed for 384. 67 The facility housed
several hundred inmates sleeping on the floors of one-man cells
due to lack of bed space in permanent housing facilities. 68 The court
was "mostdisturb[ed]" by these one-man cells, which were seven by
nine feet and housed four inmates in each. 69 According to RM C's
own personnel, these conditions created a inadequate system of
inmate classification that "contribut[ed] to the proliferation of
rapes, assaults and tension" in the general population. 70 The court
summarized this as a "potentially ... very explosive situation." 71

A Balanced Remedy: Bringing the DOC into Compliance with the
Eighth Amendment
In May of 1975, Judge Scott ordered the defendant to
reduce its inmate population-in five stages set by the court-to
emergency capacity within one year and to normal capacity by
December of 1976. 72 Judge Scott recognized that the DOC could
increase capacity through the use of temporary shelters and
the construction of new prisons. 73 He was careful not to require

64
65

66
67
68
69
70
71

72

73

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34. The court found that the DOC was around 2,682 inmates over
emergency capacity. Id.
Id. At the time of the order, the construction of new prisons was already
undenvay. Id.
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a reduction of a fixed number of inmates, or a numeric cap on
how many inmates the DOC could accept at any given time .74
Instead, he framed the injunction in terms of capacity, requiring
a minimum amount of space per inmate at any given time .75 Judge
Scott commended the defendant for using innovative solutions
such as temporary housing to address overcrowding, and noted
that the court "hope[d] to provide a continuing incentive to the
[DOC] to maintain its pertinacious program of developing further
innovations to increase the capacity of [its] penal system."76
Still, the language of the opinion suggests that Judge Scott
did not contemplate the long-term expansion of Florida's prisons
as the inevitable outcome of his order. He pointed out that "[t]
here are numerous means by which the inmate population may
be reduced. "77 Judge Scott enumerated some of these options,
including the DOC's statutory authority to grant inmates good
time credits, and emphasized the DOC's "great[ ] flexibility" to
grant earlier releases. 78 Judge Scott also suggested that the Florida
Parole and Probation Commission (also a defendant in the case)
"accelerate the granting of paroles."79 He noted that this would not
require the release of dangerous inmates, because according to the
defendant's "own testimony, 30% to 50% of the inmate population
could be [released] ... without any danger to the community."80
Finally, Judge Scott encouraged increased pre-trial intervention for
victimless crimes as a way to reduce incarceration. 81
In light of this language, it appears that Judge Scott
saw deceleration of the Florida prison population as sound
budgetary policy. Moreover, he seemed to suggest normative
policy reasons for decreasing reliance on incarceration in
the face of budgetary constraints. He explained that "severe
overcrowding ... perpetuate[s] antisocial behavior and foster[s]
recidivism," and "ultimately disserve [s] the rehabilitative goals
of the correctional system." He opined that "[a] free democratic
society cannot cage inmates like animals in a zoo . .. and expect

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

81

Id. a t 34-35.
Id. a t 35.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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them to emerge as decent, law abiding, contributing members of
the community," without "society becom[ing] the loser."s2
Yet, Judge Scott recognized that alternatives to incarceration
are legislative considerations that eclipse the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, and that the legislature must ultimately decide
whether increased reliance on incarceration is in fact sound policy.
He emphasized that the State of Florida could "place as many
convicted persons as the state courts permit in its jails and prisons,"
so long as the State provided "minimally adequate health care and
housing" to its inmates.s3
Therefore, in keeping with the spirit of the Fifth Circuit's
decisions in Gates and Newman, Judge Scott understood that the
district court's authority was limited to imposing only that equitable
relief necessary to correct the State of Florida's constitutional
violations. s4 The court would likely have violated the separation of
powers and the federalist structure of government had it ordered
the DOC to reduce overcrowding by lowering its population to a
fixed number of prisoners.s5 Accordingly, it acted to protect the
constitutional rights of Florida's prisoners by ordering the State
to bring its prison population to normal capacity by any means
within the State's discretion.s6 However, given the measured attitude
towards incarceration reflected in the decision's dicta, Judge Scott
likely did not foresee or intend that Costelw would be used to
campaign for Florida's extraordinary prison expansion over the next
several decades, and to accommodate, rather than temper, growing
imprisonment rates. And yet this is precisely what happened.
If I Had a Hammer: Using Costello to Push Through Florida's

Prison Expansion
Initially, Costello led to a decrease in prison overcrowding. The
subsequent settlement agreement imposed population caps based
on capacity,s7 but the DOC struggled to comply.ss Unwilling to

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1329 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Gates v. Collier,
501F.2d1291, 1301 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Costello, 397 F. Supp. at 34; Newman, 503 F.2d at 1329.
Costello, 397 F. Supp. at 34, 35.
See Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 6-9.
See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 745.
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fund prison construction sufficient to comply with the agreement,
the Florida Legislature created the Corrections Overcrowding
i;ask Force (COTF) to develop alternative solutions. 89 Many of
the COTF's recommendations were codified in the Correctional
Reform Act of 1983, 90 which most notably created a Community
Control Program for nonviolent offenders and increased gain-time
for parole inmates. 91 These changes lead to a short-lived decrease
in the prison population throughout 1984. 92
However, in the mid 1980s the War on Drugs, the emergence
of crack cocaine, and a national spike in violent crime ushered
a political climate that emphasized deterrence and stigmatized
rehabilitation, and lead to increasingly punitive criminal policy
and a sharp increase in Florida's prison population. 93 Although
Florida expanded early-release for parole inmates in 1983, it
simultaneously abolished parole for individuals convicted post1983. 94 Overcrowding was again a palpable crisis. Initially a thorn
in the DOC's and legislature's sides, the Costello settlement became
an effective tool for funding prison expansion to accommodate
the exploding prison population. 95 A former deputy director of the
DOC put it bluntly:
The [settlement agreement] helped us tremendously .... We
wanted ... that ... "maximum capacity" beyond which
we wouldn't be able to go without violating the Costel/,o
Agreement. That ... gave us the hammer we needed to go
to the legislature and say" . .. we are within two percentage
points of being in contempt of court, we have got to build

89
90
91
92
93

94
95

See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 746; Mark Dykstra, Apart From the Crowd: Florida '.s
New Prison Release Program, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 779, 795 (1986).
Dykstra, supra note 93, at 796 (citing Correctional Reform Act of 1983, ch. 83131 , 1983 Fla. Laws 435 (amending FLA. STAT. chs. 947, 948 (1985)).
Id.
Id.
See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 747 ("Between ... 1986 and 1987, prison
admission increased by 7,400 offenders (or 33 percent). Forty-six percent
of this ... was due to the increase in admissions for drug crimes."); ALEXIA
COOPER AND ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 2 (2010).
PAROLE: THE AND Now, SENATE RESEARCH CE TER 3 (1999), available at\VWW.
senate.state. tx. us/ src/ pdf/ ib0599. pdf.
See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 754.
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more beds, or we are going to have to trigger this release
mechanism"-and nobody wanted to do that, so they said,
"We'll give you money for more beds." 96
In 1972 the annual budget for the Florida prison system was
$36 million; by 1985 it was $322 million. By another account, "the
Florida Legislature . . . relied heavily on the federal guidelines
established in Costello" to secure this funding. 97
In 1987, the new governor, Bob Martinez, similarly used the
Costello agreement to obtain funding for mass prison expansion.
He sent state legislators lists of offenders from their districts and
claimed they would be released by court order if the State failed
to act. 98 These tactics appear to have been effective. Between 1987
and 1991, the legislature funded the construction of twenty major
correctional facilities, creating room for an additional 27,087
Florida inmates. 99
In this way, Costello-which contemplated a balanced approach
to reducing prison overpopulation-was ultimately used for
the singular purpose of expanding Florida's prison system to
accommodate the dramatic growth of its incarceration rates.
Florida had 12,748 100 inmates in seventeen prisons when Costello
was decided. 101 Today there are roughly 100,000 inmates in
sixty prisons. 102 Florida's corrections budget exceeds two billion
dollars, 103 and represented an estimated 9.4% of the State's general
revenue budget in 2011. 104 Last year, Florida's prison population

96

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 7 46-4 7. A state senator also told Schoenfeld in
an interview: "I don't like letting them out on administrative gain time at all,
but we've got to go by the federal guidelines until we build enough prisons to
hold them. " Id. at 750.
See e.g. Dykstra, supra note 93, at 783; Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 745-47.
See Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 749.
Id. at 751.
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 22 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
LOUIE L. WAI WRIGHT, AN UAL REPORT 1975-76: FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
0FFE DER REHABILITATION 16, 19, 23, 27, 31 (1976).
Quick Facts About the Florida DOC, FLA. DEP'T CoRRECTIO s, http: / / www.
de.state.fl.us/ oth/ Quickfacts.html (last updated Feb. 2012).
TRANSPARENCY FLORIDA: SHINING THE LIGHT ON FLORIDA'S BUDGET, availnhle at
http:/ / www.transparencyflorida.gov/ Agency.aspx?FY=l2&BE=70000000&M=.
FINAL BUDGET REPORT 2011, FLORIDA FISCAL PORTAL 3 (2011), availab/,e at
http:/ I floridafiscal portal.state.fl.us/ Documents.as px?FY=20l2&AGY=O1 OO&E
XID= l 25&DisplayAgy=N.
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continued to rise by over 1,500 inmates. 105 At a time when the
State's annual budget shortfall is projected to total two billion
qollars, this is a costly trajectory. 106

A Lasting hut Uncertain Legacy: Prison Reform or Prison
Expansion?
Prison litigation reform like Costello has been critical in
establishing and enforcing the fundamental rights of prisoners
and minimum standards for their conditions of confinement. 107
However, as states have been required to reduce overcrowding in
prisons, they have most often responded by simply constructing
new ones. 108 Like Florida, the nationwide trend in criminal justice
has unquestionably been one of mass incarceration: 109 the prison
population in the United States is now over 2.3 million people. 110
In many states, corrections is the single largest budget item. 111
In a time of shrinking revenues and state budget crises, mass
incarceration is an unsustainable approach to criminaljustice, and
it raises the likelihood that prison conditions will fall below what
is constitutionally acceptable. 112 Yet, increasing criticism of judicial

105 Diana Moskovitz, Florida Prison Population Rises as Most States Show Declines, Study
Says, FLORIDA ISSUES (Mar. 17, 2010, 7:45 AM), http:/ / florida-issues.blogspot.
com/ 2010/ 03/ florida-prison-population-rises-as-most.html (noting that this
distinction is due to the Florida Legislature's failure to initiate cost-effective
alternatives to imprisonment).
106 ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
STATES CONTI UE TO FEEL REcEss10 's IMPACT 5 (2012), available at http: / I
www.cbpp.org/ cms/ index.cfm?fa=view&id=71 l.
107 See Sturm, supra note 23, at 662.
108 See id. at 678.
109 DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 1-2 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2007).
110 Adam Liptak, US Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2008), available at http: / / www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 04/ 23/ world/
americas/ 23ih t-23prison. l 2253738.h tml?pagewan ted=all.
111 See Sturm, supra note 23, at 695.
112 For instance, in 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed a district order directing
the State of California to remedy ongoing Eighth Amendment violations
within its prisons, where severe overcrowding led to deficient medical care
and the proliferation of"needless suffering" and "preventable deaths." Brown
v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1923, 1925 (2011). The Court found that the
order was necessary in part because California's ongoing attempts to address
the crisis through new construction had repeatedly failed due to budgetary
limitations. Id. at 1931.
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oversight in prisons has led to a federal judiciary more reluctant
to engage in such oversight, 113 and statutory limitations have
constrained the judiciary's discretion and ability to do so. 114
As this scenario plays out in Florida, it is unclear what Costello's
legacy will be. What is clear is that budgetary problems are having
a significant impact on Florida's prison system. The Correctional
Medical Authority (CMA) was an independent state agency
developed to provide ongoing oversight of the DOC's health services
and to ensure compliance with the Costello settlement agreement
and the Eighth Amendment. 115 In 1993, Judge Scott's successor
Judge Susan H. Black 116 entered a final judgment permanently
closing Costello. m Judge Black found that the CMA was providing
satisfactory oversight of the DOC, 118 and concluded that so long
as the CMA was adequately funded it would continue to provide
"moral and legal authority" sufficient to "make future involvement
of the federal courts unnecessary." 119 This order ended two decades
of the district court's involvement in Florida's prisons. 120
Last fall the Florida Legislature defunded the CMA, and with it,
independent oversight of Florida's prisons. 121 In addition, a political

113 In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to limit
federal judicial intervention in prison litigation. Catherine G. Patsos, The
Constitutionality and Implications of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N .Y. L. REv.
205, 253-54, 239 (1998) (arguing that this limitation on federal courts is an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power); see also Sturm, supra note 23,
at 642.
114 See Patsos, supra note 118, at 256 (arguing that the PLRA unconstitutionally
prevents federal courts from enforcing the constitutional rights of prisoners).
115 Celestino v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258, 262 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
116 Judge Black was nominated to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, where she served as chief judge
from 1990 to 1992. Biographical Directory of Fedrealjudges: Black, Susan Harrell,
FED. Jun. CTR., http:www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetinfo?jid=l84&cid=999&ctype=n
a&instate=na (last visited Sept. 23 2012). In 1992 she was nominated to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by President George H. Bush,
where she remains today, having assumed senior status in 2011. Id.Judge Black
took over the Costello case when Judge Scott died in 1983. See supra note 2;
Schoenfeld, supra note 8, at 747.
11 7 Id. at 264.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 263.
120 Id. at 264.
121 Agency Overseeing Prison Medical Care Is Shut by Legislative Action, THE SUN
SE TINEL (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http: //articles.sun-sentinel.com/ 201108-19 I news/ fl-prison-health-watchdog-no-more-201108 l 9_l_private-prisonsprison-improvements-cma.
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movement to cut costs by privatizing Florida prisons is ongoing, 122
and the State has plans to close seven major prisons. 123 The impact of
these cost-cutting measures on Florida's prison conditions remains
to be seen, and the extent to which Costello is a watershed for prison
reform or prison expansion will ultimately be decided by the State
of Florida's response to this crisis.

122 Bill to Privatize Prisons Dies in Senate, THE MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 14, 2012),
available
at
http: / / www.miamiherald.com/ 2012/ 02/ l 4/ 2642075/ bill-toprivatize-prisons-dies.html.
123 Kathleen Haughney, State to Close 7 Prisons, THE SuN SENTINEL Qan. 12, 2012),
availabl,e at http: / / weblogs.sun-sentinel.com / news/ politics/ dcblog/ 2012/ 01 /
state_to_close_7_prisons.html.
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Extreme Circumstances Call for Extreme
Measures: How United States v. Lyons' Radical
Remedies Corrected a Grave Injustice
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D.

Fla. 2004)
United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D.

Fla. 2010)
by Samuel W. Wardle
ver the course of a decade, Antonino "Nino" Lyons
appeared before the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida at least four times. In 2001, a
jury convicted Lyons of crimes carrying a mandatory minimum
sentence oflife in federal prison. In 2003, the Honorable Gregory
PresnelP ordered Lyons to be released on bail, only to be reversed
by the Eleventh Circuit. A year later, in 2004,Judge Presnell again
ordered Lyons' release, and this time, there was no appeal. 2 Finally,
in 2010, Judge Presnell took the extraordinary step of granting

0

The views and opinions expressed in this Comment are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, its judicial officers, its judicial staff, or its
employees.
Samuel W. Wardle received the JD, 2013, University of Miami School of Law. The
author thanks the Historical Society of the United States District court for the
Middle District of Florida and gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Robert
Berry, Greg Eisenmenger, and Nino Lyons.
President Clinton appointed Judge Presnell to the Middle District in 2000.
1
2
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004) [hereinafter

Lyons I].
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Lyons' pet1t10n for a certification of actual innocence. 3 This
certification cleared the path for Lyons' successful suit against the
United States Government for wrongful conviction. 4
Judge Presnell's decision to reverse Lyons' conviction and
set him free constituted an extraordinary application of Brady
v. Maryland, 5 which requires prosecutors to share exculpatory
evidence with a criminal defendant. United States v. Lyons is one
of the very few reported federal cases in which a conviction was
entirely reversed, and a defendant freed from jail, simply on the
basis of withheld impeachment evidence relating to jailhouse
informants.
But the extraordinary nature of Lyons' case did not end
with Judge Presnell's application of the Brady doctrine. Judge
Presnell's decision to declare Lyons innocent of all charges against
him was also nearly unprecedented. Federal courts rarely grant
certifications of innocence at all, much less in cases like Lyons,
where the defendant was exonerated by evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, rather than hard exculpatory evidence.
This Comment examines why such extraordinary measures
were necessary to redress the unjust prosecution and imprisonment
of Nino Lyons. First, the Comment examines the evidence withheld
by prosecutors from Lyons' defense attorneys. At trial, Lyons'
prosecutors put dozens of convicted felons on the stand to testify
against him. Each witness lied about Lyons' supposed criminal
activity, and prosecutors concealed these witnesses' mendacity-or
at least their inducements to lie-from Lyons.
Second, the Comment describes why Judge Presnell
appropriately granted Lyons' petition for a certification of actual
innocence under the federal Unjust Conviction Statute. Such
petitions are granted only in extreme cases, in which an exoneree
can carry the burden of proving his own innocence. United States v.
Lyons was such a case.
Finally, the Comment proposes that the approach taken
by Judge Presnell in Lyons' long fight to prove his innocence
should be the rule, rather than the well-reasoned exception. The
United States Constitution, as currently interpreted, provides little

3
4
5

United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010) [hereinafter
Lyons Il].
Lyons v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552 (2011) [hereinafter Lyons III] .
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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protection for criminal defendants who, like Nino Lyons, have
been convicted on the basis of testimony from jailhouse informants.
Moreover, the Urtjust Conviction Statute raises a bar so high that
few victims of Brady violations are ever able to take advantage of its
remedies. In tandem, these factors prejudice both defendants and
prosecutors.
2001: Nino Lyons' Arrest and Prosecution

On June 14, 1998, two men robbed Nino Lyons in a hotel near
Orlando. The men had lured Lyons to the hotel by claiming to
represent a musical group interested in playing at Lyons' nightclub. 6
Instead, one of the men pulled a gun and demanded the cash that
Lyons had brought with him to hire the musical group. 7
After the thieves left the hotel, Lyons went after them. He
saw a man in a car at the hotel's entrance who he thought was the
robbers' getaway driver. Lyons ordered the man out of the car, and
commanded the hotel staff to hold him until police arrived. Lyons
thenjumped into the still-running car, and drove off after the men
who had tricked him. 8
Largely due to Lyons' quick response, one of the thieves was
captured. The man whose car Lyons commandeered turned out to
be an innocent bystander with no connection to the robbery, but
he refused to press charges. Lyons was given a community service
award for his role in apprehending the robbers. 9
Unfortunately, that was not Lyons' final experience with the
criminal justice system. Officers began to quietly investigate Lyons,
and, in 2001, the United States Attorney for the Middle District
of Florida indicted him for carjacking, counterfeiting, and largescale drug-dealing. 10
At the time of his indictment, Lyons was a businessman with a
spotless local reputation. Lyons, a former high school and college
basketball star, lived with his wife and children in a $60,000 home. 11
6

7
8
9

10
11

Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Certification of Actual Innocence Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513 at 3-4,
United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010) (No.
6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 355 [hereinafter Def.'s Reply].
Telephone Interview with Antonino Lyons (March 27, 2012).
Def's Reply, supra note 7, at 3-4.
Id.
Lyons I at 1237-38.
Def. 's Reply, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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Lyons owned several businesses, and his wife was an elementary
school principal. Lyons had no criminal convictions 12 and was a
community leader who volunteered with the NAACP and other
civic organizations. 13
Prosecutors nevertheless found dozens of witnesses willing
to testify that Lyons' record was not as clean as it looked. For
example, the men who robbed Lyons claimed that they lured him
to the hotel with a promise to sell him $100,000 of cocaine, and
that Lyons' lied when he said he had gone to the hotel to hire
a musical group. 14 These men, and more than two dozen others,
wove a staggering tale of Lyons as a violent man at the center of
million-dollar cocaine enterprise. 15
As is standard procedure in drug investigations, these felons
were offered sentence reductions and other benefits in exchange
for their testimony. 16 The Government had no hard evidence of
drugs, no wiretap recordings, and no surveillance evidence of
Lyons engaging in any illegal activity. 17 Yet the sheer number of
witnesses against Lyons overwhelmed his defense. Lyons was
arrested in August 2001, and his case went before a jury in late
November 2001. 18
In closing arguments, Lyons' prosecutor argued that the jury
should consider the thirty witnesses against Lyons "one at a time,
consider them as a group, because you've got to consider all the
evidence. You've got to just take it all out, because if you believe
one of them, just one, that means Antonino Lyons is lying and he's
a drug dealer." 19 Lyons was convicted.

2001-2004: Withheld evidence comes to light
Almost immediately after Lyons' conviction, evidence began
to creep out that something had gone wrong at trial. While Lyons
awaited sentencing, one of his attorneys, Robert Berry, was reviewing

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Telephone interview with Antonino Lyons, supra note 8.
Id.
Lyons lat 1239-40.
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452, 57 F. App 'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir. Dec.
30, 2002).
Lyons lat 1236.
Id.
Lyons III at 554.
Lyons lat 1240-41.
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Lyons' forty-page pre-sentence investigation report. 20 Berry found
one sentence attributed to prosecution witness David Mercer that
contradicted Mercer's testimony at Lyons' trial. 21 Berry and his
partner, Greg Eisenmenger, filed a flurry of motions, including a
motion for a new trial and a motion to compel the production of
any documentation on Mercer. 22
In May 2002, Judge Presnell vacated Lyons' sentence and
ordered that Lyons be released on bail pending a new trial. 23
Judge Presnell reasoned that the Mercer evidence may have led
a jury to doubt the veracity of all Government witnesses, and that
the Government prejudiced Lyons' trial by withholding it. 24 The
Government immediately appealed. 25
A twojudge quorum of the Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge
Presnell's orders and affirmed Lyons' conviction in an unpublished,
16-page opinion. 26 The quorum agreed that the Mercer evidence
withheld by the Government was Brady material. 27 However, the
quorum went on to find that the Mercer evidence, without more,
was not important enough to justify a new trial. Specifically, the
quorum reasoned that it was
simply not possible to review this record and come to
any other conclusion than that arrived at by the jury....
Mercer's testimony was only one piece of a rather large
picture. We conclude that there exists no reasonable
probability that disclosure of the Mercer tapes, transcripts,
notes and reports would have affected the outcome of the
jury's verdict ..... 28

20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Telephone Interview with Robert Berry and Greg Eisenmenger criminal
defense attorneys for Antonino Lyons (March 23, 2012) [hereinafter Berry/
Eisenmenger Interview].
Id.
Id.
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
Order Granting Motion for a New Trial, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d
1231 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2002) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 208.
Notice of Appeal, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M. D. Fla.June
19, 2002) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 231.
United States v. Lyons, o. 02-13452, 57 F. App 'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir. Dec.
30, 2002).
Id. at 9 ("We find that the district court was correct in finding that the Mercer
tapes, transcripts, notes and reports were Brady material. ").
Id. at 10-11.
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After the Eleventh Circuit's reversal,Judge Presnell ordered an
in camera review of all evidence that the Government did not give
Lyons and his attorneys. 29 This order began the great unraveling
of the Government's case against Lyons. Over the course of a year,
Magistrate Judge David Baker learned that the Mercer evidence was
just the tip of the iceberg. Magistrate Judge Baker found that the
Government had withheld a staggering amount of evidence that
Lyons' attorneys could have used to attack the credibility of nearly
all Government witnesses. 30 Because the Government's case against
Lyons was built entirely on these witnesses' sworn testimony, the
evidence impeaching them was critical to Lyons' defense. And he
had been convicted without the benefit of ever knowing it existed.
Magistrate Judge Baker's report lists, in minute detail, scores
of pieces of crucial evidence that the Government failed to disclose
to Lyons or his attorneys. For example, the Government withheld
evidence that contradicted the testimony of jailed informants
who claimed to have been two of Lyons' biggest customers. 31 The
Government likewise withheld evidence that Frantz Jean Mary,
a man who claimed to be Lyons' highest-volume supplier, had
been promised assistance with his pending deportation to Haiti in
exchange for his testimony. 32
One witness, Antonio Holley, claimed at trial that he had
purchased at least ten kilograms of cocaine from Lyons, and that
Lyons had twice offered to pay Holley to kill rivals. 33 Holley also
testified that he had identified Lyons as a drug supplier during a
previous trial. 34 The Government did not disclose that Holley had
never previously mentioned Lyons in any context, or that Holley
had once perjured himself on the stand. 35
Jeanty Jacques, the man who helped orchestrate Lyons'
1998 robbery, accused Lyons of cocaine trafficking and testified
29

30

31
32
33
34
35

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Investigative Notes and Reports,
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2003) (No.
6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 272.
Lyons I at 1249. See generally In Camera Ex Parte Report and Recommendation
at 14-15, United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2004)
Case No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAH, ECF No. 300 [hereinafter Ex Parle Report]
(describing in detail the Brady material withheld on nearly all prosecution
witnesses) .
Lyons latl24l.
ExParteReport, supra note 35, at 14-15.
Lyons I at 1242.
Id.
Id.
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that "I ain't looking for no sentence reduction" in exchange for
incriminating testimony. 36 The Government failed to correct
Jacques, even though it had already filed a sealed motion for a
sentence reduction on Jacques' behalf. 37 In fact, at 6:07 p.m. on the
very day thatJacques testified, Lyons' prosecutor emailedJacques'
prosecutor, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of Florida, recommending a 50 % reduction of Jacques'
sentence in a separate case. 38
The extraordinary dismissal of the case against Nino Lyons
In January 2004, another Assistant United States Attorney
replaced Lyons' lead prosecutor. 39 Then, in May-several months
after the release of Magistrate Judge Baker's report-the new
prosecutor filed a motion dismissing the Government's drug
conspiracy charges, leaving Lyons accused only of carjacking and
counterfeiting. 40 Judge Presnell ultimately concluded that this step
in the right direction did not go far enough and reversed Lyons'
entire conviction, noting" [prosecutorial] misconduct so pervaded
the case that dismissal of the remaining counts is warranted." 41
Specifically, Judge Presnell held that the previous prosecutor's
decision to withhold a mass of impeachment evidence caused such
"unconscionable delay and prejudice to Lyons as well as to the
judicial process" as to warrant a total dismissal. 42
Under Brady v. Maryland, 43 prosecutors violate a defendant's
Due Process rights by withholding "material" exculpatoryevidence. 44
And under Giglio v. United States, 45 this duty includes evidence that
36
37
38
39
40

41
42

43
44
45

Id. at 1242-43.
Id.
Id.
Notice of Attorney Appearance, United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231
(M.D. Fla.Jan. 26, 2004) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No. 286.
Motion by United States to Vacate Jury Verdict, United States v. Lyons, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2004) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB), ECF No.
304.
Lyons lat 1234-35.
Id. at 1251. Dismissal of a case for Brady violations is a rare sanction, reserved
only for the most extreme cases. In fact, many states have express provisions
prohibiting judges from reversing convictions solely based on Brady violations.
See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the
Inferenceoflnnocence, 100]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 444-46 (2010).
373 U .S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 86.
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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could be used to impeach prosecution witnesses. 46 Brady's guarantee
is expansive, but its interaction with Giglio is often unclear.
Impeachment evidence, particularly evidence that impeaches
witnesses whom the defendant already knows are convicted felons,
is often not considered "material" under Brady. Therefore, proof
that a prosecutor withheld impeachment evidence regarding a
convicted felon will rarely justify a new trial, much less an order
dismissing an entire indictment or one reversing a guilty verdict.
"Impeachment evidence" is a broad term, encompassing
anything that could cause a jury to doubt the reliability of a witness's
testimony. 47 In its own right, the admissibility and relevance of a
piece of impeachment evidence is often difficult to determine. 48
And it becomes a great deal more complicated when subjected to
the Brady materiality standard.
Put simply, the materiality of impeachment evidence is much
harder to determine than that of classic exculpatory evidence. 49
The Brady materiality standard, as applied to a typical piece of
exculpatory evidence (such as a parallel confession, contradictory
video footage, or DNA evidence) is fairly straightforward-if the
evidence is exculpatory enough to sway the outcome at trial, it
must be disclosed.
Yet the materiality of impeachment evidence can be a
much closer question. 50 A legal tension exists between the Brady
materiality standard and Giglio's directive that prosecution/ witness
deals must be disclosed to the defense. When prosecutors withhold
impeachment evidence and a defendant is subsequently convicted,
an appellate panel will vacate the verdict only if the prosecution
suppressed evidence "material to the case." 5 1 Impeachment
evidence is material only if "there is a reasonable probability that,
had the [impeachment] evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." 52

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 154-55.
Id.
See generally FED. R. Evrn . 601-609 (describing the complex parameters for the
admissibility of impeachment evidence).
See e.g. R. Michael Cassidy, P/,ea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractab/,e Prob/,em
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1439-40 ( 2011) .
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985).
United States v. Lewis, 567 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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A number of factors weigh against the materiality of
impeachment evidence that prosecutors possess regarding
convicted felon witnesses. For one, a defendant will usually be aware
if a witness offered against him is a convicted felon or is currently
incarcerated. A prior conviction is a classic ground upon which
to impeach a witness. 53 The witnesses against Lyons, for example,
were thoroughly impeached on the basis of their past criminal
convictions. 54 Yet a prosecutor's use of convicted felons as witnesses
has the ironic effect of making impeachment evidence beyond
their criminal histories less material, as the law is clear that "[e]
vidence that impeaches an already thoroughly impeached witness
is the definition of 'cumulative impeachment' evidence and its
suppression cannot give rise to a Brady violation." 55
Moreover, the materiality of evidence impeaching an individual
felon witness is lessened where the witness's testimony is corroborated
by others. 56 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit, in affirming Lyons'
conviction after his attorneys learned of the first piece of withheld
evidence, found the number of witnesses who testified against
Lyons to be dispositive. "In this case," the Eleventh Circuit noted,
"Mercer was not a key witness whose testimony was essential ....
Twenty-nine additional witnesses provided testimony regarding
Lyons' extensive drug dealings." 57
The materiality of impeachment evidence also diminishes
where the witness's testimony is not central to the case against the
defendant; 58 where the witness testifies regarding only one count of

53
54
55

56

57
58

See FED. R. Evrn. 609 (establishing standard for impeachment by prior
conviction).
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 819 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Barker v.
Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that impeachment
evidence of witness' four prior convictions was duplicative and immaterial
because witness was impeached on the basis of other criminal misconduct).
Mascioli v. United States, o. 1:07CV44, 2009 WL 1328105 at *5 (N.D. W.
Va. May 12, 2009) (holding that evidence of an undisclosed deal between a
witness and the government was not material, because two other government
witnesses gave largely the same testimony).
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452at15, 57 F. App'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2002).
United States v. Gonzalez, 938 F. Supp. 1199, 1213 (D. Del. 1996) ("[W]here
the witness does not directly incriminate the defendant . . . the undisclosed
information about that witness is deemed to be immaterial.").
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a multi-count indictment; 59 where the exact terms of an informal
deal between a witness and the prosecution were withheld from
-the defense; 60 or where other independent evidence supports the
defendant's guilt. 61 In its most recent decision construing Brady,
the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicial practice
of balancing materiality against other factors. In Wetzel v. Lambert,
the Court held that potentially exculpatory evidence was likely
immaterial, because the evidence was ambiguous. 62
In Lyons, the sheer scale of the withheld impeachment
evidence overwhelmed the factors, outlined above, that weigh
against the materiality of impeachment evidence against convicted
felon witnesses. The Government did not just withhold evidence
impeaching a handful of the thirty witnesses it proffered against
Lyons-it withheld evidence that could have impeached every
single one of them. And the evidence touched the very heart of
the case against Lyons. Indeed, the Government essentially had no
case at all once Magistrate Judge Baker's review was complete. 63
Judge Presnell's order to dismiss Lyons' conviction puts
United States v. Lyons on a very short list of cases in which an
entire indictment was dismissed, and a defendant set free, due to
pervasive Brady violations. The typical remedy for Brady violations
is a new trial, not dismissal. 64 As the Northern District of New Jersey
noted in a habeas corpus case nearly thirty years ago, "[i] mmediate
release from custody with prejudice is rarely awarded .... "65
In fact, only one federal appellate panel has ever affirmed a
complete dismissal solely on the basis of Brady violations related to

59

60
61
62
63

64
65

United States v. Weintraub, 871F.2d1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1989) (" [T]he veracity
ofEmrick's trial testimony regarding the details ofjust one cocaine transaction
on December 31, 1982 was not essential to establishing Weintraub's guilt on
States
the conspiracy charges .... ").
United
v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251 , 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1993).
Stephens v. Costello, 55 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (W.D.N.Y 1999).
132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012).
See e.g. Lyons I at 1249-51 (describing the extent of the withheld evidence,
and noting that once the evidence was turned over to Lyons, the Government
moved to dismiss the drug conspiracy charge, and offered to release Lyons on
time served for the remaining charges).
See e.g. Ramsey v. Belleque, No. CIV 03-193-BR, 2005 WL 1502875 (D. Or.
2005).
Carterv. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 559 (D.NJ. 1985) aff'd in pertinent part, 826
F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. LJ. 1509, 1509 (2009)
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impeachment evidence of felon witnesses. 66 In 2008, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed United States v. Chapman, 67 a
· case with facts remarkably similar to those in Lyons. In Chapman, an
Assistant United States Attorney knowingly withheld "650 pages ...
of rap sheets, plea agreements, cooperation agreements, and other
information related to numerous government witnesses .... "68 The
defense was not made aware of these materials until the third week
of trial, after twenty-five prosecution witnesses had already taken
the stand. 69 In a decision remarkably similar to Lyons, the Ninth
Circuit found that the prosecution's "flagrant" and "outrageous"
misconduct justified a complete dismissal of all charges. 70
The rarity of dismissals based on large-scale Brady violations
raises a difficult point. Evidence of the Government's Brady
violations in Lyons' trial trickled in over the course of more than
a year. When the first such piece of evidence-the undisclosed
information on David Mercer-came to light, the Eleventh Circuit
applied the materiality standard and found that a single piece of
impeachment evidence was immaterial, and did not justify a new
trial or release. 71 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit correctly
applied the prevailing standard-courts evaluating Brady claims
examine the effect of the totality of evidence presented at trial, not
just an individual piece. 72 Therefore, if Magistrate Judge Baker had
only uncovered evidence of a few Brady violations, Lyons probably
would not have been released or granted a new trial.
The extraordinary certification of Lyons' innocence

Several years after Lyons' release, Berry suggested to
Eisenmenger, that they attempt to certify Lyons' innocence
and pursue a wrongful conviction claim against the federal
government. 73 The federal Unjust Conviction Statute gives a

66

67
68
69
70
71
72
73

United States v. Lashley, No. CRIM.A. 09-307, 2011 WL 5237291 (E.D. Pa.
2011) ("The Court is aware of only one case in which a federal appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for a Brady violation.").
524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id. at 1084-87.
United States v. Lyons, No. 02-13452 at 15, 57 F. App'x 415 (unpub.) (11th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2002).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).
Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
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wrongfully convicted individual a statutory cause of action against
the government, and authorizes the Court of Claims to award the
-individual $50,000 per year of imprisonment. 74 Yet, the Statute also
requires, as a prerequisite to money damages, that a district court
certify the exoneree's complete innocence of all charges and lack
of any other fault leading to his conviction. 75
The requirements for a certification of innocence are difficult,
and in most cases impossible, to satisfy, absent hard physical
evidence or a valid confession from another person. 76 These
requirements have little to do with the perceived fairness of the
exoneree's conviction. Rather, an individual seeking a certification
of his innocence has the burden of proof in showing: ( 1) that he
did not commit the charged crime, and (2) that he did nothing
through his own negligence to bring about his prosecution and
conviction. 77
The Unjust Conviction Statute is not intended to indemnify
every exonerated former prisoner. 78 It is an extraordinary remedy
for exceptional cases. 79 Little case law exists that applies the statute,
probably because, as one court noted, "few applicants can satisfy
its rigorous standard." 80 The Supreme Court has never elaborated
on the statute, and only a handful of federal appellate courts have
ever reached it. 81 Of those few decisions, all but one 82 affirmed a
district court's denial of an exoneree's petition for certification of
actual innocence. 83

74
75
76
77
78

79
80
81

82
83

28 U.S.C. § 2513. Up to $100,000 per year is available to individuals wrongfully
convicted of a capital crime.
Lyons !lat 1364.
Mary C. Delaney et al., Exonerees' Hardships After Freedom, 83 Wis. LAW. 18, 21
(Feb. 2010).
Id.
Lyons II at 1365; see also United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 639-40

(S.D.N.Y 1947) (finding that, although the evidence did not prove the
defendant's guilt, it was nevertheless sufficient to raise a question as to his
innocence, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a certification of innocence).
Lyons II at 1365.
United States v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (S.D . W.Va.
2008).
United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 182 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Racing Servs., Inc. , 580 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2009); Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d
1278, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 841 (5th
Cir. 1963); Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 73 (D .C. Cir. 1953).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285-86
See Amy Oxley, Not Innocent Enough: The Denial of a Certificate of Innocence based
on Neg/,ect in United Stales v. Graham, 36 S. ILL. U.LJ. 425, 427 (2012).
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Eisenmenger was initially skeptical of Berry's suggestion, with
good reason. 84 Like dismissals under Brady, innocence petitions
are granted only in the face of the most "flagrant" prosecutorial
misconduct and subsequent injustice. 85
The situations in which a certification of innocence may be
granted are carefully circumscribed. A claimant whose conviction
was reversed on procedural grounds 86 or insufficiency of evidence, 87
or any other ground unrelated to the defendant's innocence, 88
does not generally have a basis to petition for innocence. Rather,
the defendant must show that he did not commit a crime. In Betts
v. United States, for example, Betts was convicted of violating a court
order. 89 Betts certified his innocence by showing that the court
order was too vague to be enforced. 90
Certifications of innocence in drug cases are exceedingly rare.
United States v. Lyons may be the only district court case to ever grant
such a petition in regard to drug conspiracy charges. Only one
other district court has granted a recent petition for innocence in
a drug case. In Jones v. United States, the Eastern District of Missouri
certified the innocence of a defendant who had been sentenced
to 20 years in prison for drug-related charges. The defendant had
been convicted solely on the basis of testimony from a police officer
who was later imprisoned for corrupt practices. 91 The government
in Jones conceded the defendant's innocence because, without the
officer's testimony, it had no case. 92 Like the Lyons prosecution,
the Jones prosecution had no physical evidence of the defendant's
possession of drugs. 93
The Government began its brief in opposition to Lyons'
motion for certification of innocence by admitting that the
"prosecution of Lyons did not reflect the government at its best." 94
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Berry/ Eisenmenger Interview, supra note 21.
Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
Osborn, 322 F.2d at 841.
United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284.
Id. (noting that the facts underlying the B etts case are "gothic," and provide a
very interesting read). See Matter of Betts, 927 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1991).
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284.
No. 4:10-CV-1748 CEJ, 2011WL2516600 (E.D. Mo.June 23, 2011).
Id. at *l.
Id. at *2.
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Certification of Actual Innocence
Under 28 U.S.C.A. 2513 at 1, United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (No. 6:01-cr-134-0rl-31DAB)ECF No. 353.
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The Government also conceded that Lyons was innocent of dealing
drugs. 95 The Government did not argue, as prosecutors have in
·other cases, that Lyons somehow brought about his prosecution by
his own negligence or misconduct. 96 The ruling, then, boiled down
to whether Lyons was innocent of carjacking and counterfeiting.
Lyons proved his innocence by showing that he had no
criminal intent in the underlying acts for which he was charged.
When he commandeered a man's car outside the hotel in 1998,
Lyons' intent was to stop a crime, not harm the driver or steal a
car. 97 And Lyons proved that he did not know that a few items of
second-hand clothing in his shop were counterfeit. 98
A year later, the Court of Federal Claims awarded Lyons the full
statutory amount, giving him $140,000 for his nearly three years in
prison. 99 In March 2012, the Government dropped its final appeal,
clearing the way for the United States Department of Treasury to
pay Lyons. 100
Brady: A right without a remedy

In recent years, a growing coalition of judges, academics,
and attorneys has begun to advocate for a change to the Brady
materiality standard. 101 The criticism focuses on the challenges
prosecutors face in actually applying the standard. The Brady
materiality inquiry requires that prosecutors engaged in the "oftencompetitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" 102 put aside their
adversarial bias and hand the weakest elements of their case over
to the defense. At the same time, it presents prosecutors with the
dilemma of guessing not only whether that evidence could sway

95
96

Id. at 2 n.l.
See e.g. Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 2009)
(rejecting government's argument that exonerees brought about their own
prosecution).
97 Lyons flat 1366-67.
98 Id. at 1368. Lyons purchased clothing for his store from wholesale and discount
suppliers. The counterfeits he inadvertently purchased were so authenticlooking that only an expert could distinguish them from the real name brand.
See Def.'s Reply, supra note 7, at 4 iI 10.
99 Lyons III at 553.
100 E-mail from Robert Berry, Lyons' attorney, to autl10r (Mar. 28, 2012) (on file
with author).
101 See e.g. Cassidy, supra note 54, at 1439-40.
102 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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the outcome at trial, but whether a future appellate panel might
believe that it would have done so. 103
This exercise in crystal-ball gazing is primed for error. Courts
interpret Giglio to hold that impeachment evidence must be
disclosed if the impeachable witness' credibility will determine
guilt or innocence. 104 Yet, it is often impossible to know, before
trial, which witness will prove most important to the jury, what parts
of the witness' testimony will be most important, and whether a
given piece of impeachment evidence will significantly affect that
witness' credibility in the jury's eyes.
The use of testimony from jailhouse informants, like those
who testified against Lyons, only compounds the difficulty.
'Jailhouse snitches" are nearly indispensable in drug conspiracy
cases like Lyons, where the government's only evidence is often
circumstantial. 105 Yet they tend to testify in exchange for favors, such
as sentence reductions. The powerful inducement to lie created by
these favors has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly and
judicial commentary and debate. 106
More than fifty percent of federal judges and ninety percent of
defense attorneys favor some form of clarifying and strengthening
of the government's obligations under Brady. 107 This coalition has
sought to change the Brady standard by appealing to the Department
ofJustice (DOJ) and the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 108 These efforts
have thus far yielded little real improvement. The DOJ has released
a number of directives recommending that federal prosecutors
interpret Brady liberally. 109 The ABA has proposed a broad
interpretation of Model Rule 3.S(d) that requires expansive pre-trial
103 See e. g. Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch ofFlaws, 67 WASH. & L EE L. REv. 1533,
1542 (2010).
104 Cvijanovich v. United States, 3:07-CR-55, 2011WL2680485 at *9 (D.N.D. 2011)
("If a witness's reliability may dete rmine guilt or innocence, the impeachment
information falls within the Brady rule. ").
105 Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of
Offering Testimony by jailhouse Informants an d Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1413 (Dec. 2007).
106 See generally id.
107 Mike Scarcella, Divided on Discovery, NAT'L LJ., Mar 14, 2011.
108 Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1445.
109 Id.; see also Memorandum from David W. Ogden , Deputy Att'y General,
to Dep 't Prosecutors Qan. 4, 2010) (regarding "Guidance for Prosecutors
Regarding Criminal Discovery"), avail,abl,e at http:/ / wwwJustice.gov/ dag/
discovery-guidance. pdf.
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disclosures by prosecutors. 110 But the ABA rule is toothless and rarely
enforced, 111 and the DOJ's directives have had no apparent effect. 112
-These are poor substitutes for a constitutional right. 113
The debate over the materiality standard tends to invoke a
great deal of criticism of prosecutors. Civil libertarians critique the
standard as a tool that unscrupulous prosecutors use to subvert the
civil liberties of criminal defendants. 114 This is beside the point,
and probably wrong. The problem is not that prosecutors are
dishonest-the vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated public
servants with high ethical standards. The problem is that the
materiality standard is primed for error. 11 5
The second flaw in Brady is its lack of a vigorous enforcement
mechanism. Lyons' $140,000 award may seem paltry compared to
the time he lost and the massive damage to his reputation. In fact,
considering the law of reparations for the wrongfully imprisoned,
he was lucky to receive anything at all. 116
Despite Brady's promise of expansive protections for the
criminally accused, few jurisdictions within the United States
actually have vigorous mechanisms by which to enforce Brady. 117
When prosecutors withhold exculpatory or impeachment
evidence and then obtain a conviction, the usual remedy is a new
trial, where the defendant will receive the benefit of the previously
withheld evidence. Yet in extraordinary cases like Lyons, where an
entire prosecution is unraveled by newly discovered Brady material,
the law gives wrongfully convicted defendants few opportunities
to be compensated for the devastation to their lives, finances,
and reputations.

110 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009).
111 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REv. 381, 398 (2002).
112 Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1447.
113 See Cassidy, supra note 54 at 1445-60.
114 See, e.g., Angela]. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMER1CAN
PROSECUTOR 130-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
115 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2119,
2135 (2010).
116 Only a few years before Lyons' certification of innocence, Congress upped the
annual compensation amount under the Unjust Conviction Act from $5,000
to $50,000. Lyons III at 555 ..
11 7 See generally Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REv. 703 (Summer, 2004).
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A growing chorus of legal academics, lawyers, and judges is
calling for an enhanced remedy for the victims of Brady violations. 11 8
The current regime simply does not provide sufficient incentives
for prosecutors to make the right choice, nor does it give much
recourse for defendants who were harmed by withheld evidence. 11 9
These commentators argue that the traditional remedy for a Brady
violation-a new trial-is inadequate to compensate exonerees. 120
Postscript

Nearly three years after his August 2001 imprisonment, Nino
Lyons was finally released from jail. 121 "I'm happy to be home,"
Lyons told reporters, outside the jail. "But am I satisfied? No.
Because I spent thirty-four months of my life in jail, for no reason
at all." 122
Since 1989, well over 200 people have been exonerated by the
hard science of DNA testing; hundreds more by other evidence. 123
Most of them, like Lyons, lost everything attempting to prove their
innocence. 124 Those lucky enough to be set free find it exceedingly
difficult to readjust to society, given the stigma of any conviction,
even one obtained unfairly. 125
Nino Lyons lost nearly everything while he was in jail, including
his businesses, his home, and his retirement savings. 126 Even
eight years after his release, Lyons says that it would "not even be
possible, not by a long shot" to get his life back to what it was before
his arrest. 127 He now works for a company that provides tutoring
materials to elementary schools, but has been unable to find
employment commensurate with his education and experience. 128

118 See, e.g., Sunil Bhave, The Innocent Have Rights, Too: Expanding Brady v. Maryland
to provide the Criminally Innocent with a Cause of Action Against Police Officers Who
Withhold Exculpatory Evidence, 45 CREIGH TO L. REv. 1 (2011).
119 See Raeder, supra note 110at1439-40.
120 Bhave, supra note 123, at 3.
121 Lyons II at 1364.
122 Brad Heath and Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors' Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, USA
TODAY at Al (Sept. 23, 2010) (Video available online at http:/ / www.usatoday.
com/ video/ index.htm?bctid=615464508001) ..
123 Delaney, supra note 81, at 21.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Telephone Interview with ino Lyons, supra note 8.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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His wife, formerly an elementary school principal, has been unable
to find any administrative work and is now a teacher. 129
The media viewed United States v. Lyons as a frightening example
of prosecutorial overreach. 130 This view, however, oversimplifies
the issues. Under the modern application of the Brady standard
to impeachment evidence, it is often almost impossible for
prosecutors to determine what their constitutional obligations
are. Moreover, the lack of any normal remedy for victims of Brady
violations, beyond a new trial, tacitly encourages prosecutors to err
on the side of withholding impeachment evidence. United States v.
Lyons stands as the exception to these trends. Perhaps it should
become the rule.

129 Id.
130 See generally Heath and McCoy, supra note 127.
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Uses and Potential Abuses of Federalism
by Robert Batey

F

or the Criminal Cases PaneP at the symposium celebrating
the fiftieth anniversary of the Middle District of Florida, the
United States Attorney's Office proposed seven prosecutions
that in the words of one of the panel's participants, the office was
"particularly proud of." Given my choice of those cases to discuss, I
picked four that give perspectives on the uses and potential abuses
of federalism.
As any political scientist will tell you, federalism is an inefficient
form of government. 2 Parallel sets of courts, prosecutors, and law
enforcement officers are by definition wasteful. But this parallelism
can become an advantage. This is especially true when corruption
infects one system, which the other system can investigate and
prosecute. One of the cases nominated by the Middle District's
prosecutors, United States v. Waldon, 3 provides a textbook example
of this advantage of federalism.
Waldon involved a group of rogue Jacksonville cops who
routinely assaulted, robbed, and/ or kidnapped their victims; they

Robert Batey is a Professor Emeritus of Law at Stetson University College of Law.
The author is indebted to Bankruptcy Judge Catherine P. McEwen for the invitation
to participate in the symposium.
1
I was honored to be included on this panel with former Eleventh Circuit
Judge Joseph W. Hatchett and Senior Judge William]. Castagna of the Middle
District of Florida.
2
This was the topic of a paper I wrote in freshman political science more
than 45 years ago, comparing the greater ease with which a unitary system of
government (Great Britain) responded to a regional poverty crisis than did a
federal system (West Germany).
3
See363 F.3d 1103 (ll'h Cir. 2004).
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even murdered one of them. As indicated in an in-depth article in
the Florida Times-Union, 4 state investigation of the many complaints
against the officers was going nowhere 5 when the United States
Attorney's Office got involved. Diligent federal investigation (led
by Assistant United States Attorney James R. Klindt) broke the
blue wall of silence one defendant at a time, ultimately yielding six
guilty pleas and one conviction, with effective sentences ranging
from time served to life imprisonment. 6 The "wasteful" parallelism
of federalism showed its worth. 7
Despite examples like Waldon, in recent years a claim has
arisen that federalism can be abused. Scholars have complained
about "overfederalization," most notably in drug prosecutions. 8
Even Justice Anton Scalia has joined the chorus. 9 The essence of
the complaint is that many federal drug (and other) prosecutions
concern local matters that would be better left to the state courts.
The three drug cases nominated by the United States Attorney's
Office for consideration by the Criminal Cases Panel provide an
opportunity to evaluate this claim.
United States v. Valencia-Trujillo 10 provides a strong argument
that some drug cases can only be pursued at the federal level, with
its far greater resources and scope.II Valencia-Trujillo ran a cocaine

4
5
6

7

8
9

10
11

Jim Schoettler, The Terror in Blue, Fla. Times-Union,Jan. 19, 2003, at G-1.
"State prosecutors ... showed little interest." Id.
An interesting footnote to Waldon is Arnold v. Secretary, Dep 't of Corrections,
595 F.3d 1324 (ll 'h Cir. 2010), in which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge
Corrigan's grant of habeas corpus relief to a state defendant whose case was
investigated by one of the defendants in Waldon; both courts ruled that the
investigator's failure to out himself during Arnold's prosecution constituted a
Brady violation. See Arnold v. McNeil, 622 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1309-23 (M.D. Fla.
2009).
Another of the cases nominated by the United States Attorney's Office (but
not discussed by me at the symposium), United States v. LaBrake, involving a
fraudulent scheme to defraud by local Tampa officials and others, exemplifies
this use offederalism. See United States v. McCarter, 219 Fed. Appx. 912 (11th Cir.
2007).
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 74 7 (2005).
See Mark Sherman.judges ''Aint What They Used to Be," Associated Press (Oct. 5,
2011) (reporting Scalia's comments that expanded federal jurisdiction over
drug crimes has burdened and weakened the federaljudiciary).
See 573 F.3d 1171 (l Jth Cir. 2007).
Another of the cases nominated by the United States Attorney's Office (but not
discussed by me at the symposium), United States v. Trofimoff, an international
espionage prosecution, also shows the need for federal action. See 54 Fed.
Appx. 689 ( 11 ui Cir. 2002).
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trafficking enterprise that involved three different Colombian
drug cartels and was truly international in scope. To expose this
enterprise and convict its kingpin, the federal government created
"Operation Panama Express," which involved in the words ofJudge
Ed Carnes, "a virtual alphabet soup of federal law enforcement
agencies." 12 The result was a forty-year sentence for ValenciaTrujillo. It is highly unlikely that the state of Florida could have
mounted an equally successful investigation and prosecution. 13
United States v. Lorenzo 14 and United States v. Schweickert, 15 on the
other hand, give some support to the argument of overfederalization.
Lorenzo, occasionally with Schweickert's assistance, drugged young
gay men and then subdued and raped them; two of the victims
were killed. Rather than being tried in state court for these serious
violent felonies, the federal government prosecuted Lorenzo for
multiple counts of possession of drugs with intent to commit a
crime of violence, and Schweickert for being an accomplice to
some of Lorenzo's crimes. The federal courts sentenced Lorenzo
to two hundred years and Schweickert to twenty.
The willingness of the United States Attorney's Office to
prosecute these hate crimes is highly commendable. But more
appropriate convictions, with even stiffer sentences, would have
been available in state court. Was the federalization of these cases
appropriate? 16
A defender of federalization in these cases would be quick to
point out that the state of Florida has yet to prosecute Lorenzo
and has only recently begun to try Schweickert, five years after his
conviction in federal court. 17 The rejoinder might be that the state
was waiting until it was clear that Schweickert's confession would
be admissible against him (an issue not resolved until the United

12
13
14
15
16

17

573 F.3d at 1173.
One wonders, however, whether a combined federal-state operation, with
prosecution in state court, would have been possible.
See 312 Fed. Appx. 189 (ll'h Cir. 2008).
See298 Fed. Appx. 857 (11'11 Cir. 2008).
The same question might be raised by another of the cases nominated by the
United States Attorney's Office (but not discussed by me at the symposium),
United States v. Payne, a case involving a fraudulent investment scheme. See 566
F.3d 1276 (11 lh Cir. 2009),
See James Jackson, Scott Schweickert Indicted on Murder Charges, http:/ / www.
abcactionnews.com / dpp / news / region_hillsborough / scott-schweickertindicted-on-murder-charge (Sept. 28, 2012).
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States Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Powell18 ). And the delay
in prosecuting Lorenzo may be attributable to a desire to convict
Schweickert first, so that he might be persuaded to testify against
his accomplice (the same ploy used so successfully in Waldon).
Lorenzo and Schweickert at least raise the question of whether
charges that should be tried in state court too often end up in
federal court. I suspect that many of the cases not chosen by the
United States Attorney's Office for discussion by the Criminal Cases
Panel raise that question even more strongly.

18

130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (upholding the version of the Miranda warnings used
for years by the Tampa police).
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Early Jail and Prison Conditions Litigation in
the Middle District Court
by William J. Sheppard

T

oday, jails and prisons throughout the Middle District
of Florida (Middle District) are hardly places a person
would want to spend the night. However, those currently
incarcerated in the Middle District have had many rights secured
for them which did not exist prior to the existence of that Court.
The story of prison reform in the Middle District illustrates the
power hardworking, courageous pro se plaintiffs, attorneys, and
judges can wield to ensure all inmates receive the constitutional
liberties and protections to which they are entitled.
Prior to the existence of the Middle District, inmates had
few civil rights because state and local government entities could
operate their jail and prison systems in virtually any manner they
chose. This "hands-off' approach was a product of cases prior to
the 1960s that denied inmates legal standing to interfere in the
operations of state prisons. Prisoners themselves were unable
to challenge the conditions of their confinement until the
Supreme Court decisions in Jones v. Cunningham, 1 which granted
inmates the right to challenge the legality and conditions of their
imprisonment, and Cooper v. Pate, 2 which granted inmates standing
to sue in federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§1983).
Before Jones and Cooper, almost any claim a prisoner could raise

William]. Sheppard is an attorney in the Jacksonville firm of Sheppard, White &
Kachergus, P.A.
1
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
2
Cooperv. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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today relating to the conditions of his or her confinement would
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Many of the cases in the Middle District before 1970 follow
this pattern, because the federal courts seldom could intervene in
matters regarding the self-regulation of prisons and jails. Even after
the decisions in Cooper and Jones, the jails and prisons in the Middle
District3 and various other centers for incarceration throughout
Florida remained in disarray for years. Cells were often packed
with inmates upwards of four times their living capacity, adequate
medical care was scarce, vermin ran rampant through the halls,
and fights, rapes, murders, and suicides were commonplace.
Following the landmark decision in Holt v. Sarver, 4 courts
throughout the Middle District received unprecedented numbers
of complaints from prisoners alleging that they, too, were being
deprived of their constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. Many of the allegations related to
overcrowded living conditions-a ballooning problem in the
nation's jails and prisons during the 1960s and 1970s. Usually filed
and argued prose, most petitions were dismissed at the outset. Given
the number of suits being filed, and with greater judicial scrutiny, it
became apparent that many of these petitions had merit.
Judge William A. McRae presided over one of the earliest
successful claims by a prison in the Middle District, Coonts v.
Wainwright. 5 Coonts was a prisoner at the Doctors Inlet Road Prison
in Florida in April and May of 1966. During that time, he helped
other inmates, many of whom could neither read nor write in English,
prepare petitions to state and federal courts. In May 1966, his prison
posted a regulation which prohibited prisoners from assisting other
inmates in the preparation of legal documents. In accordance with
the new regulation, Coonts ceased aiding his fellow inmates with
their legal filings and filed for injunctive relief, only to be placed in
solitary confinement. He was then transferred to another prison

3

4

5

Jails in the State of Florida are used as places for pretrial detention as well as
service of sentences less than one year. They are operated by the counties and
municipalities in the State of Florida. State prisons are operated by the Florida
Department of Corrections and house inmates who have been sentenced to
serve a sentence of one year or more.
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) , held that the conditions
within large portions of the Arkansas prison system constituted cruel and
unusual punishment of inmates.
Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968) .
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and, yet again, placed in solitary confinement for more than eighteen
months, until his court hearing in February 1968.
Finding no justification for the actions taken towards Coonts
by both prisons, Judge McRae held that prohibiting inmates from
assisting other inmates in the preparation of legal documents
effectively denied those individuals access to state and federal
courts, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections was
prohibited from enforcing the contested regulation. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge McRae 's decision, rejecting
the state's argument that the regulation's purpose was to combat
the unauthorized practice of law and manage discipline within the
prison. 6 Coontswas an important early victory in the Middle District
for the fight against unconstitutional conditions of confinement,
but it was by no means the end of litigation.
Judge Charles R. Scott's imprint on jail and prison reform in
the Middle District began with Hooks v. Wainwright, 7 in which he
required the state to furnish law libraries and professional legal
help to inmates. Hooks proved contentious because it went directly
contrary to the "hands-off' approach employed at the time by
the federal courts, but Judge Scott was by no means a stranger
to controversy. Only two years earlier, the Governor of Florida,
Claude R. Kirk Jr., appeared on television to denounce an order
by Judge Scott which desegregated Volusia County School System
buses, going so far as to call for his impeachment.
Why would a judge who had already incurred the ire of the
highest ranking official in Florida get involved in the business
of securing and protecting rights for those on the lowest rung
of the social pecking order? The sentiment of many privy to the
history of jail and prison litigation throughout the Middle District
is that Judge Scott had genuine empathy for inmates and their
circumstances. A theory proposed by others is that he used court
appointment and encouraged class action suits to facilitate the
resolution of the massive volume of jail and prison condition
litigation during the 1960s and 1970s. This theory is exemplified
in the similar and linked decisions of Costello v. Wainwright and

6
7

409 F.2d 1337 (1969).
Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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Miller v. Carson. 8 The two cases concurrently brought about the
greatest changes to date regarding the conditions inside the
Middle District's litigation.9 These cases are widely seen as a
hallmark of his time on the bench.
Costello was groundbreaking from its inception. Tobias Simon,
one of the nation's most respected civil rights litigators, agreed to
handle the case on behalf of the inmate plaintiffs. Representation
by competent counsel helped the massive, complex class actionthe docket alone was 250 pages-proceed more effectively and
efficiently than the pro se litigation that had come before it. The
complaints in Costello assailed the rampant overcrowding within
Florida's prison system, alleging prisoners were denied adequate
medical care as a result of overcrowding.
Judge Scott agreed with the plaintiffs. In his opinion, he
observed that, at the time of the original filing in Costello, "the
normal capacity for the existing institutions of the Division of
Corrections was seven thousand (7,000) persons with a 'emergency'
(as described by the defendants themselves) capacity of eightythree hundred (8,300) inmates. The actual inmate population
on February 8, 1973, was approximately ten thousand three
hundred ( 10,300). "10 Judge Scott enforced settlement agreements
between the parties regarding the prison population, medical
care, sanitation, and food service. The overcrowding settlement
agreement, which finally codified the prison system's maximum
capacity, mandated the population of the prison system could never
exceed its maximum capacity. Ultimately, Costello would involve
the Middle District of Florida, as well as the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, at least six additional times before being closed in 1992.
Years after litigation commenced regarding Florida's prison
system, the state's jails-and the Duval county Jail in particularremained epicenters of constitutional infringement. On June
11, 1974, the filing of a handwritten notice unleashed a flurry of
reformations in jails throughout the Middle District. The note was
written, not by a lawyer, city council member, or a prison official,

8
9
10

Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F.Sup. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975) and Miller v. Carson, 401
F.Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
Judge Scott took senior status in 1976, but still kept review of these cases until
his death in 1983.
Costello, 397 F.Supp. at 20. As of September 30,2012, the population in the
Department of Corrections was in excess of 100,000 people.
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but by a lone inmate. Richard Franklin Miller, a federal detainee
who was being temporarily housed in the Duval County Jail, filed
a prose "Petition for Injunction" with the court. Judge Scott, who
was privy to the legal issues because of his concurrent involvement
in Costello, presided over the case. Within eight days, the court had
ordered a complaint to be served on Sheriff Dale Carson, the sole
defendant at the time, and had appointed an attorney well-known
for his work regarding civil rights and constitutional law, William].
Sheppard, as counsel for the prose plaintiff. With the court's grant
of Miller's Motion to Proceed as a Class Action, ac case involving
an individual temporary detainee quickly turned into another class
action lawsuit.
The allegations in Miller were shocking. The jail was so
overcrowded that the inmates had to eat standing up. Cells had
become cesspools of infectious disease because inmates were
crammed into tiny quarters with little or no plumbing. Restrictions
on visiting privileges, telephone use, outdoor recreation, and
religious freedom were commonplace. There was a severe lack
of personnel. Inmate-on-inmate assaults were rampant, frequent,
and ignored. Inmates could not meaningfully contest their
inhumane treatment, because it was nearly impossible to secure
witnesses or competent counsel. Library and law books were
virtually non-existent.
On January 31, 1975, Judge Scott ordered the defendants
to cease the violation of the inmates' constitutional rights and
awarded them attorneys' fees. The defendants moved for relief
from the injunction, and the court modified the injunction with
respect to compliance for fire codes, treatment of juveniles, and
outdoor recreation. 11 However,just a few months later,Judge Scott
went so far as to hold the defendants in contempt and ordered
them to show cause why the jail should not be closed. Like Costello,
Miller wound up back in court four more times before the Duval
County Jail was finally released from contempt in 1994, more than
twenty years after Miller's original handwritten letter was presented
to the Court.
Judge Scott remained active in Miller and Costello long after the
original filings. By the time of his death in 1983, he had overseen

11

Millerv. Carson, 392 F.Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
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each case for the better part of a decade .12 Through failure after
failure of the administrators of the Florida prison system and the
Duval County Jail to implement his respective orders, Judges Scott,
Howell W. Melton, and Susan H. Black remained committed to
ensuring justice was served. Their guidance and sound decision
making in cases containing allegations as contentious as those in
Miller and Costelw make them true pioneers in the fight towards
realizing the Constitution's promise of fair treatment of prisoners.
This fight continues. In 1996, without serious debate, Congress
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e), in an attempt to inhibit prisoner civil rights claims. The
law's proponents claimed it was necessary to curtail abuse of the
judicial process by prisoners filing meritless claims, but, in reality,
litigation rates among prisoners had declined seventeen percent
between 1980 and 1996. The PLRA erects a variety of procedural
and substantive hurdles to prison conditions litigation, which the
Ninth Circuit characterized as evidence of Congress' intent to
revive the "hands-off" doctrine-the same doctrine which allowed
and even encouraged the notorious prisoner rights violations that
occurred before the 1970s. 13 During the year before PLRA passed,
1.6 million prisoners filed roughly 40,000 federal civil rights
actions, but by 2005, under 25,000 actions were filed.
Despite decreasing the rate of prisoner lawsuits being filed,
the PLRA does not appear to have led to a higher proportion of
meritorious suits. If it had, one would expect the reduced pool
of litigation since 1996 to have succeeded in court more often.
Instead, the opposite had occurred: defendants have won more
cases pretrial and have settled few cases.
However, though the PLRA may have posed a setback to prison
reform efforts since 1996, the history of prisoner rights litigation
both nationally and in the Middle District provides reason for

12

13

Following Judge Scott's death , Judge Howell W. Melton and Special Monitor
Dr. Jerome E. Miller presided over M iller until its conclusion, ten years later.
Judge Susan H. Black, Special Master Joseph R. Julin, and Monitor Robert
W. Cullen presided over Costello with the appointment of its companion case
Celestineo v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258 (M.D. Fla. 1993) , for ten more years also
until 1993. See Celestineo v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Dr.
Miller wrote a book about his experiences as monitor of the Duval County Jail.
Miller, Search and Destroy: African American Males in the Criminal justice System
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2d edition, 2011).
See Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 990-92 (9th Cir. 200).
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continued vigilance against the abuse of inmates. It would have
been easy for potential reformers to dismiss wholesale change
as impossible in 1963, just a year before the Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Cooper, or in 1969 prior to the Eastern District
of Arkansas' holding in Holt, or during the few years before Judge
McRae's courageous 1968 ruling in Coonts and Judge Scott's
groundbreaking 1972 Costello decision. Thanks to the tireless,
often thankless efforts of individuals like Judge Scott, as well as
pro se litigants, Michael Costello and Richard Miller, correctional
institutions were forced to grant inmates their most basic rights.
The political climate and judicial opinion are constantly changing,
but the Constitution's animating principles are not and, for that
reason, the fight against inhumane conditions of confinement can
and should continue.
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Our Experience in the History of the
Middle District of Florida and the Speedy
Trial Clause of the SixthAmendment
Doggett v. United States, 906 F.2d 573 (11th Cir.
1990), 505U.S. 647 (1992)
by William J. Sheppard and Elizabeth L. White
arc Doggett was charged by indictment with conspiracy
to import and distribute cocaine. He called and made
an appointment a few days after he had been arrested in
Reston, Virginia. The case itself was in Jacksonville, Florida, so he
came to Jacksonville and hired us. I'm not altogether clear how
Mr. Doggett found me, but the minute I met him, I knew what his
avenue of escape from the clutches of the United States might be. I
recall meeting with Marc in the conference room in the afternoon
and, during the course of our conversation, I had the folks in the
office retrieve a closed file in the case of United States v. AJB. 1 AJB's
case involved the same issue as Doggett's: the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial. I had won AJB's case on a motion to dismiss
before the Honorable Charles R. Scott, United States Federal
District judge for the Middle District of Florida. The difference
between the two cases was that Mr. Doggett's delay was far longer
than AJB (8-1 / 2 years versus 32 months).
AJB had been arrested after an indictment 32 months prior
to his arrest. Though the government had tried to locate AJB at

M

William]. Sheppard and Elizabeth L. White are attorneys inJacksonville, Florida, in
the firm Sheppard, White & Kachergus, P.A.
1
A. J.B. is a pseudonym.
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the college he attended, it was unsuccessful because the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had changed to the Drug
Enforcement Administration within a month of the start of the
search for AJB, and he subsequently "fell through the cracks."
Thirty-two months later, when AJB was returning from a holiday
out of the country, he wa arrested at the border because of the
outstanding Jacksonville, Florida, warrant. In AJB's case, I filed a
motion to dismiss as indicated. Because of the passage of time, AJB
was ineligible for sentencing under the Youthful Offender Act, an
option utilized by the judge in sentencing his co-defendants. After
two or three bifurcated hearings, Judge Scott finally dismissed the
case. Ironically, and thankfully, the judge realized that 36 months
to the day of the hearing, he had stayed late from work to receive a
return of an indictment from the federal grand jury indicting AJB.
The judge, upon making this realization, and obviously disgusted at
the government's nonchalance in apprehending AJB, announced
from the bench that the case would be dismissed, as he pushed the
file over the edge of the bench onto the floor and recessed court.
Once I retrieved AJB's file for Doggett, I remembered AJB had
absolute proof of being prejudiced by the delay of 32 months from
indictment to arrest. ReviewingJudge Scott's order also convinced
me that the length of delay in Mr. Doggett's case was of sufficient
length to be concerned that the passage of time could prejudice
him in ways I might not be able to articulate.
I felt confident enough of my position to file a motion to
dismiss. The prosecutor, Thomas Morris, Assistant United States
Attorney, now a United States Federal Magistrate Judge, prosecuted
for the United States. The Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, thenUnited States Magistrate Judge, and now a Senior Federal District
Judge, presided over the motion hearing. The Honorable John
Moore, Federal District Judge, now Senior Federal District Judge,
affirmed Magistrate Judge Schlesinger's opinion denying relief to
Mr. Doggett on his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, he entered a
conditional plea of guilty reserving the right to appeal the denial
of the dispositive motion to dismiss. Mr. Doggett received a
probationary sentence, but nevertheless was a convicted felon, and
in my view, unconstitutionally so. If the constitutional right to a
speedy trial meant anything, it seemed to us that we should prevail
in Doggett's case.
We pursued an appeal to the Eleven th Circuit Court of Appeal
in Atlanta and my partner and wife, Elizabeth "Betsy" white, argued
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the case while pregnant with our second child. We lost by a two-toone vote. Fortunately, Judge Clark wrote a concise and persuasive
dissent. Until Doggett, prejudice had to be proven in order to
prevail on a constitutional speedy trial claim. For our viewpoint,
a presumption of prejudice arouse from the inordinate delay in
arresting Mr. Doggett. Ultimately, that became the holding in
Doggett, but not without a very interesting and unusual experience
for everyone involved.
Marc Doggett's story, which led to his victory in Doggett v. United
States, 2 is best told by then Justice]. Souter
On February 22, 1980, petitioner Marc Doggett was
Indicted for conspiring with several others to import And
distribute cocaine. Douglas Driver, the Drug Enforcement
Administration's principal agent Investigating the
conspiracy, told the United States Marshal's Service that
the DEA would oversee the apprehension of Doggett and
his confederates. On March 18, 1980, two police officers
set out under Driver's orders to arrest Doggett at his
parents' house in Raleigh, North Carolina, only to find
that he was not there. His mother told the officers that he
had left for Colombia four days earlier.
To catch Doggett on his return to the United States,
Driver sent word of his outstanding arrest warrant to all
United States Customs stations and to a number of law
enforcement organizations. He also placed Doggett's
name in the Treasury Enforcement Communication
System (TECS), a computer network that helps Customs
agents screen people entering the country, and in the
National Crime Information Center computer system,
which serves similar ends. The TECS entry expired that
September, however, and Doggett's name vanished from
the system.
In September 1981, Driver found out that Doggett was
under arrest on drug charges in Panama and, thinking that
a formal extradition request would be futile, simply asked
Panama to "expel" Doggett to the United States. Although
the Panamanian authorities promised to comply when
2

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 64 7 ( 1992).
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their own proceedings had run their course, they freed
Doggett the following July and let him go to Colombia,
where he stayed with an aunt for several months. On
September 15, 1982, he passed unhindered through
Customs in New York City and settled down in Virginia.
Since his return to the United States, he has married,
earned a college degree, found a steady job as a computer
operations manager, lived openly under his own name,
and stayed within the law.
Doggett's travels abroad had not wholly escaped the
Government's notice, however. In 1982, the American
Embassy in Panama told the State Department of this
departure to Colombia, but that information, for whatever
reason, eluded the DEA, and Agent Driver assumed for
several years that his quarry was still serving time in a
Panamanian prison. Driver never asked DEA officials in
Panama to check into Doggett's status, and only after his
own fortuitous assignment to that country in 1985 did he
discover Doggett's departure for Colombia. Driver then
simply assumed Doggett had settled there, and he made
no effort to find out for sure or to track Doggett down,
either abroad or in the United States. Thus Doggett
remained lost to the American criminal justice system
until September 1988, when the Marshal's Service ran a
simple credit check on several thousand people subject
to outstanding arrest warrants and, within minutes, found
out where Doggett lived and worked. On September 5,
1988, nearly 6 years after his return to the United States
and 8 years after his indictment, Doggett was arrested.
There were many on our team who contributed to Marc's
victory. Jan Fail answered the phone when he called for an
appointment and had much contact with him over the years. Linda
Hughes mastered preparing multiple briefs of perfect quality by her
diligence and perseverance, long before the use of WordPerfect.
Cyra O'Daniel, a young lawyer the, now a United States
Department of Justice lawyer, helped litigate the case. And,
as mentioned, Betsy White argued Mr. Doggett's case before the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and prepared the petition for
certiorari. Alan Morrison, one of the most respected appellate
attorneys in America, assisted from the moment review was granted
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by the United States Supreme Court until the conclusion of the
case. Alan shared his knowledge as an experienced Supreme Court
litigator by arranging moot courts and giving us countless hours in
preparation and advice.
One of the more unique aspects of the Doggett case was that it
was argued twice, once with a four justice Court and the second
time before a Court which included the newly appointed Justice
Clarence Thomas. We argued in October 1991 and, in December
1991, received an order from the Court, which added a question
to be rebriefed and set the case for reargument in February 1992.
This order was probably the result of a vacancy on the Court that
was filled between the two oral arguments by Justice Thomas, who
ultimately dissented from the July 1992 opinion.
Appearing before the United States Supreme Court for oral
argument twice in the same case is an unusual experience. With the
exception of Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board ofEducation, 3 we could
find few other cases where the Court sua sponte ordered a second
argument. Thus, we were left somewhat to our own devices as to
what to do in this next argument. We theorized that whatever we
did the first time was not successful. Because we felt strongly about
the substance of our argument, the only thing we could change the
second time around was our strategy. In the first oral argument,
I did not present rebuttal. In re-argument several months later, I
reserved a good measure of time for rebuttal. I also argued the
specific facts of the case, as I felt strongly that the lengthy and
unnecessary delay worked strongly in Mr. Doggett's favor. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist was less than pleased with my continued
recitation of the facts, so I knew I was making headway with some
of the other justices. His annoyance reminded me of the old saw,
"Don't confuse me with the facts," but I wasn't about to let up on a
method of attack which was clearly of interest to the other justices.
As we were leaving the courtroom, Betsy White was emphatic
we were going to win. I inquired about her recently -acquired
clairvoyance and she very quickly replied I had changed Justice
Souter's mind in our rebuttal. She perceived a different approach
in his questioning as it related to prejudice/presumed prejudice.
We will never know, but as it turned out, Justice Souter authored

3

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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the opinion. The day before the opinion was released Ms. White
was at the United States Attorney's Office and made her prediction
of success and the vote split, which amazed all involved.
The child who Ms. White was carrying while arguing before the
Eleventh Circuit, and who ran into my arms after oral argument,
is now a senior in college, applying to law school. The other day
she asked me to read her admission essay. To my delight, he recalls
our experiences before the Court as her catalyst to want to be a
lawyer. The last time I checked the Doggett decision has been cited
by various courts over 2,289 times. Thus, this case has not only
impacted my life and the life of my family, it has had a profound
impact on the right of our citizens to a speedy trial.
We are proud we had something to do with the history of the
Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
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Book Reviews
Daniel Murphree, Book Review Editor
Diggi,ng Miami. By Robert S. Carr. (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2012. Acknowledgments, illustrations, notes, maps,
references cited, index. Pp. xiii, 352. $29.95 cloth.)
In Digging Miami Bob Carr tells the stories of ancient southeastern Florida with the unique voice of Miami-Dade's first county
archaeologist. Even today-over thirty years after Miami-Dade's
watershed historic preservation ordinance-few counties and municipalities have their own archaeologist. This is unfortunate and
Digging Miami demonstrates that strict local historic preservation
ordinances really do help in identifying, studying, and preserving
archaeological sites. For example, state environmental land and
emergency acquisition funds have been used to acquire places
like the Deering Estate, Snake Warrior's Island, and the Miami
Circle-and Bob Carr was instrumental in the preservation of
each of these locales. Don't get me wrong, Digging Miami is not a
historic preservation textbook. It is a blend of historical research,
larger than life characters, hard to believe events, and little-known
artifacts and sites woven together in the best tradition of archaeological storytelling.
Digging Miami is divided into five parts that cover every time
period and culture known from the region, ranging from ancient
American Indians to the earliest European explorers, Bahamian
"Conchs," the Seminole and Miccosukee, military outposts, and
Miami's pioneer families. The book concludes with a discussion of
urban archaeology, the Miami Circle, and some of the other sites
found (often by Bob Carr) in the heart of downtown. Illustrations
[433]
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are numerous and drawn from the collections of HistoryMiami
(formerly the Historical Museum of Southern Florida), the Archae·ological and Historical Conservancy, and Bob's personal archive.
Following a short review of archaeologists who have worked
in the Miami area, readers are rewarded with an entire chapter
dedicated to the Cutler Fossil site. The author was instrumental in
the discovery, excavation and preservation of this early site, where
human artifacts and remains were mixed with a tremendous number of fossil animal bones in a solution hole, perhaps reflecting
some of the most ancient human residents of southern Florida.
This chapter is important because a full-length report treating
the archaeology of the site has not been available. A highlight is
the information on the Paleoindian lithic artifacts found at the
site, which support the early radiocarbon dates. The subsequent
discussion of the Archaic in southern Florida also is significant,
since this period was poorly known when John Griffin prepared
his monumental synthesis of Everglades archaeology in the 1980s
(later published by University Press of Florida as Archaeology of the
Everglades in 2002).
I found that some sections detracted from the book. For example, the discussions of American Indian artifacts known from
the Miami area is interesting, but the descriptions of pottery types
occupies over five pages-most of these descriptions could have
been omitted here, as they are found in other works on the area
(the aforementioned Archaeology of the Everglades). More space
could have been dedicated to some of the author's really interesting discoveries, like the bird or turtle effigy adorno on a Surfside
Incised sherd from Marco Island. Other weaknesses are the typographical errors and minor factual errors. For example, on page
15 archaeologistJohn M. Goggin's year of death is given as 1964he actually died May 4, 1963, before the publication of Indian and
Spanish Selected Writings, prepared by his friends Charles Fairbanks,
Irving Rouse, and William Sturtevant.
Despite the author's extensive work with ancient American Indian sites, well-represented in the first part of Digging Miami, the
treatment of the early pioneers, soldiers and sailors, fisher folk, and
Seminole and Miccosukee Indians is really where the author hits
his stride. Throughout his career, Bob Carr has elevated historical
archaeology in southern Florida and he knows how to weave stories
of the recent past with that of our quotidian world. Bob's parsing of the Black Caesar legend, including a graphic from a 1940s
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restaurant menu, is a good example of the microhistories found
throughout Digging Miami and the way that the illustrations contribute to the stories. This happens again when the author takes us
on a tour.of Miami in the early nineteenth century and the archaeology of arrowroot flour manufacture, specifically the search for
the remnants of the Ferguson brother's mill on the north fork of
the Miami River. Carr articulates the value of telling these stories
when he says that historical archaeology is valuable for reaching an
understanding of a community's recent past-sometimes "uncovering artifacts associated with specific families or individuals that
reach beyond the written record to provide a glimpse of a family's
past or a long-lost secret" (215).
Digging Miami will find a home on the bookshelves of those
archeologists and historians who continue to ask questions and
look for answers below parking lots and in flower beds in southern Florida where remnants of our past still persist. I think this
book, however, will find its greatest audience among those who
want to connect with the little-known ancient and recent past of
the Magic City.
Ryan]. Wheeler

Robert S. Peabody Museum of Archaeology

Heaven's Soldiers: Free People of Color and the Spanish Legacy in
Antebellum Florida. By Frank Marotti. (Tuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 2013. Illustrations, notes, bibliography,
index. Pp x, 176. $39.95 cloth.)
A very detailed book on a subject often neglected in Florida
history is unusual. Frank Marotti's book, Heaven's Soldiers, is just
such a book. He covers free people of color during the four decades of the antebellum period before the U.S. Civil War. Marotti
includes effects on both slave and free caused by wars, turmoils,
and changes in political, legal, and economic spheres as far away
as Africa and Europe. Five pages of photographs and illustrations
add more interest.
Florida had long been known as a sanctuary for people of color,
as illustrated by extensive and continuing research on Fort Mose,
the free town established in Florida in the First Spanish Period. Yet
attention to free men during and after the Second Spanish Period
had also been slighted. Marotti covers this as well.
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Marotti begins his book with a gracefully written introduction
of 1821 as a base line for the antebellum period when Spanish
culture and religion endured for some years after the U.S. Territorial Period. The Catholic Church's attitude toward slave and free
African Americans allowed baptism and full membership in the
Church. Slaves, as Marotti explains, were allowed to sue their masters over mistreatment and negotiate contracts, including those on
installments, to buy their freedom, which both parties theoretically
were obligated to honor. Aside from the Church, the white hispanic culture was permeated with this acceptance of the rights of
African Americans as fully human.
Marotti highlights the other principal group living in the region during most of the first decade of the antebellum period-the
Minorcans: white hispanic, previously indentured servants, who
had fled the British New Smyrna Plantation in mass and retreated
to St. Augustine. They enjoyed a generally positive relationship
with the African Americans in their midst, sometimes even serving
as godparents as Minorcans were only just above people of color
within St. Augustine society. At the time, the environs of St. Augustine extended many miles down the Florida peninsula until the
next town. Towns, in the Spanish tradition, were sanctuaries for
those in need. Thus, both slave and free, although technically in
U.S. territory, enjoyed the benign influence of Spanish culture to
their great advantage.
After 1830, the situation began to deteriorate for African
Americans as the customary Anglo attitudes prevailed, which were
prejudicial and repressive. Slaves were treated harshly; some were
moved to plantations. The number of manumissions, which had
previously been high under Spanish influence, was dropping precipitously. Attempts were even made, with a certain success, to
re-enslave some of the freedmen. Florida gradually became similar
to other slave states, such as Georgia.
After Chapter 1, which is actually a continuation of the
introduction, the next six chapters consist of exceedingly well-researched and dense case material showing the extensive adaptive
strategies by those individuals who were "quasi free" as well as
legally free. Marotti covers the legal, family, manumission, and
property ownership of those cases selected. Several white family
dynasties-Kingsley, Clark, and Sanchez-also had black families.
In some cases, individual African Americans were managing family
businesses or plantations, though still technically slaves. The read-
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er may find Marotti's extensive case treatment rather daunting, but
perseverance is well worth the effort to digest this fuller history.
Noted is one mistake on the pages 40 and 41 where two Jack
Smiths are confused. One was born in Africa and was a Methodist;
the other was born in Georgia and was a Baptist. This one lapse
is unfortunate because of the great discordance between the two
Jack Smiths, resulting in the questionable character of the Georgian Baptist impinging upon the good character of the African
Methodist.
Marotti emphasizes the gradual erosion of the positive Spanish
influence. By the last decade, the situation for people of color was
so bad that most of the black population-both free and slavecould do little except try to escape. Flights to freedom took many
forms. Individual attempts were often frustrated by white captors.
More successful were runaways to Seminole Indian towns, where
the African Americans were allowed to live in separate villages.
In one rather humorous incident, Marotti relates how seven
slaves, later joined by two others, stole a 25-foot whale boat in an
attempt to reach the Bahamas. Because of storms and turbulent
water, they were forced to play cat and mouse with their pursuers up and down the Florida coast. Eventually, they came into the
hands of the British, aided by abolitionists, and the incident became international. The case dragged on but was finally closed to
the advantage of the runaways.
The last chapter of the book outlines statistics from the last
antebellum decade. The freedmen were few, and those with property lost their land. African Americans were mostly living in rural
areas; some lived on plantations. Furthermore, St. Augustine was
in recession and enduring bad economic times. Property grabbing was the order of the day. Only those people of color who
had white ancestors or patrons were able to make sales of any of
their property. Families endured and flourished, however, in spite
of everything.
Clearly, the message of Marotti's book is that the situation was
confusing, so confusing that some African Americans thought they
were free when they weren't and others who were free thought they
were slaves. Thus, much is to be admired in Marotti's use of discerning concepts, such as "quasi slave" and "degrees of freedom."
These phrases served throughout the book to bridge the often
unclear divisions between the conflicting and confusing states experienced by African Americans in St. Augustine and its environs
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during the antebellum period. Published material that meets this
need has been scant. Another book is Jane Lander's 2010 volume
Atlantic Creo/,es of Colour in the Age of Revolution with its emphasis on
the Atlantic Ocean Basin. Other writing is now coming to the fore.
However, Marotti has mined this field well. His book is extensive in
its research and documentation and, thus, is a worthy addition to
the historiography of Florida.
Patricia C. Griffin

Saint Augustine, Florida

Populism in the South Revisited: New Interpretations and New
Departures. Edited by James M. Beeby. Uackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 2012. Acknowledgements, notes, index.
Pp. xxi, 229. $60.00 cloth.)
Perhaps owing to the political climate of our own time, scholarship on the Populists has experienced something of a renaissance
in the last few years. Charles Postel's prize-winning The Populist
Vision (2007) takes the broadest view, but numerous other studies, including a number by authors in the collection at hand, have
asked new questions and opened new vistas for studying one of
American history's great puzzles: the rapid rise and equally precipitous fall of the most significant third-party challenge since the
Civil War. In this book, James M. Beeby, whose own recent monograph, Revolt of the Tar Heels: The North Carolina Populist Movement,
1890-1901 (2008), is among those that have broken new ground in
our understanding of the politics of Populism, brings together significant contributions from a number of leading younger scholars
of Southern Populism to demonstrate that the topic still has much
life in it.
Taken together, the essays elucidate three major themes about
the Populists. The first is their historical context. Matthew Hild's
essay on the Knights of Labor in Georgia maps the connections
between worker protests in the 1880s and the critique of the Bourbon political order offered by the Populists in the subsequent
decade. In Hild's estimation, the Knights were not direct predecessors of the Populists, but they did "set a precedent and an agenda
for advocates of 'workingmen's democracy' for decades to come,"
(37). Similarly, but on the other side of the timeline, Jarod Roll
argues that the demise of the People's Party did not kill the agrar-
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ian producerist worldview that animated the Populists. Instead,
the ideas that animated support for the Populists can be found
-in the political visions of the Socialist Party and Marcus Garvey's
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), organizations
that offered white and black southerners two distinct vehicles for
articulating their postmillennial Christian faith into a real-world
critique of the dominant southern social order. While neither of
these essays reduces the Populists to just another in a line of rural
protest vehicles-indeed, the relative powerlessness of the groups
that came before and after the 1890s tends to reinforce uniqueness
of the Populist revolt-they do force us to think about what it was
that made the Populists different.
One of those differences, of course, was its attempt to win elections with biracial coalitions. Leading Populists sought to organize
southern whites and blacks along economic lines. While they were
able to win offices in some states, their success proved fleeting. Historians have long sought to explain the Populists' failure to build
a sustainable challenge to Democratic Party hegemony. None of
the historians here offers a unified theory, but taken together the
essays offer important insights. Lewie Reece argues that we should
not become jaded by the Populists' failure to bring whites and
blacks together and instead should see the transformative power of
political activism in the lives of everyday Populists. Indeed, James
Beeby shows that national political failures, especially the presidential election of 1896, did not dissuade North Carolinians from
organizing at the grassroots, which they did to some effect until the
disfranchisement of black voters in 1901. Other essayists are less
sanguine, however. In his study of Grant Parish, Louisiana, Joel
Sipress argues that historians would be better served to examine
the operation of politics rather than the personal racial ideas of
individual Populist leaders if they hope to understand the failure
of coalition politics. David Silkenat, in his essay on white and black
North Carolinians' perceptions of debt and credit, demonstrates
that historians should pay closer attention to how cultural differences created barriers to bi-racial coalitions. Omar Ali pushes
this idea further in his essay on Black Populism, showing that the
movement, long depicted as an adjunct to white political activity,
really must be understood as a distinct, organic political movement
rooted in the experiences of black rural people, a fact that white
Populist organizers failed to recognize in their attempts to emphasize the shared condition of white and black farmers.
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The book's third theme deals with the other groups Populist
leaders failed to connect with: urban workers. Historians have
· tended to view attempts to organize rural people and urban workers as the great failure of the Populists and have largely blamed
labor union leaders for failing to join with farmers. Two essays in
this collection complicate that view. Alicia Rodriguez shows that
urban workers in Dallas played a critical role in building support
for the People's Party in Texas. Michael Pierce, meanwhile, argues
that it was the overt hostility of southern Populist leaders, especially Tom Watson, to urban laborers that prevented the building
of bridges between the two.
This excellent collection provides us with new insights and new
incentive to shake up our lectures and seminar discussions about
the late nineteenth century. Beeby's ability to bring the works in
this collection together is praiseworthy. While each stands well on
its own, the essays both complement and argue with each other in
ways that should make this a great book for the classroom.
Evan P. Bennett

Florida Atlantic University

Beyond Blackface: African Americans and the Creation of Popular
Culture, 1890-1930. Edited by W. Fitzhugh Brundage (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. Illustrations,
index. Pp. v, 373. $65 cloth.)
Many cultural histories have chronicled the profound influence of African Americans on emerging American popular culture
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Often, as
is indicated by their titles, the subject of their focus is blackface
performance. William]. Mahar's Behind the Burnt Cork Mask: Early
Blackface Minstrelsy and Antebellum American Popuwr Culture ( 1998);
Robert Toll 's Blacking Up: The Minstrel Show in Nineteenth-Century
America (1977); and Eric Lott's Love and Theft: Black/ace Minstrelsy
and the American Working Class (1993) are examples. It is praiseworthy that such performance is being recognized as the popular art
form that it is, and even more praiseworthy that attention is being
paid to the complex intertwining produced by cultural appropriation. However, the focus on blackface suggested by these titles risks
the perhaps unintended consequence of masking, if I may, the vast
diversity of African American popular culture that existed amidst
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the phenomenal popularity ofblackface minstrelsy. As BeyondBlackface, the title ofW. Fitzhugh Brundage's edited collection, suggests,
African American popular culture was larger than minstrelsy and
was a vital component of American mass culture.
Brundage opens the collection with the introductory essay
"Working in the 'Kingdom of Culture': African Americans and
American Popular Culture, 1890-1930." The selection provides the
work's overall rationale-that the rise of American mass culture and
black popular culture are inextricable. The book is divided into
four main sections: "Representations of Blackness in Nineteenth
Century-Culture," "The Marketplace for Black Performance," "The
Meanings and Uses of Popular Culture," and "Spectacle, Celebrity
and the Black Body." The sections mirror cultural scholarship's
move from material analyses of African American culture to more
postmodern interpretations of spectacle and black body imagery.
Between each section Brundage places a "coda" that contextualizes
the set's cultural significance. This arrangement is effective in giving the whole cohesion and continuity.
The essays range widely in the contemplations of the challenges inherent in maintaining proprietorship of indigenous
culture in an environment both hostile to and desirous of that
culture. Stephanie Dunson's "Black Misrepresentation in Nineteenth-Century Sheet Music Illustration" and David Krasner's
"The Real Thing" investigate material culture and performance,
respectively, and the subversive practices African American creators employed to face the conundrums of seeing one's work
simultaneously condemned and appropriated. John Stauffer's
"Creating an Image in Black: The Power of Abolition Pictures"
delves into abolitionist visual culture and African Americans' desire to control their own image. Other essays venture into less
explored territory. John Giggie in "Buying and Selling with God:
African American Religion, Race Records, and the Emerging Culture of Mass Consumption in the South" interprets recordings
of sermons chanted by black preachers against an accompanying background of congregational vocals as avenues to economic
self-sufficiency. These records became both memorials to African
American orality and commercial components of a consumer
market that used modern methods of advertising to raise money
for churches, schools, and newspapers, thereby sustaining African American life within a segregated world. Davarian L. Baldwin
in "Our Newcomers to the City: The Great Migration and the
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Making of Modern Mass Culture" seeks to complicate perceptions of African American movement from South to North in the
World War I era by analyzing the cultural cross-fertilizations such
an exodus made possible. Various essays recount the experiences
of artists surmounting relentless racism in their desire for selfexpression-Bert Williams, George Walker, and Oscar Micheaux
among them-while others consider the cultural products themselves, from dance, to music, to the black bodies of personas such
as aviator Herbert Julian, "the Black Eagle," and boxing champion Joe Louis, as they were transformed into icons of freedom
and self-definition. Some of the essays in Beyond Blackface are
stronger than others, but as a collection the edition is an invaluable introduction to the emergence of African American popular
culture during a time of unprecedented changes in the nature
and conveyance of culture. Scholars who have read much in this
area might find the essays less than avant-garde, but all the writers
offer excellent footnotes with references to other studies.
Throughout the collection the creative synergy that characterized the late 1800s to the 1930s becomes evident and, more
importantly, so does the immeasurable contribution of black culture to larger American mass culture. This latter point should
not be interpreted as merely a Black History Month exercise,
but rather as a counter to presumptions of cultural purity. It is a
credit to the breadth of these essays that they leave their reader
wanting more. Beyond artists, performers, and famous athletic
figures, what other more subtle manifestations of African American contributions to popular culture exist? Might the work of
black architects be mined to illustrate some of the issues raised
in the book? That Paul Revere Williams, for instance, designed
the headquarters of Music Corporation of America (MCA), which
represented talent including Bette Davis, Joan Crawford, and Eddie Cantor; that he designed homes for celebrities such as Frank
Sinatra, Bill "Bojangles" Robinson, Lon Chaney, and Tyrone
Power, raises potentially interesting questions regarding African
American impact on popular culture. But this is not a criticism,
just an observation stimulated by a grouping of thought-provoking writings.
The 1890s through 1930s was a remarkable period, one which
saw the rapid scientific and technological changes that contributed
to altering the American cultural landscape, and African American
artists were part of his dynamism. They took advantage of innova-
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tions in the recording and film industries, while making inroads
in sports, aviation, and performance to forge unique expressive
modes. Beyond Black/ace goes further than recovering lost histories.
It illuminates the social and intellectual history of African Americans within an expanding cultural universe.
Valerie Babb

University of Georgia

My Work Is That ofConservation: An Environmental Biography ofGeorge
Washington Carver. By Mark D. Hersey. (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2011. Acknowledgements, map, photographs,
notes, index. Pp. xv, 306, $24.95 paper.)

Tenant farming dominated the Southern landscape that
George Washington Carver entered when he landed at Tuskegee
Institute in 1896, recruited by Booker T. Washington to head that
institution's farm program and teach courses in agriculture. In his
2011 book, My Work is That of Conservation, Mississippi State University historian Mark Hersey has ably anchored Carver's story in
the agricultural reform movement of the Progressive Era, along
the way dispelling the childhood myths that constrained many previous readings of Carver to the flat, stereotypical "Peanut Man."
While doing so, Hersey has helped in the ongoing endeavor to document the strong place of African American thought and practice
in the history of U.S. environmental thought and environmentalism, alongside such books as Kimberly Smith's African American
Environmental Thought (2007) and Dianne Clave's Rooted in the
Earth (2010). This text is part of the University of Georgia's acclaimed series on Environmental History and the American South,
with a foreword by series editor Paul Sutter. The book expands on
Hersey's essay in Land and Power. Sustainabl,e Agriculture and African
Americans (2007), an edited volume from the Black Environmental
Thought Conference held at Tuskegee in 2007.
As the quotation from Carver that forms the title of this book
suggests, Carver consciously thought of his work in the mainstream
of conservation. While not forcing Carver into the origin story that
traditionally has centered on the preservationist-conservationist
debates that engaged John Muir and Gifford Pinchot, Hersey
clearly links Carver to the trends in ecology and nature study of
the period. The book does not aim to be a comprehensive rewrite
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of Carver's biography, only to outline Carver's intellectual and
practical work as regards nature. "Carver's appreciation of nature,"
Hersey writes, "along with his understanding of the foundational
principles of ecology, convinced him that black farmers could find
succor from the political and economic vicissitudes they endured
by turning to the natural world" (98). A fierce commitment to science and reverence for a divine presence in nature fueled Carver's
prodigious life's work.
Born in southwestern Missouri in the mid-1860s, Carver's energy and obvious talents yielded fortuitous connections that led
him to study conventional scientific agriculture at Iowa State Agricultural College at Ames. The academic training ill-prepared
him for what he would find in Macon County, Alabama, at the
eastern end of the state's Black Belt region. Widespread poverty
and illiteracy in the Cotton Belt hampered the tenant farmers '
success. The stranglehold of Jim Crow racism on the lives of African American sharecroppers and the intense demands of farm
labor were hardly conducive to active participation in agricultural
reform. White suspicions of black expertise meant that Carver
and his apprentices had to take great care in their advocacy
(157). Hersey documents also the opposition Carver's reform
spirit encountered from his colleagues at Tuskegee. Moreover,
most of the school's students saw their Tuskegee education as
a route away from the harsh farm life they had recently abandoned, not toward it. Still, with Macon County as his laboratory
and utilizing a pedagogy that respected the knowledge of local
farmers, Carver nurtured a corps of students as devoted to him
as he was to them. His influence was not limited to farming. One
of Carver's assistants, Clinton Calloway, helped establish forty-six
one-room schoolhouses for black children across Macon County
that became the model for the Rosenwald Schools throughout the
South (150).
Hersey outlines the ways in which Carver's teachings attempted to reshape approaches to farm management in the South as his
views about agriculture evolved to meet the conditions he encountered in his investigative travels among the black tenant farmers
and small landholders who produced the bulk of the region's
cotton. Through frequent farm bulletins, Carver advocated sustainable practices, building up the soil both physically and chemically
with mast and muck gathered from forest and swamp, manures,
and compost, seeking approaches possible for African American
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subsistence farmers with very little cash for commercial fertilizers
and pesticides. His techniques for conserving the soil by drawing
upon nature's processes may have seemed "backward looking" as
Hersey writes, but they were also "subversive" (145).
Hersey assesses Carver's contributions to agricultural science,
urging the reader not to overrate Carver's scientific findings, nor
to minimize them. Through his writings, invited public lectures,
and congressional testimony, Carver won increased national and
international recognition. Washington's death in 1915 enhanced
Carver's role beyond Tuskegee as a symbol of black achievement
and an advocate of improved racial relations (168). Carver's
work on crop diversification and wartime conservation during
World War I brought additional notice. His 1921 testimony before a congressional committee in support of a proposed tariff
on peanuts, the source of the Peanut Man "caricature,'' Hersey
writes, catapulted Carver into heightened fame, even as his celebrity status blunted his effectiveness as an agricultural reformer
( 164, 178). The increased national presence provided new opportunities for research but took him away from his early work
with black farmers, a development Carver later regretted ( 164).
His concern about the impact of chemical-based farming on the
human body put him at odds with agricultural modernizers of the
period, anticipating Rachel Carson's Silent Spring by more than
twenty-five years (173). This well-written reconsideration should
find a welcome audience not only among scholars of environmental history and African American thought and culture, but also
among advocates seeking environmental justice and sustainable
practices today.
Ellen Griffith Spears

University of Alabama

River of Interest: Water Management in Sauth Florida and the Everglades,
1948-2010. By Matthew C. Godfrey and Theodore Catton.
(Washington, DC: Published for the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers,
Jacksonville District, by the Government Printing Office, 2012.
Acknowledgements, abbreviations, illustrations, bibliography,
biographical information, index. Pp. xiii, 330. $89.00, cloth.)

River of Interests is an ambitious attempt to tell the history
of water management in southern Florida. The book's narrative
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begins in earnest with the advent of the Central and Southern
Florida Flood Control Project (C&SF Project) in 1948 and ends
.with an analysis of the uneven implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) between 2000 and
2010. The central theme of this book is that the Everglades, and
the broader Kissimmee-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades (KLOE)
watershed, has been affected by a large number of often conflicting interests. Agricultural, urban, and environmental interests,
among others, collectively shaped the distribution and quality of
the area's water.
This book primarily examines the actions of the Army Corps of
Engineers, although federal and state actions outside the purview
of the Corps are examined as well. Any discussion of the Corps
among environmentalists or environmental historians is bound
to elicit strong emotions and wide divergences of opinions. The
authors attempt to explicitly avoid engaging in arguments about
the nature of the Corps, however, they do present the Corps in
three different ways. The authors acknowledge that the Corps had
been a destructive force, but argue that the Corps has more recently embraced environmentalism. The Corps is also presented as
an agency that has largely been afflicted by "innocent ignorance"
(ix). In this formulation the Corps' destructive tendencies are explained away by the law of unintended consequences. Finally, the
Corps is implicitly presented as an organization that, like the Everglades itself, has been shaped by a multitude of interests. The
Corps merely responded to the forces that acted upon it and either
sought to control the areas' water for certain interests or, responding to other interests, pursued restoration.
River of Interests was actually commissioned by the Corps and
printed by the US Government Printing Office, raising questions
about bias and subjectivity. The authors admirably try to navigate
the treacherous waters in which they have found themselves, yet
their overall approach towards the Corps' actions is ultimately
unsatisfying. To deal with this problem the authors commonly
employ an authorial voice that derives from notions of journalistic 'balance.' For example, when the authors examine why the
Modified Water Deliveries and C-111 projects designed to deliver
water to Everglades National Park were delayed, they provide quotations from Army Corps officials that lay blame on park officials,
then provide evidence from environmentalists that lay the fault
at the feet of the Corps. Ultimately, the authors conclude that
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different interests had different values, thus leading to delays,
yet the authors draw no real conclusions about why these delays
happened, nor do they draw meaningful conclusions about the
motivations of the Corps. The authors are in a difficult situation
and certainly write the best history they possibly could under the
circumstances. Ultimately though, historians reading this book
will be frustrated by the lack of real explanatory power that this
'balanced' approach provides. Likewise, environmentalists reading the book will find that the book's criticisms of the Corps do
not go far enough.
What the book lacks in explanatory power, it makes up for
with an abundance of information concerning the human alterations of the KLOE watershed between 1948 and 2010. The
book provides an excellent and detailed narrative concerning
not only the Corps ' actions, but also those of the large number
of state agencies and organizations that played important roles
in the Everglades. River of Interests examines the Corps' flood
control efforts and the later CERP proposals, but it also includes
chapters on the fight over the Everglades Jetport and the CrossFlorida Barge Canal, the Everglades National Park's fights over
Everglades water, the herculean efforts of Bob Graham to acquire
Everglades ' land, the legal history of Everglades water policy, and
the restoration of the Kissimmee River.
River of Interests fills an important gap in the history of the
Everglades. Although David McCally's excellent Everglades: An Environmental History (2000) examined drainage and the C&SF Project,
no comprehensive historical account of the enormous multiplicity
of water projects in the KLOE watershed had been written until
Rivers of Interests. Likewise general histories of the Everglades, like
Micheal Grunwald's The Swamp (2007), and Jack Davis' An Everglades Providence (2009), were unable to focus specifically on these
larger water projects and on the political, economic, and social
interests that complicated and shaped them. The authors of this
book have synthesized an enormous amount of complex and controversial history into a beautifully illustrated book. The story of
Everglades restoration is far from complete, but this book provides
an excellent start in understanding the complex relationships that
the United States and Florida have had with the Everglades and the
larger KLOE watershed.
Chris Wilhelm
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The Years of Lyndonjohnson: The Passage of Power. By Robert A.
Caro. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012. Acknowledgements,
illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. xix, 605. $35.00.)
Robert Caro and his epic biography of Lyndon B. Johnson
have become legends in the author's own lifetime. With the publication of The Passage of Power, Caro's work now stands at more than
three thousand pages and will exceed four thousand pages with the
projected final volume. This is a monumental accomplishment.
The reception of The Passage of Power has been overwhelmingly
favorable. The New York Times and the Washington Post have printed
glowing stories about the book and the author. Opinion makers from George Will to Gary Wills have lavished praise on Caro.
Meanwhile, former President Bill Clinton wrote an essay for the
Times applauding the book and Lyndon Johnson, maintaining that
even in his days protesting the Vietnam war he did not hate LBJ.
Naysayers are few.
Passage of Power deserves praise for its story of Lyndon Johnson from the beginning of his bid for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1958 through the passage of the tax cut legislation
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lyndon Johnson's use of power
is the overriding theme. Caro argues that Johnson's understanding of power was far superior to that ofJohn F. Kennedy and made
possible the landmark legislation. The author, though, is not an
unabashed admirer. He emphasizes Johnson's tortured personality and his abuse of power that manifested itself in the maltreatment
of people around him and in various financial machinations. In
fact, Caro suggests that in November 1963 the vice president's political position was disintegrating. With his chief lieutenant Bobby
Baker facing prosecution and other investigations into LBJ's nefarious business activities gaining momentum, Johnson appeared to
be on the brink of political ruin. The assassination of JFK, Caro
suggests, saved Johnson from ignominy.
If Johnson's personal behavior and ethics were repulsive, he
had one great redeeming virtue-his commitment to social justice.
However, the realities of Texas politics constrained him. To escape
the confines of Texas politics was the major reason, the author indicates, that he was willing to abandon his position as Senate majority
leader for the vice presidency. Thus, Caro's LBJ is a great paradox-a vicious, self-aggrandizing politician without scruples who
at the same time was inspired by a vision of social justice that he
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produced as president. Caro argues that Johnson with his flawed
character overcame his worst tendencies in the aftermath of the
Kennedy assassination. He not only "held the country steady during a difficult time" but also "set it on a new course, a course toward
socialjustice" (605). Caro concludes, "In the life of Lyndon Baines
Johnson, this period stands out as different from the rest, as perhaps that life's finest moment, as a moment not only masterful but,
in its way, heroic" (605.)
This volume also emphasizes Johnson's relationships with John
and Robert Kennedy. JFK, according to Caro, did not have the
commitment to racial justice, did not know how to move legislation
through the congress, and would not have succeeded as LBJ did
with his legislative program in 1964. On the other hand, Caro gives
credit to the Kennedy brothers for their superior 1960 campaign
and for JFK's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He alternately
praises and condemns RFK, but by the end of the book seems to
agree that Robert Kennedy was becoming a noble figure.
Passage ofPower has two great strengths. The first is the author's
writing. Caro writes, tells stories, and creates character portraits
as well or better than any contemporary American historian. His
characterizations are brilliant. He takes small incidents and uses
them to illustrate larger themes. The conflict between LBJ and RFK
revolves around three such vignettes-the first meeting of the two
men in 1953, a second incident in 1963 in which RFK humiliated
the impotent vice president, and a final occasion in 1964 when the
new president got his revenge and humiliated the attorney general.
The second great strength is the extraordinary interviewing
that Caro has done. Caro talked at great length to LBJ's closest
associates-Walter Jenkins, George Reedy, John Connally, Harry
McPherson, Horace Busby, Abe Fortas, andJames Rowe Jr., to name
just the most prominent. Only Bobby Baker and Bill Moyers refused
the opportunity to talk. Caro also managed to interview important
members of the Kennedy entourage. Theodore Sorensen, Ted Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and a number of aides of Robert F.
Kennedy confided the Kennedy side of the story to the author. In
his note on sources, the author lists more than 330 individuals he
interviewed himself. That number speaks for itself.
While there is much to praise in Passage of Power, there are also
shortcomings and weaknesses. To start, the book is repetitious
with excessive, annoying references to past volumes, the volume
to come, and various obsessions of the author such as the question
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of Robert Kennedy's "ruthlessness." The prose is magnificent, but
not the editing.
More significantly, the book mishandles important subjects.
For example, the first section of the book about the 1960 campaign
is too brief and superficial. There is an excellent account of LBJ's
acceptance of the vice presidential nomination and a good analysis
of the November vote in Texas, but otherwise the treatment is disappointing. The author tells us nothing new about LBJ's bid for
the nomination or about the general election campaign in which
LBJ played a major role. Caro indulges in careless assertions (e.g.
that William Knowland was a leading Republican presidential candidate in 1958 and that Ted Kennedy was responsible for delivering
western state delegates for JFK), half truths (e.g. that Kennedy "carried" Alabama in the election), and dubious assumptions (e.g. that
LBJ could have won the nomination and the election). Any reader
interested in a comprehensive account of LBJ and the election of
1960 should look elsewhere.
Caro's flawed narrative of 1960 is the product of a disregard
for new research on the election. Theodore White and his 1961
account seem to be the final authority. This disinterest in recent
historical writing becomes glaring when he gets to the Cuban
Missile Crisis. On this subject there is little indication in Caro's
inadequate and slippery end notes that he has mastered the major
works of the past twenty years. Instead, he is content to rely largely on the memoir of Robert Kennedy and the histories of Arthur
Schlesinger Jr. and Theodore Sorensen.
Even Caro's greatest strengths raise issues. His stories and characterizations embellish his master narrative, but whether they serve
any purpose beyond that is open to question. Overwhelmingly, the
depictions of major characters beyond LBJ and the two Kennedys
either lack life or reduce individuals to presidential puppets. Powerful senators such as Harry Byrd and Everett Dirksen are reduced
to dupes of the president. Meanwhile, other national figures such
as Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Barry Goldwater are
little more than cardboard figures on Caro's and Johnson's stage.
Republicans, in fact, count for almost nothing in Caro's version of
US history between 1958 and 1964. In the end, Robert Caro has
fashioned a flawed masterpiece that offers us a brilliant portrayal
of Lyndon Baines Johnson and little else:
Edmund F. KallinaJr.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

University of Central Florida

282

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

BOOK REVIEWS

451

The Beast in Florida: A History of Anti-Black Violence. By Marvin

Dunn. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013.
Acknowledgements, notes, bibliography, illustrations, index,
Pp. xi, 336. $29.95 cloth.)
The Beast in Florida: A History of Anti-Black Viol,ence, authored by
Marvin Dunn, is first-rate scholarship. A former chairperson of the
Department of Psychology at Florida International University, the
author uses the disciplines of psychology and history in a masterful way to lay out the dark underside of Florida's past in regard to
white racial violence against blacks.
Perhaps the deepest scholarly roots of Dunn's book can be
found in the 1980s in Pensacola at the University of West Florida
history department. When resident historian James R. McGovern
published Anatomy of a Lynching: The Killing of Claude Neal in 1982,
the modern scholarship of American lynchings was born. Moreover,
over the last three decades-nurtured and inspired by Harvardtrained historian of the South, W. Fitzhugh Brundage [Lynching in
the New South (1993)] and John Jay College of Criminal Justice's
Michael]. Pfeifer [Lynching and American Society (2004)], among
many other able researchers and writers-lynching scholarship
has grown into a major academic industry. In this context, Dunn's
beautifully-written and well-designed analysis adds a unique contribution to this field of study.
Undeniably, Dunn-like McGovern, Brundage and Pfeiferoffers readers a thought-provoking description and examination of
the archetypal form of American aggression that we call lynching.
The Beast in Florida also reflects the author's profound grasp of the
secondary literature and associated theories in this field.
To be sure, Dunn understands white violence against African
Americans in the southern state of Florida better than any scholar
I know. He clearly demonstrates that this southern domain, with its
sunshine, beaches, and palm trees, has long been troubled by mob
violence. In the way of historical background, we should remember
that Florida (a slave state) seceded from the Union along with the
Deep South after Lincoln's election and was a stalwart member of
the Confederate States of America.
What is the "beast?" As a psychologist and historian, Dunn recognizes that the "beast" in Florida's and America's past is much
more than historical manifestations of Sigmund Freud's "Id": the
animal evolutionary past that is the core of the human personality.
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It is also more than a Jungian archetype of the collective unconscious. Rather, the "beast" is a powerful and accurate historical
metaphor for the white racial hatred fostered by the long shadow
of centuries of slavery.
Indeed, the author profoundly comprehends the overall history of lynching in Florida, the South and the nation. He realizes
that lynching is the practice of killing people by extralegal methods
and occurred in the United States chiefly from the late eighteenth
century through the 1960s. Lynchings took place most frequently
in the southern United States from 1890 to the 1920s, with a peak
in the yearly toll in 1892. As a Floridian himself, Dunn lived amidst
some of the occurrences depicted in this volume. As an insider, he
has added new details to the historical record. This author offers
a complete, balanced examination of racially driven violence and
exposes the darkest aspects of Florida history. In the process, he
has covered all the bases: Rosewood, Claude Neal, Harry and Harriette Moore, Willie James Howard, the Newberry Six lynchings,
and many more white racist killings. The outcome is an interracial
landscape of enthralling human narratives that instructs the reader
as to the history of the "beast" in American history.
Dunn probes the depth and breadth of white racial hatred as
the brutality, savagery, and barbarism that it is. Like historian Winthrop Jordan, he understands that white racism and slavery grew
up together as they mutually reinforced each other. He also understands that the historical implication of this condition is that white
America places little value on black life in contemporary affairs.
The following statistics illustrate this historical fact: the Tuskegee
Institute has recorded that 3,446 blacks were lynched between
1882 and 1968.
Serious scholars of Florida history, the history of American violence, and the history of U.S. race relations will welcome this tome
as a major achievement. Dunn's splendid book finds white violence
endemic to Florida's past and, more generally, pervasive in American
culture. He clearly demonstrates in exploring the Sunshine state's racial barbarities-lynchings, race riots, and hate crime murders-that
white violence against people of color and immigrants was the basic
instrument whites have used to control blacks and other marginalized
people. Filled with detailed indictments, the book shows how white
violence burst forth in the Southern state of Florida -over the past century and a half, and how such violence occurred with the knowledge
and complicity of the authorities. In the case of African Americans,
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this ever-present reality forged black solidarity and commitment to
achieving racial justice. Dunn's disquieting compilation will enlighten
and stir complacent readers. Well done, Professor Dunn.
Walter T. Howard

Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

A Mess of Greens: Southern Gender and Southern Food. By Elizabeth
S.D. Engelhardt. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011.
Acknowledgements, notes, illustrations, bibliography, index.
Pp. xi, 248. $24.95 paper.)

In this aptly titled book, American Studies scholar Elizabeth
Engelhardt chronicles five "moments" in her exploration of
southern food and southern gender at the tum of the 20th Century (focusing on the period between 1870 and 1930). Exploring
seemingly disparate topics like moonshine, cornbread vs. biscuits,
tomato canning clubs, and curb markets, Engelhardt argues that
together they show the entwined relationships of food, gender, and
region. A Mess of Greens should be read in the context of recent
studies on food, race, and gender like Psyche Williams-Forson's
Building Houses Out of Chicken Legs: Black Women, Food, & Power
(2006) and Rebecca Sharpless's Cooking in Other Womens Kitchens:
Domestic Workers in the South, 1865-1960 (2010), as well as studies
on southern foodways like Frederick Douglass Opie's Hog and
Hominy: Soul Food From Africa to America (2008) and Marcia Ferris
Cohen's Matzoh Ball Gumbo: Culinary Tales of the Jewish South (2005).
Engelhardt's work is a welcome addition to this illustrious body of
scholarship in that she brings a critical eye to the contested and
socially-constructed nature of "white" identities, femininity / womanhood, and place in the United States.
Engelhardt takes us through a stimulating search for the often hidden stories imbedded in the production and consumption
of food in the South. Positioned at the cross-roads of Critical Food
Studies (a field which she has been engaged in defining), Feminist Studies (particularly utilizing a race/ class/ gender analytical
frame), and American Studies (especially its interdisciplinarity)
she engages not just disparate stories, but also reads disparate
"data" sources: archival materials, letters, diaries, literature,
photographs, government records, song lyrics, and cookbooks.
Engelhardt is mostly successful in her endeavors, weaving a
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series of narratives which are convincing and build successively on
one another.
A Mess of Greens begins in the first chapter with moonshine
and the struggle to sort out the post-Civil War food terrain as both
agriculture and industry in the southern states had been severely
impacted. She argues that though moonshine is a food item that
had recently been legislated outside the boundaries of propriety,
its actual status on the borders of acceptability make it uniquely
positioned to reveal the central tensions and anxieties surrounding
food and womanhood at the start of the twentieth-century. Engelhardt traces this story, however, not primarily through historical
record (of which there is scant material), but through a genre of
literature popular at the time-novels, short stories, and magazine
stories focused on the Progressive era's rhetoric surrounding the
New Woman of the South and the moonshiner. Analyzing Lucy
McElroy's novel Juktty (1901), George Creswell Gill's Beyond the
Blue Grass (1908), and Catherine Frances Cavanaugh's nonfictional magazine report "Stories of Our Government Bureau" (1911),
which posited moonshining as a serious option for women who
had been left out of society's domestic safety net through, for example, widowhood. Engelhardt also uses Martha S. Giello's novella
Old Andy, the Moonshiner (1909) and Sherwood Anderson's novel
Kit Brandon: A Portrait (1936) to think through the possibilities of
moonshine, commerce, and the development of the New Woman.
In the second chapter, "Biscuits & Cornbread: Race, Class, and
Gender Politics of Women Baking Bread," Engelhardt expands
upon the ideas of the New Woman of the South which were introduced in the first chapter. Here the center of the narratives is
the relationship between southern women of different social locations-college educated, upper-and middle-class white women and
poor women from the rural and mountainous areas of the south.
The college women, who were developing their careers as teachers
and activists (social reformers) and were at the center of the Progressive Movement of the time, ventured "deeper" into the south
to educate women about proper womanhood. This work began
(and ended for the poor women) in the kitchen-with cooking
lessons. More specifically, these reformers engaged in instruction
about the unsanitary nature of corn bread and the uplifting qualities of the beaten biscuit, lectured on proper kitchen layout, and
identified the tools women would need to move into modernity.
Engelhardt's writing in this chapter is clear and compelling and

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

286

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

BOOK REVIEWS

455

brings into much sharper focus the ideas only hinted at in the first
chapter. Focusing on reformers like Wellesley-educated May Stone
and Katherine Petit, who kept copious journals of their work, and
the resistances these women met from the their students and the
larger body politic, Engelhardt is better able to tell the story of
how beaten biscuits, and the labor required to produce them, was
becoming increasingly less viable.
By far the strongest chapter in this collection is the third one,
"Canning Tomatoes: Growing 'Better and More Perfect Women '."
The Tomato Clubs came into fruition out of women's work with
bread, but approaches the question of social uplift not with a
top-down moralistic tone. The women leaders (Jane McKimmon,
Marie Samuella Cromer, Susie V. Powell, Ella G. Agnew, and Virginia Moore) organized poor girls throughout the region to grow,
process, and sell tinned tomatoes. This movement, which had its
nexus from about 1911 through 1920, offered girls opportunities
to make money to use as they wished. Engelhardt's telling of this
tale is made rich by the historical record left behind for her to
study: not just the journals and diaries of the leaders, but many of
the original scrapbooks of the girls themselves.
The story told in the next chapter is a perfect foil for the one
about canning tomatoes. While the previous chapter is rooted in
an exploration of the bounty of the land, of the use of girls' time
for themselves and their families, and the possibility of commerce,
this one focuses on hunger and disease. The rise of pellagra during
a time of seemingly great productivity is creatively analyzed in "Will
Work for Food: Mill Work, Pellagra, and Gendered Consumption."
The mill workers' reliance on biscuits, cornbread, moonshine, and
canned goods as the sole sources of nourishment led to great physical decline. Engelhardt draws from a variety of materials to tell this
story, but most significantly novels, which portray the working lives
of those who toiled many long hours and perished in the mill.
In many ways, the final two chapters read as an extended
conclusion. In "Cookbooks and Curb Markets: Wild Messes of
Southern Food and Gender and Market Bulletins: Writing the
Mess of Greens Together," Engelhardt introduces the metaphor of
"mess" and its uses in the context of southern food, politics, and
culture. While it is a compelling metaphor (that may have been
better introduced in the beginning of the book rather than its
end), it also signals a messiness of the final two chapters which
leave open many questions and avenues for exploration. There are
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no pat conclusions or grand theories ... just a great deal of very
provocative stories about southern food and southern gender. So
while frustrating on some levels, it is also generative.
This is a challenging work which, though quite pleasurable
to read, is I believe best suited for scholars and graduate students
in the fields of History, American Studies, Cultural Studies, Food
Studies, Literature, African American Studies, and Women & Gender Studies. Sections of the text would work in undergraduate
courses (I intend to teach the "Biscuits and Cornbread" chapter
in my undergraduate food studies course). However, those outside
of the academy who have more than a lay-persons knowledge and
interest in southern foodways would also find this book accessible.
Kimberly D. Nettles-Barcelon

University of California, Davis

The Florida Folklife Reader. Edited by Tina Bucuvalas. Qackson:

University Press of Mississippi, 2012. Acknowledgements,
appendices, bibliography, index. Pp. xx, 295. $25 paper.)
Most everyone knows not to judge a book by its cover. An objective reviewer should likewise not form an opinion about a book
by its introduction's third paragraph, but Tina Bucuvalas hooked
me with this statement about Florida: "It was the most complex
place I had ever been, it was a mess, and I have never been able to
get enough of it" (xi). Her collection of fifteen essays on Florida
folklife captures that complexity. What makes Florida distinctive
is the diverse, vibrant mosaic of cultural traditions that the term
"folk" includes.
An editor such as Bucuvalas, therefore, faces the hard task of
choosing from a wealth of representative materials. To manage
the "colliding and merging" of cultures, she organizes The Florida
Folklife Reader geographically, beginning in the Keys, then moving
north through the state and west through the Panhandle. Authors
include folklorists, anthropologists, and ethnomusicologiststhose tied to universities and public programs as well as those who
work independently. Some essays focus on a subject: Martha Ellen
Davis on Peruvian music in Miami, Anna Lomax Wood on Greek
tsamb6una in Tarpon Springs, Laurie K. Sommers on Sacred Harp
singing in the Okefenokee. Other contributions explore a practice through a person: Michael Kernahan as pan, or steel drum,
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performer (Stephen Stuempfle), Richard Seaman as fiddler and
storyteller (Gregory Hansen). Some essays survey storytelling,
foodways, and other folkways within a group: South Florida African
Americans and West Indians (Joyce M. Jackson), Miami Nicaraguans (Katherine Borland), statewide maritime culture (Florida
Folk.life Program).
The results are uneven. The best essays explore ideas rather
than convey information. Bucuvalas's own work on Cuban patronal
festivals stands as a model. The piece succeeds not only because of
its rich descriptive details, but also because of its broader point.
Bucuvalas demonstrates how immigrants from the town of Vueltas
have adapted festival customs, recreating and reimaging community despite the potential fragmentation of a new location. Other
standouts include Jerrilyn McGregory's "The Rest is Up to You and
Me," which studies Sunday Morning Band, Panhandle burial societies that assist members with proper internment and systems
of mourning. McGregory links organizations of Sunday Morning
Band to a larger "matrix of memory" (235), that of the African
Diaspora, thus connecting her field work to a compelling thesis.
Similarly, Martha Nelson's "Nativism and Cracker Revival at the
Florida Folk Festival" probes a question connected to the book's
title: what, exactly, does one mean by the term "folk"? For the nonprofit organization Friends of Florida Folk, the word refers to an
identity that is primarily white or Cracker. Academic and professional folklorists disagree, Nelson explains, preferring a definition
that is "committed to furthering cultural democracy" (220). The
implications for social policy are clear in Nelson's view of "folklore
as public discourse about the spaces where the individual and society meet" (220).
The writing suffers in essays that do not consider larger connections and questions. Brent Cantrell's introductory survey of Upper
and Middle Keys folklife attempts to cover traditions of fishing and
trapping; boatbuilding; sail-, net-, and trap-making; sponging and
scavenging; shell and monumental sculpture; foodways; music; and
woodcarving-all in seven pages. In other words, the essay is too
general to say anything of substance. Similar points can be made
about short essays by Ormond H. Loomis on Seminole chickees
and Stavros K. Frangos on Greek cemeteries. Conversely, the closing essay on statewide maritime practices offers many details at
the expense of coherence. Multiple authors-each tackling a different subject from storytelling to boats, fishing gear, music, and
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foodways-may prevent this potentially excellent piece from delivering on its promise. Nancy Michael, who wrote the introduction,
makes an important point: "maritime folklife needs increased attention in efforts to maintain what is distinctive about the state"
(239). But Michael's point gets lost amid information overkill.
Despite a few setbacks, The Florida Folklife Reader is recommended reading for experts and general audiences alike. Those
who know the field know Bucuvalas and most, if not all, of her
respected contributors. The book provides a significant overview
of contemporary Florida folklike. Supporting material helps to
round out what the fifteen essays contained here can only survey.
An extensive Bibliography points readers toward essential resources. Appendixes describe the work of key figures in early folklife
research and of current state programs. As a faculty member in
a Florida Studies program, I would recommend the book to colleagues in multiple disciplines. As a Florida resident, I like the
book for different reasons-its various essays act as travel guides for
wonderful one-tank trips, pointing me toward good Nicaraguan
food in Miami, House of God churches for steel guitar in Central
Florida, and so much more. As a parent, I appreciate the volume
for its constant evocations of what is special about the place we call
home: my eleven-year-old, our family fisherman, got many doses of
wisdom from "Maritime Folklife."
Both Bucuvalas (from California) and I (from Alabama) are
transplants to the state. Before moving here, I shared the outsider's
perspective of Florida as beaches and Disney World-beyond that
is the rural South, and past that lie big cities where retired people
live. The variety of people, environments, cultural practices, and
historical traditions continues to intrigue me. The Florida Folklife
Reader foregrounds that variety: like that sentence in its third paragraph, the book lures readers in with the rich possibilities the state
has to offer and continues to remind us why we stay hooked.
Julie Buckner Armstrong

University of South Florida St. Petersburg
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CALL FOR PAPERS
DEADLINE: FEBRUARY 10, 2014

Annual Meeting and Symposium of the Florida Historical Society
May 22-24, 2014
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

THEME: Les Frartfais en Floride: Cultural and Historical Influences
The Florida Historical Society seeks submissions for its Annual
Meeting & Symposium to be held May 22-24, 2014 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The conference hotel will be the Hyatt Regency Pier
Sixty-Six. Information about conference registration and hotel
reservations will be posted at http:/ /myfloridahistory.org/annualmeeting.
Submission guidelines:
In 2014 we commemorate the founding of the French colony
of Fort Caroline, but all topics on Florida history are welcome. The
Society will accommodate as many papers as possible within the
limit of available time slots. Our program committee will notify
you of the status of your paper shortly after the submission deadline.
INDIVIDUAL PAPER: send a title, 150-word abstract and onepage vita.
THEME PANEL: send a title and brief (150 word) description
of the theme; 150-word abstract for each paper, one-page vita for
each panel member, suggested discussant.

[459]
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ROUND TABLE FORUMS OR DISCUSSIONS: send a title and
brief (150 word) description of the topic and a complete list of
the participants and moderatorI discussant with vitas. Time allocation-90 minutes.
Send your submission by email as an MSWord attachment to
program organizer James Cusick at jgcusick@ufl.edu (Please put
''FHS Paper" in your email heading). Or send a paper copy to James
Cusick, Special & Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers
Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611. Please expect
an email confirmation that your submission has been received. If
you do not receive a confirmation, send an email query to James
Cusick to verify receipt. The Society sponsors numerous annual
awards. For types of awards and information on how to submit an
entry, please see http: / /myfloridahistory.org/ society/ awards.
FLORIDA FRONTIERS: THE WEEKLY RADIO MAGAZINE OF
THE FLORIDA IDSTORICAL SOCIETY
Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society, airing on public radio stations throughout the state,
continues to be one of our most successful educational outreach
projects. The program is a combination of interview segments
and produced features covering history-based events, exhibitions,
activities, places, and people in Florida. The program explores
the relevance of Florida history to contemporary society and
promotes awareness of heritage and culture tourism options in
the state.
The first section of the program each week is a long-form
NPR-style piece from Florida Frontiers producer and host Ben Brotemarkle, Executive Director of the Florida Historical Society. He
talks with authors of books about Florida history and culture; takes
listeners to historic sites around the state; discusses important issues dealing with education and preservation; and demonstrates
how learning about our history and culture can provide a sense of
community to Floridians today.
The second section of the program is a conversation between
Ben Brotemarkle and FHS Educational Resources Coordinator
Ben DiBiase about various items in our archive at the Library of
Florida History in Cocoa. Recent discussions have focused on slave
documents from the El Destina Plantation; the 1821 decree from
Spain informing residents of Florida that they were now living in a
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territory of the United States; 19th century Florida money; and the
FHS collection of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings materials.
The third section of the program is produced by Robert Cassanello, Associate Professor of History at the University of Central
Florida and an award-winning podcaster. Cassanello's segment has
recently featured a look at urban planning in 1920sJacksonville; a
discussion about wooden Gothic churches in Florida; a visit with
Ernest Hemingway's cats in Key West; and a conversation with
Gilbert King, Pulitzer Prize winning author of Devil in the Grove:
Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America.
Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical
Society is currently broadcast on 90.7 WMFE Orlando, Thursdays at
6:30 pm and Sundays at 4:00 pm.; 88.l WUWF Pensacola, Fridays at
5:30 p.m.; 89.9 ~CT Jacksonville, Mondays at 6:30 pm; 89.5 WFIT
Melbourne, Sundays at 7:00 a.m.; 88.9 WQCS (HD2) Ft. Pierce,
Wednesdays at 9:00 a.m.; 89.l WUFT Gainesville, Saturdays at 6:00
am and Sundays at 7:30 a.m.; and 90.1 ~UF Inverness, Saturdays
at 6:00 am and Sundays at 7:30 a.m. Check your local NPR listings for additional airings. The program is archived on the Florida
Historical Society web site and accessible any time at www.myfloridahistory.org/ frontiers.
Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical
Society is made possible in part by the Jessie Ball duPont Fund and
by Florida's Space Coast Office of Tourism, representing destinations from Titusville to Cocoa Beach to Melbourne Beach.

FLORIDA msTORICAL QUARTERLYPODCASTS
The Florida Historical Quarterly has entered a new era of media. Dr. Robert Cassanello, Associate Professor of History at the
University of Central Florida and a member of the FHQ editorial board, has accepted a new role as the coordinator for podcast
productions. In conjunction with the Public History programs at
UCF, Dr. Cassanello will produce a podcast for each issue of the
Quarterly. Each podcast will consist of an interview with one of the
authors from the most recent issue of the Quarterly. The podcasts
are uploaded to iTunes University and are available to the public at
http: / / publichistorypodcast.blogspot.com/.
Dr. Jack E. Davis on his article "Sharp Prose for Green: John
D. MacDonald and the First Ecological Novel,'' which appeared in
Volume 87, no. 4 (Spring 2009).
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Dr. Michael D. Bowen on his article "The Strange Tale of Wesley and Florence Garrison: Racial Crosscurrents of the Postwar
Florida Republican Party" appeared in Volume 88, no. 1 (Summer
2009).
Dr. Nancy]. Levine discussed the research project undertaken
by her students on the Hastings Branch Library that appeared in
Volume 88, no. 2 (Fall 2009).
Dr. Daniel Feller, 2009 Catherine Prescott Lecturer, on "The
Seminole Controversy Revisited: A New Look at Andrew Jackson's
1819 Florida Campaign," Volume 88, no. 3 (Winter 2010).
Dr. Derrick E. White, on his article "From Desegregation to Integration: Race, Football, and 'Dixie' at the University of Florida,"
Volume 88, no. 4 (Spring 2010).
Dr. Gilbert Din was interviewed to discuss his article "William Augustus Bowles on the Gulf Coast, 1787-1803: Unraveling a
Labyrinthine Conundrum," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 1
(Summer 2010).
Deborah L. Bauer, Nicole C. Cox, and Peter Ferdinando on
graduate education in Florida and their individual articles in Volume 89, no. 2 (Fall 2010).
Jessica Clawson, "Administrative Recalcitrance and Government Intervention: Desegregation at the University of Florida,
1962-1972," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 3 (Winter 2011).
Dr. Rebecca Sharpless, "The Servants and Mrs. Rawlings: Martha Mickens and African American Life at Cross Creek," which
appeared in Volume 89, no. 4 (Spring 2011).
Dr.James M. Denham, "Crime and Punishment in Antebellum
Pensacola," which appeared in Volume 90, no. 1 (Summer 2011).
Dr. Samuel C. Hyde Jr., Dr. James G. Cusick, Dr. William S.
Belko, and Cody Scallions in a roundtable discussion on the West
Florida Rebellion of 1810, the subject of the special issue of the
Florida Historical Quarterly Volume 90, no. 2 (Fall 2011).
Dr. Julian Chambliss and Dr. Denise K. Cummings, guest
editors for "Florida: The Mediated State," special issue, Florida Historical Quarterly Volume 90, no. 3 (Winter 2012).
Dr. David H. Jackson, Jr., on his article "'Industrious, Thrifty
and Ambitious': Jacksonville's African American Businesspeople
during the Jim Crow Era," in the Florida Historical Quarterly Volume 90, no. 4 (Spring 2012) and Dr. Tina Bucuvalas, 2012 Jillian
Prescott Memorial Lecturer and winner of the Stetson Kennedy
Award for The Florida Folklife Reader.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/1

294

Society: Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 2

END NOTES

463

Dr. Claire Strom, Rapetti-Trunzo Professor of History at Rollins
College, on her article, "Controlling Venereal Disease in Orlando
during World War II," Florida Historical Quarterly Volume 91, no. 1
(Summer 2012).
Dr. Matthew G. Hyland, on his article, "The Florida Keys Hurricane House: Post-Disaster New Deal Housing," Florida Historical
Quarterly Volume 91, no. 2 (Fall 2012).
Dr. Paul E. Hoffman, guest editor of Volume 91, no. 3 (Winter
2013) on sixteenth century Florida.
Dr. Christopher Meindl and Andrew Fairbanks were interviewed for the Spring 2013 (Volume 91, no. 4) podcast on their
article (with Jennifer Wunderlich). They talked about environmental history and the problems of garbage for Florida's environment.
Dr. Samuel Watson was interviewed about his article, "Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both? The U.S. Army and West Florida,
1810-1811," Volume 92, no. 1 (Summer 2013). His article challenged some of the work published in the Fall 2010 special issue
on the West Florida Rebellion. In his interview Dr. Watson spoke
about the discipline of history and the way in which the field advances as historians debate larger interpretative issues.
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
AVAILABLE ON JSTOR

The Florida Historical Quarterly is available to scholars and researchers through JSTOR, a digital service for libraries, archives,
and individual subscribers. JSTOR editors spent more than a year
digitizing FHQ volumes 3-83; it became available to academic libraries and individual subscribers in August 2009. The FHQ has
reduced the 5-year window to a 3-year window for greater access.
More recent issues of the Quarterly are available only in print copy
form. JSTOR has emerged as a leader in the field of journal digitization and the FHQjoins a number of prestigious journals in all
disciplines. The Florida Historical Quarterly will continue to be available through PALMM, with a 5-year window.
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY ON FACEBOOK

Join the Florida Historical Quarterly on Facebook. The FHQ
Facebook page provides an image of each issue, the table of contents of each issue, an abstract of each article. There is also a link
to the Quarterly podcasts and the Florida Historical Society.
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Lawton M. Chiles Center for Florida History Presents the
2013-2014 Florida Lecture Series
Lawton M. Chiles Jr Center for Florida History
Florida Southern College
Florida Southern College announces the 18th annual Florida
Lecture Series. The annual forum brings speakers to the FSC
campus who explore Florida life and culture from a wide range of
disciplines, including history, public affairs, law, sociology, criminology, anthropology, literature, and art. The series strives to bring
together members of the community, the faculty, and the student
body to interact with and learn from leading scholars in all fields.
All programs are held at 7 p.m. on the Florida Southern campus in
Lakeland and are free and open to the public.

January 23

February 20

March 13

Robert H. Kealing Uournalist, Writer)
"Calling Me Home: Gram Parsons and the Roots
of Country Rock"
Leslie Kemp Poole (Rollins College)
"Marjorie Rawlings and the 'Year of the Yearling'"
Gilbert King Uournalist, Writer)
"Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall,
the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New
America"

Lawton M. Chiles Center for Florida History, Florida Southern College,
111 Lake Hollingsworth Dr. Lakeland, Florida 33801, (863) 680-4312,
(863) 680-3006 (fax), www.flsouthern.edu/flhistory
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GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS TO THE
FLORIDA msTORICAL QUARTERLY

The Florida Historical Quarterly is a peer-refereed journal and
accepts for consideration manuscripts on the history of Florida,
its people, and its historical relationships to the United States, the
Atlantic World, the Caribbean, or Latin America. All submissions
are expected to reflect substantial research, a dedication to writing, and the scholarly rigor demanded of professionally produced
historical work. Work submitted for consideration should not have
been previously published, soon to be published, or under consideration by another journal or press.
Authors should submit an electronic copy in MS Word to the
Florida Historical Quarterly, at Connie.Lester@ucf.edu.
Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced (excluding
footnotes, block quotes, or tabular matter).
The first page should be headed by the title without the author's name. Author identification should be avoided throughout
the manuscript. On a separate sheet of paper, please provide the
author's name, institutional title or connection, or place of residence, and acknowledgements. Citations should be single-spaced
footnotes, numbered consecutively, and in accordance with the
Chicago Manual of Style.
Tables and illustrations should be created on separate pages,
with positions in the manuscript indicated.
In a cover letter, the author should provide contact information that includes phone numbers, fax number, email address, and
mailing address. The author should provide a statement of the
substance and significance of the work and identify anyone who
has already critiqued the manuscript.
Images or illustrations to be considered for publication with
the article may be submitted in EPS or PDF electronic format at
300 dpi or higher. Xeroxed images cannot be accepted. All illustrations should include full citations and credit lines. Authors
should retain letters of permission from institutions or individuals
owning the originals.
Questions regarding submissions should be directed to Connie L. Lester, editor, addressed to Department of History, 4000
Central Florida Blvd, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
32816-1350, by email to Connie.Lester@ucf.edu, or by phone at
407-823-0261.
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The Florida Historical Society
The Historical Society of Florida, 1856
The Florida Historical Society, successor, 1902
The Florida Historical Society, incorporated, 1905
OFFICERS
James G. Cusick, President
Tracy Moore, Vice-President

DIRECTORS
Abel A. Bartley, Clemson, SC
Robert Cassanello, Eustis
Judy Duda, Oviedo
Jose B. Fernandez, Oviedo
Sherry Johnson, Miami
Tom McFarland, Merritt Island
Jesus Mendez, Coral Gables

Leonard Lempel, President-Elect
Emily Lisska, Secretary
Robert E. Snyder, Immediate Past President

Maurice O'Sullivan, Winter Park
Harvey Oyer III, West Palm Beach
Sandra Parks, St. Augustine
Richard S. Prescott, Fort Myers
Christopher]. Ranck, Heathrow
KC. Smith, Tallahassee
Irvin D.S. Winsboro, Fort Myers
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